Share Name Share Symbol Market Type Share ISIN Share Description
Zanaga Iron Ore Company Limited LSE:ZIOC London Ordinary Share VGG9888M1023 ORD NPV (DI)
  Price Change % Change Share Price Shares Traded Last Trade
  0.00 0.0% 8.07 0.00 00:00:00
Bid Price Offer Price High Price Low Price Open Price
7.64 8.50
Industry Sector Turnover (m) Profit (m) EPS - Basic PE Ratio Market Cap (m)
Mining -1.42 -0.53 24
Last Trade Time Trade Type Trade Size Trade Price Currency
- O 0 8.07 GBX

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Zanaga Iron Ore Daily Update: Zanaga Iron Ore Company Limited is listed in the Mining sector of the London Stock Exchange with ticker ZIOC. The last closing price for Zanaga Iron Ore was 8.07p.
Zanaga Iron Ore Company Limited has a 4 week average price of 6.80p and a 12 week average price of 5.87p.
The 1 year high share price is 13p while the 1 year low share price is currently 3p.
There are currently 293,034,367 shares in issue and the average daily traded volume is 497,224 shares. The market capitalisation of Zanaga Iron Ore Company Limited is £23,647,873.42.
gta5: Nice find Extrader! I've taken the liberty of doing a bit of cut-n-paste from AFR: Https:// ___________________________________________________________________________________ Glasenberg tips more China pressure on Australian coal, iron ore Peter Ker Peter KerResources reporter Feb 16, 2021 – 11.30pm Save Share Departing Glencore chief executive Ivan Glasenberg says China is certain to develop an African iron ore province to rival Australia’s Pilbara region and will further banish Australian coal shipments for the forseeable future. The comments came as Glencore vowed to give shareholders an advisory vote in April on its plan to have net zero emissions by 2050, because it was a target that required “rapid and far-reaching transitions with deep emissions reductions in all sectors″⁣;. China’s ban on Australian coal was one of several factors to hit Glencore’s profit results on Tuesday night, with its Australian coking and thermal coal divisions losing a combined $US602 million ($772 million) in the six months ended December 31 amid extremely weak prices. While prices for both types of coal have improved over the past four months, Mr Glasenberg joined BHP boss Mike Henry in saying he did not expect China to relax its ban on Australian coal any time soon. “I don’t see the Chinese relenting at the moment,” he said. “It is like moving the deck chairs around, South Africa has picked up a portion of the Australian coal that went into China ... and I believe that will continue while this spat continues between China and Australia.” Mr Glasenberg said a lot of Australian coal now went to India to replace the South African coal that is being sold to China rather than its traditional market in the subcontinent. “The trade routes are changing somewhat and naturally that puts pressure on the freight rates and someone in the end has to absorb that extra freight rate,” he said. “I don’t know if it is downside for Australia, the way I see it, it is maybe downside for consumers a bit. “Long term does it help anyone? I don’t believe so.″⁣ China’s preference for domestically mined coal has led to it paying dramatically higher prices than if it had bought Australian coal, particularly as a cold snap swept the nation in the northern hemisphere winter. But Mr Glasenberg said the higher cost of buying Chinese coal was unlikely to be enough to prompt Beijing to back down on the Australian coal ban. “In the context of the battle I think the amount they are paying for coking coal is so small in the Chinese economy, I am not sure if that would affect it,” he said. Mr Glasenberg said Indonesia’s rapid emergence as a thermal coal exporter over the past 30 years was a reminder to Australia that its modern dominance of iron ore markets was unlikely to last. “Naturally competition will come in eventually, you can’t have that game forever,” he said “When I first joined in coal, Australia was the major exporter of thermal coal, Indonesia was not a player but today Indonesia is exporting 400 million tonnes and Australia is exporting 180 million tonnes or whatever it is. “Australia is a major iron ore exporter together with Vale in Brazil and a competitor is going to come. “Guinea could become an extremely large iron ore exporter and [Australia] are going to get competition, [Australia] has to watch where the competition comes from and adapt.” Simandou certainty Iron ore was Australia’s most lucrative export commodity with shipments worth more than $100 billion leaving these shores in fiscal 2020, and that tally set to rise again in