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Share Name Share Symbol Market Type Share ISIN Share Description
Woodford Patient Capital Trust LSE:WPCT London Ordinary Share GB00BVG1CF25 ORD 1P
  Price Change % Change Share Price Shares Traded Last Trade
  +1.60p +1.82% 89.70p 3,738,536 16:35:00
Bid Price Offer Price High Price Low Price Open Price
89.40p 89.60p 89.80p 87.40p 87.50p
Industry Sector Turnover (m) Profit (m) EPS - Basic PE Ratio Market Cap (m)
Equity Investment Instruments -3.44 -0.42 741.8

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Date Time Title Posts
19/1/201913:17::: WOODFORD PATIENT CAPITAL TRUST :::5,383
21/9/201807:28Woodford Patient Capital Trust199

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Woodford Patient Capital (WPCT) Most Recent Trades

Trade Time Trade Price Trade Size Trade Value Trade Type
2019-01-18 17:06:2688.8925,00022,223.25O
2019-01-18 17:02:5989.708,1007,265.38O
2019-01-18 16:49:4188.99774,000688,813.56O
2019-01-18 16:36:2889.24270,000240,948.00O
2019-01-18 16:35:3389.7010,0008,970.00O
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Woodford Patient Capital Daily Update: Woodford Patient Capital Trust is listed in the Equity Investment Instruments sector of the London Stock Exchange with ticker WPCT. The last closing price for Woodford Patient Capital was 88.10p.
Woodford Patient Capital Trust has a 4 week average price of 79.10p and a 12 week average price of 79.10p.
The 1 year high share price is 91p while the 1 year low share price is currently 70.50p.
There are currently 827,000,000 shares in issue and the average daily traded volume is 1,804,858 shares. The market capitalisation of Woodford Patient Capital Trust is £741,819,000.
daffyjones: Wow. PFG still makes up 5% of WEIF and WIFF despite the woeful performance over the past couple of years Reminder that Woody met the board and was reassured after the first profits warning in 2017, going on to buy more shares at £20 just before they cratered after a second profits warning. He was bigging them up again recently, talking about how the storm clouds had cleared and the share price was set for a recovery. Now yet another profits warning and a 20% drop in the share price. Woody has really lost the plot.
oiltakeyouhomeagaincaitlin: Does jonwig hold any WPCT shares? Erm NO. Does jonwig own any Woodford shares? Erm NO. Does jonwig intend to hold any of these shares? Erm NO. Woodford is, he claims, "untrustworthy". Does jonwig know anything substantive about the valuation of the unquoted shares in WPCT? Erm NO. Does jonwig have the ability to show that redemptions in the Woodford Funds will have a profound effect, or any effect, on WPCT? Erm NO. Does jonwig have any real knowledge that is not clearly in the public domain about WPCT? Erm NO. Does jonwig have the knowledge, ability, rationale, to conduct a campaign over hundreds of boring obsessive posts attempting to destroy WPCT? Erm NO. Has jonwig had any success in his long repetitive campaign in bringing down the Share Price of WPCT? Erm NO (Hell, NO!) Does ANYBODY admire jonwig for his futile attempts to destroy Woodford and WPCT? There may be two or three others of the same ilk (or is it Ilkley?)lurking about this thread, but they don't count because they are essentially stupid, too. So, Erm, NO What then is Jonwig? An admirable public-spirited activist? Erm NO. He is, put quite simply, an UNSUCCESSFUL TROLL! LOL
ltcm1: Porsche - if you wind back to 2014/15, the creation of all the funds looked solid, it can be argued Woodford was still on form and at the top of his game then. Since 2016 growth and investment in the UK have both declined plus Brexit too ofcourse. To me it seems obvious more foreign investments should have been bought and the correlation between the stocks he held reduced, even if it meant poorer performance for a period until the Brexit outcome was more clearly known. But instead Woodford for some reason embarked on a number of trades that significantly increased his correlation factor and left him hugely exposed to problems with Brexit. However if you look at WPCT no such issues have arisen so I don't see the same danger. Regarding the spillover or cross contamination, or a funding issue, if the share price gets low then surely someone will come in for a bid for WPCT and inject more capital. Or there will be a rights issue. I think you and jonwig are right to raise these issues they are important. But the invisible hand of the market will be taking all this into account. The other thing is they must do wargaming and will have a way of dealing with problems like this. Surely there are other funds he could sell a block of holdings to. I don't see any lack of trust issue with Woodford myself. I think he maybe cares too much about the investors, he has never had to deal with losses in such a high profile way before. Also perhaps he is not ruthless enough and is more comfortable in rising markets than having to cut funding and effectively fire people. Maybe these more choppy markets of late have found a weakness in the Woodford game.
