Share Name Share Symbol Market Type Share ISIN Share Description
Gulf Keystone Petroleum LSE:GKP London Ordinary Share BMG4209G1087 COM SHS USD0.01 (DI)
  Price Change % Change Share Price Bid Price Offer Price High Price Low Price Open Price Shares Traded Last Trade
  +121.70p +9,361.54% 123.00p 121.00p 124.00p 132.00p 120.00p 132.00p 597,691.00 16:35:15
Industry Sector Turnover (m) Profit (m) EPS - Basic PE Ratio Market Cap (m)
Oil & Gas Producers 58.5 -91.1 -9.8 - 282.20

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Date Time Title Posts
11/12/201601:59THE NEW GKP / Drilling for Super Giants (moderated)529,225.00
10/12/201622:33Grotto 3 - Until Forked Lightning Gets Us Banned1,157.00
10/12/201610:55GKP - The Last Days5,037.00
10/12/201609:26CSI GKP - Ongoing Police Investigation212.00
08/12/201623:49GKP - The Road To Takeover (by bondholders)267.00

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DateSubject
10/12/2016
08:20
Gulf Keystone Daily Update: Gulf Keystone Petroleum is listed in the Oil & Gas Producers sector of the London Stock Exchange with ticker GKP. The last closing price for Gulf Keystone was 1.30p.
Gulf Keystone Petroleum has a 4 week average price of 1.20p and a 12 week average price of 1.50p.
The 1 year high share price is 132p while the 1 year low share price is currently 1.12p.
There are currently 229,429,566 shares in issue and the average daily traded volume is 54,706,396 shares. The market capitalisation of Gulf Keystone Petroleum is £282,198,366.18.
02/12/2016
18:23
oil_investor: Something from the vaults lol .................................................................................... I have now taken a closer look at the latest Investor Presentation, since nobody much else appears to have done so. 1. Valuations The Enterprise Value is given as $341 million, with the median analysts' asset value at $896.1 million. The latter would equate to a diluted share price of 3.2 pence (or £3.20 after the forthcoming consolidation). The current CPR gives an NPV of $4.615 billion for GKP's interest in Shaikan, based upon the 3P Reserves (GKP Working Interest of 551 million barrels) at a discount rate of zero. This would equate to a diluted share price of 16.5 pence, which is more than an order of magnitude above the current diluted share price. Whilst this figure would reduce with the application of a discount rate, a counterbalancing factor is that GKP have not included the Shaikan Contingent or Prospective Resources in the NPV valuations quoted in the Presentation. These latter figures are very substantial: for example, the GKP Working Interest in the Shaikan Contingent Oil is 500 million barrels. These numbers are based upon ERC volumetric assessments which were disputed in 2014 by both John Gerstenlauer and John Stafford, but that is of course another matter. The Presentation and the CPR suggest that the current share price does not reflect the underlying value of the assets in the Shaikan Cretaceous, Jurassic, Triassic (and potentially Permian) reservoirs. GKP must presumably share this view, otherwise they could not justifiably refer to the upside potential in the share price. Indeed, by way of an example the Enterprise Value was over one billion dollars when Jon Ferrier was appointed CEO and had previously been very much higher. 2. GKP in the context of Kurdistan as a whole Perhaps rather oddly, the Presentation says that the "USGS reports...estimated undiscovered hydrocarbons of c. 40 billion barrels of oil in Kurdistan". This might perhaps lead to the incorrect interpretation that Shaikan is relatively minor compared to the overall potential of Kurdistan; that USGS figure was actually compiled many years ago and it predates the exploration drilling which has been done over the past decade etc. It has already been established that it was in fact an Oil In Place figure and it did not represent a USGS estimate of economically Recoverable Resources. GKP do not include the Shaikan Oil In Place figure in the Presentation and therefore the positioning of Shaikan within the overall context of Kurdistan is not apparent. The MNR have previously recognised the very substantial contribution of the GKP Oil In Place discoveries to that USGS "marker" figure, and it has become increasingly apparent that Shaikan is far more significant in the overall context of Kurdistan than was ever anticipated when the PSCs were awarded to the International Oil Companies around a decade or so ago. A number of high-profile PSC targets proved unsuccessful for a number of other IOCs when drilled, whereas the exploration success at Shaikan greatly exceeded the pre-drill estimate as was explained to Lord Justice Christopher Clarke at the Excalibur trial in the Commercial Court. So Shaikan - which was dominated by GKP with its small army of PIs - very unexpectedly rose to the top of the pile. The latest Presentation does show GKP already at Number Two in the Kurdistan IOC 2P Reserves table, marginally behind DNO, but any comparison of the USGS Oil In Place estimates with the Recoverable Reserves figures potentially understates what has been found in total during some ten years of exploration drilling in Kurdistan and, in particular, what GKP had discovered under the stewardship of Todd Kozel. 3. Current Production In terms of production, Shaikan is currently producing (when external factors are not hampering operations) about 39,000 bopd. This is a very good performance within the physical constraints: the current surface facilities probably have a "nameplate" capacity (including the benefits of some debottlenecking investment) of somewhere around 45,000 bopd (the figure has not been given by GKP, though individual daily production has been some way in excess of 40,000 bopd demonstrating that 40,000 bopd is not the upper limit) but an oilfield cannot run at full output because of the downtime associated with maintenance etc. work. The current output is not in decline, though the "headline" 40,000 bopd is hardly what Kurdistan needs: well-known declines and failures elsewhere (Tawke, Taq Taq, Akri-Bijeel etc) have required additional output from the Kirkuk area in order to maintain total Kurdistan output. Increasing the Shaikan production substantially, and bringing the adjacent Atrush oilfield onto commercial production, are clearly key objectives. This is why the MNR is currently installing the 10-mile 36-inch 750,000+ bopd Feeder Pipeline from Shaikan to the KPS2 injection point on the main export pipeline. Perhaps the MNR will make a public statement regarding the Feeder Pipeline at the forthcoming Kurdistan Conference, because otherwise the situation regarding Atrush (and Swara Tika) is somewhat unclear. 