fiscal 2021 on a nine-year high in iron ore prices. The stronger-than-expected prices drove BHP’s half-year profit to a nine-year high on Tuesday and Rio Tinto and Fortescue will also report bumper profits and dividends this week. Rio Tinto and a multinational consortium are mulling adjacent iron ore projects in Guinea’s Simandou mountains, but the projects have traditionally been overlooked because of the extremely high cost of building more than 600 kilometres of infrastructure to carry to iron ore to port. Asked if Simandou was certain to be developed into an iron ore province, Mr Glasenberg said; “Personally yes, I am very certain.” “I cannot believe the Chinese won’t take the opportunity to develop Simandou. “Simandou could become a 200 million to 250 million tonne exporter, there is no reason why they wouldn’t do it and they will do it. “We have seen what they have done in bauxite where Guinea was a very small producer a few years ago and today Guinea is one of the major producers of seaborne bauxite, so there is no question it will come, how long it takes, I don’t know.″⁣ Glencore has a self-imposed cap on coal production as part of its pledge to have net zero carbon emissions by 2050 and has recently refused to reopen Colombia’s Prodeco thermal coal mine because it believes the mine is unviable. That stance has prompted Colombia to threaten to strip Glencore of the mine and find another operator. Mr Glasenberg said aside from Chinese and Indian state owned companies, it was hard to see any companies rushing in to operate coal resources that Glencore left in the ground as part of its climate pledges. “To develop a new coal mine in a lot of these countries you are not going to get financing ... for a private company to get financing for a new coal mine today I see very little chance,” he said. Mr Glasenberg’s successor as chief executive will be Gary Nagle, who spent the past few years in Sydney running Glencore’s Australian coal business. Mr Nagle said Glencore would run down its coal reserves over the next few decades, but would not bother conducting further exploration work on coal “resources” of lower geological certainty. “We have a very large resource base far bigger than our reserve base, but we are not planning to develop that resource, we are not going to convert those resources into reserves and then develop them into mines, they will stay where they are,” said Mr Nagle. Asked how he would spend retirement, Mr Glasenberg said he “had a few ideas” and would be continuing to own his shares in Glencore. Glencore posted a $US4.41 billion underlying profit for 2020, which was slightly higher than last year, with the result driven by its trading business rather than its mining business. Glencore said the volatility caused by the coronavirus and associated lockdowns had created good conditions for its trading business to seize on commodity price arbitrages around the world. ___________________________________________________________________________________
pugugly: So Shard flogged 7 million shares at 5.9p net to Zanga and the share price pops up to 8.9p offered - Totally illogical and another new 7 million ovehang announced -
extrader: Hi GTA5 Yes ! Nagle is 'studiedly' opaque... As to .."the lack of visibility from our board and marketing is a clear sign that all is not well in a macro-environment that should be cause for celebration and a lot of public engagement and attention..." surely that reflects the likely partners/counterparts in any deal ? In order, (1)If, as we suspect, it'll be Chinese, I don't think they are unduly concerned about market perceptions, so they don't have to 'justify' any price paid by reference to the historic or recent price, so the share price doesn't matter to them. (2) Any rabbit that GLEN/ZIOC pull out of the hat actually looks better if its a multiple of the current price. So they're likely spot shareprice-indifferent (3) A high share price is only of interest to ZIOC if it wants/needs to use its shares as 'currency' in any future M & A activity...which I don't think is on the cards. OK,I get that a higher share price would get more bang for your Shard buck, but there I think 'dilution aversion' would kick in once their minimal funding needs were covered. (4) And a low share price is actually beneficial to the 'management team' if/when they're allocated their retention bonus.... If you ask yourself 'cui bono' ? amongst the people who matter (which deffo aren't the PIs), if anything the share price reflects pretty accurately the 'benign neglect' that we're seeing.... IMO ATB