jonwig: The saga of his Capita investment was ruthlessly dissected a few posts back, but another has not been mentioned much. In December 2016 he declared a 29% holding in Utilitywise with 22,704,413 shares, bought at around 170p. There have been no further announcements on this, but the UTW website has his holding at 23,534,413 (29.98%). The share price is now below 6p. The share price of UTW has been consistently downward trend from 200p in Jan 2017: was there never the sense that selling at 100, 50, 25, ... must be better than selling at 0? Of course, the answer is that he couldn't have sold that size much above 0.
daffyjones: CAPITA - A BAGHOLDER'S TALE June 2014 - CPI share price 1137 – CPI makes the top ten in the launch portfolio of Woodford's flagship fund. Feb 2016 – share price 1030 - "Capita weakened sharply after issuing its full year results. The company continues to show strong organic growth, and both earnings and dividend growth remain at attractive levels. Investors appear to have focused on the company’s net debt, however, which came in slightly higher than expected and some analysts now fear that a rights issue may be required to delever the balance sheet. We think that this is unlikely and are much less concerned about the strength of Capita’s balance sheet. We believe it remains well-placed to deliver very attractive rates of growth.” Sep 2016 – 670 – “The largest detractor from performance was Capita, which issued a profit warning towards the end of the month. We have always accepted that there was some cyclicality within Capita’s business but a number of other issues have arisen, some of which are one-off in nature. As you would expect, we have met the management and are reassured that the company is already doing some of the things it needs to do in order to restore the business to a healthier growth trajectory. Although the market is clearly worried about the sustainability of Capita’s dividend and the prospect of a dilutive rights issue, we are confident that the dividend is safe and that an equity issue will not be required. The market’s reaction looks disproportionate. We added slightly to the holding towards the end of the month at a very depressed share price level." Dec 2016 - 535 – “We believe the market has over-reacted to the series of profit warnings. In our view, the share price now profoundly undervalues the fundamental long-term attractions of this business. At times like this, it is essential that one does not compound the impact of a fundamental disappointment through an emotional reaction to a share price fall." Jan 2017 – 509 – “it is critical that we do not compound that mistake through an emotional reaction to the disappointment of the share price fall. Our view is that the market has over-reacted to this series of negative trading updates. In turn, this has driven Capita’s share price way below the intrinsic value of the business. We have, therefore, retained conviction in the long-term investment case and took advantage of the depressed share price to add to the fund’s position in the company.” Feb 2017 – 416 – “We have said before that we were disappointed by events at Capita last year, which combined to undermine market confidence in the business and the credibility of management forecasts. We have spoken to management several times as these issues have unfolded, including a recent conversation with the new chairman who appears keen to ensure that the business takes appropriate steps to move on from last year’s challenges. In our view, Capita’s share price continues to profoundly undervalue the fundamental long-term attractions of the business. It will take time to rebuild credibility and value at the company but we believe the management changes announced earlier this month will mark an important step on that journey.” Dec 2017 – 392 – “Capita performed poorly, following the release of its interim results. Although the results were broadly in line with expectations, there were a number of complicating one-off elements and a mixed outlook statement. The shares declined by 12% on the day of the results which looks very harsh to us in the context of Capita’s already low valuation. The shares yield over 7% here which suggests that some investors fear a dividend cut may be required. Clearly that eventuality cannot be completely ruled out, but having met Jon Lewis during the month, we are reassured that decisions around capital structure and the dividend will be informed by a clearer long-term strategy for the business. In the meantime, we have maintained the portfolio’s exposure to this business, seeing the potential for significant value creation in the future as Capita is restored to the high quality, successful and well-run business that it used to be.” Jan 2018 – 182 – “Since the profit warning on Wednesday, Capita’s share price has broadly halved, which has clearly been unhelpful to recent performance. I am pleased that we have seen from the company what we thought would be coming. This is a complete reset for Capita. The new chief executive, Jonathan Lewis, has mapped out a clear new direction of travel for the business and it is one with which I completely agree. This reset has been met with a massive fall in the share price from an already very depressed level. In the current market conditions, perhaps we should not have expected anything else. After all, Capita represents many of the things that this market loathes at the moment – it is exposed to the UK economy. This is the reality of what we have been writing about for some time now. Markets are being driven by momentum. Valuation is irrelevant – it simply does not matter in the stock market at the moment. This has been a poor investment, but it is one that has the capacity to become a significantly better one from here. I would go as far as to say that the business will be in better shape at the end of 2018 than it was in 2016. It will have infinitely better leadership, a stronger balance sheet, better cash flow, more conservative accounting policies and a lower pension deficit. The mistake I have made, albeit I didn’t know it at the time, was in owning Capita in 2016. It is not a mistake to own it now. And so, I will not be compounding the previous error by behaving in an irrational and valuation insensitive way now. I would be doing you, my investors, a massive injustice if I was to abandon the investment discipline that has guided me for 30 years in this industry.” Nov 2018 – 107 – Woody finally sells out completely, with the shares down 90% from the launch of his fund.