4. Increasing Production and the associated Capital Expenditure In the near-term, achieving 55,000 bopd at Shaikan represents an "evolution not revolution" appriach. This level is considered relatively straightforward to achieve via the installation of up to 5 Electric Submersible Pumps and one new Jurassic production well, together with the addition of a surface production module. The total cost of this work, excluding contingency, is $58.5 million to $65.4 million though GKP is apparently only liable to fund 64% of that, with MOL carrying 16% and the MNR the remaining 20%. The net cost to GKP is therefore between $37.4 million and $41.9 million excluding contingency: say, about $40 million. This is a very modest sum and represents a much lower cost per flowing barrel (actually less than $3000) than for the baseline 40,000 bopd. Indeed, the current cash-at-bank figure given in the Presentation is $108.9 million and the Shaikan operations are now reported to be cashflow positive. Including a 30% contingency, as GKP have been doing in their presentations, seems somewhat unusual not least because a capex range has already been given. The company says that the capex (of c. $40 million net to GKP) can be "funded from forecast cash flow". This is presumably intended by GKP to indicate to investors that the increase to the 55,000 bopd level can be achieved from revenue going forward, without the need to use any of the existing cash at bank. This appears reasonable, though the company's forecasting of its revenue levels has historically been over-optimistic. A level of 55,000 bopd represents annual production of 20 million barrels. Whilst such numbers are not small they bear little relationship to the future levels which have previously been forecast by GKP for Shaikan. It appears likely that another operator, with broader and deeper financial, technical and human resources would be required to realise the fuller potential within an acceptable timescale. 5. Monies outstanding The Presentation restates the 30 June 2016 figure for the net arrears of $89 million which are due to GKP from the MNR for unpaid oil sales and Government Participation Option back costs. These, together with the current cash at bank and some recent production for which payment is currently awaited, would give GKP a total cash position of some $200 million. With debt of just $100 million at the relatively modest interest rate of 10%, which can be deferred if required, the net cash position would be some $100 million. Additional to that are the recoverable Shaikan sunk costs, which are very substantial. These are probably around $500 million to $600 million net to GKP, the capex required to achieve the incremental 15,000 bopd (to reach 55,000 bopd) being itself recoverable. These monies are recoverable via the PSC Cost Recovery mechanism, going forward. The reduced oil price, which coincided with the commencement of volume production at Shaikan, prevented the recovery of these costs to the anticipated timescale. 6. In summary Broadly, a prospective purchaser would - putting aside the issue of how much recoverable oil there really is in Shaikan - be looking at an established onshore operation with positive cash flow producing 55,000 bopd with substantial upside much of which is relatively easy to address, a Feeder Pipeline in place, around half a billion dollars of recoverable capex and a total production cost in H1 2016 of just $4 a barrel, which is currently among the very lowest in the world.
16/11/2016
17:55
s_murray: An old nugget... wonder what the Sarah update from Dublin GKP AGM will be for the action group. If you held you have been shafted!!!!! It's a new day.... and I'm feeling good! Hello Action Group, it's been awhile! Just giving you an update after I attended the GKP AGM in Paris on Thursday as I know few investors were able to attend. Have you ever woken up in the morning, pulled back the curtains, the sun is shining, the sky is blue and the smell in the air is sweet? That's how i'm going to describe my AGM experience, albeit the chirping birds might come along and softly coat me with something unpleasant - that's the GKP share price and while that is largely unpleasant right now I couldn't help but smile on Thursday as that day had been a long time coming! A couple of us were sat in the bar on Wednesday night when along came Phil Dimmock and Jon Ferrier. After awhile Jon and Phil came and sat with us. What a breath of fresh air! On first impressions Jon isn't far from being a model CEO. He has had many years dealing with Ashti and knows him very well. Knows the business inside out, was the person responsible for moving Maersk in to Kurdistan so knows the area well and delivered his Syrian project on time and on budget despite very difficult circumstances. I asked Jon if he had any other commitments and he stressed that Gulf Keystone Petroleum will be his only priority, his full time job and I believed he takes it very seriously and is willing to give it his full commitment. Jon intends to spend 1 week out of every month in Erbil to maintain his relationship in Kurdistan and to keep up to date and in touch with the business. Not a yacht or a blackberry to be seen! He expressed empathy for some of the positions shareholders found themselves in and without question plans to overhaul Investor Relations as well as to provide opportunities for shareholders to meet with Company Directors and Officials so that they can feel confident in the way the company is progressing and to feedback any concerns of their own that they may have. The over-arching message that came across was that this man has a conscience and as such recognises his responsibility to and has a respect for his shareholders. On the other hand that doesn't make him a push over by any stretch of the imagination. Both him and Sami are very focused, very clear, very switched-on and very driven. The Dynamic Duo. They both set out their very clear vision for the future, - explaining that every barrel of oil sold so far in 2015 has been paid for - that they continue to negotiate with the KRG regarding the outstanding money owed - that expansion plans can only be considered when arrears are paid (or a clear plan is in place showing how they will be paid) - that while the company is up for sale, they will not accept just any offer - ALL the staff that I spoke to at the AGM stressed that the asset is very good, our problems stem from a lack of payment - that they intend to wrap up sales negotiations soon so that serious interest can either make a realistic bid or if not, that the company can focus their energies directly back in to the company. - a board aligned with shareholders - holding stock of their own It was accepted that it would not be in the KRG's interest to see us fail, they too want to see Shaikan and GKP do well. From general chatter, I picked up that our peers do class Shaikan as World Class and I think it was announced on the Wednesday that Kurdistan were going ahead with selling their own oil. All in all, despite the bird poo (the share price) I couldn't help but feel optimistic and relieved that we have the makings of a team that are aligned with us, shareholders and I think / hope that this could be the start of something special! So a big THANK YOU to team SAG, The picture that was painted on Wednesday and Thursday was the vision I had hoped for when SAG started and although it's taken a long time - they do say the best things are worth waiting for! ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- After the AGM a few shareholders asked about SAG and whether they could join. Initially I said it was pretty much dormant now but on reflection I think it would be a good idea to resume. I don't think any sort of action will need to be taken now if Jon drives his team forward with the vision he has set out, but it would cause no harm for shareholders to get together with a united front and be ready to act should a need ever in the future arise. The Institutional Investors have increased their holdings recently, they have a greater say and are well organised (but also conscientious) The bondholders are organised - look how they negotiated the BER issue But yet, the retail investors, GKP's largest group of investors are haphazard. Instead of being motivated to influence any kind of positive change they vent their frustrations or make fun at each other over a bulletin board. Some private investors have invested considerable sums of money in to this stock, this is not a way to behave. If they were over charged £10 at a shop they would speak to the shop owner, and if they got nowhere, they'd write a letter - but they'd sort it out. Here people are sat on losses of tens, if not hundreds of thousands and the best they can do is vent at another shareholder or get annoyed. Time to refocus that energy in my opinion, get your energy, like your money well spent. GKP SAG have proved they can be effective, decisive and efficient (getting our resoluntion in in the short space of time we had with the challenges that we faced in getting the paperwork together was a massive acheivement by all involved. It proved dedication and commitment.) So rather than waste our energies, I have set up a new group for EVERYONE to join who wants to - gkpshareholdergroup.boards.net - I hope to see as many of you over there as possible. It's a new dawn for GKP Let's make a new dawn for GKP's shareholders. All views my own, memory the same. Please don't take any of the above as investment advice.
02/11/2016
09:04
oil_investor: Oh dear. So Nicebut immediately changes his mind, and now says that it isn't the failures of the KRG to pay which are the cause of the GKP share price. It is simply one if a mix of adverse factors. Including appallingly poor Investor Relations and Public Relations. I mean to say: who has ever seen an article quite like the one in the Mail on Sunday?! Shaikan-6 is very interesting indeed. Nicebut believes what ERC have said, even though he now accepts that John Stafford and John Gerstenlauer said that ERC's hypothesis (it was never any more than that, a hypothesis, and the reservoir was wrongly believed to be aquifer-drive at the time) was unsound. But suppose GKP were right? What might that mean?
28/10/2016
08:04
krr13: Broker says new Gulf Keystone is a 'buy', but is an 85% rally possible?08:33 28 Oct 2016The NEW version of Gulf Keystone could rally to 2.7p, according to Cantor, but, analyst Sam Wahab notes that payment arrangements with the KRG remain the key issue."GKP is now a well-capitalised entity," the analyst said. The new version of Gulf Keystone Petroleum Limited (LON:GKP) is a 'buy', so says broker Cantor Fitzgerald, which with a 2.7p target sees some 85% upside to the current share price.It comes after a bruising restructuring saw some indebtedness reduce by US$500mln, to US$100mln, as the majority of the company's equity was handed over to its lenders.Summing up recent events, analyst Sam Wahab in a note says: "Following a turbulent period of corporate activity, GKP has effectively transformed its balance sheet, shredding debt, diluting equity, and divesting assets.He added: "GKP is now a well-capitalised entity, with sufficient resources to grow its production base for sale to the export market in Kurdistan, Iraq."GKP's full focus is now on the Shaikan field, Wahab highlights, though he says the key issue will continue to be whether or not a consistent payment mechanism can be established with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).He notes: "2016 has already seen the semi-autonomous government miss a number of monthly payments."Wahab expects arrears will now have grown to US$64mln, from around US$28mln in June.Nevertheless he highlights that following the restructuring, against a challenging market and civil uncertainty in Iraq, there remains material upside to the GKP share price now that the company's 'burdens' are now partially clear.
20/10/2016
13:54
whites123: MAYA : Mayair. 2 trades of 5000 shares go through (These are not destined for share buyback) and the result is, NMS tightens up and increase of 8% showing. Folk... DYOR etc, but it really is a coiled spring waiting to pop. The company has an approved mandate to buy back 10% of stock at an average price of £1.42. (£5,500,000) all stock bought below means the top price payable goes up. MAYA : Mayair. Very limited PI interest showing in MAYA (Mayair) still, but with just 2 small PI trades showing of £3,700 total the share price has risen some 8%. The company has an approved mandate to spend over £5,500,000 on share buy back program. Its a squeeze of epic proportions. Do some research people... Im like an over excited kid as I have not seen this situation for many a year. MAYA : Mayair Close to £5,500.000 still to spend on share buy back program. Averaged out that equates to over £1.40 per share, but all those bought lower means the upper price to pay can well exceed that marker. Tripling of the share price is easy once stock is in demand. Its a squeeze of epic proportions in the waiting. And yet another RNS from MAYA showing a further share buy back. Each and every time the rns comes out the price increases. Yesterday just 2 purchases. 1 from a PI buying 2,500 shares and the other purchase was a share buy back by the company. They have the mandate to buy approx a further 4 MILLION shares back. The share price will explode... Anyone else here excited about MAYA? (Mayair) They want to buy back 4,247,500 shares (10%) for a maximum of £5,755,750 They have already bought back 340,000 shares for £205,611 So they still have to buy back 3,907,500 shares with £5,550,139 They can pay up to 142p (£5,550,139 / 3,907,500) to acquire the outstanding stock but for every share they buy below 142p, they can pay more than 142p to complete the buy-back, so the price should keep stepping up. The objective of the buy back seems to be to get the share price up. This could triple from here. 19th Oct -2016 RNS today showing they bought back more shares.. In a lightly traded stock like this they have the mandate to buy back almost 4,000,000 more. Where will the share price be by then? Many many multiples of todays price is my best guess.
