Share Name Share Symbol Market Type Share ISIN Share Description
Valirx LSE:VAL London Ordinary Share GB00BWWYSP41 ORD 0.1P
  Price Change % Change Share Price Bid Price Offer Price High Price Low Price Open Price Shares Traded Last Trade
  +0.25p +3.92% 6.625p 6.25p 7.00p 6.625p 6.375p 6.375p 62,484.00 08:18:09
Industry Sector Turnover (m) Profit (m) EPS - Basic PE Ratio Market Cap (m)
Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 0.1 -2.6 -6.7 - 5.08

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Date Time Title Posts
09/12/201608:08Valirx 18th May 2015 and Beyond4,420.00
08/12/201617:05ValiRx Plc - exceptional cancer theraputic developments116.00
08/12/201616:59ValiRx Plc - New Cancer treatments.221.00
08/12/201614:27Valirx: Troll free thread921.00
07/12/201618:07Valrix 2011 and BEYOND2,814.00

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DateSubject
09/12/2016
08:20
Valirx Daily Update: Valirx is listed in the Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology sector of the London Stock Exchange with ticker VAL. The last closing price for Valirx was 6.38p.
Valirx has a 4 week average price of 6.57p and a 12 week average price of 7.14p.
The 1 year high share price is 24.50p while the 1 year low share price is currently 5.75p.
There are currently 76,678,057 shares in issue and the average daily traded volume is 457,116 shares. The market capitalisation of Valirx is £5,079,921.28.
03/11/2016
09:34
thebossman: Bobby..your words(pointless RNS)then the one last year was even more pointless but had the effect of sending our share price into freefall..A strongly worded email from you to the company is needed i guess if you feel todays RNS was pointless and share their response with BB..fingers crossed as always and regards.. ValiRx PLC Stmnt re Share Price Movement RNS Number : 3571O ValiRx PLC 27 May 2015 ValiRx Plc ('ValiRx' or the 'Company') Statement re Share Price Movement The board of ValiRx notes the recent increase in the Company's share price and confirms that it is not aware of any reason that would lead to such a movement. ValiRx Plc Tel: +44 (0)20 3008 4416 Dr Satu Vainikka www.ValiRx.com
19/5/2016
09:42
thebossman: A statement from valirx reads as follows.. ValiRx PLC Stmnt re Share Price Movement RNS Number : ValiRx PLC 19 May 2016 ValiRx Plc ('ValiRx' or the 'Company') Statement re Share Price Movement The board of ValiRx notes the recent fall in the Company's share price and confirms that it is not aware of any reason that would lead to such a movement. For more information, please contact:And the best of luck with the answer you get.. ValiRx plc Tel: +44 (0) 20 3008 4416 www.ValiRx.com Dr Satu Vainikka, Chief Executive Tel: +44 (0) 20 3008 4416 Tarquin Edwards, Head of Communications. Tel: +44 (0) 7879 458 364 tarquin.edwards@ValiRx.com Mark Treharne, Corporate Development Manager Tel: +44 (0) 7736 564 686 mark.treharne@ValiRx.com Cairn Financial Advisers LLP (Nominated Adviser) Tel: +44 (0) 20 7148 7900 Liam Murray / Avi Robinson Northland Capital Partners Limited (Broker) Tel: +44 (0) 20 7382 1100 Patrick Claridge / David Hignell (Corporate Finance) John Howes / Abigail Wayne (Broking)
09/5/2016
11:07
defcon3: AIM-listed ValiRx (VAL) operates in the biotech space, developing cancer drugs. I've been pretty beastly in previous pieces (see HERE) but I am pleased to note that the company has seen fit to address the questions asked over Companies House filings. As pointed out HERE they were indeed wrong and they have now been corrected. Good news. My hope is that the questions over the Bracknor funding deal will now be addressed.We were originally told that up to £4 million could be drawn in tranches of £500,000, which could then be converted into equity at 90% of a volume-weighted average price formula, and that warrants would also be issued alongside conversion shares as portions of the debt were converted, at a rate of 115% of the number of shares issued on conversion.We were not told how the warrant exercise price would be derived, but helpfully the Bracknor website stated that its funding package was for up to £8.6 million, which conveniently