Burford Capital Dividends - BUR

Burford Capital Dividends - BUR

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Stock Name Stock Symbol Market Stock Type Stock ISIN Stock Description
Burford Capital Limited BUR London Ordinary Share GG00B4L84979 ORD NPV
  Price Change Price Change % Stock Price High Price Low Price Open Price Close Price Last Trade
  1.50 0.22% 671.50 683.50 664.00 670.00 670.00 16:35:25
more quote information »
Industry Sector
EQUITY INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS

Burford Capital BUR Dividends History

Announcement Date Type Currency Dividend Amount Period Start Period End Ex Date Record Date Payment Date Total Dividend Amount
25/07/2019InterimUSX4.1730/12/201830/06/201914/11/201915/11/201905/12/20190
13/03/2019FinalUSX8.8331/12/201731/12/201823/05/201924/05/201914/06/201912.5
25/07/2018InterimUSX3.6730/12/201730/06/201808/11/201809/11/201805/12/20180
14/03/2018FinalUSX7.9531/12/201631/12/201731/05/201801/06/201822/06/201811
27/07/2017InterimUSX3.0530/12/201630/06/201719/10/201720/10/201715/11/20170
14/03/2017FinalUSX6.4831/12/201531/12/201625/05/201726/05/201716/06/20179.15
27/07/2016InterimUSX2.6730/12/201530/06/201606/10/201607/10/201628/10/20160
23/03/2016FinalUSX5.6731/12/201431/12/201526/05/201627/05/201617/06/20168
28/07/2015InterimUSX2.3330/12/201430/06/201501/10/201502/10/201523/10/20150
18/03/2015FinalUSX731/12/201331/12/201407/05/201508/05/201501/06/20157
31/03/2014FinalUSX5.2331/12/201231/12/201321/05/201423/05/201416/06/20145.23
11/04/2013FinalUSX4.7631/12/201131/12/201222/05/201324/05/201317/06/20134.76
04/04/2012FinalUSX3.6631/12/201031/12/201118/04/201220/04/201223/05/20123.66
23/03/2011FinalUSX2.2231/12/200931/12/201006/04/201108/04/201117/05/20112.22

Top Dividend Posts

DateSubject
03/1/2020
01:32
galatea99: Long read just published in Chronic Investor on fair value accounting. Burford mentioned. Extract: "Materiality, however, bursts from the fair-value gains recorded by Burford Capital (BUR), an Aim-quoted Guernsey-headquartered company whose role is to provide the finance for civil litigations and take a slice of the settlements. As Table 2 shows, in 2015 Burford’s fair-value gains were a comparatively-modest $22m out of $77m operating profits, or 29 per cent. By 2018, such gains contributed $230m out of $344m of operating profits, 67 per cent of a much bigger total. The basic concerns are twofold. First, Burford’s fair-value gains stem from level-3 valuation methods at their most unobservable. As Burford itself says about valuing the possible pay-offs from legal cases, “the estimation of fair value is inherently uncertain. Awards and settlements are hard to predict. . . There is much unpredictability in the actions of courts, litigants and defendants... There is little activity in transacting investments and hence little relevant data for benchmarking.” "Obviously, Burford’s internal valuations are checked by its auditor, the London office of Ernst & Young. For every case where there is a year-on-year change in fair value, the auditor says it tests and challenges management’s assumptions, does external research and compiles relevant secondary-market trading data, such as exists. For cases where there is no change in value, the auditor does much the same but for a sample of cases. That sounds fine. Yet, much like the ways that Burford comes up with fair value in the first place, it’s hard to know from the outside what that really means in practice. The second, and connected, concern is that Burford’s accounting profits – swollen by paper fair-value gains – contrast sharply with the rate at which cash leaves the group. In 2015, while the group recorded operating profit of $77m, its operating cash flow was minus $9m. By 2018 compared with operating profit of $344m, the cash outflow was $198m. Cumulatively in the five years 2014-18, there was a $1.2bn divergence between accounting profits, which relied heavily on fair-value gains, and cash outflows, which removed the paper gains. True, all may yet come good at Burford, though the pace of its share-price decline – at 717p, it’s down 65 per cent from its all-time high in mid 2018 – suggests otherwise. Perhaps more important, Burford prompts the thought that fair-value adjustments – great in theory – actually cause more problems for investors than they solve. If so, that would be because, at worst, the effects of IFRS 9 and IFRS 13 turn company accounts from a precise record of past transactions into glorified speculation about the outcome of future events. Not just that, but such speculation would be strongly influenced by each company’s own bosses. Paradoxically, that would tend to have the opposite effect to what accounting-standards setters wanted when they shaped the fair-value rules. It may make equity investment less efficient because values, rather than being shaped by scores of (mostly) independent financial analysts, would, in effect, be handed down by one or two company insiders. What would be fair in that? " Https://www.investorschronicle.co.uk/shares/2020/01/02/fair-but-for-whom/ (Not a holder).
