Angus Energy Share Discussion Threads

[3put] 21/6/2022 18:39

Today is the last day of testing

[3put] 21/6/2022 18:39

Natural gas up to £2.5

[3put] 21/6/2022 18:39

Given the amount of seismic performed over the last 25 years in the field and the number of bore-holes and side-tracks drilled, providing good offset data, presumably the company and its contractors must be wholly confident of hitting the target zone. Putting that aside, what operational risks exist and could the programme be more complicated or expensive than planned? What lessons have been learned from mistakes by previous drillers in this formation? Asked on 31 May 2022
Thanks. The level of confidence about the target zone is indeed very high. We are addressing an area of the reservoir which was being produced from by an existing well, which was shut in due to a well-bore related issue.

An non-exhaustive list of risks, ever present in all drilling programmes is given in hxxps://www.researchgate.net/publication/317248002_Downhole_Drilling_Problems

Pertinent here are 1) hole collapse – this occurred twice in the Saltfleetby field and both times in the same layer, so we have introduced mitigation measures and will approach this layer with appropriate caution and 2) differential sticking ; 3) loss of bottom hole assembly – this occurred twice at Saltfleetby and 4) lost circulation fluids with reservoir damage. Many of these issues can be managed by reducing mud weight which is easier to do when well control is not such an issue as in a depleted reservoir.

It is wrong to characterise the historical drilling programmes at Saltfleetby as being especially prone to failure. Drilling was conducted between 1984 and 2017 by a number of Operators of varying competence. This being the UK’s largest onshore gas field, a great number of the earlier side tracks were in fact wholly exploratory. Some of the later drilling programmes did encounter problems which (by the common agreement of many specialists present at the time) could have been avoided with a relatively small degree of caution by the then drilling manager.

As we have advised before, this sidetrack has been planned with the benefit of enhanced 3D seismic and the oversight of a great number of independent drilling engineers and specialists. Some of the later side-tracks did not benefit from such oversight.

Angus’ drilling programmes have generally been well executed – albeit with disappointment about the target zone at Brockham and Lidsey. Angus drilled Horse Hill-1 successfully before selling out to partners and drilling programmes at the other fields either did not encounter the sorts of issues listed above or Angus was able to rectify them swiftly.

[1347] 21/6/2022 18:34

HITS As far as I am aware Aleph (in any guise) have not issued a formal notification of holdings since the Form 8.3 on 20th January 2022. All we have is what was stated in the placing RNS that they would take a 21% strategic holding (the second tranche of which has not been admitted to AIM yet) along with what is on the Anguish Energy Portal. Also, does anyone else find it quite odd that Aleph Commodities are also listed on all the RNSs now and have been for a while, even though they are not the NOMAD, Broker or PR company. Makes you wonder who's really running the show doesn't it?

[3put] 21/6/2022 18:24

Natural gas up to £2.5 a therm today , just noticed that

[sincero1] 21/6/2022 18:19

dear oh dear..the resident grey old disingenuous crayon eaters are so clueless .... and all non shareholders...... tut tut...

[jtidsbadly] 21/6/2022 17:58

HITS: the significant shareholders page on the website, updated to 1 June, which you quote, says it’s based on TR-1 forms received. As usual there’s confusion in this: the AIM Rule 26 page says it’s updated to 14 June. The significant shareholders page is a sub-set of the AIM Rule 26 page. Careless?

[headinthesand] 21/6/2022 17:14

Where's the TR-1 relating to Aleph's existing recent acquisition/ownership via placing of of 7.19% of ANGS (164 million shares)?

And why hasn't the second half of the Aleph placing been announced yet either?

This is seeming more odd, the more one thinks about it...

