Central Asia Metals Share Discussion Threads

[spoole5] 27/2/2022 19:05

Can we get back to CAML please

[garycook] 27/2/2022 11:10

GTG,Filtered

[geckotheglorious] 25/2/2022 17:33

Masurenguy
"The only person guilty of that "ignorant of history" charge is you !"

Nope, it appears I was correct in my first stance.
Assurances were made.

See below.
Classified document release under FOI

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s famous “not one inch eastward” assurance about NATO expansion in his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990, was part of a cascade of assurances about Soviet security given by Western leaders to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials throughout the process of German unification in 1990 and on into 1991, according to declassified U.S., Soviet, German, British and French documents posted today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University




And here's more
"Der Spiegel: Official document confirms that NATO promised not to expand eastwards"

Der Spiegel published an article stating that a secret document was discovered in the British National Archives by an American political scientist, Boston University professor Joshua Shifrinson.

It is clear from the document that Britain, the US, Germany and France agreed that membership of eastern European countries in NATO was “categorically unacceptable”

“We have made it clear to the Soviet Union – in the 2 plus 4 talks, as well as in other negotiations – that we do not intend to benefit from the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe… NATO must not expand eastwards, either formally or informally”, – Der Spiegel quoted the US official as saying.

[geckotheglorious] 25/2/2022 17:31

ZHO, Masurenguy,

Well, I have done a bit of research as well and found this.

So my original comment stands, and my apology is retracted. I was correct that assurances were given for no easwards expansion - not just once, but several times.


U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s famous “not one inch eastward” assurance about NATO expansion in his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990, was part of a cascade of assurances about Soviet security given by Western leaders to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials throughout the process of German unification in 1990 and on into 1991, according to declassified U.S., Soviet, German, British and French documents posted today by the National Security Archive at George Washington University





The documents show that multiple national leaders were considering and rejecting Central and Eastern European membership in NATO as of early 1990 and through 1991, that discussions of NATO in the context of German unification negotiations in 1990 were not at all narrowly limited to the status of East German territory, and that subsequent Soviet and Russian complaints about being misled about NATO expansion were founded in written contemporaneous memcons and telcons at the highest levels.

The documents reinforce former CIA Director Robert Gates’s criticism of “pressing ahead with expansion of NATO eastward [in the 1990s], when Gorbachev and others were led to believe that wouldn’t happen.”[1] The key phrase, buttressed by the documents, is “led to believe.”

President George H.W. Bush had assured Gorbachev during the Malta summit in December 1989 that the U.S. would not take advantage (“I have not jumped up and down on the Berlin Wall”) of the revolutions in Eastern Europe to harm Soviet interests; but neither Bush nor Gorbachev at that point (or for that matter, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl) expected so soon the collapse of East Germany or the speed of German unification.[2]

The first concrete assurances by Western leaders on NATO began on January 31, 1990, when West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher opened the bidding with a major public speech at Tutzing, in Bavaria, on German unification. The U.S. Embassy in Bonn (see Document 1) informed Washington that Genscher made clear “that the changes in Eastern Europe and the German unification process must not lead to an ‘impairment of Soviet security interests.’ Therefore, NATO should rule out an ‘expansion of its territory towards the east, i.e. moving it closer to the Soviet borders.'” The Bonn cable also noted Genscher’s proposal to leave the East German territory out of NATO military structures even in a unified Germany in NATO.[3]

This latter idea of special status for the GDR territory was codified in the final German unification treaty signed on September 12, 1990, by the Two-Plus-Four foreign ministers (see Document 25). The former idea about “closer to the Soviet borders” is written down not in treaties but in multiple memoranda of conversation between the Soviets and the highest-level Western interlocutors (Genscher, Kohl, Baker, Gates, Bush, Mitterrand, Thatcher, Major, Woerner, and others) offering assurances throughout 1990 and into 1991 about protecting Soviet security interests and including the USSR in new European security structures. The two issues were related but not the same. Subsequent analysis sometimes conflated the two and argued that the discussion did not involve all of Europe. The documents published below show clearly that it did.

The “Tutzing formula” immediately became the center of a flurry of important diplomatic discussions over the next 10 days in 1990, leading to the crucial February 10, 1990, meeting in Moscow between Kohl and Gorbachev when the West German leader achieved Soviet assent in principle to German unification in NATO, as long as NATO did not expand to the east. The Soviets would need much more time to work with their domestic opinion (and financial aid from the West Germans) before formally signing the deal in September 1990.

The conversations before Kohl’s assurance involved explicit discussion of NATO expansion, the Central and East European countries, and how to convince the Soviets to accept unification. For example, on February 6, 1990, when Genscher met with British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd, the British record showed Genscher saying, “The Russians must have some assurance that if, for example, the Polish Government left the Warsaw Pact one day, they would not join NATO the next.” (See Document 2)

Having met with Genscher on his way into discussions with the Soviets, Baker repeated exactly the Genscher formulation in his meeting with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on February 9, 1990, (see Document 4); and even more importantly, face to face with Gorbachev.