gta5: Another good article from our friends at Caixing: Aug 25, 2020 06:23 Stalled Guinea Project Highlights China’s Struggle to Reforge Iron Ore Supply Chain By Luo Guoping and Han Wei Simandou, a 110-kilometer range of hills deep in the hinterland of Guinea in Western Africa, boasts the world’s largest untapped iron ore reserves. They could reshape the global supply chain of the critical ingredient of steel, the world’s second-most traded commodity behind crude oil. The rich assets have lured global investors, especially from ore-thirsty China, but pulling the mineral out of the ground has turned out to be a thorny challenge with entangled interests and risks stemming from technical, capital and political uncertainties. It is considered the world’s largest, highest-quality iron ore deposit. Some industry experts project it could produce as much as 150 million tons of iron ore a year, equivalent to 7% of global production in 2019. Developing the deposits could save China, the world’s largest steelmaking country, billions of dollars a year. But building the necessary infrastructure in Guinea, which ranks 160th by per capita GDP of 186 countries according to the International Monetary Fund, would also cost billions of dollars. To make the Simandou project operational would require railway and port construction amounting to the largest infrastructure project ever in Africa. Investors have been reluctant to sink that kind of money into Simandou because of the risk that prices will plunge. The Simandou project has largely stalled over the past two decades, reflecting political complexity, mining rights disputes, concerns over costs and pressures from industry rivals. Discovered in the 1990s, the Simandou deposits hold more than 8.6 billion tons of iron ore with an average content of 65% iron, according to Guinea’s National Institute of Statistics. “The reserve of Simandou is so rich that one can get minerals with a simple shovel,” a mining industry investor said. The Simandou project could maintain a stable 7% share of global iron ore supply in the coming decade if it reached full capacity, giving it the power to influence global pricing, said Andrew Gadd, chief iron ore analyst at British commodity consultancy CRU. It could threaten some high-cost suppliers such as those in Canada, Brazil and South Africa, Gadd said. In Australia, Simandou is known “the Pilbara killer.” Australia, the world’s largest iron ore exporter, produces more than 90% of its ore exports in the western region of Pilbara. Anglo-Australian mining giant Rio Tinto Group is a major stakeholder in the Simandou project since 1997 but has moved slowly to develop the project. Chinese investors are among the main forces pushing the project forward as a new source of iron ore that could bring down prices for China’s steel mills. In 2019, China imported more than 1 billion tons of iron ore, 70% of the global supply and 80% of the country’s total demand. About 80% of China’s iron ore imports come from the four largest mining companies — Brazil’s Vale S.A. and Australia-based Rio Tinto, BHP Group Ltd. and Fortescue Metals Group. In the first seven months this year, China imported 660 million tons of iron ore, up 11.8% from a year ago, official data showed. Demand has rebounded as the domestic outbreak of Covid-19 wanes and the government’s pro-growth, infrastructure push drives up steel consumption. Heavy reliance on foreign supply makes Chinese steelmakers especially vulnerable to iron ore prices. Every $10 increase of the price of a ton of iron ore will lead to an extra $10 billion of spending by China every year, analysts estimate. In 2019, a $30 price rise for a ton of iron ore cost Chinese steel mills an additional $30 billion, more than the 189 billion yuan ($27.4 billion) of net profit posted by the country’s entire steel industry, said Chen Derong, chairman of China Baowu Steel Group Corp. Ltd., China’s largest steel refiner. Despite the pandemic, iron ore prices have continued rising this year, touching a six-year high on Aug. 19 of $128.80 a ton and hovering at $120 since then. “If Simandou starts operation, it could bring a drop of global iron ore prices by $40 to $50 a ton,” a steel industry analyst in China said. Since May, Baowu has been trying to lead a consortium of steelmakers to invest in Simandou and break the development logjam. Baowu plans to set up a $6 billion investment fund consisting of steelmakers and financial investors to develop Simandou, Caixin learned. But the Baowu project is no sure thing. Chinese investors including state-owned aluminum giant Aluminum Corp. of China Ltd. (Chinalco) tapped into the project years ago with little progress to show for it. Chinese companies