[3put] 21/6/2022 16:58

Given the amount of seismic performed over the last 25 years in the field and the number of bore-holes and side-tracks drilled, providing good offset data, presumably the company and its contractors must be wholly confident of hitting the target zone. Putting that aside, what operational risks exist and could the programme be more complicated or expensive than planned? What lessons have been learned from mistakes by previous drillers in this formation? Asked on 31 May 2022
Thanks. The level of confidence about the target zone is indeed very high. We are addressing an area of the reservoir which was being produced from by an existing well, which was shut in due to a well-bore related issue.

An non-exhaustive list of risks, ever present in all drilling programmes is given in hxxps://www.researchgate.net/publication/317248002_Downhole_Drilling_Problems

Pertinent here are 1) hole collapse – this occurred twice in the Saltfleetby field and both times in the same layer, so we have introduced mitigation measures and will approach this layer with appropriate caution and 2) differential sticking ; 3) loss of bottom hole assembly – this occurred twice at Saltfleetby and 4) lost circulation fluids with reservoir damage. Many of these issues can be managed by reducing mud weight which is easier to do when well control is not such an issue as in a depleted reservoir.

It is wrong to characterise the historical drilling programmes at Saltfleetby as being especially prone to failure. Drilling was conducted between 1984 and 2017 by a number of Operators of varying competence. This being the UK’s largest onshore gas field, a great number of the earlier side tracks were in fact wholly exploratory. Some of the later drilling programmes did encounter problems which (by the common agreement of many specialists present at the time) could have been avoided with a relatively small degree of caution by the then drilling manager.

As we have advised before, this sidetrack has been planned with the benefit of enhanced 3D seismic and the oversight of a great number of independent drilling engineers and specialists. Some of the later side-tracks did not benefit from such oversight.

Angus’ drilling programmes have generally been well executed – albeit with disappointment about the target zone at Brockham and Lidsey. Angus drilled Horse Hill-1 successfully before selling out to partners and drilling programmes at the other fields either did not encounter the sorts of issues listed above or Angus was able to rectify them swiftly.

[ja51oiler] 21/6/2022 16:27

I Wonder if the OGA Actually thought that they were dealing with the other Forum Energy LTD?..... After all, Mr. Forrest was the company secretary around then?.... Only he resigned....but then signed off on the company's Accounts months later!.... Arent some other familiar names on the register in that company??

[3put] 21/6/2022 16:24

Given the amount of seismic performed over the last 25 years in the field and the number of bore-holes and side-tracks drilled, providing good offset data, presumably the company and its contractors must be wholly confident of hitting the target zone. Putting that aside, what operational risks exist and could the programme be more complicated or expensive than planned? What lessons have been learned from mistakes by previous drillers in this formation? Asked on 31 May 2022
Thanks. The level of confidence about the target zone is indeed very high. We are addressing an area of the reservoir which was being produced from by an existing well, which was shut in due to a well-bore related issue.

An non-exhaustive list of risks, ever present in all drilling programmes is given in hxxps://www.researchgate.net/publication/317248002_Downhole_Drilling_Problems

Pertinent here are 1) hole collapse – this occurred twice in the Saltfleetby field and both times in the same layer, so we have introduced mitigation measures and will approach this layer with appropriate caution and 2) differential sticking ; 3) loss of bottom hole assembly – this occurred twice at Saltfleetby and 4) lost circulation fluids with reservoir damage. Many of these issues can be managed by reducing mud weight which is easier to do when well control is not such an issue as in a depleted reservoir.

It is wrong to characterise the historical drilling programmes at Saltfleetby as being especially prone to failure. Drilling was conducted between 1984 and 2017 by a number of Operators of varying competence. This being the UK’s largest onshore gas field, a great number of the earlier side tracks were in fact wholly exploratory. Some of the later drilling programmes did encounter problems which (by the common agreement of many specialists present at the time) could have been avoided with a relatively small degree of caution by the then drilling manager.

As we have advised before, this sidetrack has been planned with the benefit of enhanced 3D seismic and the oversight of a great number of independent drilling engineers and specialists. Some of the later side-tracks did not benefit from such oversight.