worked out that the tranches of warrants would be exercisable at the same price as the issue price of the relevant tranches of conversion shares.But the subsequent announcements of conversions and warrant issues did not match the 115% originally stated, and we left with the very unsatisfactory situation of being told that the terms of the warrant issues had been changed. Now we know neither the number of warrants to be issued, nor the exercise price!As it happens, the Bracknor website still maintains that the maximum funding package is £8.6 million. We have been told that a total of 6,367,663 warrants were issued, exercisable at 9p, pursuant to the conversion of the first £500,000 tranche of convertible loan (out of £4 million).The maths works out (within rounding errors) that if the share price does not move whilst ValiRx draws down the rest of its cash under the Bracknor deal, and Bracknor converts all of the debt then £4.6 million would indeed be raised from the exercise of the warrants issued.This is all very well, but I cannot see from what has been announced how the number or the exercise price of the warrants is calculated. As such, despite having a sympathetic approach to companies developing cancer therapies, I cannot get as far as assessing any value here: I simply don't know how much I might be diluted by.That, and the small matter of shareholder authorities for the issuance of shares and rights to subscribe for or to convert any securities into shares granted at the last AGM which have now been heavily utilised to the point where I can't see how the company has the authority to draw even a second tranche of the funding deal (let alone all of the remaining seven) without seeking a big increase at the next AGM leaves me unable to get down to trying to assess whether to bung a few quid into this fine enterprise. Perhaps now that the Companies House filings have been sorted out we'll get an update on that, as well as how the warrant terms are now calculated. I really do hope so, as this is just the sort of investment I would like to consider: the opportunity to take a small stake in something which benefits society as well as offering a decent return is very attractive to me. But until I have some idea of what I might end up owning I can't make that step.With on-going clinical trials the company has bills to pay and one can fully appreciate the desire for a funding package to be in place – even if the company is simply using it as a kind of insurance policy to fall back on if other funding or corporate deals fail to materialise as hoped. It would be wrong to put the clinical trials at risk, given the effect on the patients involved.I have previously pointed to a bit of a problem in the shareholder authorities currently in place, which allows the board to issue more confetti. At the last count there were 49,218,931 shares in issue, and a further 6,367,663 warrants to subscribe at 9p had been handed to Bracknor. That makes a total of 55,586,594 shares and warrants.As I understand it the authorities currently in place allow the company to go up to a little over 60 million shares and/or agreements to allot shares or grant rights to subscribe or to convert any security into shares. So my understanding is that headroom now available amounts to another 5 million shares or rights etc. That is, of course, a long way short of the number of shares and warrants issued as the result of the full conversion of the first £500,000 of the Bracknor package and so I rather doubt that there can be any further drawdown until a new shareholder authority is in place.Against that we have an AGM coming up – last year it was held on 15 May, after the FY14 results had been released on 16 April. One might imagine, then, that results are imminent. It will be interesting to see what proposals are put to shareholders with regard to future share issuance. By my maths, if the share price remains where it has been through the drawdown and conversion of the first tranche of Bracknor funding, we are looking at a further 44.5 million warrants being issued alongside around another 46 million shares. That is quite some