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| Share Name | Share Symbol | Market | Stock Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trinity Exploration & Production Plc | TRIN | London | Ordinary Share |
| Price Change | Price Change % | Share Price | Last Trade
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| -3.00 | -7.69% | 36.00 | 08:27:12 |
| Open Price | Low Price | High Price | Close Price | Previous Close |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 37.00 | 34.50 | 37.00 | 36.00 | 39.00 |
| Industry Sector |
|---|
| OIL & GAS PRODUCERS |
| Top Posts |
|---|
Posted at 16/4/2024 19:31 by andrewbyles It’s a small consolation, but I note that Cavendish are still forecasting a 1.5p dividend for 2024 (expressed as 1.9 cents) and capex at the top end of expectations (which suggests Trinity are pushing ahead with Buenos Ayres - which I’m pleased about).The realisation by Cavendish that Trinity requires funding to develop Galeota shouldn’t surprise anyone; the surprise is that Cavendish has only just noticed it. As long ago as the November presentation, which was attended by some of Cavendish’s people, Trinity was saying that they could only borrow about 60% of the $30 million or so Galeota development costs (when I heard that they were proposing to borrow that sort of money I immediately responded by telling them that sale or partial sale was the only viable option). It’s possible that the reduction in reserves reduces the amount Trinity can borrow, making funding all that bit more difficult. However, I don’t think many shareholders are/were keen on Trinity going from a position of net cash to relatively high debt on a single project (especially after the Jacobin cost overruns, which act as a reminder that oil projects are difficult to price). |
Posted at 15/4/2024 14:23 by nocents Sleepy:- I did consider that.I also considered it as being ratification of discussions which may have already taken place. All hypothesis. But today was an advert for the proven reality of Trin’s assets. Let us not forget that Cavendish increased their target price to £3.47p” Including the 38.7mmbbls of 2C resources into our valuation highlights Trinity’s upside potential if funding was available, increasing our target price to £3.47p, a significant c8.4times the current share price”. Nota Bene M M’s , who have slumped this. There has been a lot of buying, but this is what AIM does. Let us also not ignore Cavendish’s revision of 40% higher net cash at year end and an almost doubling of free cash flow to 33%. They foresee no SPT but they may be ignoring that it is a quarterly average . Q2 is already at $ 76.7 AR price since April 1st. Nevertheless, these are friendly figures. I assume Trin had to relegate 2p obsolete fields to zero or 2C. I doubt they would choose to do it, although they do aim the pistol at their own toes with regularity as a habit. It seems, as you say, like a cheap advert. That, or Trin are more a bunch of lemmings on the march to the cliff than I ever thought. FCF and net cash increase are worth noting though, as is the revaluation to 3.47p if funding for Galeota were available. Trin are notorious for finding dirt in the diamonds but Cavendish are very precise these days. Thoughts welcome. |
Posted at 15/4/2024 08:27 by ashkv Bummed for the long term investors - I have been in the past an investor in TRIN for two extended periods. The first dip was a very profitable investment.The second go - I thankfully got out at a small profit in what was prior the 10s for TRIN. Jeremy B - the CEO has to go!!! Overpaid, misleading communications, poor strategy - WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE HORIZONTAL WELL THAT LONG LEAD ITEMS HAD BEEN ORDERED AND WAS SUPPOSED TO INCREASE PRODUCTION CIRCA 200 Boe/d??? (as I recall/please correct) Also poor hiring by the CEO - if I recall TRIN hired in 2022/2023 an exploration Director working in Asia - who has proven to be absolutely incompetent!!! TRIN should undertake a manner of BLVN strategy - fire most of management / high admin costs and squeeze the profitable assets / return cash to investors in the form of buybacks and dividends!!! Rest is a waste!!! |
Posted at 13/4/2024 18:12 by nocents I think the bottom line is that Trinity is low profile and in AIM. Institutional investors are not interested, and Trin shot themselves severely in the foot with Jacobin. They lost the confidence of the private investor and the mm’s just slumped it as they do. I don’t think many people except us have a clue about the nuts and bolts of the company. Most people just want a quick profit asap and out, thank you very much. They probably don’t understand SPT, no hedging, discounted price etc. Even Cavendish think Trin will pay no spt at all in 2024, but I think they may. This quarter is already averaging $76.5. And oil is holding up. Last year had no hedging too but the money was squandered.Trin need to increase bopd and investor trust. And the dividend. And sell assets in Galeota. Unfortunately management have not shown the greatest competence since BD died . This has wrecked the share price. I think the big