Angus’ drilling programmes have generally been well executed – albeit with disappointment about the target zone at Brockham and Lidsey. Angus drilled Horse Hill-1 successfully before selling out to partners and drilling programmes at the other fields either did not encounter the sorts of issues listed above or Angus was able to rectify them swiftly.

[3put] 21/6/2022 16:24

Can we please have an update on all the relevant permissions needed for current and near future work. Asked on 14 June 2022
We will answer this question in the ordinary course of our Q&A, but as regards our recommissioning project at Saltfleetby we note that on 22 March 2022 we have already answered this question as follows:

“Angus Energy plc (AIM: ANGS) is pleased to announce that the Environment Agency has issued its Variation Notice for the existing Saltfleetby gas field permit. The site permit now encompasses the new activities of processing and compressing of gas for direct export to National Grid. No further regulatory or planning permissions are required before First Gas.”

[3put] 21/6/2022 16:23

Wrong forum

[3put] 21/6/2022 16:23

But make no mistake: if we see another bull cycle in 2023 (as of now, it looks like mid 2023 could be the start of a new cycle), there is nothing in any your lives that will make you anywhere close the amount of money as crypto

[jasper51] 21/6/2022 15:57

Plus oil and condensate

[1347] 21/6/2022 15:38

JA/JT The piece of the jigsaw that you seem to be missing is this. As well as the connections via the offices and Dos Santos, ask yourself who had the Russian connections? Who arrived around the same time? Just coincidence? Well yes it could be.

Was it all just a coincidence that those that got discounted placings and warrants over a year ago happened to back the Sound Energy offer? Was it just a coincidence that the share price rose as a result and some we know (maybe others we don't) sold out just before the offer was withdrawn? Well, yes it could be.

Then we have the Gneiss saga, which resulted in Anguish effectively having to pay them off to settle the dispute and then Aleph and various new companies that trace back to Delaware, USA, suddenly appear with loan offers. Just coincidence? Well, yes it could be.

Is it really all just a series of unfortunate events? Are we in the matrix? Is the oaf in Downing Street a good example of propriety? Will Putin get the Nobel peace prize?

[tidy 2] 21/6/2022 15:30

Guys Note IOG 54 scuffs p/d only 150m cap

[jtidsbadly] 21/6/2022 15:10

JA51: yes, very strange, all that. An alternative explanation could be that after Russia went into the Crimea in 2014 (was it?), their ambitions for further Ukrainian territory were telegraphed to Putin’s cronies in the big companies, and they just hastened their departure from the UK domestic oil and gas scene. Though I suppose they could have put their abandonment reserve cash offshore first and the eventual cost of their being relieved of ownership would have been even lower than selling Poundland in 2019. I don’t know who benefited from the deal other than, in the end, the suppliers, multiple local contractors etc. and, of course, Mercuria. And the Angus Board got their salaries and perquisites. It’s true that some people who bought at about the 0.4p. level, and many small share traders, have made some money. The vast majority of shareholders will have lost a lot since the present management took control - and even since Anguish bought Poundland.

[ja51oiler] 21/6/2022 14:54

PS
Angus and Wingas Storage (AKA The Russian federation) Shared the same address in Chiswick!....Along with Directorships shared at the time and now of associated companies!

[ja51oiler] 21/6/2022 14:49

JT
I'm not suggesting anything. Having read the financial guidance that the then OGA gave at the time, it seems extraordinary that a tiny one-man-band company could have taken the production license area over without some sort of financial clout. That seems lacking in reading the accounts! We do know that the Angus deal was signed very shortly after the Wingas Storage Ltd (AKA The Russian federation), Forum Energy Service Ltd deal!

[jtidsbadly] 21/6/2022 14:42

JA51: yes, I agree, it was a very sweet deal for him.

[ja51oiler] 21/6/2022 14:30

JT
Mr Forrest has made out like a bandit here!!
Absolutely no surprise that he wanted shot of that £12.8 Million De-Comm liability.