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DLAR De La Rue Plc

-0.80 (-1.2%)
28 Nov 2023 - Closed
Delayed by 15 minutes
Share Name Share Symbol Market Type Share ISIN Share Description
De La Rue Plc LSE:DLAR London Ordinary Share GB00B3DGH821 ORD 44 152/175P
  Price Change % Change Share Price Shares Traded Last Trade
  -0.80 -1.2% 66.00 202,808 16:35:13
Bid Price Offer Price High Price Low Price Open Price
66.60 66.90 67.00 66.00 66.40
Industry Sector Turnover Profit EPS - Basic PE Ratio Market Cap
Commercial Printing, Nec 349.7M -55.9M -0.2860 -2.34 130.75M
Last Trade Time Trade Type Trade Size Trade Price Currency
18:28:36 O 743 66.005 GBX

De La Rue (DLAR) Latest News

De La Rue (DLAR) Discussions and Chat

De La Rue (DLAR) Most Recent Trades

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De La Rue (DLAR) Top Chat Posts

Top Posts
Posted at 28/11/2023 08:20 by De La Rue Daily Update
De La Rue Plc is listed in the Commercial Printing, Nec sector of the London Stock Exchange with ticker DLAR. The last closing price for De La Rue was 66.80p.
De La Rue currently has 195,437,227 shares in issue. The market capitalisation of De La Rue is £130,747,505.
De La Rue has a price to earnings ratio (PE ratio) of -2.34.
This morning DLAR shares opened at 66.40p
Posted at 11/11/2023 08:33 by jensen10
Just read the latest earnings transcript for Crane Currency, large US competitor of DLAR. CEO repeatedly mentions they have a strong balance sheet and low leverage and are actively looking at M&A in early 2024. They have up to $1bn of firepower and mentions their authentication and track and trace division as a growth opportunity earlier in call. Maybe watch this space....
Posted at 28/10/2023 09:06 by kooba
There were no buyers 6 months ago due to the unresolved covenants that results in the accounts being qualified...not a great situation to get yourself in . Buyers came in after the material change through alteration in terms agreed with the banks and trustees. No one except you for some reason thought that was a given ...hence the share price reaction on the new chair getting it done. Really unsure why you do not see a material difference pre and post changes in covenants as the buyers certainly did.It might well be impossible to get such agreement now with the banks as the lending environment has changed somewhat without an equity raise..that was the danger back then but was avoided by new Chair getting a solution something the previous chair had been working on for months and months without success.
Posted at 27/10/2023 18:19 by kooba
Only you knows what occurred apparently ..lmao.You don't even seem to know what moves share prices in markets..buying by individuals and institutions supporting the new Chair...CRS and Richard Griffiths cleared any loose stock buying 12% of the outstanding equity..only after there was a new chair who had pulled together financial arrangements that had dragged on previously leaving uncertainty. They saw a significant difference from months earlier when nobody was buying..but you don't.You are just full of nothing useful...the company was in an unresolved and perilous financial position if you can't see that you are in denial.
Posted at 25/10/2023 08:51 by kooba
Crystal Amber DLAR largest holder commentary with todays results.De La Rue plc ("De La Rue")We have previously explained how De La Rue stands out as a case study of how poor leadership is the ultimate destroyer of shareholder returns. The company has a long and proud history, having been established in 1821 and has been printing banknotes since 1860. In 1982, the share price was 617.5p. Forty-one years later, it traded at below 30p. Ten years ago, De La Rue paid an annual dividend of 42.3p a share. In 2019, the dividend was shelved.In July 2020, De La Rue completed a GBP100 million fundraise which was priced at 110p per share. The Fund was the largest investor in this raise and ended up owning around 18% of De La Rue's issued share capital. Following a significant rise in the share price, the Fund reduced its exposure and reverted to being a 10% shareholder.As early as January 2022, the Fund publicly highlighted operational and strategic mistakes at De La Rue. Rather than engage constructively, management was completely dismissive.Last September, the Fund commented that it believed that De La Rue was in a critical position, with essential strategic decisions required. In July 2022, the Fund wrote to the Chairman and Chief Executive of De La Rue to request that Crystal Amber, as a 10% shareholder, be invited to nominate a director in a non-executive capacity. After more than two months of procrastination and attendance at several meetings, the proposal was rejected. The board of De La Rue then called a meeting of shareholders to vote on the Chairman's future. In December 2022, the Chairman was re-elected. Following a profit warning in January 2023, the Fund requisitioned a meeting of shareholders in March 2023 to remove Chairman Kevin Loosemore. Following a further profit warning in April, his position became untenable and he resigned.In May 2023, Clive Whiley was appointed Chairman. By the end of the following month he was able to successfully negotiate a reduction in contributions to the pension plan, revise and relax banking covenants and secure the removal of the material uncertainty going concern audit qualification. Against this improved backdrop and with increasing evidence of a cyclical upturn in the currency market, the Fund substantially added to its holding. During the summer, the Fund increased its shareholding from less than 10% of De La Rue's issued capital to close to 17%. The average cost of these purchases was 41.2p a share. The Fund remains of the view that the strategic value of De La Rue continues to be substantially more than its operational value and that it is now an attractive takeover target in an industry requiring consolidation.