09/12/2019
19:55
galatea99: "Burford chief executive fears Argentine reprisals Chris Bogart tells US court he fears for safety if $1bn case is moved to Buenos Aires" Https://www.ft.com/content/bf17f624-1aa3-11ea-97df-cc63de1d73f4 "Burford Capital’s chief executive has told a US court that he could be threatened or imprisoned by the Argentine government if a $1bn court case were moved to Buenos Aires. “I do not put it past the Argentine government to attempt to imprison me or otherwise menace me,” said Chris Bogart, who co-founded Burford, in a legal declaration to a US court late last week. “Neither I nor other members of the Burford team would be able to participate in proceedings there given concerns about our safety.” The litigation financing company is pursuing the South American nation on behalf of Petersen Group, an investor that went bust when the government nationalised oil company YPF in 2012. Burford has valued its total stake in the case at $1bn. A US court ruled in September 2018 that Burford’s case could go ahead in the US, but Argentina has challenged the decision on jurisdictional grounds. Mr Bogart said he had warned his family and Burford employees of the risk of travelling to Argentina. He said: “Argentina will not hesitate to use tactics outside the four corners of this litigation in an effort to avoid responsibility for its actions [which] heightens my concern about personal safety.” Burford initially invested $18.4m in Petersen’s claims against Argentina and has so far made $236m by selling parts of its stake to third parties. The Aim-listed company, which is the world’s largest litigation funder, is resisting Argentina’s jurisdictional challenge. Mr Bogart admitted that sending the case to Argentina “would hobble and perhaps destroy it”. Burford’s $1bn valuation in its Petersen stake was attacked by short-seller Muddy Waters this summer, which accused the financier of “pulling forward” returns while not accounting for accompanying obligations. Burford is still reeling from the Muddy Waters report, which alleged it had misled investors by overstating the value of the cases it was funding and criticised its accounts and management. The report slashed Burford’s share price almost in half. Burford defended its accounting methods as “reliable and judicious” and has claimed to have found evidence that trading of its shares was illegally manipulated around the time of the report’s publication in August. It has since disclosed the extent to which its performance hinges on the Petersen case. Burford said in September its return on invested capital spanning all of its investments stood at 98 per cent but acknowledged that this would fall to 59 per cent if its Petersen claim were stripped out. Burford’s internal rate of return would fall from 32 per cent to 24 per cent, it said. Argentina’s Peronist party, which was in power at the time of the expropriation of YPF’s assets in 2012, returns to power on Tuesday amid fears among investors of a deterioration of relations with the private sector. A spokesperson for the incoming government did not comment."
02/10/2019
06:21
metis20: "At the close of trading on 5 August 2019, Burford’s shares were priced at £13.81 and Muddy Waters had built up a significant, but at the time undisclosed, short position amounting to 0.71% of Burford’s share capital. Rather than publicly disclose this position to the market (as required under legislation governing short selling), at 1:30pm on 6 August 2019, Muddy Waters tweeted that it would be announcing a new short position the following day, but without identifying the target. Despite this lack of transparency, Burford’s share price fell in the afternoon of 6 August 2019 to a closing price of £11.21. At 8:53am the next morning, Muddy Waters posted a further tweet which identified Burford as the subject of its short position, albeit without disclosing that Muddy Waters had already significantly reduced the size of that position. Burford’s share price continued to fall during 7 August 2019, closing at £6.05." Above is from one of the briefing papers - the principal court filing - The principal court filing along with Professor Mitts' report have been uploaded to the Briefing Papers section within Investor Resources on Burford's investor relations website which can be found at www.burfordcapital.com/investors/investor-resources/briefing-papers/.