have a poor track record of investing in foreign mining. The painful example is the Sino iron project in Australia. After Chinese state-owned conglomerate Citic Ltd. paid $450 million for 25 years of mining rights to the iron ore deposit at Cape Preston in 2006, it quickly turned into a money pit because of repeated production delays and skyrocketing investments. Simandou “needs a sophisticated dealmaker to coordinate various parties, to share interests and risks,” a senior energy industry investor said. Without the capability to get all parties to act together and figure out a sustainable business model, the development of Simandou will remain out of reach, the investor said. Long-stalled project Mining rights to Simandou have been split into four blocks, none of which has yet been developed. The first two blocks in the north are owned by SMB-Winning, a consortium backed by Singaporean and Chinese companies, while the No. 3 and 4 blocks in the south are controlled by Rio Tinto and a group of Chinalco-led Chinese investors. The Guinean government holds 15% in each of the two parts. Chinalco and Chinese partners entered Simandou in 2010 by acquiring a 39.5% stake in Simfer, a Rio Tinto unit operating blocks 3 and 4. Chinalco is the largest single shareholder of Rio Tinto with a 10.3% stake. But development of the blocks stalled in following years, leaving huge costs for investors. A company document seen by Caixin showed that Simfer invested more than $3.7 billion in infrastructure and mining facilities in Simandou. In 2015 and 2016, Rio Tinto wrote off nearly $2.3 billion of losses from the project. Simfer staff working on the Simandou project has been slashed to dozens from around 1,000 before 2016. Chinalco and partners paid $1.35 billion for the stake in Simfer. A company financial report showed that Chinalco spent $15.5 billion as of the end of 2019 on Simfer and affiliated companies. Industry analysts said they think Rio Tinto’s slow progress on the Simandou project reflects a strategic decision to focus on cheaper development in Australia, and the company doesn’t want new supply to press down market prices. In reply to a Caixin inquiry, Rio Tinto said Simandou will provide a good supplement to ore supplies from Australia and Canada to meet strong demand for high-quality iron ore from China and other markets. Rio Tinto was the first foreign investor licensed to explore Simandou in 1997. In 2006 the company won 25 years of mining rights for all four blocks with an option to extend. But no sustained work has been done on the sites. In 2008 the Guinean government forced Rio Tinto to relinquish its rights to the northern two blocks to an Israeli company, BSG Resources. But BSG’s purchase of the mining rights was controversial and was voided in 2019 by Guinea’s new government, citing corruption. In November that year, the government relaunched bidding for the two blocks, and SMB-Winning became the winner. SMB-Winning is a venture jointly set up by Singapore-based shipping company Winning International Group, Chinese private aluminum producer Shandong Weiqiao, Yantai Port Group and Guinean-French logistics company UMS. SMB-Winning didn’t disclose how much it paid for the mining rights but pledged to invest $14 billion to develop the two northern blocks. Sources close to the matter said the Guinea government hoped to pressure Rio Tinto into making progress in Simandou by inviting in the new investors. In June, SMB-Winning signed a framework accord with Guinean authorities and agreed on a timetable leading to commercial operations within 74 months after signing. But several industry insiders said they are doubtful of SMB-Winning’s ability to raise enough funds to support the development. Shandong Weiqiao, with the strongest balance sheet among the shareholders, has a debt-to-asset ratio of more than 60%, restricting its capacity to tap new credit, they said. SMB-Winning contacted some Chinese banks for potential loans, but most lenders showed little interest, sources said. Game changer The Simandou project is strategically valuable to China as it would diversify the country’s iron ore supply and give it greater bargaining power in price setting, said Lu Guangming, an analyst at CRU. The four iron ore giants — Vale, Rio Tinto, BHP and Fortescue Metals — accounted for nearly half of 2019 global iron ore production of 2.1 billion tons. They have the major say in settling global prices. Heavily reliant on imports, China has accepted almost every price increase by the four major suppliers since 2003 no matter how the pricing mechanism was changed, analysts said. The country has more than 300 steel