Posted at 06/10/2023 11:10 by kooba
Well my guess would be any figure would have to be higher as we move through the second half irrespective of markets. I did think 80-5p might clinch it but i am now thinking nearer a £1 as the financials stabilise further.There is starting to be significant corporate activity targeting UK listed small/mid caps and i maintain if one competitor or even PE has a tilt at DLAR it would become competitive bidding process.The company though has certainly navigated the very rough waters it was facing earlier in the year so anyone sitting back waiting to pick up the pieces on the cheap is going to be disappointed and will need to be realistic..DLAR can further recover shareholder value over the coming years so any offer will have to reflect that.As i say just guessing really.
Posted at 11/7/2023 15:06 by jensen10
So as soon as CA announce they have increased their stake, the selling pressure increases and I have seen a big spike in my shareholding being lent out on borrow, presumably to shorters. Looks like all the accounts who had the CA arb on of share price vs underlying NAV have had to increase their DLAR hedge. So rather than helping drive share price higher CA buying has increased the stalemate!
Posted at 13/4/2023 07:35 by kooba
Another piece in the Times..i imagine the CEO has just choked on his cornflakes! Being described as delusional is not a look he was going for!No longer a licence to print money at De La RueAlistair OsborneThursday April 13 2023, 12.01am, The TimesMoney talks. A banknote printer shouldn't need telling that. So how come the De La Rue chief executive sounds so delusional?Clive Vacher has just issued his fourth profits warning in 16 months. The shares, which were around 190p when he took charge in October 2019, are down to 40½p - off another 19 per cent on the latest alert. A company that was valued at £125 million before he tapped investors in July 2020 for £100 million at 110p is now worth just £79 million.Having blown those funds, De La Rue's now admitting to talks with lenders over "an amendment to its banking covenants": a shift of stance from November when Vacher was railing about auditor EY issuing a "material uncertainty" warning over the group's "going concern" status. To boot, he's just asked the pension trustees to defer "£18.75 million of deficit repair contributions".None of that points to a well-run group: one reason near-10 per cent investor Crystal Amber is gunning for De La Rue chairman Kevin Loosemore, calling an EGM in an attempt to oust him. But talk to Vacher and this is the sort of thing he says: "We've spent the last three and a half years making a significant transformation of the company, making it a lot more competitive."Really? Alongside Loosemore, who joined days before him, Vacher says they've "revamped the cost structure", shrunk five printing sites to three, stuck £20 million into a new polymer line and won heaps of contracts. Sales from the passport-printing wing will top £100 million next year for the first time too.So why has the share price tanked? Nothing to do with them, guv - just the post-Covid banknote market. Demand, Vacher says, "has been at the lowest levels for over 20 years", even if he says bid activity has picked up in the past month.On that, seeing is believing. But back in the real world, Crystal Amber's investment adviser Richard Bernstein says he's celebrating a "pyrrhic victory": having his arguments proved right at the cost of another share price plunge. Roll back to January 2022 and consensus adjusted operating profits forecasts for the latest financial year were £56.5 million, a figure that's dropped to £41.4 million, then £35.6 million, then £30.1 million and now, weeks before the publication of the results, to £28.2 million. Worse, De La Rue is now guiding to just £20 million for the 12 months to March 2024 - less than half previous forecasts.This is where things could also get more serious for the board. In December, Crystal Amber's lawyers wrote to each director, reminding them of their fiduciary duties and arguing that, on its analysis of issues in the business that the group hadn't disclosed, the market forecasts were "not achievable". So it has proved. Bernstein cannot believe the board has just discovered the profits miss.Vacher says he is fully aware of his disclosure responsibilities. But he does say some extraordinary stuff, not least that one reason for the endless missed forecasts is that he's had to put "£57 million cash into the pension scheme" to repair a deficit that still tops £90 million. But isn't meeting obligations to 6,770 pensioners a cost of running the business? He also says, "I don't think we need to raise more money" and that he doesn't recognise forecasts that De La Rue's net debt will hit £105 million by 2024. But that's the estimate of house broker Numis.Crystal Amber wants to replace Loosemore with a new chairman to take a view on Vacher. Its nominee, Pepyn Dinandt, an Eberspaecher Group exec, is not well known. But, whoever the candidate, other big investors such as Schroders, with 16 per cent, and Crispin Odey with 6.9 per cent can't be happy.De La Rue is meant to print money, not lose it.