shareholders will have made their feelings known. Newlands owns over 10%. Trin should be marketing Galeota( Perenco are next door), increaing the dividend as promised, and explaining what( if anything) they have learned from Jacobin. The update in about 10 days may be a flop ( Q1 usually is) but ought not to be. No SPT. Decent profit. No capex. Let’s see if they manage to shoot the other foot or not. Disgrace if they do. 40p( 4p old money) is well below the all-time low in Covid of 55p(5.5p). I fear a year stuck in the Sargasso with no wind in our sails, but it all comes down to management competence and care. The big holders need to know the plan or should be proactive and move management out if it does not happen. Not yet though. See what 10 days bring. Have no expectations. But the ground is solid and assets plentiful. But this is Trin and it is in AIM. Grab and run index. |
Posted at 25/2/2024 04:29 by andrewbyles We’re nearly two months into 2024 and Trinity’s share price continues to disappoint - it’s lost two thirds of its value since the beginning of 2023 and for now has settled at that level.It’s worth remembering some of the recent comments made by Trinity’s management. First, on September 20th 2022, as part of the interim results, shareholders were told, “The first six months of 2022 was a period of consolidation for Trinity, positioning the Company strongly for the second half of the year and beyond. Stable production and higher oil prices boosted our revenues in the period, the benefit of this will be fully felt when our hedges expire at the end of 2022. Towards the end of the first half the Company commenced a potentially transformational drilling programme onshore Trinidad. The six-well programme is ongoing, with drilling of the most notable wells, a horizontal well and a deeper appraisal well, due to start in the coming months. I believe this has the potential to meaningfully increase our scale, and as such prove to be the start of one of the most exciting periods in the Company’s history. I am also pleased to announce the Company’s intention to implement a new Capital Allocation Policy which is likely to include the payment of a regular dividend and a share buy-back programme to further deliver value to our shareholders.” Second, on June 2nd 2023, in the Annual Report, shareholders were told, “During 2022 Trinity put in place the foundations for an ambitious growth programme, developing a series of catalysts to drive shareholder value that we are now starting to execute in 2023. This important process has involved taking tough decisions based on identifying the most efficient allocation of capital across the portfolio” and “We are a forward-thinking company, harnessing the benefits of new datasets, software, processes and technologies to drive efficiency and responsibly deliver hydrocarbon-based energy. Trinity’s investment case is based upon resilient, low-cost production; near term, deliverable catalysts with the potential to achieve incremental growth; and a medium-term hopper of organic opportunities capable of delivering transformational growth. On behalf of our shareholders, we are focused on delivering significant growth in production and free cash flow, allowing us to pursue new growth opportunities and deliver sustainable returns to shareholders. Our strategy and business model are designed to deliver this core objective.” In addition to those specific comments, for many years Trinity has ended it RNSs with, “Trinity's portfolio includes current production, significant near-term production growth opportunities from low-risk developments and multiple exploration prospects with the potential to deliver meaningful reserves/resources growth.” Unfortunately, 2023 wasn’t Trinity’s year and, instead of growing, the business shrank (Trinity produced 2,975 bopd in 2022, but in 2024 is forecast to produce between 2,600 and 2,700 bopd - if Jacobin manages to contribute any meaningful production there’s a possibility that figure may be revised upwards). Obviously this isn’t good enough. Whilst I’m not in favour of replacing the board (at least not yet), things cannot continue as they have before. In the first instance, the board needs to consider whether the company has the ability to deliver on the aims set out above (eg, does it have the necessary expertise and financial resources). Trinity has a core net asset value of 201.5p (arguably the company is worth much more than that as the core net asset value doesn’t take into account the company’s significant 2C resources, the investment in Buenos Ayres, the investment in the Hummingbird prospects or even the VAT refund), which is more than four times the current share price. If the board isn’t confident that the company can deliver, it has a duty to explore selling the company or part of the company to a larger company that can deliver on those aims and in doing so close the gap between the current share price and core net asset value. If the company believes it does have the ability to deliver, it needs to set out clearly and compellingly how it will do so. I think that will include: 1. Reducing costs so as to