jonwig: @ ltcm1 - your investor is in good company. A private company (Commonwealth Fusion Systems) in partnership with MIT has recently announced some important developments in the field of cold fusion. Https:// Https:// If you look at the list of investors in this venture, you'll see a few familiar names: Http:// [No, not N W] Now the point about this is the relative transparency of the process. Nothing about 'Industrial Heat' confers the same sense of legitimacy. For some six years it has been associated with a convicted fraudster. We have no idea of the size of the investments which lifted its share price by 375%, nor the identity of the investors involved. Just as an aside. In theory, the valuation of a private company can be at the share price of the latest funding round. So a single, small investment in I H could be made at a 10,000% higher value than before. WPCT's nav would be marked up accordingly and earn him a performance fee. Of course, that's the stuff of fiction!
researchanalystman: "AstraZeneca is beginning to look a lot like Tesco"Both companies use similar accounting practicesADVICE & COMMENTTerry Smiththree major costs from its reported profits, namely:• Restructuring charges• "Exceptional" legal costs• Intangible asset amortisationIn other words, major costs were being ignored in the calculation of profits. It is this approach to accounting which is beginning toremind me of Tesco.Historically, Tesco also managedeight changes in the definition of return on capital employed over the period 1998-2011, years when Terry Leahy was chief executive (I examined these in an FT Money column in September 2014, How investors ignored the warning signs at Tesco).AstraZeneca moved to reporting "core" earnings in 2007. In 2012, it moved to excluding all intangible asset amortisation and impairment charges as opposed to only certain amortisation charges. In a pharmaceutical company, almost all the assets are intangible - namely the drug patents. This change led to reported "core" earnings in 2012 going up. Quelle surprise. While this accounting treatment would not fool a decent analyst, who in any event would be looking at cash flows rather than earnings, it certainly seems to have fooled some people.The other way in which AstraZeneca is beginning to resemble Tesco is its vast increase in invested capital at the expense of returns. As you may know, I regard return on capital as the single best measure of financial success for a business (as does Warren Buffett for what it's worth).In my September 2014 article, one of the planks in the argument that Tesco was headed for a fall was a chart - reproduced here - whichcontrasted the steady upward march of Tesco's earnings per share (EPS) which seemed to have mesmerised investors with the more or less continuous fall in its return on capital employed (ROCE).Alongside the Tesco chart is one showing AstraZeneca's ROCE for the period 2001-16. You will see that the returns fall from a superior 28.4 per cent in 2001 and a wonderful 40.9 per cent in 2006 to a barely acceptable 11.9 per cent over the period (and have been as low as 5.1 per cent recently).This is hardly surprising given that invested capital, the denominator in this calculation, has risen 114 per cent since returns peaked in 2006. Even "core" EPS has risen by just 10 per cent in total over the same period, and that's with the benefit of all those "core" adjustments.It certainly looks as though all that additional capital has not been very well invested. An example may be the 2007 acquisition of US biotechnology business MedImmune for $15.6bn.MedImmune had revenues of just $1.3bn and its main product at that time - a nasal flu spray called FluMist - had failed to live up to expectations. Yet AstraZeneca paid a premium of 53 per cent to MedImmune's share price before the company put itself up for sale - a price that one analyst (Brian Lian at CIBC World Markets) described as "extraordinary" and "difficult to rationalise".I guess it's not that difficult to rationalise if you exclude any resulting restructuring costs and write down of the intangible assets acquired from the calculation of earnings. It is no coincidence that AstraZeneca's ROCE peaked the year before this acquisition and that itmoved to reporting "core" earnings that year.Leaving aside AstraZeneca's exploits in acquisitions and accounting, last week's Mystic drug trial problem was hardly their debut. In the past, clinical trials have also failed for drugs billed as potential blockbusters to treat heart disease, strokes, lung cancer, diabetes and blood clots.This