20/10/2016
07:48
whites123: MAYA : Mayair. Very limited PI interest showing in MAYA (Mayair) still, but with just 2 small PI trades showing of £3,700 total the share price has risen some 8%. The company has an approved mandate to spend over £5,500,000 on share buy back program. Its a squeeze of epic proportions. Do some research people... Im like an over excited kid as I have not seen this situation for many a year. MAYA : Mayair Close to £5,500.000 still to spend on share buy back program. Averaged out that equates to over £1.40 per share, but all those bought lower means the upper price to pay can well exceed that marker. Tripling of the share price is easy once stock is in demand. Its a squeeze of epic proportions in the waiting. And yet another RNS from MAYA showing a further share buy back. Each and every time the rns comes out the price increases. Yesterday just 2 purchases. 1 from a PI buying 2,500 shares and the other purchase was a share buy back by the company. They have the mandate to buy approx a further 4 MILLION shares back. The share price will explode... Anyone else here excited about MAYA? (Mayair) They want to buy back 4,247,500 shares (10%) for a maximum of £5,755,750 They have already bought back 340,000 shares for £205,611 So they still have to buy back 3,907,500 shares with £5,550,139 They can pay up to 142p (£5,550,139 / 3,907,500) to acquire the outstanding stock but for every share they buy below 142p, they can pay more than 142p to complete the buy-back, so the price should keep stepping up. The objective of the buy back seems to be to get the share price up. This could triple from here. 19th Oct -2016 RNS today showing they bought back more shares.. In a lightly traded stock like this they have the mandate to buy back almost 4,000,000 more. Where will the share price be by then? Many many multiples of todays price is my best guess.
08/9/2016
18:26
lifeson: Oilman63 and cutthecagain, This is why you are both very clear and obvious frauds. In early 2012, it was the Market Makers working within the Alternative Investment Market, the junior sub-Market of the London Stock Exchange, who set the GKP share price above £4.00. You would have to ask those individuals why they valued the Company at this price, if they answer "it was due to the ramping of Robert Waterhouse" or any private investor, I will be amazed. What you are suggesting is that a single private investor / small group of private investors by talking up the 'potential' value of the Company on free to post forums has / have managed to manipulate the L.S.E. Market Makers into this "pump" as you call it. You surely must have some idea of how totally ridiculous that sounds. The investor you name so often as the cause of so much pain and financial loss to so many is only one blogger on one or two bulletin boards and is free to air his opinion as is anyone, including yourself. But it is just that, an opinion. It is the duty of anyone old enough to purchase a single share of any particular Stock, whether that Stock has been introduced to them by another or not, to thoroughly investigate and research that Stock, weigh up all the associated risks that may come with it before making up their OWN minds to press the buy button. That is no one's responsibility but theirs. This is what I have done and what any REAL investor would do. It is then up to an investor to hold, buy more or sell at any given time depending on their own position. Some will have sold, some have traded and some have held and added. An investor can only make a profit or a loss when they sell, paper gains or losses are irrelevant in long term investments. You always threaten to post something of note but never do. Now is your chance to do so and claw back some small crumb of credibility which has long since gone. I don't expect a reply from you as I'm a filtered "clown" I believe, well maybe from cutthecagain or joseki and I certainly don't expect to read any REAL revelations from yourself any time soon or ever. Go on and surprise me. By the way, why do you continue to post here when, according to cutthecagain (and she would know), you no longer hold any shares. At least this filtered "clown" is a current GKP investor. However, I very much doubt you have actually sold out but are probably doing quite the opposite and have also traded this with all that ‘inside’ information, by your own admission CPR1 etc. TIA, lifeson ====================================================================================== Oilman63 8 Sep '16 - 15:17 - 514980 of 515005 6 2 Cutt History has been conveniently rewritten across the blogs in an attempt to hide the truth. It goes against the grain to release all I have in my possession as I feel it will severely rock the boat and potentially sink it. What it would do is reveal the true extent of Robert Waterhouse's involvement in the pump & dump that cost so many their life savings. Weighing up my options.