mills, but their combined interests in foreign iron ore reserves amounts to only 65 million tons a year, or less than 10% of annual ore imports, according to the Metallurgical Industry Planning and Research Institute. The Simandou project could become a game changer for Chinese steel mills. Caixin learned that Baowu’s proposed $6 billion investment would put $4.5 billion into the southern blocks and $1.5 billion into the northern blocks. Under the Baowu plan, 15% of the fund would come from Baowu, 35% from other steelmakers, 25% from the sovereign wealth fund, 10% from other institutional investors and 15% from infrastructure investors. Baowu has held talks with major domestic steel companies since June, including Shougang Group Co. Ltd., China Minmetals Corp. and Jianlong Group. It also met with Simandou’s current investors Chinalco and SMB-Winning, Caixin learned. Baowu Chairman Chen is very enthusiastic about the Simandou investment and wants to push it forward, said a person close to the company. But the plan is still at an early stage, and many Chinese steelmakers are hesitant to take part because of different concerns over iron ore supply, a steel industry professional told Caixin. Meanwhile, financial investors shy away from the long investment period and related uncertainties, a fund manager said. Even if Baowu’s plan wins supports from other investors, it will remain a major challenge to negotiate a way to work with the current project shareholders, analysts said. A person close to the matter said Baowu hopes to persuade Rio Tinto to sell part or all of its Simandou stake. No easy money Getting the minerals out of Guinea’s mountainous hinterland and transporting the ore to China will be a challenge requiring massive investment in infrastructure and logistics, the investor said. The Guinean government is seeking to leverage the Simandou project to expand domestic infrastructure, demanding construction of a 650-kilometer Trans-Guinea Railway and a deep-water port as well as supportive facilities. This would mean a huge additional investment for Simandou developers. A study by Rio Tinto before 2016 showed that overall investment in block 3 and 4 could amount $18 billion. A preliminary study by Baowu projected $15 of billion investment for the two blocks, while SMB-Winning estimated $14 billion of spending for the other two blocks. Such massive construction also means a longer investment period. Analysts said it could take as long as eight years for Simandou to complete construction and start delivery. A greater challenge would come from market response after Simandou commences production. “Once Simandou starts production, international iron ore prices will be slashed, hurting investors’ interests,” a financial institution source said. Average production cost at Simandou might range between $35 and $40 a ton, compared with $15 to $20 a ton in Australia, making it more vulnerable to price wars, analysts said. “It is almost certain that the four mining giants will cut prices after Simandou starts operation to kill it,” a fund manager said. The financial institution source said considering the complexity of the Simandou project, it will need to be pushed forward by state-level coordination and planning. However, another source said authorities haven’t shown any interest in offering state backing to the Simandou project amid concerns over domestic steel industry overcapacity. (Source: hxxps:// )
extrader: Hi GTA5, Good Q's (1)The current share price is a useful reference in a conventional merger or acquisition, but is surely irrelevant in Zanaga, where pretty much all the value is theoretical future : an iron-clad (boom boom) patent for penicillin , say, wouldn't be worth much if there were no means of monetising it. (2) Who would underwrite...and who would buy a 'pig(iron, sorry) in a poke' ? The subscribers would get a trivial %age in something that still had no road to market...and a GLEN right of first refusal, if things got interesting... (3) Just posted this e lse where : ..".."I don't understand why Glencore won't buy us out through a share issue.." No need for a share issue, AFAICS : GLEN has abt 1 bn shares in treasury, so a 1:1 for 300m ZIOC would be easily do-able....and @ £ 2.40 would tick a lot of boxes, I imagine. Plus would make any deal-doing easier...and send a strong signal that GLEN wanted to monetise the asset, one way or another....and set, by implication, a 'floor price' for any discussions. All roads certainly seem to lead to GLEN, atm.... ATB