03/9/2019
02:40
ronchong: Not sure why everyone on this board is so fixated on the daily share price of Bur. Ben Graham once said "In the short run, the market is a voting machine but in the long run, it is a weighing machine." Over the short term, the market is driven by sentiments and current sentiments for burford are not great.There appears to also be more at play here & it is not hard to understand why given its nature of business. If you look at the volume data for burford for the past week, the data shows sell orders that are multiples higher than the average day volume near the close on the day of 27/08, 28/08, 30/08, 02/09 artificially keeping the closing price low even tho most of muddy waters claims have been dismissed. Burford is bound to have made some enemies along the way & it should not be surprising that someone is taking the chance to bring them down. The shorts have brought up some compelling arguments and gave all of us interesting insights into Burford operations. However so far, it seems like none of them has held up and I would like to thank them for the long overdue changes they have effected. For the longs that have done their due diligence, this gives you an opportunity to obtain part ownership at in a wonderful business for only 1.5x the book value. For anyone that has ever been to a litigation finance conference, you would know how highly respected Burford is, even by their closest competitors. Specialty Fin thrives on superior underwriting and It is telling when none of the other litigation funders have not come out to capitalize on this but cleared burford of any wrongdoings (LCM). Sure, Argentina is a wild card but the last remembered, bonds were still trading even at the very worst, a 70% discount to par when Argentina defaulted. At 30% ROE compounded, Burford is a steal at the current price and like all longs would, I have never been happier for a price like this. Continue taking the long term view and filter out the noise & trolls on this board. You will be a lot wiser and richer in 10 years time. Ron
27/8/2019
08:26
dgdg1: So clearly MW are feeling pressure from the discovery of the Glenmark case which they admit they didn't know about but insist "no don't be silly", we weren't wrong. So they are the ones starting to look defensive. And they are not even denying now that there was an entitlement. They admit that "Like skilled trial lawyers, BUR stops just short of actually lying." which seems a departure from their original claim. The claim now is only that "It seems likely that BUR’s supposed “entitlement” was in the form of a debt Napo owed BUR, which would have been of questionable value at best to Burford. While we do not know Napo’s financial condition as of the end of 2013, just three years later, it had only generated $391,000 in LTM revenue and had negative book value of -$58.9 million. It would strain credulity to claim that at the end of 2013, Napo had looked like a solid credit to BUR." So they admit they don't know what the financial condition was in 2013 but try to argue that the entitlement must have been of "questionable value" because if you look at Napo's financial condition three years later it didn't look good. Hmmmm. In any case, Burford has clearly stated many times that the figures on concluded cases only imply that there is no litigation risk, whereas there is always the risk an entitlement might not actually be capable of being collected. But in fact ultimately Burford DID manage to collect in the form of a shareholding in Jaguar. So now the whole claim of MW is that it was supposedly obvious that this shareholding would end up being worth less, and the proof is that the share price went down after the shares were received (and that therefore they are still supposedly right to say that the entitlement never had a chance of being collected). So MW's claims now look incredibly tenuous, but they desperately insist that "BUR is not worthy of an AIM listing, let alone a U.S. one", without any further reasoning. Desperate.
15/8/2019
22:11
sweet karolina2: winsome, Do you have a link to the Viceroy report on Burford? I would be very happy to do a side by side review of Viceroy and Burford. Obviously the purpose of the Viceroy report on Burford was to inform the client who paid them for it as to whether or not they should make a bid for Burford - they decided not to, and the purpose of the MW report was to create a shock correction in Burford's share price. As for the other company you mention, I have no knowledge of it or interest in it. However frauds and dogs exhibit many common characteristics. These are colloquially know as red flags (see post 10888 in the header for some examples), individually they do not prove much, but when there are a lot of them, then it is definitely worth avoiding a company. Whether they make it worth launching a short attack is more debatable. But in every analysis of a company that is not worth taking the risk of buying or taking the much greater risk of shorting (something I have not done for over a decade) there will almost certainly be many of the same red flags, hence I think your charge of plagiarism would be hard to substantiate but feel free to have a go yourself, just remember to avoid confirmation bias in your analysis. Burford has more red flags than May Day in Moscow, today's RNS was the first step in removing some of them. As I have said before, still a very long way to go, but every long journey has to start somewhere. Anyway looking forward to you providing the link to the Viceroy report on Burford, do let us know if you also stumble across a link to the 2013 case which Napo won and could credibly have provided a $15.8m return to BUR.