dilution – and my fear is that it could be worse as Bracknor will no doubt be selling its conversion shares as well as any shares issued from the exercise of warrants.Why do I assume this? Well the first £500,000 tranche saw Bracknor issued with a total of 6.7 million conversion shares. Had Bracknor held on to those shares it would now hold 13.6% of the issued equity which would have seen a few TR-1s flying around. There have been none so I assume that Bracknor has dumped in smart fashion – which suggests that this will continue if/when any further tranches of funding are drawn by the company.Whilst it is to be noted that the share price has been fairly stable through the (now complete) conversion of tranche 1, I would be less than certain that this will be the case going forward with the other (up to) seven: the nature of death spiral funding tends to place heavy downward pressure on the share price. There is the obvious risk that a falling share price will mean that the conversion price falls and thus the number of conversion shares which need to be issued rises substantially.Of course, if some corporate deal comes along then one assumes that the remaining Bracknor facility will not be needed. I guess that's the investment risk.I'd like some clarity over those warrants before considering an investment, and I'll wait for the AGM notice to see what is proposed with regard to authorities sought by the board for the issue of further shares. If that is limited and the warrant issue is cleared up I'll take a closer look t- See more at: http://www.shareprophets.com/views/20604/hooray-valirx-corrects-companies-house-filings-good-now-about-that-bracknor-death-spiral#sthash.Ktd6zKnK.dpuf
26/4/2016
17:35
thebossman: Every day you can Learn something new about investing... By Ken Little Why is a stock that cost $50 less than another stock priced at $10? This question opens a point that often trips up beginning investors: The per-share price of a stock is thought to convey some sense of value relative to other stocks. Nothing could be farther from the truth. In fact, except for its use in some calculations, the per-share price is virtually meaningless to investors doing fundamental analysis. If you follow the technical analysis route to stock selection, it’s a different story, but for now let’s stick with fundamental analysis. The reason we aren’t concerned with per-share price is that it is always changing and, since each company has a different number of outstanding shares, it doesn’t give us a clue to the value of the company. For that number, we need the market capitalization or market cap number. The market cap is found by multiplying the per-share price times the total number of outstanding shares. This number gives you the total value of the company or stated another way, what it would cost to buy the whole company on the open market. Here’s an example: Stock price: $50 Outstanding shares: 50 million Market cap: $50 x 50,000,000 = $2.5 billion To prove our opening sentence, look at this second example: Stock price: $10 Outstanding shares: 300 million Market cap: $10 x 300,000,000 = $3 billion This is how you should look at these two companies for evaluation purposes. Their per-share prices tell you nothing by themselves. What does market cap tell you? First, it gives you a starting place for evaluation. When looking a stock, it should always be in a context. How does the company compare to others of a similar size in the same industry? The market generally classifies stocks into three categories: Small Cap under $1 billion Mid Cap $1 - $10 billion Large Cap $10 billion plus Some analysts use different numbers and others add micro caps and mega caps, however the important point is to understand the value of comparing companies of similar size during your evaluation. You will also use market cap in your screens when looking for a certain size company to balance your portfolio. Conclusion Don’t get hung up on the per-share price of a stock when making your evaluation. It really doesn’t tell you much. Focus instead on the market cap to get a picture of the company’s value in the market place.
