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TRIN Trinity Exploration & Production Plc

45.50
-0.50 (-1.09%)
Last Updated: 09:00:31
Delayed by 15 minutes
Share Name Share Symbol Market Type Share ISIN Share Description
Trinity Exploration & Production Plc LSE:TRIN London Ordinary Share GB00BN7CJ686 ORD USD0.01
  Price Change % Change Share Price Shares Traded Last Trade
  -0.50 -1.09% 45.50 16,273 09:00:31
Bid Price Offer Price High Price Low Price Open Price
43.00 48.00 46.00 45.50 46.00
Industry Sector Turnover Profit EPS - Basic PE Ratio Market Cap
  -
Last Trade Time Trade Type Trade Size Trade Price Currency
11:03:20 O 3,151 44.95 GBX

Trinity Exploration & Pr... (TRIN) Latest News

Trinity Exploration & Pr... (TRIN) Discussions and Chat

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Date Time Title Posts
22/2/202411:37Trinity: OIL PRODUCER 20207,142
11/2/202410:04Trinity Exploration - bickering thread 20203,536
08/3/202116:06Trinity Going to 1p3
10/12/202021:46Trinity Exploration & Production 20188,953
02/4/201915:49Trinity Exploration & Production PLC6,470

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Trinity Exploration & Pr... (TRIN) Most Recent Trades

Trade Time Trade Price Trade Size Trade Value Trade Type
11:03:2144.953,1511,416.37O
09:00:3148.002913.92O
09:00:1149.001,985972.65UT
08:39:4545.5510,0004,555.00O
08:10:3845.55496225.93O

Trinity Exploration & Pr... (TRIN) Top Chat Posts

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Posted at 16/2/2024 11:06 by aqc888
With the current share price at less than 25% of the recently reported NAV why is everyone dancing around what should happen next? Is Trinity a family heirloom that makes everyone want to hold it anyhow? Nope. Does Trinity hold some kind of emotional attachment that would be hard to let go?!?! Nope. Would its asset be difficult to sell? Nope! Does everyone want to see the disaster of Trinity’s share price loss removed from their portfolio? Yes. Do management have to follow shareholders wishes if pressed? Yes. Would just the mere mention of the start of a formal process to sell Trinity/assets make the share price rise? Seriously though, one has to ask will Trinity ever be priced at a premium to its nav? Highly highly unlikely I’d say, therefore an offer of a slight discount would be ideal for everyone…
Posted at 10/2/2024 18:44 by arlington chetwynd talbott
Yes, the BoD are saying let us bank our salaries for another year and then we might have something meaningful for you. Not good enough, but they will undertake some kind of charm offensive in a few months to keep the natives (a disappointingly complacent lot) from becoming restless and it will all likely trundle on.

Sleveen suggests switching into TXP, but after all this time, although it is clear to me that TRIN no longer has a competent BoD and that things are finally happening at TXP, it is also clear that Trinidad itself appears to be part of the problem.

If the TRIN share price recovers modestly at some point in the coming months and folk then switch into a solid non-tech blue chip of their choice (one paying substantial but well covered dividends that they can reinvest), the majority of those folk will in the medium term (if not the short term) likely find themselves doing better than those remaining in TRIN - even if its dividends do continue - and wondering why on earth they ever bothered with TRIN and companies like it.

TRIN is a frustrating itch that I have resolved to stop scratching until the next (meaningful) RNS. I am clearly not persuading anybody to see TRIN for what it has become, let alone sack even one single member of the BoD.
Posted at 28/1/2024 22:47 by andrewbyles
In the new blog, I’ve argued that Trinity is potentially worth at least $166.3 million (£131 million or 336p per share). That sounds like a lot compared with the current £18.5 million market capitalisation/47.75p share price, but: (i) it’s based upon prices offered for two of Trinity’s three asset groups within the past 8 years; and (ii) is dwarfed by the $226 million of additional funds that shareholders have poured into Trinity since 2012.

If my estimate is wrong, it’s because oil assets have fallen significantly in value since 2016 (which seems unlikely in Trinidad given the fiscal reforms - which are now worth between $7.5 to $8.5 million per year to Trinity, and much more if we get some production from Galeota) and/or because management have squandered the $226 million (there have been several unsuccessful drills, but that’s part of oil exploration and there hasn’t been $226 million worth of failed drills or for that matter $226 million worth of payments to managers - the combined salaries for senior management have been between about $1.2 and $1.8 million per year for years).