23/8/2016
15:08
wildrider7: ok here are the 2015 questions brought at the AGM, different day, same sheet (DDSS) 1. SHAIKAN OPERATIONS - CURRENT 1.1 What was the flow rate on test of Shaikan-7 and Shaikan-11? 1.2 What is the total potential output of all the Shaikan wells drilled so far, irrespective of the surface capacity at PF-1 and PF-2, at a rate which would not lead to reservoir damage? 1.3 What is the total daily fluid handling capacity of PF-1 plus PF-2 with the de-bottlenecking of PF-2 completed? 1.4 What is the current oil-cut at Shaikan? 2. SHAIKAN OPERATIONS - GOING FORWARD 2.1 What is required to be done to achieve 70,000 barrels of oil per day in terms of wells and surface facilities? Is the leasing of Early Production Facility equipment an option? 2.2. what is the earliest date by which 70,000 bopd could be achieved? 3. SHEIKH ADI OPERATIONS - GOING FORWARD 3.1 what is the total potential daily production capability of the existing Sheikh Adi wells and when will Sheikh Adi be brought onto commercial production? 3.2 is there a "Phase One" production target for Sheikh Adi? What is it? 4. AKRI-BIJEEL OPERATIONS 4.1. in March 2014 Akri-Bijeel was described by the operator Kalegran (MOL) as producing an initial 3,500 barrels of oil per day. In August 2014 it was stated that Akri-Bijeel would reach some 35,000 barrels of oil per day during 2015. What was the average daily production during the past twelve months, what is the current production level, and when will the 35,000 barrels of oil per day level be achieved? 5. RESERVES AND RESOURCES 5.1 ERC Equipoise said in their 12 March 2014 Competent Person Report that they were assuming the fracture porosity at Shaikan to be 0.4%, though Gulf Keystone Petroleum indicated in their presentation the following day that they thought the actual level was higher. In April 2014 John Stafford of Gulf Keystone described the Shaikan reservoirs to the American Association of Petroleum Geologists in Houston, Texas as "highly fractured" and John Gerstenlauer had on 13 March 2014 said that there was "one hell of a fracture system" at Shaikan. He also later described the drill bit at Shaikan dropping some three metres through some sort of void, and cavernous porosity is recorded for the Kurdistan Zagros in the academic literature. The company seems reluctant to publish numbers for the fracture porosity, but in a presentation in May 2012 Gulf said in one of the slides that fracture system had been quantified. Various studies have been done since 2009 by a number of external fracture consultants but the results have never been published. Gulf Keystone said on 13 March 2014 that each additional 0.2% on the Fracture Porosity would add 0.8 billion barrels of Reserves and Resources. The Ryder Scott report of November 2010 appeared to have looked into the Fracture Porosity (p.36/37) without stating what it was, though matrix porosity was given. Ryder Scott stated on page 42 that "The Permeability appears to be extremely high and the porosity consistent with a world class asset." The Competent Person Report lists some - but not all – source documents used in preparing that Report. Were all the studies done both internally and externally into the Shaikan Fracture System given to ERC Equipoise? If so, why are they not referenced? If not, why not? 5.2 what is Gulf's current view of the Shaikan fracture porosity? Expressed as a percentage? 5.3 John Gerstenlauer said on 13 March 2014 that production data would be important in quantifying the Shaikan fracture system. Some ten million barrels of Shaikan crude oil have now been produced. Have new studies been commissioned by Gulf to quantify the fracture porosity? Who has done/is doing them? What do they show? 5.4 the Competent Person Report implied a Recovery Factor for Shaikan of just 12%. This shocked many shareholders, because Adnan Samarrai, John Gerstenlauer and Todd Kozel had all guided a Recovery Factor of about one-third. No examples of a highly-fractured carbonate reservoir, with matrix porosities similar to those of Shaikan's Jurassic reservoirs, can be found in the academic literature with Recovery Factors as low as Shaikan's purported 12% level. A recent Society of Petroleum Engineers conference in Istanbul gave the current average worldwide carbonate Recovery Factor at 30%, and the conference discussed how this average might potentially be raised to 60% or more. Mr. Zouari of Gulf Keystone Petroleum indicated in his March 2015 presentation that the 12% figure should move upwards and by inference Gulf does not consider that 12% is a reliable pointer to the proportion of the Oil In Place which can actually be recovered. What does the company currently believe the Shaikan Recovery Factor to potentially be, assuming gas re-injection? 5.5 what percentage of oil can be recovered from the reservoir matrix, or is it still unknown? 5.6 John Gerstenlauer said in 2014 that there would be updates to the Reserves and Resources numbers for Shaikan. There has been no such update. When will there be such an update? Whose decision is it when such an update will be done? 5.7 Kalegran (MOL) indicated on 13 March 2014 that they were not happy with the figures given by ERC Equipoise for the Reserves and Resources at the Akr-Bijeel oilfield. New figures were promised by MOL but they have not appeared. When will they appear? 5.8 John Gerstenlauer told Lord Justice Christopher Clarke at the Excalibur trial in late 2012, under oath, that the results at Akri-Bijeel kept increasing the value of the asset and that Gulf Keystone were playing it clever and would not sell the asset, which has been for sale as a non-core asset for a long time, too cheaply. When he made that statement under oath he and his colleagues had guided that the Gulf Keystone stake in Akri-Bijeel was worth between $350 million and $500 million. What is the company's current view of the value of this asset, which has so far absorbed a substantial amount of capital and about which the shareholders currently know very little? Were there ever any serious offers for it? 5.9 high recovery rates are potentially possible with secondary recovery ("Enhanced Oil Recovery" or "EOR") methods. Are Gulf Keystone and Kalegran investigating the longer-term application of EOR at Shaikan and Akri-Bijeel? If not, why not? If so, when will the results be available for the shareholders? 6. FINANCES 6.1 what is the price paid per barrel to Gulf for Shaikan export crude as at June 2015? 6.2 what is the price paid per barrel for Gulf for Shaikan domestic crude at June 2015? 