03/4/2016
06:43
defcon3: On 21 March this year, AIM-listed ValiRx (VAL) announced a convertible loan facility with Bracknor Fund Ltd. It was announced that the company could draw down up to £4 million in tranches of £500,000. But it seems that some of the information given was either wrong or just missing, not to mention a small problem of share issuance authorities which look to be insufficient to seal the deal. Having had no reply to two emails sent to the company, I am assuming that the conclusions I have come to are correct. It is not pretty.Firstly there is the small matter of just how much has been raised. ValiRx says up to £4 million. But looking at the Bracknor website, I see that Bracknor thinks it will fork out up to £8.6 million. This is, perhaps explained by the issuance of warrants as part of the package – but even that is mired in confusion and missing information.Firstly, the company's 21 Mar RNS does not say at what price the warrants are exercisable. This had me getting out the calculator: what we were told is that the number of warrants to be issued as part of the tranches of loan conversion would amount to 115% of the number of loan conversion shares issued. If we do the maths (215% of £4 million = £8.6 million) then it seems that these conversion warrants are to be exercisable at the same price the shares issued in the associated loan conversion – which is calculated as being 90% of a volume weighted average price formula.Of course, that does not mean that there might exist an alternative mechanism which could be even worse – see Cynical Bear's excellent demolition of the deal between Vast Resources and Crede (HERE). The company has not indicated that this might be the case – but since it has not bothered to give full details of its package with Bracknor one is inclined to consider all possibilities.We are told that:The Company has agreed to issue CLN Warrants such that, at the point of any conversion of CLNs ("Conversion"), the Company shall issue CLN Warrants to Bracknor at a rate of 115% of the number of shares to be issued pursuant to the corresponding Conversion. The CLN Warrants shall be exercisable at any time prior to the fifth anniversary of the date of their issue.This brings us to yesterday's RNS which announced that the first tranche of £500,000 loan notes had been issued, and Bracknor had applied to convert the first £90,000 of them: 1,184,211 shares are to be issued as a result – which works out at 7.6p per share. So we might expect an issue of warrants over 115% of 1,184,211 shares = 1,361,842 warrants.But what we are told is that: Pursuant to the Bracknor agreement the Company has also issued Bracknor with a warrant over 4,926,741 ordinary shares in the Company, which may be exercised at a price of 9 pence per share at any time until the fifth anniversary of issue, being 31 March 2021.Er....that's not 115%, is it?!Let us go back to the 21 Mar RNS:As part of the agreement, the Company has agreed to issue warrants to Bracknor ("CLN Warrants"). Further details of the CLNs and the CLN Warrants are set out below.Aha – are there "Warrants" and "CLN Warrants", then? Why were there no details the "Warrants" given in that RNS?And are we to expect a further RNS at some point detailing the issue of another 1,361,842 "CLN Warrants" as a result of the conversion of £90,000 of CULs?Why has ValiRx not been clear about all this? I suggest that "CLN Warrants" will indeed be issued, exercisable at 7.6p. The 9p exercise price of the "Warrants" looks to be a bit of a red herring, given that the share price is sitting at 8.125p mid. The death spiral effect of the funding package looks to me to be set to have only one effect on the share price – and it is not an upward movement!I think ValiRx has not given enough detail about this Bracknor funding package and it needs to come clean.Now let us consider the effect of the package as a whole. If we (extremely generously) assume that the share price is not forced lower by the death spiral effect, and assume that the whole loan ends up being converted at 7.6p, we will see 52.6 million shares being issued as a result. Add in the "CUL Warrants": 115% of 52.6 million = 60.5 million. That's a total of 113.1 million shares, once the warrants have been exercised.But at the last AGM there were (after a capital reorganisation) about 31 million shares in issue, and the board was given authority to issue a further (approx.) 31 million shares. Since then we have seen about 12 million shares issued in a placing and a funding package with YA Global. That leaves authority for the issue of about another 19 million shares.Yet ValiRx has just handed out about 1.2 million shares, 4.9 million "Warrants" and looks to me to be set to dish out a further 1.4 million "CUL Warrants".It rather looks to me as though the company is going to need a very substantial increase in the number of shares it is allowed to issue when it comes to the next AGM.Will the turkeys vote for Christmas? Have shareholders realised that even on an unchanged share price they are set to be diluted by 118 million shares under this deal with Bracknor?One might also consider the implications of Rule 9 of the Takeover Code. Bracknor, one assumes, will not want to go over 30% of the company for fear of triggering a mandatory bid. But with all those shares heading its way, there is a simple solution to that little problem.....Sell!- See more at: http://www.shareprophets.com/views/19807/valirx-have-we-been-told-the-truth-the-whole-truth#sthash.w7TDBBGN.dpuf
22/7/2015
10:58
francoismyname: Singer88 , I appreciate you dislike this trader guy as he may have been under hand in his dealings over on another stock. That said we have all seen the message from you numerous times now that he cannot be trusted and we can all filter him should we see fit. I fear that whatever stock this trader buys you will follow him around the boards without you knowing yourself anything about that said company. Indeed if this trader person invested in British Telecom you would follow him and say it's a pump and dump. I conclude by saying that if you understood Val and where we are as a company you would clearly recognize with an £11m market cap , this certainly is not a P&D. The company is valued significantly less than its peers and the market is acting in an inefficient manner with regards to the Val share price.