extrader: Hi all, A couple of things that might have prompted AT to do an unsolicited (?) interview, mentioning a not-quite-RNSable increase in approaches from 'strategic investors, Chinese and Western' : - next week sees the US election, in case no-one had noticed ;-<, outcome of which may have some bearing on US/China relations and the extent of the various unnamed investors' interest or otherwise in Zanaga; and -this Friday is the ZIOC AGM, which will presumably include sign-off/details of the Management Team Retention package for 2020. This is what they RNS'd last year, 3 days before the AGM : .."The calculation of the Retention Fee for each Team Member in respect of the 2019 calendar year is due to take place in October 2019. Each Team Member has agreed with ZIOC that he will use the Retention Fee due to him in October 2019 to subscribe for new Ordinary Shares in ZIOC at the market price of such shares at the relevant time. The number of the new Ordinary Shares so subscribed will be equal to the number of Reference Shares notionally attributed to him for the calendar year 2019. .. The arrangements for the payment of a Retention Fee for 2020 are broadly similar to those for 2019 described above, except that the amount of such Retention Fee will reduce pro rata if the Team Member's arrangement with the Company ceases before or during 2020. The total number of new ZIOC shares which could be issued in 2020 is yet to be determined and further announcements will be made at the relevant time..." It'll be interesting to see the size of this year's retention fee (last year 2.8m shares, 1% of shares in issue) , for now, though, AT and co have a vested interest in NOT talking the price up , IMO. ATB
extrader: Hi GTA5, Historically , I think we've been on the same page or nearby, this time I think you're misreading the situation : .."I'd rather have some "excitement" now and a quick (and small) placing at 250p/share for 10M shares to Coidic/Rio/Glen etc on the back of that excitement. Now THAT would give a bit of credibility to Zioc, not this drip of petty cash..." (1) What would £ 25m do for ZIOC , esp. if you believe, as I do that (a) they have no role to play once the big boys arrive; and (b) £ 25m is 'chump change' if they do want to remain involved. (2) Who would pony up £ 25m without having GLEN on-side ? and why set a 'floor' of 250p from the outset ? (3) ZIOC has minimal runcosts atm, AT's words emphasize that they intend to keep it that way ...and are really, really keen to avoid dilution. I think the most likely scenario is that - when there's some genuine interest - GLEN will take ZIOC out (hopefully at only a small discount to the end-price) and then sell out.... No idea how much GLEN would want (esp. in view of comments re views on possible royalties), mind... ATB
extrader: Hi Gismo, Quite right. Per the August 2019 RNS, the LTIP shares are options, exerciseable under certain conditions at 0.01p per share. These and other (then) unexercised options equal 6.44% of the (then) capital. The qualifying conditions don't appear to have been met for 2019, tbc tomorrow, presumably. The retention fee shares are :.." an ADDITIONAL [my bold] part of the overall fee structure agreed between the Company and the Team Members. This consists of an additional amount (the "Retention Fee") to be determined on a one-off basis in both October 2019 and December 2020. The Retention Fee for 2019 will be calculated on the basis of a number of potential new Ordinary Shares in ZIOC ("Reference Shares") which are notionally attributed to the Team Member concerned. · The calculation of the Retention Fee for each Team Member in respect of the 2019 calendar year is due to take place in October 2019. · Each Team Member has agreed with ZIOC that he will use the Retention Fee due to him in October 2019 to subscribe for new Ordinary Shares in ZIOC at the market price of such shares at the relevant time . The number of the new Ordinary Shares so subscribed will be equal to the number of Reference Shares notionally attributed to him for the calendar year 2019. If such Retention Fee does not become payable to the Team Member, the subscription for new Ordinary Shares in ZIOC by him described above will not take place. · The total number of new ZIOC shares which could be issued in 2019 in respect of the arrangements described above is 2,833,334 Ordinary Shares, representing approximately 1.00% of the Company's current issued share capital. A further announcement will be made upon the issuance of these Ordinary Shares..." We may or may not learn more about this second element tomorrow. I don't recall an RNS, so they may not have been issued...? ATB
