Share Name Share Symbol Market Type Share ISIN Share Description
Just Group Plc LSE:JUST London Ordinary Share GB00BCRX1J15 ORD 10P
  Price Change % Change Share Price Shares Traded Last Trade
  -2.25 -2.74% 80.00 2,727,097 16:35:13
Bid Price Offer Price High Price Low Price Open Price
79.40 79.75 84.65 76.55 84.65
Industry Sector Turnover (m) Profit (m) EPS - Basic PE Ratio Market Cap (m)
Life Insurance 3,825.00 368.60 28.37 2.8 831
Last Trade Time Trade Type Trade Size Trade Price Currency
17:52:24 O 1,099 79.996 GBX

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Date Time Title Posts
15/1/202113:32JUST retirement new thread1,418
29/3/200305:17just a thought1

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Just Daily Update: Just Group Plc is listed in the Life Insurance sector of the London Stock Exchange with ticker JUST. The last closing price for Just was 82.25p.
Just Group Plc has a 4 week average price of 60.70p and a 12 week average price of 40.80p.
The 1 year high share price is 86.15p while the 1 year low share price is currently 40.80p.
There are currently 1,039,081,664 shares in issue and the average daily traded volume is 2,460,200 shares. The market capitalisation of Just Group Plc is £831,265,331.20.
undervaluedassets: PE of 2.78 for final year 2019 Is it too much to hope for a divi? I think it unlikely given the mood for companies to hang on to cash and to be seen to be doing the right thing in these straitened times. Still the news is good here and the value proposition striking.
hollcat: 18BT - I agree this is very positive for Just, especially the sale of a mature book of LTMs. I agree the true value is dependant on the price they were sold for, and we await this detail, but this lends further credence to Just's argument with the Regulator to value these assets at a mark to market valuation rather than an incredibly penal mark to model. Furthermore this should allow Just to hold less capital in future arguing that they do not need to hold capital as if the LTMs were an illiquid option valued at risk free (CP16/18 or something like that). The Regulators view of LTMs is non-sensical given the large market of transacting LTMs - thousands are sold every day, and this transaction shows there is a bulk secondary market. I expect that when the market realises the significance of this we could easily be pushing at the 150-160 RBC target. I am buying more !
bubloo: learned friends what is the expected share price to reflect the company?
18bt: So as I understand the likely effect on JUST, there should be 2 potential releases of mortality reserves: 1. Any deaths in excess of assumptions for 2020 - there will be some COVID deaths given that the excess deaths figure which has been reported this morning is c80,000 YTD 2. The adjustment that the CMI will make to future life expectancy (albeit modest as it will discount the 2020 effect in its entirety) models because, even discounting 2020, life expectancy has fallen since the last adjustment. There may then need to be some offsetting adjustment to equity release there may have been excess deaths on the mortgage book. Even though the mortgages will not last so long, they are not allowed to account for future profit, so the CMI should have little effect on the ERM portfolio, Is that correct?
cjac39: blimey i hadnt realised eumaeus was still going on about mispriced options. the method they use is agreed with the PRA and therefore, irrespective of the accounting rules which roughly speaking are irrelevant when one considers investing in a life company, its the reg bs that really matters. who cares about theoretical option pricing really. its just that. they arent trading erm options they are long term holders. it doesn't matter what you think the right price is because they are not going to sell so long as you have some reasonable expectation as to the cost of the option baked in. as the loan progresses you can then move your assumptions to reflect reality which is what they do. so i agree with your basic point that forwards are not based on expected outcomes but its roughly speaking irrelevant to my decision to invest in just or other erms.