Not once, but three times, Baker tried out the “not one inch eastward” formula with Gorbachev in the February 9, 1990, meeting. He agreed with Gorbachev’s statement in response to the assurances that “NATO expansion is unacceptable.” Baker assured Gorbachev that “neither the President nor I intend to extract any unilateral advantages from the processes that are taking place,” and that the Americans understood that “not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries as well it is important to have guarantees that if the United States keeps its presence in Germany within the framework of NATO, not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.” (See Document 6)

[geckotheglorious] 25/2/2022 17:09

Masurenguy,

Happy to admit my recollection of the peace talks in 90s was incorrect.
(Edit - I was Actually correct as national Archives release shows)

I'm no fan of Putin either, but it is pretty clear EU expansion eastwards has aggravated the bear and I've no interest in the UK being dragged into a war to protect Europeans who tried to shaft us over Brexit.

[geckotheglorious] 25/2/2022 16:17

Zho,

Have to admit that is interesting, from the horse's mouth so to speak.

Whilst I was aware there was nothing written in stone, I was under the impression that there was a verbal agreement.

Thanks for the heads up.

I note he says "Nato" and no mention of the EU (or whatever derivation of it as it was back then.EEC? EEC has always been expansionary and it is primarily the EU that is the problem causer. NATO is ambivalent about Ukraine joining. But the EU was keen.

[zho] 25/2/2022 16:00

>>A deal was struck in 90s by Gorbachev and West. No Eastwards expansion of Nato.>>

I have no memory of this so I looked it up, and the consensus appears to be that there was an agreement over deployment of non-German NATO troops in the former GDR, but not elsewhere:

"Vladimir Putin ... claims that NATO took advantage of Russian weakness after the collapse of the Soviet Union to enlarge to its east, in violation of promises allegedly made to Moscow by Western leaders. But no such promises were made — a point now confirmed by someone who was definitely in a position to know: Mikhail Gorbachev, then president of the Soviet Union."

[binghall] 25/2/2022 12:21

That's the beauty of where we live, we can offer different opinions on the same topic and disagree without repercussion (generally). His motives may be understandable but they are not rational. Let's hope the bloodshed comes to an end quickly and we can get back to our peaceful world on investing. I look forward to seeing CAML back on the investment radar.

[zangdook] 25/2/2022 12:08

If you read his speeches you'll understand his motivations and concerns. The fact that Western commentators choose to ignore or misrepresent them, in some cases through Masurenguy-level stupidity and in others because it suits their agenda to do so, doesn't mean the information isn't easily available.

[binghall] 25/2/2022 12:00

Putin is unpredictable by Western standards. This is an invasion to satisfy his demands and is not for the benefit of the Russian people - if this does not raise eyebrows I am unsure what does. I am a holder but I have reluctantly trimmed my holding due to macro issues totally outside of the control of what is an excellently run company.

[masurenguy] 25/2/2022 11:28

Yeah, well perhaps the Ecuadorians don't need to worry about Putins intentions either !
Did you ever do History or Geography at school ?

[zangdook] 25/2/2022 11:26

Or London, for that matter, if you're worried about the HQ.

[masurenguy] 25/2/2022 11:23

#4965: I see no particular concerns on that front in Kazakhstan or N. Macedonia.
What on earth has N. Macedonia got to do with this? It was previously part of Yugoslavia not the Soviet Union.
If Putin wanted to annex North Macedonia he would have to invade by sending troops through Romania and Bulgaria to reach it !

[zangdook] 25/2/2022 11:19

I don't know why people say Putin is unpredictable. He's spent years expressing concern about Ukraine and NATO and months moving his forces west and saying that if the situation is not resolved soon he'll deal with it. The only thing that was perhaps not predictable was that Biden and Zelensky would not blink.

I see no particular concerns on that front in Kazakhstan or N. Macedonia.

[2603] 25/2/2022 11:05

Great comment Bing.

[binghall] 25/2/2022 10:56

Whatever we all think there is no getting away from the fact that the share price is going to be affected by the situation in Ukraine. This might be in Central Asia but Putin's sphere of influence extends to Kazakhstan, and his unpredictable nature means that the risk has increased. This is no longer just about the copper price and the yield.

[2603] 25/2/2022 10:51

I purchased these a couple years ago and sold out around £2.20. Looking to buy in again done something update research, this looks a good value to get back in. Should I be aware of anything going forward. I do value opinions bull or bearish. Thank you.

[spoole5] 24/2/2022 19:37

So the price of everything this company mines continues to rise yet the price continues to fall. Going to be some supply issues as a result of sanctions which should benefit