6.3 what is the total sum currently owed to Gulf by the Kurdistan Regional Government? 6.4 who decides whether the Shaikan crude is sold into the export or local market? 6.5 can we have an assurance that Texas Keystone interest can in no circumstances exceed 5%? 6.6. the Bond Equity Ratio issue came as a shock to shareholders. Can you give an assurance that there are no other such undisclosed "issues" concerning Gulf's finances? 7. INVESTOR RELATIONS 7.1 why are emails from shareholders left unanswered? 7.2 how many emails sent to the company are currently unanswered? 7.3 why are emails from shareholders to the directors of the company - including emails about why emails are unanswered - not answered? 7.4 why are shareholders prevented from speaking to the directors, despite the UK Corporate Governance Code explicitly stating that the Senior Independent Director needs to be available to shareholders in the event of concerns which are otherwise unanswered? 7.5 why have there been no open presentations, as the company used to give at Oilbarrel and Proactive Investor, for nearly four years? Why are contradictory excuses given by Gulf for not holding such open presentations? 7.6 why should shareholders have to spend their money travelling to Bermuda and Paris to ask questions of directors? Why did Simon Murray fail to address a list of questions put to him on behalf of 130+ shareholders in late 2013? 7.7 why has the Investor Relations Manager responded aggressively to a number of shareholders who asked to see the slides which John Stafford used at the April 2014 American Association of Petroleum Geologists presentation in Houston, Texas? Why should slides, which have been publicly presented to hundreds of people, cause that reaction? Why does the company allow hundreds of non-shareholders who have not signed Non Disclosure Agreements to receive information which is then denied to the shareholders? 7.8 why does the IR manager refuse to make available the slides used by John Stafford at his presentation to the Petroleum Exploration Society of Great Britain in July 2013? 7.9 will you give a commitment to put John Stafford's slides onto the company website, so that the shareholders can see what hundreds of other people have already seen? 7.10 why is the "GulfTV" channel, which was introduced in late 2013 to improve communication with shareholders, which Todd Kozel admitted in the first episode needed improvement, not been more fully used? 7.11 why does Gulf do nothing visible in terms of public relations? 7.12 many shareholders consider that the RNSs are badly written, and fail to convey clarity, and fail to positively promote the company. For example Shaikan is variously described as a "world-class" asset, and as a "major" asset, with the description shifting from week to week, implying that there is significance to these apparent upgrading and downgradings? Another example is an RNS which was interpreted as Mr. Todd Kozel selling almost all his shares, which led shareholders to believe that the Chairman and CEO lacked confidence in the company. In reality this was something linked to repayment of a loan connected with his divorce. Does the company consider this situation with RNSs to be acceptable? If not, what is going to be done about it? 8. COMPANY WEBSITE 8.1 why is the website out-of-date, and why does it remain so despite the company being told at board level, and on a number of occasions, about the problem? 8.2 do the directors ever look at the website? If so, why is there a misleading statement about Sheikh Adi - that a well which was spudded in 2013 is still drilling ahead at 2,240 metres in the Jurassic, but which is actually completed - remain on public view? If not, why? 9. LEAKAGE OF REGULATORY NEWS SERVICE ANNOUNCEMENTS TO SKY NEWS 9.1 has the board discussed the longstanding leakage of Gulf Keystone's RNSs and other company information to Mr. Mark Kleinman of Sky News, and is this referenced in board agenda items and formal minutes? 9.2 does the company know who has been leaking the information? If so, when did it find out, why does it continue, and what action is being taken about it? Have private detectives e.g. Kroll been appointed to investigate and identify the person responsible? If not, why not? 10. SHARE PRICE 10.1 the company's lawyers Memery Crystal claimed that Gulf's share price had dropped in early 2013 because of posts on Twitter by a person called "Spencer Freeman". But Mr Freeman was actually a bullish commentator. The share price has lost some 93% of its value. It cannot possibly be Mr. Freeman who caused the drop in the share price. In July 2013 Todd Kozel said at the Investor Day that the legal claim by Excalibur had imposed a "glass ceiling" on the share price. Mr. Kozel personally described the claim as "frivolous" and two months later the claim was wholly rejected by Lord Justice Christopher Clarke in a damning verdict. The share price when Mr. Kozel made those comments was 151p. It is now about 35p, a drop of some 77%. What explanation does the company now offer for the current share price? 11. BOND EQUITY RATIO ("BER") ISSUE 11.1 the write down of the value of the Akri-Bijeel asset triggered a problem with the BER and required change to the arrangements with Bondholders and to the company's finances. When was the board first told about this problem, and why did the board not deal with it earlier? 12. BOARD AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 12.1 why have so many directors apparently been forced to leave the company since 2013? 12.2 what role did Mr. Todd Kozel play, as an "officer" of the company, between the end of his period as Chief Executive Officer in 2014 and his final departure in 2015? 12.3 the 2014 London Stock Exchange Main Listing Prospectus explicitly stated that Mr. Kozel's presence at the company was essential. Was this true? If so, then assuming it is no longer true, when did this change and why? 12.4 are all board appointments made following an independently conducted search or open advertising process, as recommended by the UK Corporate Governance Code? If not why? 12.5 what is the position regarding the appointment of a new permanent Chairman? 12.6 when is the endless stream of director changes going to stop? 12.7 does the company consider that Umur Eminkahyagil the Kurdistan Country Manager would be a valuable addition to the board, bearing in mind his experience and the fundamental importance to shareholder value of what he and his team in Kurdistan are doing?