15/8/2019
11:40
galatea99: Mr Bearbull of Investors Chronicle on Burford. Quite a long commentary that starts: "It should be obvious why I am writing about companies that run a mismatch between profits and cash flow. It’s to do with the fun and games at litigation financier Burford Capital (BUR). It wouldn’t surprise me if Burford is a can of worms. Yet the point isn’t to pass judgement on it. That’s why a PDF of the Muddy Waters research sits unread on my desktop, lest it influence me. Rather, the aim is to draw investors’ attentions to the type of company that Burford might be, or Aero Inventory was. That said, the ‘safety’ spreadsheet could have been written with Burford in mind. The company may set records for the gap between accounting profits and cash flow (see table). While operating profits rose almost eight times in the four years to end 2018, cash flow resolutely went in the opposite direction. As a result, over the five years 2014-18, $363m (£295m) of cash left the group before interest and taxes while the income statement simultaneously totted up $863m of operating profit. And in the most recent year – 2018 – the gap between profit and cash flow is a mind-boggling $543m." ........................ "These are the sort of shares that I would only consider buying at a steep discount to net assets, whose value – almost by definition – is tentative. In Burford’s case, the latest net asset figure is 573p a share. So, even at the current 808p (down 60 per cent from its 12-month high), the share price would have to halve, then drop some more before I would take an interest. Even then there is the issue of its corporate governance – idiosyncratic or risible? Has anyone noticed that next month all four of its four-man board solely comprising non-executive directors will cease to be independent? Still, as I say, it’s not really about Burford." Https://www.investorschronicle.co.uk/comment/2019/08/15/against-the-flow/ "It wouldn’t surprise me if Burford is a can of worms"! This is one of IC's flagship columns.
14/8/2019
18:10
sweet karolina2: dgdg, The pressure is intense to report bigger and bigger profits each year, especially when more money has been put in. MW was certainly right to question why the uplift on a lost case. But if $15.8m is just the lost arbitration which probably cost around $800k and the 2014 uplift is the lost Napo case for an outlay of $6.6m this is an incredible way to treat clients. We fund your litigation and win or lose we take what we would have got had you won! Does that really make sense as a good deal? The conversion of "investment" in the court cases converted into debt in Napo 10 Oct 14 according to MW - I am not sure where he got that date from. "Burford restructured its financing arrangements with Napo to become entitled to certain fixed payments and to give Napo greater flexibility to reorganize its business" this was moving the debt into payments that actually came from the IPO and into shares all well down the line. I doubt the IPO could have happened with such a large debt already in place. What do you make of Miriam's departure some time before 3 Nov 14 ie after the debt conversion and after the bond issue? The RNS announcing she had left (not was leaving) is here: Https://uk.advfn.com/stock-market/london/burford-capital-BUR/share-news/Burford-Capital-Operating-Management-Update/64257912 but the bit about Miriam is: Miriam Connole, Burford's CFO, has left Burford to pursue other opportunities. Her current deputies, Mr. Jamie Knowles, Burford's UK-based Group Financial Controller, and Ms. Christina Yue, Burford's US-based Vice President Finance, have been given expanded role accountabilities and, together with the forthcoming hiring of a tax manager, will run Burford's finance function and report to Mr. Garber, who will assume responsibility for the overall function subject to the supervision of the relevant entity boards of directors. Both Mr. Knowles and Ms. Yue are qualified accountants; Mr. Knowles, who also has a law degree, was most recently a financial controller at RSA Group, and Ms. Yue was most recently a manager at Ernst & Young. Mr. Rowles-Davies will succeed Ms. Connole as a director of Burford Capital PLC, the issuer of Burford's retail bonds and a wholly owned subsidiary of BCHUKL. Do you think it is strange that the notification to the market is after she had gone and also there was no thanks and best wishes blah that normally appears when someone senior who has been there for so long goes. Also Jefferies believes Liz was really in the role from when Miriam left, but certainly no mention of that here. What do you then make of the Hogwarts defence against the dark arts professoresque procession of replacement CFOs leaving? You are getting the hang of looking at individual bits in more detail, but it is putting them all together to make the picture which should inform your opinion and therefore your investing decisions.