If my estimate is wrong, I’d be surprised if it’s out by more than 50%, which would still give a share price of 168p.

Obviously, it would be helpful if Trinity or its brokers set out their opinion on asset value and I’ve asked them to do that.
Posted at 24/1/2024 18:21 by andrewbyles
There are a couple of beneficial scenarios: the slow one and the quick one.

In the slow one, Trinity spends 2024 reducing costs and accumulating cash (Jeremy’s done it several times before), whilst reading drilling plans for 2025. As cash builds up and fresh drilling draws nearer the share price will drift up.

In the quick scenario, Trinity also reduces costs and accumulates cash, but also takes steps now to realise value from its assets (eg, by selling or partially selling Galeota or even the entire company).

In either scenario, returning cash to shareholders and providing information through presentations, Q&A opportunities etc will assist. Hopefully, we’ll all feel a bit better after the 2024 projections, which are due this month (so within the next week), have been issued.

As for bad a scenario, I think one would only arise if there were some sort of extreme event: a collapse in the oil price, a production problem with Trintes (the rest of Trinity’s production comes from small wells that probably wouldn’t all have a problem at the same time, whereas with Trintes about 1,000bopd comes from three platforms) or some sort of political instability in Trinidad. All those things have happened in the past (albeit they were short lived - in 1990 there was an attempted coup in Trinidad), so can’t be ruled out. However, none is especially likely and Trinity fared pretty well during the turmoil of 2020.
Posted at 24/1/2024 15:36 by andrewbyles
In 2015 Trinity had a $13 million debt balance with Citibank that it defaulted on. It was given 38 loan extensions, but was refused a 39th in July 2016. The shares were then suspended and Trinity had to use the Trinidad debt moratorium laws to save itself from administration. At the end of 2016, Trinity raised $15 million from shareholders at 49.8p (a 165% premium to the suspended share price - which is pretty unusual; it’s also when Jeremy Bridglalsingh started buying shares - he invested almost £40,000 at that price).

It’s pretty ridiculous that Trinity could raise money at more than the current share price to stave off administration in 2016. In 2024, with net cash of about $5.8 million, highly profitable operations thanks to fiscal reform and high oil prices, and expected cash inflow for the year of $16 to $17 million, Trinity is in considerably better shape than 2016.

Trinity’s share price soon recovered from the loan default. By the end of January 2017 it was in the 80s, by June 2017 it was 125p and by December 2017 it was in the 150s. By April 2018, it was 240p.
Posted at 22/1/2024 03:32 by andrewbyles
As we know, Trinity’s balance sheet contains just over $30 million of intangible assets related to the cost of drilling TGAL-1 on the Galeota licence. As we also know, Trinity has about $163 million of tax losses connected with the Galeota licence (Trinity has some other tax losses attached to other assets).

Those tax losses point to another reason why Galeota might appeal to a larger oil company. They arose, at least in part, because TGAL-1 wasn’t the only well drilled on Galeota. There were others and their cost is responsible for much of the tax losses (investment in Trintes is presumably responsible for the other part).

The Galeota licence previously belonged to Bayfield, which was listed on the AIM in July 2011 and raised about $87 million via its IPO (primarily to fund Galeota exploration). By the time Bayfield announced its results on May 28th 2012, it had carried losses of $26,298,182 (of which at least $3.3 million were related to exploration) - see

In 2012, “Capital expenditure for the year was US$69.8 million (2011: US$41.3 million) comprising Trintes field development costs (US$22.9 million) and exploration costs (US$46.9 million)” - see Those exploration costs were connected to Galeota.

At the end of 2012, Trinity, which was then a privately owned company run by Bruce Dingwall, merged with Bayfield via a reverse takeover and the listed company took the name Trinity. Another $90 million was raised at that time and in 2013 capital expenditure on TGAL-1 was $23.7 million (total capital expenditure that year was $92.1 million and some of it may have been spent on Trintes).