23/8/2016
14:39
wildrider7: This was the 2013 letter sent to Simon Murray, signed by 130 shareholders you will see the same questions, same concerns Dear Mr Murray, I am writing to you as representative of a group of private GKP shareholders. In the first instance, we would like to convey our sincerest congratulations to the company in its discovery and development of its world-class assets, and its evidently excellent relationship with the Kurdistan Regional Government throughout this very exciting past 4 years. We all recognise the extraordinarily challenging conditions in which these remarkable achievements have taken place - in a remote, and relatively undeveloped region, with an obviously very turbulent recent past. We are in no doubt this was a unique set of challenges, from which most explorers would have understandably shied away; your subsequent success is therefore all the more rewarding. In addition, we would also like to express our congratulations for the superbly professional, and uncompromising, fashion in which Mr Kozel and Mr Gerstenlauer acquitted the company in the face of the Excalibur litigation team. Their fortitude in this extraordinarily difficult situation is to be applauded, and has reinforced our faith in the strength of the management at the helm of GKP. We are all keen believers in the immense future potential for GKP, and are very enthusiastic to remain invested supporters of the company for the foreseeable future. However, we are getting in touch in response to a growing level of concern with aspects of information disclosure and general investor relations. These are issues which we feel could be addressed in an effort to improve company profile and reputation, and to provide greater clarity and reassurance around the GKP story to existing and potential investors. Our private investor group numbers over 130 people, each with a sufficient holding in GKP to be actively concerned by these issues and the company's current performance. The main content of this letter is a series of questions concerning GKP operational and corporate affairs. These questions have been circulated and agreed by our shareholder group, and represent our mutual concerns. We believe that we are entitled to fuller disclosure from the company concerning these matters; and that the perceived current information gap is damaging the reputation of the company, and with it, the share price. This conclusion is drawn from the widely acknowledged fact that the market is quick to exploit any opportunity to imply weakness or negativity in a company, and drive damaging sentiment in response. We have seen numerous examples of this in recent times, and are keen, therefore, that this trend should be reversed in the future. We are writing to you to request answers that are substantial enough to provide sufficient clarity on the state of our investment. If, for whatever reason, some of these questions cannot be fully answered because of matters unseen by the investment community (such as confidential constraints imposed on you by your political partners in the Kurdistan Regional Government), we request clear explanation of any such limitations on disclosure, and appropriate reassurances that these do not represent an unwarranted threat to the wellbeing of our investment. Before outlining our questions, we believe that you may benefit from understanding the context of our concerns, and our desired outcome. At the most recent Investor Day, the company requested of shareholders that any concerns or questions we may have are addressed to the company; and that the company’s response be taken as the official truth of the matter. The company was understandably concerned by the often feverish, and misleading, speculation that is commonplace amongst the GKP bulletin board community; speculation that spans all matters that are perceived to be of significance to the company’s state of health. We entirely agree that all such speculation should be anticipated, and rendered obsolete, via official company statements and demonstrable transparency in investor relations. The majority of genuine GKP investors would like nothing more than to refer to the company for the facts, and to disregard PI speculation moving forward. There is, therefore, clearly a burden of responsibility on the company in order to ensure the above is achieved. However, it is our belief that the company is not providing sufficient levels, and quality, of information disclosure to deliver to this goal. There are a number of apparent issues in this respect, as follows: We are often left at the mercy of anecdotal feedback from closed-door meetings, or Investor Days, concerning matters that are of apparently critical importance to the company; information that is not officially reported to the market (either to confirm or deny these claims). Such examples (of which there are many), include claims of much higher OIP figures mentioned by the COO at a meeting in New York last year, a partnership with the KRG mentioned at this year’s Investor Day, and the suggestion that Oil Water Contact at Shaikan has been found. In addition, there are apparent examples of delays in releasing highly important information to the market – such as the significant share disposal by the Gokana Trust last year, and, most recently, the shutting down of Shaikan Production Facility 1 on 4th September (only reported on the 19th September, and even then this was absorbed into the body of the interims). There are other examples, but this information is clearly of critical importance to shareholders since it will (and did) affect the market’s rating of GKP. Such delay in reporting is easily exploited by the market to spread negative sentiment and potentially inflate the apparent seriousness of these issues. Where information is officially released to the market via RNS, we have repeatedly witnessed examples of vague or incomplete statements concerning price-critical information; and this has subsequently (and in our view, unnecessarily) fuelled share-price declines. This includes the question of Mr Kozel’s ‘transfer̵7; of 10 million shares earlier this year, and the lack of any explanation for the shutting down, and subsequent resumption, of Production Facility 1. The consequence of this is that we are uncertain as to the true state of affairs for the company at any moment in time, and we cannot estimate the scale of future risk where issues are reported without full explanation (can we, for example, expect future Production Facility closures – essential to understand, given this is our current revenue stream?). The main thrust of our concerns, however, is the simple lack of information on matters that we believe we should have received more recent updates. This includes OIP estimates and recovery rates at Shaikan, status of the BIRs, state of the long-running sales process for the Akri-Bijeel license, current work being performed (or not) by Perella Weinberg on the company’s behalf. The company’s ongoing apparent silence on these matters projects a sometimes negative impression to the shareholder community; we can, at times, feel that we are not necessarily a company priority (whilst accepting you have a great many challenges and obligations to address; of which we are one, albeit important, example). We look forward to your response, and anticipate a renewed positivity in the investor-management relationship moving forward. Best regards Appendix 1: List of questions for the attention of the board of Gulf Keystone Petroleum – 14th October 2013 The following is our detailed list of questions that our group has compiled and on which we would appreciate your comments. We understand that some of our questions are of a potentially price-sensitive nature, and if you can answer, would need to be done so via RNS. It would therefore be appreciated if you could indicate in the first instance whether you can answer such price sensitive questions (and it would also be appreciated that if you are unable to answer any given question, why that is the case). For your convenience, we have attempted to categorise our questions at an overall subject level. 