09/8/2019
11:31
sweet karolina2: "SweetKarolina, I think your comments about growth of the share price are very misleading. If you look at the Net Assets/Total Assets/Book Value of IMF Bentham it is AUD 368m (page 63 of their annual report). Their market capitalisation is AUD 665m. Hence 1.8x book value (665m/368m)." Book value at IMF is what they have put in at BUR it is fair value guess work. That is the point. Has BUR really been growing as quickly as its accounts suggest? Surely IMF would have gone down the same path 10 years ago. If IMF was just a grown up version of BUR that had stopped growing and using lumpy accounting it would report profits of $500m one year and $100m the next not $10s of M in a good year and a loss in bad year. Hence there is something fundamentally different between the businesses and not just accounting methods, or BUR's accounting methods allow them to report bogus profits and NAV and nobody can tell - it would be very hard for IMF to cook the books. If BUR really want to clear their name they should get IMF's accountants to produce accounts from the raw data, verifying each bit of data and see how the picture looks - it should just be a more lumpy version of what BUR reported in terms of historic profits. IMF also report specific cases which have completed in the year. BUR now only produce a summary by cohort so it is not easy to see where values of specific cases have changes (BUR used to, which is why MW were able to catch them out on Napo - BUR just put a different (not particularly convincing IMHO) spin on it, but confirmed the raw facts)
08/8/2019
00:22
stevoc1964: From this mornings Telegraph:-LEAD STORY'Bear raid' on Burford piles further woes on WoodfordEmbattled fund manager is caught up by attack on one of his major investments, which sees its shares slump     By Harriet Russell? and Michael O'DwyerNEIL WOODFORD suffered a fresh blow yesterday when one of his most successful investments, litigation funder Burford Capital, came under attack from short seller Muddy Waters, which accused the company of "egregiously misrepresenting" its returns.Burford Capital was a top 10 holding in Mr Woodford's now-suspended equity income fund. According to the latest available data, his funds still own more than 7pc of Burford.Muddy Waters claimed in a note published yesterday that Burford "is a perfect storm for an accounting fiasco" and that its "governance strictures are laughter-inducing".As a litigation funder, Burford puts up the cash to help costly legal cases proceed. Investors, such as hedge funds, agree to invest in exchange for attractive returns if the cases are won.The short seller also hit out at Invesco, Burford's largest shareholder and Mr Woodford's ex-employer, for what it called "unethical behaviour"."We also see Invesco fund manager Mark Barnett as having been equally complicit in ways reminiscent of some of the highly aggressive marking value techniques he and Neil Woodford have employed together," the report stated.It highlighted Invesco's relationship with Napo Pharmaceuticals, which was backed by Burford in a legal case.Invesco said: "We categorically refute any accusation of improper or unethical behaviour on behalf of Invesco or fund manager Mark Barnett."Invesco has been a long-term shareholder of Burford Capital and held investments in Napo since 2006. These investments were made and overseen in line with our robust investment and independent oversight processes. Invesco's legal advisers are reviewing the accusations and we expect we will be able to make a broader statement in due course." Woodford Investment Management declined to comment.Muddy Waters asserted that Burford relied on "a very small number of cases" for its returns.Responding to the note, Burford said its board "takes note of the short attack report by Muddy Waters, a firm known for such tactics, and believes that the report's criticisms are without merit". It added: "Burford will issue a detailed response to the report as soon as practicable and, following that detailed response, will also convene an investor conference call ... in due course."It said that directors would buy more Burford shares once a response to the Muddy Waters' report was published.Burford issued a stock exchange statement earlier yesterday, prior to the Muddy Waters' note, after its share price fell by almost a fifth on Tuesday on speculation that it was the subject of a cryptic Muddy Waters tweet.Yesterday, the company's shares halved in value to 561p. Analysts at Jefferies said they thought Burford should "seek longer-term remedies" by issuing more market updates.The fallout threatened to engulf the wider litigation funding industry.Shares in Litigation Capital Management fell as much as 28pc before recovering to be 5pc lower, while Manolete Partners fell as much as 21pc before ending 13pc down. There is no suggestion of any misconduct at either firm.LCM boss Patrick Moloney said: "LCM has consistently prepared its accounts and its return metrics on a conservative cash accounting basis. There is no fair value accounting in our numbers. We are committed to providing investors with the disclosure and transparency needed to assess the underlying basis of our returns and performance."
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