is hardly surprising given that the odds of any one compound making it through all the stages of clinical trials and to market are about one in 10,000. Moreover, even when a drug is successful, patents have a limited life and the drug companies are running on a treadmill which requires more and bigger discoveries and product development to drive growth.It makes me wonder what investors find so attractive about them. You might say the dividend, with AstraZeneca's shares now yielding nearly 5 per cent, but with the dividend cover at 1.1x there must be a reasonable chance that the fate of the dividend may also soon begin to remind me of Tesco.I would guess that by now AstraZeneca shareholders are ruing the support they gave to reject the Pfizer bid at £55 a share three years ago.Many investors' approach to these companies, with their accounting issues, remind me of the chorus of another song Where Have All the Flowers Gone? performed by Peter, Paul and Mary in 1962.Terry Smith is chief executive of Fundsmith LLP; the views expressed are personal It might be tempting to view last week's fall in the AstraZeneca share price in isolation, related to the disappointing results of the "Mystic" lung cancer drug trial. However, I suspect that AstraZeneca's problems go much deeper than a setback for a single drug.To paraphrase the title of a Christmas song which was a hit for Perry Como in 1951, AstraZeneca is beginning to look a lot like Tesco.In FT Money nearly two years ago I wrote a column about AstraZeneca's accounting (Why bother cooking the books at all?) in which I highlighted that AstraZeneca's move to "core" earnings in 2007 had allowed its reported results and most of the investment community to exclude
saltraider: Hands up ... I am really not a 'harsh' sort of a person. Apologies to @orinocor for being excessively terse. The trouble is that there are a fair few people around and about who are trying to manipulate the WPCT share price ... and using some pretty dubious means to do it. They are shorting WPCT and trying to use other 'communications' avenues to add to the pressure on the price at the same time. That includes pushing blatantly fake news. When you step in (@orinocor) and make negative statements based on apparently zero knowledge of the basic WPCT concept, you are just accidentally (and ignorantly ... sorry!) aiding and abetting the manipulators.
daffyjones: Some positive press coverage at last for Woody! To be fair he was started from a terrible position in Feb. [Begins:] An unexpected recovery for Woodford Patient Capital Trust has made the struggling investment trust the surprise top performer among the sector specialist funds in March, albeit amid a substantial slump for the wider biotech and pharmaceuticals sector. WPCT was the top performer out of the 13 closed end funds investing in wholly or largely in biotech or healthcare, in terms of both NAV and share price performance, in March, and was a mid-range performer over the first quarter. This contrasts markedly with its poor longer term performance for NAV and share price in absolute terms and in comparison with benchmarks and peers. WPCT achieved a 0.6% rise in NAV and a 6.7% increase in share price in the month, which compared with negative 1-5% changes in NAV for all the other funds and 1.5-6.5% declines in price, for all but one other fund.
dr biotech: I am pretty sure that he has all his money invested in either the WPCT or his equity funds. He is doing a live webcast as I type. NEIL WOODFORD says: Today 2:00 pm Kelvin (and others that have asked similar questions), The weakness of the WPCT share price and NAV since the start of 2016 has been the product of the pretty severe sell-off in shares across healthcare, biotech and early-stage quoted stocks, both here in the UK and in the US. Much of this, we believe to be driven by short-term positioning and rotational activity amongst the fund management community. We don’t believe that it is driven by a correction of over-valuation, nor by a deterioration in fundamentals. We remain very pleased with the underlying progress of the businesses in which we have invested in the trust. Indeed, in what has been a pretty short space of time since launch, our expectations for the underlying performance of many businesses in the portfolio have been exceeded. This is a long-term vehicle. We hope to deliver good performance in the short-term but believe we should be judged over the 3 to 5 year time scale we have talked about consistently since launch. Kind regards Neil
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