rapier686: Thanks eumaeus, you have very satisfactorily answered my question of why sensible people are avoiding the apparently attractive investment metrics here. You believe they're bunkum, and clearly explain why you think so. I have found your paper a very interesting and educational read, and it has exposed that I had sloppily considered two different things to be the same. Many of your chapters make very good points. But I believe your central point is wrong. I think we would agree that if we had the probability density function of (the NPV of) ERM economic outcomes, we'd be done. We'd want their expected value for profit purposes, and drop ourselves a couple of std deviations away for reserving purposes to protect policyholders from the possibility of an unlucky future. I claim your Black Scholes priced put option gives you that expected value if and only if the expected value of house price inflation equals the risk free rate*. Let us imagine that in a clap of thunder, Thor announces that the future will be radically simplified. a) Everyone will expire on their 85th birthday b) The risk free rate is zero (this one's just a convenience) c) All house prices will alter in lockstep, the return for each year being independently sampled by Thor from N(mu, sigma). We'd then be in no doubt about the pdf, but where does your option pricing stand? How do you use Thor's choice for mu, which is clearly very significant to the economic outcomes? Your paper is clear that you'd ignore mu, and further anyone who paid attention to it lies somewhere on the scale between deluded and fraudulent. I disagree. And I'm pretty confident that the historical evidence can soundly reject the hypothesis that the expected rate of house price inflation is equal to the risk free rate. You point out that there's public harm in underreserving. But there's also public harm in regulators requiring overreserving - it makes the afflicted products poor value to consumers. * The resolution is that the option is delta neutral in conjunction with an associated hedge. If the underlying's expected return differs from the risk free rate, then the hedge is expected to make/lose money. And consequently the option starts off under/over priced compared to the economic outcome.
rapier686: I'm having trouble understanding why the share price is as it is, at a tiny fraction of net assets and a minuscule adjusted P/E ratio (never mind IFRS). The potential reasons I see are: a) Concern over recession induced credit losses (downgrades/defaults) b) Concern about the IFRS effect of interest rates possibly increasing again c) Concern about possible NNEG impact of future house price falls To my eyes, none of these come near an explanation for the share price, but perhaps I've missed an important concern or I should be a lot more worried about one of the above than I am. Clearly the market as a whole isn't piling in to a perceived bargain here - so what do we think is putting people off?
alex4141: Ridiculous drop today of genuinely undervalued company. Not the greatest source but reminder highlights of the just basic fundamentals from MotleyFool: " Click here for The Motley Fool UK’s resources on Coronavirus and the market. Another company I’ve my eye on today is Just Group (LSE: JUST). This business is facing similar headlines to NatWest. But just like the banking giant, the shares look cheap at current levels after the stock market crash. The shares are changing hands at a forward P/B of 0.2. Considering the extreme uncertainty facing many companies at present, I think the P/B ratio is a good way of establishing value. This gives us some indication of the company’s asset value, which is less volatile than earnings. It also provides a great idea of how much the business could be worth in a takeover or liquidation situation. Just provides retirement products, so its income is more stable than other businesses. This implies the group also has more headroom to navigate the current crisis. It could even emerge stronger on the other side if it can use its strong balance sheet to acquire peers."
18bt: Good spot - PTP consensus has drifted up but consensus EPS has drifted down. There are 2 key things for me in the results: 1) They reaffirm that they will be capital generative by 2022 (confirmed in the HY results) and, connected, 2) That dividend payments restart (0.8p forecast rising to 1.1p relating to 2020). Just re-read the AKG Solvency report which is on the JUST web-site. This is the nub of the capital position; "Just has estimated that a change in the regulatory treatment of lifetime mortgages will lead to a capital impact of £350m. Of this, £70m has already been implemented, £150m arises from PS31/18 and £130m from PS19/19. This is being phased in during the 3 year period between 31/12/18 and 31/12/21. To offset this, Just has already executed £118m via a management action in H2 2019 (the DB reinsurance transaction [a transaction with RGA to increase the existing longevity reinsurance programme in relation to the post Solvency II DB liabilities written during the 3 ½ years to 30 June 2019.]), and is working on other management actions to offset the balance. Just has stated that it would continue to review the need for further capital and its optimal mix, including consideration of the refinancing of PLACL's Tier 2 debt of £100m, which has a call option in March 2020 and in October 2019 it issued £125m of Tier 2 capital, primarily to refinance this. Just states that this means 'we can focus on our key objective of being organically capital generative by 2022'. A £200m revolving credit facility remains undrawn and available to support the business." We should also expect to see some further growth in H2 over H1 in in-force capital generation. L&G reported growth in individuual GIFL sales and it will be interesting to see whether JUST has seen the same. The other thing I will be looking closely at is the elimination of trading losses at Hub Financial Solutions. The affinity business with e.g. Phoenix Life, Prudential, Royal London, Scottish Widows, Standard Life and Zurich needs to make money on a self standing basis, nit just by securing profitable GIFL sales. Lastly, Andy Parsons will have had 2 months getting to know the business. His take on things will be closely watched.