12/3/2015
09:32
thebossman: A little info on what shareholder value should mean from ft.com Part 2 Shareholder value is an outcome, not an objective Terry Smith Most strategies to increase earnings are short-termist or risky In the first article of this two-part series I explained how I define the term shareholder value: whether or not a company is able to generate a sustained return on capital employed (“ROCE”) above its cost of capital. This time I want to link that definition with shareholder activism. When an activist shareholder becomes involved in a company, the modus operandi is often something like this. More TERRY SMITH What exactly do we mean by ‘shareholder value’? Let’s all do the corporate hokey-cokey Why I don’t own bank shares Eureka! I discovered how funds are named 1. Acquire a stake in the company, usually via on-market purchases; 2. Campaign noisily for change, which can entail the company trying to sell itself to an acquirer, splitting itself into a number of listed entities for each of its activities, taking on more debt, buying back its own shares, or some combination of these; 3. The share price rises as a result of excitement about this activity, which it is claimed will “create shareholder value” and benefit all investors; 4. Sell the shares at a profit. Nothing wrong with that, you might think, and certainly not from the point of view of the activist. But there is plenty wrong for those of us who are long-term investors and actually want to own the shares to gain from their ability to compound in value over time. We are often left trying to make sense of fragmented businesses, new management teams, higher leverage, the costs of separation or integration and financial statements which are rendered incomprehensible by many adjustments. This particular problem of activism comes from confusing creating shareholder value with making the share price go up. One should lead to the other, but when short-term share price movements become the main objective, as they clearly are with many activists, the inevitable byproduct is future problems for the business and its long-term shareholders. EPS takes no account of the capital required to generate it, or the return on that capital - Terry Smith Tweet this quote You might conclude from this that the main target of my criticism is activists who pursue corporate action to promote short-term share price gains. But there are plenty of pitfalls for exponents of shareholder value, including those who embrace my own view on how to measure its creation. Too often, the measures of shareholder value creation become the objectives of management. ROCE is after all only a financial ratio. In order to improve it, executives focus on getting the numerator to rise or reducing the denominator, or both. The numerator is usually taken as operating profit, which may be increased by raising prices (which may lose market share and build a platform for competitors), cutting costs (which is not a likely source of growth), and cutting research, product development and marketing spend (to the long-term detriment of the company). When it comes to the denominator, managers usually look to reduce the capital employed by “de-equitising” the business, using debt to buy back shares. But if the pursuit of improving shareholder value in the form of high ROCE can lead to problems, they are nothing compared to those which can arise when growth in earnings per share is the target. A fixation on earnings per share (EPS) is one factor behind the mania which has developed for share buybacks. In an era of zero interest rates, every buyback which reduces cash or increases debt can be claimed to be “accretive to EPS”. Sadly, it doesn’t actually make the shrunken share base any more valuable. When it comes to misconceived actions which aim to boost shareholder value metrics, Stanley Druckenmiller, the legendary hedge fund manager, has described IBM as a “poster child”. Last year, IBM abandoned its 2015 EPS target of $20 per share, having made only $10.76 in the first three quarters of 2014. The computer services business had delivered its “IBM 2015 Roadmap” in May 2010, purporting to show how IBM would increase its 2010 EPS of $11.52 per share to $20 by 2015. Terry Smith Read more articles by FT Money’s columnist Quite why any other investor should be impressed with this goal, even if IBM could achieve it, is beyond me. As I never tire of reminding people, EPS takes no account of the capital required to generate it, or the return on that capital. The IBM “road map” described a number of “bridges”; to growth in EPS. Roughly 40 per cent was to come from revenue growth, although this included acquisitions; 30 per cent “operating leverage” (cost cutting, in English); and 30 per cent from share “buybacks̶1;. Acquisitions, cost cutting and share buybacks are not a particularly high-quality source of growth. The cost cutting and share buybacks are certainly finite — you can’t shrink your business to growth. The outcome for IBM has been inevitable, and not good. Investors and executives need to realise that the creation of shareholder value is an outcome — not an objective.