maximise profitability from the base production; 2. Explaining exactly what has been learned from Jacobin and why it’s appropriate to drill further wells, especially on Buenos Ayres; 3. Demonstrating that base production can be maintained (when you strip out ABM-151, 2023 was a terrible year for base production even allowing for the one-off problems with Trintes following the fire); 4. Bringing in a partner to develop Buenos Ayres and Galeota (a partner will provide two things: confidence in the drilling programme and a financial contribution towards the cost of that drilling); 5. Maximising returns to shareholders (reducing costs, maintaining base production and bringing on board a partner to fund fresh drilling will each make dividends more affordable); and 6. Making more of an effort to engage with shareholders and potential shareholders. Trinity urgently needs to set out a deliverable vision and set about persuading people of it (eg, by attending the various investor presentations). |
Posted at 10/2/2024 18:44 by arlington chetwynd talbott Yes, the BoD are saying let us bank our salaries for another year and then we might have something meaningful for you. Not good enough, but they will undertake some kind of charm offensive in a few months to keep the natives (a disappointingly complacent lot) from becoming restless and it will all likely trundle on.Sleveen suggests switching into TXP, but after all this time, although it is clear to me that TRIN no longer has a competent BoD and that things are finally happening at TXP, it is also clear that Trinidad itself appears to be part of the problem. If the TRIN share price recovers modestly at some point in the coming months and folk then switch into a solid non-tech blue chip of their choice (one paying substantial but well covered dividends that they can reinvest), the majority of those folk will in the medium term (if not the short term) likely find themselves doing better than those remaining in TRIN - even if its dividends do continue - and wondering why on earth they ever bothered with TRIN and companies like it. TRIN is a frustrating itch that I have resolved to stop scratching until the next (meaningful) RNS. I am clearly not persuading anybody to see TRIN for what it has become, let alone sack even one single member of the BoD. |
Posted at 26/1/2024 10:41 by nocents ST is interesting. He has tipped Trin many times.I have been here from the beginning so I would suggest 5-6 times. He always speaks very highly of it and it rises. Hecalways mentions its assets. He has not yet tipped Trin since the SPT reform offshore, which is big news for a small operator ( 5% of T snd T oil?. His last tip was maybe at 80p I think. It was autumn I believe. Its discount to NAV and its sssets feature strongly. Buenos Ayres, no hedging, offshore reform and tax credits not yet mentioned. BA is a year off but virgin onshore. This means shallow drilling should yield. And instantly . Why drill deep? The energy ministry finally seems to be taking oil seriously, although no mention this week of further promised reform.Oil prices will eventually sag, but not yet, so it is important to make hay while sun shines. Galeota is next to Perenco drilling which already yields oil. Although I feel self-interest by the BOD could hamper a Galeota sale, it is foolishness really. But they may put themselves first unless pressure is too much. I hope it is. To be on a 50% loss is better than a 75% loss, sobI would welcome Simon Thomson’scinvo NEVER count on it, but it has never been more appropriate.It is more of a bargain at 44p than at 80p or even £1.20. He may not have Trin in his sights, but ought to. No better time, ever. But we can’t and shouldn’t rely on it. We need the dreary following 1) update on low Jacobin yield plus 2024 forward bopd 2) special owed dividend 3) a bloody sale of or news on marketing of Galeota. Trin can’t do it and should stop pretending they can. Put shareholders, not your careers, first. 4) Make 2024 “turning the corner” for Trin. It’s what they promised 2023 would be. |
Posted at 22/1/2024 03:32 by andrewbyles As we know, Trinity’s balance sheet contains just over $30 million of intangible assets related to the cost of drilling TGAL-1 on the Galeota licence. As we also know, Trinity has about $163 million of tax losses connected with the Galeota licence (Trinity has some other tax losses attached to other assets).Those tax losses point to another reason why Galeota might appeal to a larger oil company. They arose, at least in part, because TGAL-1 wasn’t the only well drilled on Galeota. There were others and their cost is responsible for much of the tax losses (investment in Trintes is presumably responsible for the other part). The Galeota licence previously belonged to Bayfield, which was listed on the AIM in July 2011 and raised about $87 million via its IPO (primarily to fund Galeota exploration). By the time Bayfield announced its results on May 28th 2012, it had carried losses of $26,298,182 (of which at least $3.3 million were related to exploration) - see In 2012, “Capital expenditure for the year was US$69.8 million (2011: US$41.3 million) comprising Trintes field development costs (US$22.9 million) and exploration costs (US$46.9 million)” - see Those exploration costs were connected to Galeota. At the end of 2012, Trinity, which was then a privately owned company run by Bruce Dingwall, merged with Bayfield via a reverse takeover and the listed company took the name Trinity. Another $90 million was raised at that time and in 2013 capital expenditure on TGAL-1 was $23.7 million (total capital expenditure that year was $92.1 million and some of it may have been spent on Trintes). By the end of 2014, carried losses were $118.3 million. In the years that followed (and in the years before 2011; Bayfield started work on Galeota in 2008), smaller amounts were spent on TGAL/Galeota and the losses continued to grow (probably a combination of investing further in TGAL/Galeota and investment in Trintes) until they reached the current $163 million. My point is that to establish 2C reserves of 37.1 million on Galeota, Bayfield/Trinity has spent around $100 million (and more on Trintes) and hasn’t yet produced a drop of oil. That’s the oil exploration business for you. But, if you were running a medium to large sized oil company interested in doing business in Trinidad would you start at the beginning of this process by bidding for a new shallow marine licence so that you can spend the next ten years drilling exploration wells at a cost of $100 million or would you consider acquiring Galeota (or even Trinity) in order to quickly bring proven reserves into production? It seems to me that Trinity has, at great expense, de-risked Galeota. As part of the abandoned farm-down process, Trinity arranged for Netherland, Sewell & Associates Inc to prepare an Independent Competent Person’s Report on Galeota in late 2021. I’ve asked Trinity to disclose that report either in part (I’ve suggested that Cavendish be instructed to prepare a research note on Galeota’s likely value making reference to it) or in full (other companies I’ve invested in have published their ICP reports) so that shareholders can be better satisfied of the considerable value in this asset, which clearly isn’t reflected in the share price. Bruce Dingwall certainly considered Galeota to be of great value. When Trinity struggled in 2015/16, he was ready to sell the Onshore assets and then the West Coast assets so that the Company could concentrate on Galeota (in the end, he was able to raise more money from shareholders so that he didn’t have to). PS I’ve paid a visit to the other place. It’s no secret that I was optimistic about Jacobin (as Trinity’s management clearly were). It’s incredibly disappointing that the well is neither producing vast quantities of oil nor likely to (150 to 200bopd seems to be most we can hope for now and it might not even be that much), but success was never guaranteed and I never claimed that it was. It seemed to me at the time that success was more likely than not (a belief based upon Trinity’s estimate of a 62% chance of success), and that even if the deeper levels failed to produce there was the even more likely consolation of oil from the upper levels (which is where it now seems that the oil will come from). It was worth the risk. However, I think Trinity need to explain in some detail what lessons have be learned from the well, why they carried on putting money into the well, what the actual cost is ($10.5 million is the headline cost, but the 12.5% VAT is refundable, there may be tax allowances and there may be tax losses) and what the payback period will be once production starts (at the December presentation, Jeremy stated that the well should eventually recover its cost). I don’t think it was misleading to describe the well as essentially an appraisal well as there was oil in most of the places they expected it to be. I should add, although Jacobin’s failed to generate the expected cash flow (it was supposed to cost $4.5 million and repay that cost within a year), the reforms to marine SPT, which weren’t anticipated at the start of 2023, should generate that much in 2024 alone. There can be little doubt that Trinity has played a major role in campaigning for those reforms - as previously mentioned the Energy Minister specifically stated that they are for the “Trinity&rsquo |
Posted at 21/1/2024 23:38 by arlington chetwynd talbott Neither we nor Ab76 were to know this? This is not some exercise in 20/20 hindsight, as you can see from what I posted more than half a year ago:“Arlington Chetwynd Talbott - 26 Jun 2023 - 23:40:02 - 2437 of 3448 Ab76 - the proof of the pudding is in the eating. But when I see the suggestion that what is clearly exploration is more like appraisal, I get a distinct whiff of snake oil. You, on the other hand, sound as if you are just going to keep giving these guys the benefit of the doubt, indeed whether Jacobin pans out or not. Hopefully there are other substantial shareholders who are ready, willing and able to hold them to account.” None of us needed to be a practiced geologist to smell the snake oil - all we needed was a bit of experience investing in oilers. So, frankly, Ab76 was