|Harvey Nash Grp
||EPS - Basic
||Market Cap (m)
Harvey Nash Grp Share Discussion Threads
Showing 4201 to 4224 of 4225 messages
|If it was the case, they'd have to build a stake first? They were invested in Creston for 2 years before making a bid. They only appeared on the scene here this month with an 11% stake that has potentially increased to 16%?|
|Looking that way if they are the buyers
won't be much of a premium though so guessing around 80p max|
|Get ready for a bid probably from DBAY.
Just like CRESTON bid.|
|over 5% changed hands today at 72p
DBAY adding to their holding and standard life sold out ??|
|happy with the bunch i bought at 66p..have bought some more.|
|mmmm, a tidy looking chart now I have to say.|
|some decent buying this morning...|
|Yes, this is running up fast now. Looking at the chart the 50 day moving average line has now made a definitive cross-over the 200 day moving average line. Stockopedia score is high. Large final dividend coming up. I bought this at 59.4p but will probably sell ahead of the final dividend, price permitting. Not a long-term investment for me as I don't like the sector much, but no real downside until the outlook statement / the shares go xd. Bought because they were cheap, had a high QVM score and fat dividend yield which was unlikely to be cut short-term.|
|Nice move today...having been preparing itself for a couple of weeks for this, hopefully the share price will move on through the 70s in fairly short order...|
|Since 2017, edmund?! Never realised you were such a short termer ;-)|
|For myself, I am a tad overweight in these at the moment. I have held these since 2017 at varying levels, so naturally I have been a fairly happy holder in the main.
Oops, 2007, not 2017!|
|Keevo, What do you think is a fair PER? or EV/EBITDA? or choose another ratio and adjust to suit your preferences on exceptionals, intangibles etc.
The Board expects to report adjusted pre-tax profit for the year ended 31 January 2017 in line with market expectations: Overall gross profit increased by 8% (all the increase down to forex positives). Last year Adjusted earnings per share was 9.73p (9.42p unadjusted).
Dividend is looking a tad over 4p, so 80p would be a 5% yield and a PER of somewhere in the region of 8. Seems a good conservative marker for a target price. Whether that is a fair price I couldn't say, but it must depend on the outlook of course...|
|Good response. What is the general consensus on fair value here. I'm looking at circa 80p with a cushion in projections.|
Intangibles warranted? Now there's a topic! I'd say I'd defer to the FD and the FSA on that one because as our poster above has already discussed it's a necessary evil really. FWIW I personally find it inconsequential (at least here).
Things get tricky when write-downs for amortised acquisitions need to be applied because they can make things look worse than are justified. The flip side of the same coin is that they need to be there because just because an asset is intangible in nature it does not mean it's not still there. I mean for example if you were to buy the Jack Daniels Brand it is worth a lot of money! Why it would be worth less after a few years of owning it makes no sense. (Again as explained above, this IS different for a recruitment business).
WHY I really find it inconsequential, is related to my earlier post on profits, the NT, and valuations based around those principles. Quite simply put, I value these TYPES of business not on NAVs but on the ability to produce real earnings for owners (there being that earlier mentioned similarity between (some) of Graham's writings and those of Mr. Burns.
With respect to your specific rhetorical question on Graham's treatment of "goodwill": Whole chapters were applied and thus summary is tough, but in principle he was synical of most such things BUT the main reasons for being so were related to his desire for a safety margin should things go wrong. In such scenarios ONLY cash would be valued at 100% of reported value. The rest would be on a sliding scale with intangibles at 0%. (All of which is from my memory I hasten to add). So in short even tangible assets are often (usually) NOT worth the value at which they are carried upon a balance sheet.
What I should also add is that Graham's main principle was to buy companies REALLY cheaply. I don't look for that per se. Buffet of course took those principles and adapted them to find "great companies at a fair price". And it's really more as a analysis tool that Graham's principles help me to be synical and in determining fair values for companies in today's market.
I do think recruiters have reasons why they should trade on modest PERs:-
Lack of large barriers to entry.