By the end of 2014, carried losses were $118.3 million. In the years that followed (and in the years before 2011; Bayfield started work on Galeota in 2008), smaller amounts were spent on TGAL/Galeota and the losses continued to grow (probably a combination of investing further in TGAL/Galeota and investment in Trintes) until they reached the current $163 million.

My point is that to establish 2C reserves of 37.1 million on Galeota, Bayfield/Trinity has spent around $100 million (and more on Trintes) and hasn’t yet produced a drop of oil. That’s the oil exploration business for you. But, if you were running a medium to large sized oil company interested in doing business in Trinidad would you start at the beginning of this process by bidding for a new shallow marine licence so that you can spend the next ten years drilling exploration wells at a cost of $100 million or would you consider acquiring Galeota (or even Trinity) in order to quickly bring proven reserves into production? It seems to me that Trinity has, at great expense, de-risked Galeota.

As part of the abandoned farm-down process, Trinity arranged for Netherland, Sewell & Associates Inc to prepare an Independent Competent Person’s Report on Galeota in late 2021. I’ve asked Trinity to disclose that report either in part (I’ve suggested that Cavendish be instructed to prepare a research note on Galeota’s likely value making reference to it) or in full (other companies I’ve invested in have published their ICP reports) so that shareholders can be better satisfied of the considerable value in this asset, which clearly isn’t reflected in the share price.

Bruce Dingwall certainly considered Galeota to be of great value. When Trinity struggled in 2015/16, he was ready to sell the Onshore assets and then the West Coast assets so that the Company could concentrate on Galeota (in the end, he was able to raise more money from shareholders so that he didn’t have to).

PS I’ve paid a visit to the other place. It’s no secret that I was optimistic about Jacobin (as Trinity’s management clearly were). It’s incredibly disappointing that the well is neither producing vast quantities of oil nor likely to (150 to 200bopd seems to be most we can hope for now and it might not even be that much), but success was never guaranteed and I never claimed that it was. It seemed to me at the time that success was more likely than not (a belief based upon Trinity’s estimate of a 62% chance of success), and that even if the deeper levels failed to produce there was the even more likely consolation of oil from the upper levels (which is where it now seems that the oil will come from). It was worth the risk. However, I think Trinity need to explain in some detail what lessons have be learned from the well, why they carried on putting money into the well, what the actual cost is ($10.5 million is the headline cost, but the 12.5% VAT is refundable, there may be tax allowances and there may be tax losses) and what the payback period will be once production starts (at the December presentation, Jeremy stated that the well should eventually recover its cost). I don’t think it was misleading to describe the well as essentially an appraisal well as there was oil in most of the places they expected it to be. I should add, although Jacobin’s failed to generate the expected cash flow (it was supposed to cost $4.5 million and repay that cost within a year), the reforms to marine SPT, which weren’t anticipated at the start of 2023, should generate that much in 2024 alone. There can be little doubt that Trinity has played a major role in campaigning for those reforms - as previously mentioned the Energy Minister specifically stated that they are for the “Trinity’s, the Touchstone’s” when debating the Finance Bill in Parliament (I don’t think Touchstone actually has any marine assets).
Posted at 20/1/2024 01:50 by andrewbyles
What’s Trinity Exploration and Production’s potential break-up value?

Trinity’s owed $4 million by the government in VAT refunds, but has offset this with a $4 million overdraft. They cancel each other out, so there’s no asset or liability here.

Trinity ended 2023 with cash of $9.8 million, but owes about $4 million in drilling fees. Therefore, it effectively has cash of $5.8 million.

On October 21st 2015, Trinity announced the sale of its Onshore assets for $20.8 million (a sale that was subsequently abandoned). At that time, Onshore had 2P reserves of 3.59mmbls and so that potential sale was worth $5.69 per barrel of reserves. Also at that time, production costs were $17.40 per barrel, oil prices were $45.50 per barrel, and Supplementary Petroleum Tax (SPT) was payable when the oil price was between $50.01 and $75. Onshore’s 2P resources were around 5.9mmbls at the end of 2023 (assuming similar production to 2022 and no other adjustments; it’s unknown at the stage whether Jacobin will result in any increase to reserves). If those resources are worth $5.69 per barrel (as they were in 2015), Onshore is worth at least $34.18 million. There’s no reason to think that the per barrel value has decreased. Rather, in all likelihood it’s value has increased as consequence of the significant reforms to the SPT (worth at least a few million dollars per year), slightly lower production costs ($17 per barrel) and a higher oil price. On the strength of the SPT reforms alone, Onshore is likely to be worth at least $40 million (ie, an additional 20% or $6.78 per barrel of 2P) and perhaps more. A great deal of work has gone into the Hummingbird prospects, there is a proof of concept for deep oil and Trinity won the bid for the Buenos Ayres licence.