Posted at 05/4/2023 06:18 by kooba
REACH5 April 2023CRYSTAL AMBER FUND LIMITED("Crystal Amber", the "Company", or the "Fund")Letter to be sent to De La Rue plc shareholders with Notice of requisitioned General MeetingOn 31 March 2023 the Fund announced that it had sent to the board of De La Rue plc ("De La Rue") a requisition notice requiring De La Rue to convene a general meeting at which a resolution will be proposed to remove Non-Executive Director and Chairman Kevin Loosemore ("the Requisition"). The Requisition also proposed to appoint Pepyn Dinandt as a Non-Executive Director and Chairman. Crystal Amber advises that it has provided De La Rue with the text of a letter which Crystal Amber has requested is included with the notice of general meeting when it is posted to shareholders by De La Rue in due course. The text of the letter to all the shareholders of De La Rue is set out below and can be viewed on the Fund's website at:" CRYSTAL AMBER FUND LIMITED("Crystal Amber", the "Company", or "Fund")Statement regarding De La Rue plc ("DLR")Failed Turnaround Plan, major governance and stewardship concerns and chronic share price underperformance at DLR requires replacing Chairman.Dear Fellow Shareholder,On 30(th) March 2023, Crystal Amber sent to the board of DLR a requisition notice requiring DLR to convene a general meeting at which a resolution will be proposed to remove Non-Executive Director and Chairman Kevin Loosemore ("the Requisition"). The Requisition also proposes to appoint Pepyn Dinandt as a Non-Executive Director and Chairman.Why this is essential?THE TURNAROUND PLAN HAS FAILED BY EVERY MEASUREIn February 2020, DLR announced a three-year Turnaround Plan. In the summer of 2020, it raised GBP100 million via an equity issue at 110p a share. Crystal Amber was the lead investor, providing GBP18 million of rescue capital to support the Turnaround Plan. At the time, the directors stated that by the end of Turnaround Plan in March 2023, they were targeting: 1. annual revenue growth of 9% (from GBP350 million to GBP453 million). 2. mid-teens and growing operating margins. 3. Authentication revenues of GBP100 million by FY21/22, with strong operating margins. 4. positive free cash flows capable of supporting sustainable cash dividends. 5. a net debt/EBITDA ratio of below one. 6. balance sheet strength with a long-term gearing policy of below one times net debt/EBITDA The reality is: (based on current market consensus estimates for the year to March 2023) revenue will be GBP340.5 million, falling 25% below forecast. Operating margins will be 8.9%. Authentication revenues for FY21/22 were GBP90 million. H1 operating margins for Authentication of 10.8% compared to 15.8% for FY19/20.Negative free cash flow. No dividends. Net debt/EBITDA margin of 1.7. Net debt/EBITDA of two times. Net debt is forecast at GBP103.3 million. This is GBP0.5 million higher than three years ago, before the GBP100 million equity capital injection.DLR's stock market value is now GBP100 million, after the GBP100 million equity investment, so on a like for like basis, the entire GBP125 million pre-money stock market valuation has been destroyed.Since March 2021, DLR's share price is down by 75%.STEWARDSHIP FAILINGS RESULTING IN MATERIAL UNCERTAINTY GOING CONCERN AUDIT QUALIFICATIONThe company's failure to renegotiate its banking covenants when renewing its banking facilities following discussions to pay Portals GBP20 million to exit its paper commitments, represents in our opinion a gross failing of stewardship. Consequently, DLR is still incurring substantial additional and avoidable costs. This culminated in November 2022 with a material uncertainty going concern audit qualification. The company's Finance Director has since resigned.GOVERNANCE FAILINGS DEPRIVING SHAREHOLDERS OF UP TO GBP10 MILLION CASH PROCEEDS FROM SELLING THE HIGH SECURITY PRINT BUSINESSIn the Turnaround Plan, DLR trumpeted being "the only major high-security printer in sub-Saharan Africa within the cheques and cards market." Last December, Crystal Amber wrote to the directors of DLR highlighting the inevitable effect on revenues and profits of its decision to make 300 staff redundant at its Kenyan print facility and cease print operations. Annual revenues were around GBP30 million and profits approximately GBP3 million. DLR wrote to Crystal Amber to deny any intention to cease its Kenyan operations. On 20 January 2023, DLR announced the closure of its Kenyan print facilities.Aside from the detrimental effect on future revenues and profits, DLR's management chose to close a profitable division rather than undertaking a sales process. We understand that a disposal could have realised cash proceeds of up to GBP10 million, helping to reduce debt. Closure has also adversely impacted commercial opportunities in this long-established region.EXCESSIVE COSTS PAID TO PROFESSIONAL ADVISERSCrystal Amber understands that the Chairman is failing to control fees paid to professional advisers including but not limited