12/3/2015
09:31
thebossman: A little info on what shareholder value should mean from ft.com Part 1 What exactly do we mean by ‘shareholder value’? Terry Smith Returns consistently exceed the cost of capital As an investor you will probably have encountered two terms which have the word “shareholder” in common: shareholder value and activist shareholder. Just before the end of last year we were contacted by an activist investor who has a stake in one of our portfolio companies to discuss a set of proposals. They basically amounted to a demand that the company should seek to sell itself to one of its competitors to “create additional shareholder value”. More ON THIS TOPIC Buybacks sustain US bull run Smart Money Activist investors carried by bull run Inside Business Activist investors tread softly in Asia Fanuc placed under uncomfortable spotlight TERRY SMITH Shareholder value — outcome not objective Let’s all do the corporate hokey-cokey Why I don’t own bank shares Eureka! I discovered how funds are named This set me thinking again about the nature of shareholder value, and indeed activism. In this and a subsequent article, I’ll attempt to explain what I think these terms really mean and how they fit into the world of investment. Company managers, fund managers and activists investors often say they are committed to generating or releasing shareholder value without ever spelling out precisely what that means. For me, it is simply determining whether or not a company is creating additional wealth for its ultimate owners, and whether its managers are acting appropriately to achieve this. I’m not sure this is everyone’s definition, though. Latterly I have come to wonder whether this concept has come to be misused, like so many others in finance. Put simply, my definition of value creation is when a company delivers returns that are above the cost of the capital used to generate them. Companies are in essence just like us. If you borrow money at a cost of 10 per cent a year and invest it at a return of 5 per cent a year you will become poorer. If you invest it at a return of 20 per cent a year you will become richer. Similarly, companies which consistently make returns above their cost of capital become more valuable and vice versa. A company that can sustain a return on capital above its cost of capital creates value for its shareholders, who should want it to retain at least part of its profits to reinvest at these attractive rates of return rather than handing them all over as dividends or using them to buy back shares. I define returns as the “return on capital employed” or Roce. That is fairly easily determined from company accounts; it’s basically operating cash flow divided by the sum of shareholders’ equity and net debt. Terry Smith Read more articles by FT Money’s columnist Determining what the cost of capital is for a company is rather more difficult. If you borrow money at a cost of 10 per cent in order to invest, then your cost of capital is fairly clear. A company’s cost of debt capital is equally clear and can often be found in, or calculated from, the notes to its accounts. But what about the cost of its equity? The commonest way of estimating this uses the so-called capital asset pricing model, often snappily known as “Cap-M” after its acronym. This defines the cost of equity capital as a risk-free rate, usually taken as the yield on government bonds in the same currency as the company, plus a risk premium. This premium is observed over time from the actual return that equities deliver relative to the bonds that form the risk-free rate. If I haven’t lost your attention with that last paragraph, I’d be amazed. And therein lies one of the problems: a company’s cost of capital is not easy to define and can only ever be an estimate. These problems have been compounded more recently because of the financial crisis. This has led some investors to query whether government bonds are truly risk-free, while ultra-low official interest rates, quantitative easing and a lack of inflation have sent bond yields down to record lows and even into negative territory. Terry Smith Shopping trolleys are pictured outside a...Shopping trolleys are pictured outside a Tesco supermarket in north London, on August 29, 2014. British supermarket giant Tesco on Friday issued another profits warning and slashed its shareholder dividend by 75 percent, blaming challenging trade and high investment costs. AFP PHOTO/Leon NealLEON NEAL/AFP/Getty Images How investors ignored the warning signs at Tesco Perhaps because cost of capital is not straightforward to define or compute, the most commonly accepted means of measuring value creation is growth in earnings per share (EPS), which is just the profits net of tax divided by the number of shares in issue. What could be simpler to calculate? Not much — which is probably why so much importance is attached to this simplistic measure of performance and its related valuation metric, the price/earnings ratio. Look through any analyst’s research and you’ll find dozens of references to them, often on the front page. Simple they may be, but EPS and p/e ratios suffer from some serious flaws. The most important is that they take no account of the capital employed or the returns made on it. As the Tesco example shows, it is perfectly possible for a company to generate rising EPS at the same time as it is employing increasing amounts of capital at falling and inadequate rates of return. In other words a company can be busy destroying shareholder value even as it increases its earnings. So I’m sticking with Roce as my preferred measure of value creation. But of course neither Roce nor EPS is the same as making the share price go up. This, I suspect, is an even more common definition of shareholder value creation, especially among activist investors — of which more in the next column.