On August 11th 2017, Trinity announced the sale of its West Coast assets for $4.55 million (a sale that was also subsequently abandoned). At that time, West Coast had 2P resources of 2.64mmbls and so the potential sale was worth $1.72 per barrel of reserves. Also at that time, production costs were $48.60 per barrel and the SPT was payable when the price of oil was between $50.01 and $75. The West Coast’s 2P reserves were around 2.05mmbls at the end of 2023 (assuming similar production to 2022 and no other adjustments; however, the reactivation of AMB-151 might result in an increased). If those resources are worth $1.72 per barrel (as they were in 2017), West Coast is worth at least $3.45 million. Again, there’s no reason to think that the per barrel value has decreased. Rather, in all likelihood it’s value has increased as consequence of the significant reforms to the SPT (worth a few hundred thousand dollars per year to this asset), significantly lower production costs (now $30), a significant increase in production (from 190bopd to 365bopd) and a higher oil price. An additional 20% to account for the SPT reform lifts the potential value to $4.1 million and the significant reduction in costs (worth just over $2 million per year) could potentially double it (to $4 per barrel).

Considering the above, Trinity’s cash, onshore and West Coast assets have a likely minimum value of $43.43 million (cash of $5.8 million, onshore $34.18 million based upon the 2015 valuation of $5.69 per barrel of 2P, and West Coast $3.45 million based upon the 2017 valuation of $1.72 barrel of 2P). Taking account of the SPT reforms, reduction in costs, business developments and the higher oil price, that valuation could easily increase to $54 million.

Between $43.43 to $54 million amounts to between £34.16 and £42.5 million or between 88p and 109p per share.

In addition to cash, Onshore and West Coast, Trinity also has the Galeota assets. In my recent blog (see ), I argued that they could be worth between £68.15 million and £75.37 million. That valuation was based partly upon Trintes being worth at least $2 to $3 per barrel of 2P. The $2 to $3 valuation may be too low as Trintes, with production costs of $23 versus West Coast’s costs of $30, is arguably more valuable than West Coast, but not as valuable as Onshore (where production costs are $17), suggesting a possible value of around $5 per barrel - adding another £14.46 million to the valuation. Sticking with £68.15 million as the lower figure and increasing the higher figure to £89.83 million, Trinity has a potential break-up value of between £102 million and £132.33 million or between 262p and 340p per share.

The lower figure is based very much upon the prices at which offers were previously made for two thirds of Trinity’s producing assets and a relatively modest valuation of Galeota, where as the higher figure is more speculative. However, on the basis of the lower figure alone there’s plenty of value in Trinity and it’s only a matter of time before it’s realised.

Over the past four years, Trinity’s share price hasn’t closed higher than 175p. An ambitious competitor that wanted to get its hands on Galeota could, at the moment, probably succeed with a £2 per share bid, which would cost about $97 million (less if it bought shares in the market before making an offer). Trinity’s cash would reduce that cost to $91.2 million and the cost could potentially be reduced by at least a further $37.63 million to $53.57 million by selling Onshore and West Coast. It would then find itself the owner of Trinites (producing 900 to 1,000bopd, with 2P reserves of about 9mmbls), the significant tax losses and Galeota (exploration costs of about $30 million, 2C reserves of just over 37mmbls, over 770mmbls of oil in place, and potential near-term production of 7,000bopd).

I remain confident that Trinity’s management can unlock the value in the business, but if they can’t it’s only a matter of time before someone else does.
Posted at 11/1/2024 19:01 by kenmitch
nocents.

I’m genuinely sorry about your predicament and to read that your near 70% TRIN loss has so obviously hurt you badly.