18bt: This is helpful: Fitch Ratings-London-11 December 2018: Fitch Ratings has revised Just Retirement Limited's and Just Group plc's (Just Group) Outlooks to Stable from Negative. The agency also affirmed Just Retirement Limited's Insurer Financial Strength (IFS) Rating at 'A+' and the Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) of Just Retirement Limited and Just Group , the group's ultimate holding company, at 'A'. Fitch simultaneously affirmed the rating on Just Group's GBP230 million Tier 3 subordinated debt at 'BBB'. KEY RATING DRIVERS - The Outlook revision reflects a significant reduction in the uncertainty regarding the ultimate adverse impact of proposed valuation changes in relation to Just Group's portfolio of equity release mortgages (ERMs). This follows the publication of the UK prudential regulator's (PRA) Policy Statement (PS31/18), which updates the assumption setting methodology for insurers' ERM valuation models under Solvency II (S2). Under PS31/18 insurers are not required to apply the revised ERM valuation assumptions retrospectively to business written prior to 2016. This is in contrast to the proposals outlined in the PRA's previously published consultation paper (CP13/18). The proposals in CP13/18, if implemented, would, absent capital actions, have led to a large reduction in Just Group's S2 coverage ratio due to a high concentration of ERM in Just Group's asset portfolio. The potential capital impact of the revised valuation methodology for the ERMs under PS31/18 has thus been significantly reduced. However, Fitch believes that by virtue of its concentrated exposure to ERMs, Just Group remains exposed to residual uncertainty related to the final impact of the changes proposed in PS31/18. These changes include future increases in the deferment rate and volatility parameters used in Just Group's ERM valuation model. In addition, sustained adverse house price movement compared with the group's ERM model assumptions could dampen the group's reported S2 ratio over time. Just Group's S2 solvency capital requirement coverage ratio remained broadly stable at 142% at end-1H18 after a notional allowance for transitional measures (end-2017: 139%). Fitch continues to view Just Group's capitalisation, as measured by Fitch's Prism factor-based model (Prism FBM) as 'Extremely Strong', at end-1H18. The group's financial leverage ratio (FLR) weakened to 25% at end-1H18 (end-2017:17%) following Just Group's GBP230 million Tier 3 subordinated debt issuance in February 2018. Fitch assesses Just Group's business profile as strong, with a strong franchise in an annuity market that is underpinned by sound economic fundamentals. We believe that UK annuity writers, including Just Group, were able to adjust new business pricing to accommodate the possible outcomes of CP13/18. The group has previously indicated that it has already made adjustments to new business pricing and product features in response to CP13/18. Therefore, we do not expect the new policy statement to have any additional impact on new business. RATING SENSITIVITIES - The ratings would likely be downgraded in the event of a weakening of the group's capitalisation as evidenced by a decrease in the group's S2 ratio to below 130%, a prolonged fall in the group's Prism FBM to the low end in the 'Very Strong' category or the group's FLR weakening to above 30% on a sustained basis. The ratings could also be downgraded as a result of a sustained weakening in the group's financial flexibility, as evidenced, for example, by the group's fixed charge coverage declining to below 3x (6.2x in 1H18). Deterioration in the group's business profile may also lead to a downgrade. An increase in product and geographical diversification could lead to the ratings being upgraded. However, we view this as unlikely over the medium term.
Just share price data is direct from the London Stock Exchange
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