11/12/2011
13:17
cautiousmoney: response from worlitzer................ Hi Fragma, thanks for reading and responding to my post. I am not peed off as you say, I just think that the deal done by VAL in the disposal of ValiBio has turned out to be a very poor one from VAL's view point. You, as an investor, clearly think that VAL's management can deliver on their strategy and create shareholder value from acquiring, enhancing and, at the appropriate time, licensing or selling on their IP. I, as a potential investor, am seeking to determine the likelihood of their success in this endeavor. So far, we have evidence in just two cases, first – the investment in Morphogenisis INC, which appears to have been a failure – and, second - the development and disposal of ValiBio, which you presumably consider to have been a success and I do not. When VAL entered into the Valibio disposal agreement with Volition, the expectation was that Volition would complete an IPO and that VAL would receive shares priced at an active trading mid bid/ask share price. Satu, herself, opined that VAL expected to hold c. 20% of Volition. Why were her expectations at that level? Presumably, she expected that an IPO would give rise to a reasonably accurate assessment of the worth of the business. A reasonable assumption as any offering to the public must be priced at a level which the public believes either reflects the correct value of the floating company or undervalues it. Volition had not made any offering to the public so no such value has been determined. As Volition could not float through the public offering route, they obtained funding through issue of shares for services received and from placings for cash all at share prices negotiated between Vol and the providers of the services/cash. Incidentally I did refer to these in my original post, a point you missed despite reading my post a few times. Fifteen months ago, this price was 10 cents a share and subsequent share issues have been made at 50 cents until 6 months ago when the price doubled to $1.00 then immediately prior to the quote, $1.25. What happened to raise this share price to between $2 and $3? Nothing, apart from a reverse takeover of a US quoted company with negative net assets and no business. An initial public offering of shares raises awareness of the company in broker and investor circles helping to create a market – obtaining a quote by reverse takeover does not create this awareness nor does it create a block of shares for trading thus severely limiting the market. Even leaving 1.2m shares in the hands of Standard Capital's hands has not helped. I agree with you that I cannot blame Volition for the low trading volumes and thus the possible artificiality of the share price. I do not blame them, I blame VAL for not building in safeguards against such an eventuality. You say why get upset, VAL has $200,000 more than they would have had at a Vol share price of $2.60. I say why be happy when Satu confidently expected VAL to have 20% of Vol and they end up with less than 6%. You ask whether I have actually looked at Volition. I have and can find nothing to validate your assertion that Vol were a successful company with their own IP and products prior to the acquisition of ValiBio. Perhaps, from your research, you can tell me something of their success and product development in the 30 odd days that they were in existence prior to buying ValiBio. Do you believe that Volition (using your words, VAL's cash intensive non-core technology) is worthy of its market capitalisation of $18m at an share price of $2.11? If you do not, then VAL have come out of this deal very poorly and if you do then it appears that VAL were foolish to sell ValiBio for just $1.61m just 15 months ago. After all, VAL could have invested $950k of services and $1.9m cash in ValiBio and turned that into $18m themselves. It still seems ludicrous that the initial Vol shareholders received 3.5 million shares for services of $350,000 yet VAL who, at the same time, contributed the whole established business to Vol, get $400k and 510k shares. After all, which of these contributions was the more valuable at the time? Good luck with the long and strong. For me, its wait and watch. W.