My key point though was about so many private investors making the mistake of not selling as soon as there’s bad news. And another terrible mistake is investing more than we can afford to lose.

I’m NOT suggesting you or anyone else should sell TRIN now. That’s after very big share price fall instead of cutting a modest quick small loss far far higher. Once the share does fall so far selling is much riskier because there’s a chance of a bid or change of management etc. Or simply the risk of selling at the bottom. But it’s so wrong and so easily avoidable from getting in to that pickle.

There are so many quality alternative shares to go for both in the oil sector and elsewhere. We soon forget our small loss (as I did the 10% TRIN loss at 80pish)if buying much better alternatives that don’t consistently let their investors down as TRIN has. There’s a far higher chance of winning and recovering previous small loss taken, with better quality and better run alternatives than by persisting with a share that lets down its investors as TRIN has.

Good luck with your TRIN stake. At this price surely there’s hope of a better share price ahead?
Posted at 11/1/2024 17:14 by arlington chetwynd talbott
No, it is, the conversation was about what those of us who are still in here should be doing now, particularly in the light of the news today, and what there is to be gained by calling for heads to roll. I am arguing that heads rolling is exactly what the TRIN share price needs.
Posted at 05/1/2024 12:22 by nocents
ACQ
Yes the first action did obviously-to some degree-precede the second.
But you have evaluated me falsely. I have been in Trin since 2013 and only feel I criticise on evidence. Read my optimistic posts pre-Jacobin results. As yoou always say, debate is important, and internal debate on new evidence can change one’s view . I do not see them as the professional outfit I once did. I wonder if Ab does. He has a breakeven near mine and has lost a huge amount( as have I) . To remain in La La Land is to be an utter nincompoop. Work with reality.
I have my whole holding in Trinity. Like Ab I held a huge amount once . I bought in at £1.28p 2013 old money, £12 present. I averaged down and down never expecting them to nearly go bust.
I then sold some and got ripped off by Ncut and 4D. Lost 7/8. Rest is in Trin. All I have is in Trin as my average is still high at £1.28-£1.30. I have never had the chance to sell at breakeven or profit since the week before the Placing. It caught us out in 2018. I essentially lost my life savings out of gullibility and not thinking people could get away with being as wicked and corrupt as they have been on the London Stock Exchange. It’s essentially every man for himself and as corrupt as it gets. It changed radically post Lehmans and has got more and more sleazy as years pass.Because they get away with it. FCA does nothing. I know this from years of interaction.
Many of us are trapped in Trin. If I had the opportunity to sell without a 70% loss I would.
I have been to all meetings except one. I know the BOD and knew Bruce well. I knew the CEO 7 years ago as financial officer. I do not slag Trin off, I just see their failures, which are indeed real. I used to be very optimistic even bullish. My stupidity lay in getting sick of Trin’s low price in Covid and putting into pharmas. I lost nearly all in corrupt firms. I see Trin’s stability as much as its fallibility.
I put my last penny in in order to average down from my £1.28-30. Simply that. I have been all but broke for 2 years since 4D stole my investment( along with many others) and I run the Shareholder Action Group trying to get a legal case. Mine is a story of gullibility. Lost life savings in stocks. Bit left here, a fifteenth of what I once held. I was once fairly comfortable and lost it in Pog, Ncyt, 4D and Trin. My bad times 4. Fool.
I am trapped in Trin and average down ( no money left now…it was from my lorry/car court case). I bought just £2,500. All I had. Rest went on debt. I get my State Pension in 6 months so will be able to pay bills. There you have it. The truth in all its glory. Life since 2020 has been so damned tough.
I don’t slag Trin off though. I see their errors and point them out. I did not agree with some of BD’s actions. I find error in most companies. Shareholders are cannon fodder.
I hope that answers your question. It has been a gruesome few years and still is. No exaggerration, but no more details at risk of boring others.You did ask.
But I don’t say how dreadful they are. Yes I have lost a good deal of faith but I think that is justified after all the shenanegans and false promises. At least 15% is to allegedly be returned, but it does not make up for a 70% paper loss. Still, it’s better than being conned out of all of it in 4D, POG and Ncyt. A fool such as I as the song goes.
Here’s to a better 2024
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