either plain foolish or astonishingly naive to parrot James Menzies in the way that he did. Ab76 really is just about the last person that you or anyone should be listening to when it comes to TRIN. Can you not see that? And, again, I am not saying with the benefit of hindsight that they would have been better saving their cash for Galeota. This is what I was saying six months ago: “Arlington Chetwynd Talbott - 01 Jul 2023 - 12:40:19 - 2451 of 3448 SKYSHIP - maybe they will, but as I said to nocents about the dividend, whether they continue going through the motions of throwing shareholders the odd bone will likely very much depend on the Jacobin result. It should not be like this - while all will no doubt be forgiven if Jacobin really comes off, I would argue that a company that has an asset like Galeota should be keeping its powder dry for that opportunity, instead of taking a risk like Jacobin. Look at it this way - if Jacobin does not come off, how many more times will they be able to gamble the cost of a deep well? Not nearly as many as the cheerleaders would have you believe. At least it appears that Jacobin has potential as a shallow field, which is something. More power to the rebel shareholders alliance, which is a new, positive, development. TRIN cannot be allowed to exist just to generate direct and indirect employment, tax revenue and executive salaries. The shareholders own the company and should be calling the shots. They finally seem to be waking up to this.” “Arlington Chetwynd Talbott - 24 Jul 2023 - 22:38:29 - 2538 of 3448 strathroyal - why Jacobin/Hummingbird feels like a bad strategy to me is down to TRIN taking the risk of exploration rather than focusing all their available energy and capital on the development (not exploration) of Galeota. And the quoted Jacobin CoS seems unrealistically high to me. How dare I question the figures in a TRIN presentation, Ab76 and Pavey Ark will of course ask. I guess I am just conscious of problems with deeper drills in Trinidad in recent years (CEG, TXP) and quite a run of disappointments from TRIN of late.” |
Posted at 20/1/2024 15:54 by nocents What an interesting set of posts.I fully appreciate Andrew’s very detailed “presentation& I fudamentally disagree that we all inhabit the world of self-interest. A bleak and wrong view of mankind.To a degree we must to survive, but we also live to give. Most of us anyway. What a miserable world if we did not care for others!!! We do.Caring for others’ wellbeing is what makes us human and humane.Clearly most of us walking the planet do not put ourselves first thank goodness. Most of us care for others whilst looking after ourselves of course.Looking after oneself at expense of others is psychotic or at the very least narcissistic. And not the majority-thank goodness.That is why altruism and all kinds of philanthropy exist.Putting ( some) others first and the world of service is all around us thank goodness.( What my life as a school teacher and therapist has been about) . w Too many exceptions, but that’s people for you. Thank Goodness many of us do put deserving others before ourselves!!! Humanity has not changed-“same as it ever was”! (“Talking Heads 1976 I think!) (Let that part of the post go if it was already plainly bloody obvious to you, apologies if so!) Trin has imo lost touch with its duty to shareholders and relies on appeasing comments in RMS’s about its Galeota assets and shareholder value.Trin has to ( imo) be pressured to become less apathetic about its duty to shareholders. I support all that is said about encouraging large shareholders to bring about an EGM if they sit on Galeota for their own ends. It is wrong. It must be monetarised and Trin either sold or slimmed down to Onshore and West Coast and BA. And it should, as is suggested, be done soon. This year. I too fear a sitting on it. They must not be allowed to do this. There are large players, one in particular, who could assimilate Galeota into its existing neighbouring offshore next-block production. Interested? Who knows. But Trin should be actively aggressively pursuing this. I don’t believe they necessarily are but can be wrong. They need to do those 3 or 4 things which Andrew suggested in a post earlier this week. They have lost credibility with failed wells. They need to attract new investors by becoming proactive. Aggressively approaching suitable buyers. I fear they will not without investors’ intervention. I have no proof of this but it suits their behaviour since August 2021. My very meagre holding ( I once had to issue 5 TR1’s in 2017 for Trin-never again) would also go towards a call for an EGM if Galeota is not monetarised and if they do not present forward production and capex in January, and re-support the 15% with a relevant dividend, ideally a special dividend as it is owed from the unpaid buyback last year. 10 days left of this month. I still recommend writing to Vigo and asking for it to be passed on to Trin BOD, as I have and will again. I would like to thank Andrew for taking the time to put all that together and present it here. |
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