11/12/2011
13:17
cautiousmoney: Hi Fragma, thanks for reading and responding to my post. I am not peed off as you say, I just think that the deal done by VAL in the disposal of ValiBio has turned out to be a very poor one from VAL's view point. You, as an investor, clearly think that VAL's management can deliver on their strategy and create shareholder value from acquiring, enhancing and, at the appropriate time, licensing or selling on their IP. I, as a potential investor, am seeking to determine the likelihood of their success in this endeavor. So far, we have evidence in just two cases, first – the investment in Morphogenisis INC, which appears to have been a failure – and, second - the development and disposal of ValiBio, which you presumably consider to have been a success and I do not. When VAL entered into the Valibio disposal agreement with Volition, the expectation was that Volition would complete an IPO and that VAL would receive shares priced at an active trading mid bid/ask share price. Satu, herself, opined that VAL expected to hold c. 20% of Volition. Why were her expectations at that level? Presumably, she expected that an IPO would give rise to a reasonably accurate assessment of the worth of the business. A reasonable assumption as any offering to the public must be priced at a level which the public believes either reflects the correct value of the floating company or undervalues it. Volition had not made any offering to the public so no such value has been determined. As Volition could not float through the public offering route, they obtained funding through issue of shares for services received and from placings for cash all at share prices negotiated between Vol and the providers of the services/cash. Incidentally I did refer to these in my original post, a point you missed despite reading my post a few times. Fifteen months ago, this price was 10 cents a share and subsequent share issues have been made at 50 cents until 6 months ago when the price doubled to $1.00 then immediately prior to the quote, $1.25. What happened to raise this share price to between $2 and $3? Nothing, apart from a reverse takeover of a US quoted company with negative net assets and no business. An initial public offering of shares raises awareness of the company in broker and investor circles helping to create a market – obtaining a quote by reverse takeover does not create this awareness nor does it create a block of shares for trading thus severely limiting the market. Even leaving 1.2m shares in the hands of Standard Capital's hands has not helped. I agree with you that I cannot blame Volition for the low trading volumes and thus the possible artificiality of the share price. I do not blame them, I blame VAL for not building in safeguards against such an eventuality. You say why get upset, VAL has $200,000 more than they would have had at a Vol share price of $2.60. I say why be happy when Satu confidently expected VAL to have 20% of Vol and they end up with less than 6%. You ask whether I have actually looked at Volition. I have and can find nothing to validate your assertion that Vol were a successful company with their own IP and products prior to the acquisition of ValiBio. Perhaps, from your research, you can tell me something of their success and product development in the 30 odd days that they were in existence prior to buying ValiBio. Do you believe that Volition (using your words, VAL's cash intensive non-core technology) is worthy of its market capitalisation of $18m at an share price of $2.11? If you do not, then VAL have come out of this deal very poorly and if you do then it appears that VAL were foolish to sell ValiBio for just $1.61m just 15 months ago. After all, VAL could have invested $950k of services and $1.9m cash in ValiBio and turned that into $18m themselves. It still seems ludicrous that the initial Vol shareholders received 3.5 million shares for services of $350,000 yet VAL who, at the same time, contributed the whole established business to Vol, get $400k and 510k shares. After all, which of these contributions was the more valuable at the time? Good luck with the long and strong. For me, its wait and watch. W.
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