to Rothschild & Co., Slaughter & May and Brunswick PR. Crystal Amber asks the board to provide shareholders with a breakdown of these material costs.STATEMENTS TO MARKET PARTICIPANTSThe interim results presentation in November 2022 referred to the company's second polymer line at Westhoughton being "fully operational." The company failed to disclose that this line has been mothballed because there are no orders requiring fulfilment. This follows GBP20 million of capital investment.CHAIRMAN'S FAILURE TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY AND PROTECT SHAREHOLDERS' INTERESTSDespite as set out above and in our opinion the overwhelming evidence that the board and the Executives have failed to deliver, Chairman Kevin Loosemore continues to fail to take responsibility. Instead, he blames external factors, including "the cycle." The Chairman has failed to hold management to account and protect shareholders' interests. By contrast, Crystal Amber understands that competitors including Oberthur, G&D, Crane NXT and SICPA are trading well.URGENT CHANGE REQUIREDAn immediate change of leadership is essential. Crystal Amber has concluded that it is necessary to replace Non-Executive Director and Chairman Kevin Loosemore. Crystal Amber believes that Pepyn Dinandt should replace Kevin Loosemore as Non-Executive Director and Chairman.Pepyn Dinandt has a long and successful track record in building businesses by delivering on value creation programs and securing exits. He is currently Chief Executive of the Climate Control Systems and Automotive Controls division at the Eberspaecher Group, a large family-owned Tier 1 automotive supplier. By the end of 2023, this global division is forecast to have approximately EUR900 million revenues and 3,500 employees.Commenting, Pepyn Dinandt said: "The last two years have been a disappointing and costly one for a once proud, great British company. The buck stops with the leadership. I believe that if we act quickly, with focus and operational execution, DLR can recover and thrive. It is now for DLR's long-suffering shareholders to decide if they wish to condone this woeful record or seek to end this spiral of destruction of shareholder value."CRYSTAL AMBER URGES SHAREHOLDERS TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF RESOLUTION 1 TO REMOVE KEVIN LOOSEMORE AS A DIRECTOR.CRYSTAL AMBER URGES SHAREHOLDERS TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF RESOLUTION 2 TO ELECT PEPYN DINANDT AS A DIRECTOR.Yours faithfully,Chris WaldronChairman
Posted at 21/3/2023 10:39 by kooba
Well spotted have taken the liberty to post in full.De La RueThe past is often a reliable indicator of the future. During the period under review, De La Rue delivered its third profit warning of 2022. Since January 2022, the Fund has found it necessary to update De La Rue shareholders on the faltering turnaround plan and offer solutions, which management has repeatedly ignored. De La Rue management chose instead to blame both Crystal Amber, as a long-term significant shareholder and incredibly, in November, its auditor EY, for arriving at the same conclusions as Crystal Amber. The failure of the De La Rue executives and the board as a whole to take responsibility for mistakes and instead blame others is symptomatic of their inability to grasp the nature of De La Rue's predicament.In September 2022, we stated that De La Rue stands out as a case study of how poor leadership is the ultimate destroyer of shareholder returns. In July 2020, De La Rue completed a GBP100 million fundraise which was priced at 110 pence a share. Crystal Amber provided GBP18 million of this funding and at the time was an 18% shareholder in De La Rue. The "honeymoon" period following the fundraise and a buoyant market within its currency division resulted in the share price increasing by 70% and Crystal Amber reduced its shareholding to just under 10%.In early July 2022, the Fund wrote to the Chairman and Chief Executive of De La Rue to request that Crystal Amber, as a near 10% shareholder, be invited to nominate a director in a non-executive capacity. At the end of September 2022, it was disappointing to be informed by De La Rue that it had rejected this request.On page 14 of De La Rue's interim results released in November 2022, a reference was made to a material uncertainty going concern audit qualification. This relates to potential banking covenant breaches. Coming only two years after the GBP100 million equity raise in July 2020, market participants were understandably alarmed, and the share price fell sharply. Immediately following the publication of the interim results, Crystal Amber wrote to the directors of De Le Rue in a personal capacity. In that letter, Crystal Amber highlighted several specific concerns, including the effect on revenues and profits of making 300 staff redundant at the Kenyan print facility and ceasing print operations. The company wrote to deny that this was the case. However, on 20 January 2023, it announced the closure of