extrader: Hi pugugly, You make a fair point when you write : .."to all - Please read the rns again - No prices mentioned - So (imo) NO BOTTGM PRICE at which these shares can be placed - Subject of couse to Zanga saying STOP So message received massive overhang with no bottom price. I am sure if I have got this wrong the bulls here will be able to point out where there is any restriction on minimum price at which the shares can be placed... As Jesse Livermore said : "There is only one side to the stock market; and it is not the bull side or the bear side, but the right side” . You are right to point out that, on the face of it, there is no bottom price at which the new shares can be placed. But Shard's deal with ZIOC is that it hands over 95% of GROSS subscription proceeds ie its net return is < 5%...and it's highly motivated in CASH terms to place subscriptions at the highest price it can. The terms of the second and third tranches of shares appear to give ZIOC an unusual amount of discretion as to when/whether they're issued (incl. termination and suspension)...and a clawback provision for 3, so worst case Shard could end up with only 1/3rd of its projected net fees to cover all its sunk marketing, legal and admin costs. By chance, I see that Shard is currently also involved in a fund-raising at LVGC (Live Company), in a .."Placing to raise £0.4 million gross (approximately £ 0.36 million net) at the Issue Price of 10 pence per share .." So, on the face of it - and other things being equal, which I accept may not be the case - £ 40k to raise £400K for LVGC and < £ 22k to raise £ 434 K (@ 6.2p) for ZIOC. In some respects , esp. when looking at the structure of tranches 2 and 3, one could credibly make the case that their deal with ZIOC is barely commercial, almost a 'loss leader'. Which would then invite the question : why ? ATB
extrader: Hi GTA5, You may well be right....and I perhaps should lay off the Kool-Aid ! However, in my defence I'd say : (1) ZIOC has always had to kick the can down the road because it's not in control of its destiny (something I think we agree on), nothing new there; (2) I interpret the Management Incentives 8/19 (13.6M shares LTIP; 2.83M shares Retention for 2019; X.XM ? shares Retention for 2020) as a signal that there was/is prospect of a 'monetisation event' and key players (3) needed to be kept 'on-side' (something else I think we agreed on ? IIRC, nobody quibbled over 16.4M ++ shares being issued for NIL (or as near as dammit) consideration, which is similar dilution to what is now proposed ); (3) On 11/12 2019, we get news of the COIDIC Framework Agreement w/Jumelles, which provides a structure for integrating Zanaga into a wider project complex. Lenin's question is relevant : Who, whom ? Do you think Jumelles/GLEN/ZIOC approached COIDIC...or the other way round ? I come back to (2) (4) Coronavirus arrives 'out of the blue' Jan + 2020, to throw multiple spanners 'in the works' : world economy/recovery, China/US, deal-making/cashflows/priorities. (5) The funding issue rears its head with the passage of time/ lack of progress to report and (I believe) becomes more pressing as we approach 30 June, perhaps because of concerns at possible auditor 'going concern' qualification, which would possibly kill any deal in the making and certainly be used as an argument for chiselling on the price... (6) There are cost/disclosure issues with a placement and possibly approval constraints re 'material Shareholder' loans (as seems to have gummed things a bit at 'connected' account NCCL). If the BoD are in a closed period, what deal involving a 'major Shareholder' could they/the NEDs approve ? [Serious question : I don't know]; (7) It may [my speculation] be tactically important to show interested parties that 'we can keep things going'....and that 'we' have our own version of COIDIC, able to help with some / any creative deal structuring. Is the glass half full or half empty ? I think in context and based on the above timeline, my case for 'half full' is reasonable. Of course, an engineer would just say that the glass was obviously the wrong size...! We may get a steer - and even some answers - soon enough. ATB PS As to the dilutive effect of the deal with SCM, the current price is already slightly up on the opening price and around the average over the last 6 months, had we gone down a 'placement' ' route; SCM is incentivised to 'encourage' the share price upwards; and the clawback mechanism for Tranche 3 suggests to me (the Kool Aid talking ?) that they're keen to avoid unnecessary dilution, both for the general reasons you've mentioned and the specific reason that it eats into the 3 Team Members' incentives...
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