1. RESERVES AND RESOURCES 1.1 Given that it has been over a year since the last Oil In Place estimate for Shaikan was reported to the market, please can you provide an indicative range of the most recent estimates for this figure. 1.2 We are still not in possession of an official quoted Recovery Rate for Shaikan. This is despite the discovery having been made over three years ago, a considerable number of wells having being drilled on the structure, extensive study of the structure by both internal and external geophysicists, and the approval of the Field Development Plan by the Kurdistan Regional Government. What is your estimate of the Recovery Rate; in terms of a range if you cannot give a precise figure at this time? 1.3 The Company has released only limited information about Shaikan-4, Shaikan-5 and Shaikan-6. Why does the company not release details for each well of gross pay, net pay, porosity and permeability for all reservoir formations, so that shareholders can make their own assessments of the potential? 1.4 What is to become of the Shaikan-6 well, now that it is being replaced by Shaikan-10? Given that Shaikan-6 is reputed to be the best well after Shaikan-4, it seems very relevant to get clarity on this point. 1.5 When do you anticipate that Shaikan-7 will enter the Permian? Will you make an announcement regarding the initial finding, or will you wait until the Permian has been flow tested? If the latter, when do you expect to make the announcement? 1.6 It has been said that Shaikan and Sheikh Adi are connected. Can you confirm or deny this, and if true, on how many levels are they connected? 1.7 Can you inform us of the test results for SA2, given these have been apparently in the company's possession for several months. 1.8 What is the Company’s current view of the unrisked potential of the Sheikh Adi block (Gulf Keystone 80%) and the Ber Bahr block (Gulf Keystone 40%) in terms of barrels of Oil In Place? 2. PRODUCTION 2.1 Can the company explain why it did not instruct the market on the commencement of production at the Shaikan Production Facility 1? 2.2 What is the exact cause of the recent cessation of production at the Shaikan PF-1 facility? 2.3 What is the reason for resumption of production at the Shaikan PF-1 facility? 2.4 What is the likely risk of production cessation in the future, on the basis of the reasons for this recent stoppage? 2.5 Can you confirm that the completion and commissioning of the Shaikan PF-2 production facility is on schedule, such that it will be able to commence commercial production before the end of 2013? If this is not the case, please can you explain why? 2.6 Has the production term of the PSC started? 2.7 Do the recent PF-1 cessation, the lack of an oil pipeline, and the oil dispute with Baghdad qualify as force majeure – and therefore freeze the PSC production schedule? 2.8 Why was the Company apparently selling to (unregulated) small local oil refineries? Why is the Company not tankering its 12k bopd Shaikan output to the border with Turkey for export, as Genel does with its 30k-40kbopd? 2.9 The Company advised at the Investor Day that the tie-in “spur” pipeline to connect to Shaikan was being built and paid for by the Kurdistan Regional Government. A six-month timescale was quoted for its completion. Can you please advise the current position, and explain why this information has not been officially released to the market, and why there have been no updates giving details of progress? 2.10 Can the company confirm when exactly the Shaikan spur connection should be completed? If a spur is available by the time the KRG Export Pipeline is completed, will we be able to load product into it - or will this be dependent upon the completion of suitable blending facilities and storage tanks at the (Shaikan) tie-in point? 3. DIVESTMENTS, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 3.1 What is the current position regarding the Shaikan Back-In Rights? Have these been awarded, and if so, to whom? If these have not yet been awarded, what is the reason, and when can we expect this to happen? 3.2 If the BIRs have been awarded, in accordance with the terms of the PSC, will the awarded party be refunding to GKP its share of costs to date? 3.3 At the investor day it was reported that Mr Kozel informed shareholders that the KRG are now our partners. Can you please advise, that if this is the case, where has the KRG's percentage come from? 3.4 If the KRG are paying for the Spur, is this payment a substitute for the costs we could anticipate being refunded to the company as payment, or part payment, for the KRG's percentage of Shaikan? 3.5 What is the exact current position regarding the ongoing sales process of the Company’s stake in Akri-Bijeel? Do we have any buyers lined up, has a conditional sale price been agreed; if so, for approximately how much? 3.6 Is Perella Weinberg still employed by the company? If so, what exactly have they been working on since their services were retained, what are they currently working on, how much have their services cost the company so far? 3.7 There has been extensive speculation in the media about the potential sale of the Company. Would any discussions on the potential sale of all or part of the Company be handled by Perella Weinberg? 4. COMPANY IMAGE AND COMMUNICATIONS 4.1 Please confirm or deny whether the OIP estimates for Shaikan is / are much higher than officially stated to the market; this question results from reports of the CEO and COO’s statements to an Investor group in New York, last year, citing an estimated 18b-21b barrels OIP. If this is the case, please provide an accurate and updated figure, and please explain why this information has not been officially released to the market via RNS. 4.2 Please confirm or deny whether the company has found oil water contact (and if so has this been specifically via the Shaikan-5 and 6 wells), and if so, why this information has not been officially released to the market via RNS. 4.3 Why have RNS announcements often excluded key information, such as the reason for the halt in production at Shaikan and the reason that Mr. Kozel transferred his shares; which causes feverish speculation in the market, and damage to the share price? What steps are you taking to ensure that there is no repetition of such events? 4.4 Please explain why we as shareholders are apparently required to wait until the publication of the listings prospectus before we gain visibilty of the CPR. 4.5 If prospectus publication is to be delayed, are we to therefore assume that notification of the CPR will also be delayed - and if so, please explain why this should be the case 4.6 Please can you provide an update on the status of progress towards main listing, and anticipated timelines from here 4.7 The city appears notoriously dismissive of heavy oil, and this appears to be a reason for their marking down of our assets. Can you advise as to whether any specific measures are being taken to remove this as a perceived barrier to investing in GKP? 4.8 Please can you indicate what steps are being taken to appoint a final new NED as per the RNS referring to this issue over 2 months ago?
18/8/2016
11:44
zorsupas: In the short term, I see the GKP share price going to 170p, at least. Try to keep up.
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