Key personnel issues (as per above again).
but among all of that, the truth is that companies that produces tidy returns to shareholders, growth and genuine profits do all warrant strong valuations...regardless of NAVs.|
|thanks. Yeah I'm @DangerCapital|
|Very good response. As HVN revenue is increasing from around Europe the drop in Sterling v Euro can only be a good thing also. I see HYDG as low risk with a good dividend yield. Are you on twitter?|
|Personally I ignore all goodwill in all valuations of all companies. It is simply an accounting entry to account for the premium paid over net assets on takeover. Acquisitive companies will typically have more goodwill.
While having a low PTBV like HYDG may provide a better downside protection in extremis unless it is in cash or property then the assets tend be be hard to collect in a wind up situation. I'm not sure it is good metric for valuing recruiters as a going concern where most of the value is in the brand and economies of scale. They typically require very little capital to operate since their assets are their people.
The benefit of this asset-lite model is typically high ROCE so if successful they can grow rapidly with little capital expenditure. The downside is that the 'assets' demand a high proportion of the economic value they generate or they go elsewhere. This is one of the reasons that profits at HVN have been relatively static even as revenue has grown. They are priced for a significant permanent decline in earnings and their balanced business model of permanent, contracting & outsourcing has always proved quite resilient. For HVN to be a successful investment they don't need growth just a lack of significant decline.
For HYDG having a large amount of capital tied up in working capital is not necessarily a good thing - their low ROCE means they will suck in cash even as they grow earnings and probably face the same problems as other recruiters of staff retention. If they can operate on a lower NWC and generate growth then turning this working capital into cash and increasing earnings will make this a good investment too.|
|Thanks for the reply. How much is the goodwill on HVN's balance sheet? Do you believe that is warranted. Seems a tad unrealistic but just my opinion. 49.7 million? Did Mr. Graham value with goodwill, I dont think so.
I'm invested in HVN btw. 80p is attainable short term I believe and nice dividend. Not convinced on anything beyond especially if there is a downturn.|
|Based on their trading statements for the next reporting period:
HYDG.L expect to report a PBT of £0.75m so are on an EV/PBT of c.10.
HVN.L expect to be in line market expectations of 8.3p EPS = £6m PAT = c£7.5m PBT vs EV £55m = £61m mkt cap - £5.5m net cash so are on a EV/PBT of c.7.
Very simplistic metrics but on the surface it seems less than obvious that HYDG.L should be considered better value.|
Thanks, I have had a look at these.
I personally have a few problems with it. Firstly it's a little too small for the portfolio rules; but in terms a valuation Mr. Graham warned me about inconsistentcy of earnings. Although he also advised against judging the future against the past it is important to understand a trend.
Upon my previous commentary of measuring value against profitablility I still have the issue of even finding normalised EPS to give a measure of underlying profits.
HVN have a course been utilising the normalised section for some time to describe their underlying profits as opposed to the headline ones. I am just about OK for this if there is a viable story. (My notes on the last sect of accounts called it a binary bet on whether management had a hold or not)....my last such bet was greggs BTW.
Hard for me to give a fair value for Hydrogen. Do you have an expectation of future profits? I note some postive momentum of late which perhaps aaugers well. However small stocks such as these can move either way quickly as I suspect you are well aware.|
|compare to HYDG.L . They are a much better value pick|
|A nice breakout on the chart I have to say.
There are LOTS of ways to value a PLC. I ordinarily utilise Ben Graham's methods and whilst I would not say I implement every idea from his book "security analysis" (War and peace is an easier read) I have to say I still find his writings remarkably relevant still.
Robbie Burns tends to utilise some very effective but simple methods for valuations which (in many respects not disimilar to Mr Graham) make very good sense when you think about it.
"How much are your profits and how much does your company cost to buy?" is kindof the gist. His analogy is to consider if you were to buy the whole company would you be happy with how long it took you to make your investment back.
On that basis we're extremly cheap here. On Mr. Graham's method we have a tidy margin of safety with a valuation of circa 40% lower than fair value. (by my calcs).
We could compare others if you wish? Any in particular?|
|In what way not as good?|
|they are cheap because they are not as good