its Kenyan print facilities. Whilst it said that this was not expected to affect revenues to March 2023, it made no reference to the effect on revenues for the year commencing on 1 April 2023. Revenues from Kenya comprise around 12% of total revenues from the Currency division.De La Rue's current market capitalisation is GBP103 million. Adjusting for the 2020 capital raise would bring this down to GBP3 million. When Kevin Loosemore became Chairman in October 2019, before the GBP100 million fundraise, De La Rue's market capitalisation was GBP205 million. Immediately prior to announcing the 2020 fundraise, De La Rue's market capitalisation was GBP125 million. This is a like-for-like 98% reduction in returns to shareholders.Management has sought to blame factors outside of its control. However, the blunt reality is that it has made operational and strategic mistakes. Margins have shrunk because De La Rue has failed to secure new business in both its Currency and Authentication divisions. Despite savage cost-cutting, margins in both divisions are unacceptable. Driving down costs in an attempt to avoid a fourth profit warning is not a good strategy. It is revenue that matters: removing headcount means that when business is won, orders cannot be fulfilled. Even after significant investment funded by shareholders, the business still fails to generate cash and it is all too evident that the turnaround plan has failed.
Posted at 30/9/2022 21:28 by gargoyle2
Crystal Amber's take today -- De La Rue stands out as a case study of how poor leadership is the ultimate destroyer of shareholder returns. The company has a long and proud history, having been established in 1821 and has been printing banknotes since 1860. In 1982, the share price was 617.5 pence Forty years later it is 82 pence. Ten years ago, De La Rue paid an annual dividend of 42.3 pence a share. In 2019, the dividend was shelved. In July 2020, De La Rue completed a £100 million fundraise which was priced at 110 pence a share. Over the last two years, the business has been transformed. However, a combination of failing to fully capitalise on pricing in a buoyant currency market in 2020 as central buyers stocked up, limited contract wins in both its Currency and Authentication divisions, cost inflation and continuing to work through legacy issues inherited from the previous Chief Executive Martin Sutherland, has seen the market capitalisation decline to £164 million. During the year to June 2022, De La Rue's share price fell by 55 per cent. The Company notes that since March, the current management team has achieved significant success with two legacy issues. Firstly, in March, the De La Rue Pension Trustee agreed that the planned £9.5 million per annum increase in pension contributions for the next six years was no longer required. Secondly, in July, De La Rue and Portals Paper Limited ("Portals") terminated the agreement they signed in 2018, which had committed De La Rue to purchase substantial quantities of paper until 2028. Without this termination, in the remaining years of the relationship, De La Rue would have been committed to paying Portals volume shortfall payments, which the Company estimates would have been approximately £8 million per annum. In the year to March 2022, De La Rue delivered adjusted earnings per share of 13 pence. Current year market estimates are for adjusted earnings per share of 11.7 pence. Despite these two legacy "wins," De La Rue's share price trades on just seven times current year earnings. Whilst this reflects in part the market's understandable scepticism in the context of two profit warnings since January and a lack of pricing power, it has left De La Rue very vulnerable to corporate action. In the year to March 2022, the Authentication division achieved revenues of £90 million. Management is guiding to current year revenues of £100 million and close to 20 per cent operating margins. The Company believes that this division, with its long-term earnings visibility could now be sold for between £200 million and £250 million. The Company believes that De La Rue is now at a critical position, with essential strategic decisions required, but unfortunately, over many years, De La Rue's track record demonstrates its poor judgment when it comes to making business decisions in the interests of its owners. The Company believes that now is the time for better decision making, with input from stakeholders. Consequently, in early July, the Company wrote to the Chairman and Chief Executive of De La Rue to request that Crystal Amber, as a 10 per cent shareholder, be invited to nominate a director in a non-executive capacity and a decision is expected on this in the near future. With corporate action most likely, the Company believes it is in the interests of all stakeholders that a long-term and significant shareholder now has representation at board level.
De La Rue share price data is direct from the London Stock Exchange

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