 bordert, the price of the pub lunch is what I stand to get, not what I invested!
True, my losses are not large, in the grand oder of things, so it is easier for me to be philosophical than it is for others who have lost more.
The fact remains though that a lot of us have ridden this down, watching our losses increase, rather than taking a more rational decision and selling and cutting our losses long ago, when they were smaller.
I blame myself for that. What was I doing hanging on to shares in a company whose management I had concluded were incompetent, and with no reason to expect a change of management? For those, like you, who had come to the conclusion that the management was not only incompetent but dishonest, hanging on was even more irrational.
Surely you did not do so in the expectation that the management would be brought to book and your losses flowing from their incompetence and dishonesty would be made good?
We have to be honest with ourselves. Most of us held on for one or both of two reasons:-
1. There might be a miracle and against the odds HUM might prosper and the share price rise despite management incompetence and/or dishonesty.
2. We could not bring ourselves to sell and crystalize a loss.
Both were bad, irrational, reasons. The rational course of action was to have taken the hit, got what remained of our money out, and put that money into something where we saw better prospects. Had we done so, we would have recovered more money, and put it to work with better prospects of profit much sooner than will now be the case.
A few here believed that the management had 'learned from its mistakes', that Hum had 'turned the corner' and had good prospects, and was therefore a good investment at the then current price. Their decisions to hold and even add were therefore rational, but unfortunately have proved to be ill-judged and wrong.
There is no rule in the investment handbook which says we have to try to recover our losses through holding on to (still less buying more) shares in the same company as our losses were made.
Having paid a high price for the tuition, it behoves us to make sure we understand the lesson we have been taught, and to remember and apply it in future. |
bartybarty I agree 100% with what you say here. I rejected the offer, so did others I know. For years, I tried to open peoples eyes with this, so did TBTT and trader465. If you haven't done so, please read some of trader465's well documented evidence on here.
To me (and many others now), it would seem to be abundantly clear what has been going on and if that is proven to be the case, it is absolutely outrageous. As you say, regulatory intervention is of paramount importance here.
Iknocker. I agree. But don't forget many of us lost a helluva lot more than a pub lunch. I too would love to see some resolution here but the Bod and especially the Ceo should be held accountable. |
Good to know someone still puts faith in the prospects of a productive intervention in anything by Rachel from accounts.
Personally, I shall be happy to see the HUM ticker disappear from my portfolio, get my few quid, blow it all on a pub lunch, and move on. |
Thanks for the INFO, you now need to try and get every small shareholder to right to the FSA copying in relevent minsites and their MP's Publicity is our ONLY hope. As is is scandalous what is happening and the BOD & Non execs have been neglegent in my opinion. |
The board and especially Non Exec directors should be looking after the interests of ALL SHAREHOLDERS. HUM had a market cap of 50m a few months ago I am not sure what it is worth right now. BUT the BOD and the NON EXEXC have been derelict in their duty. Sure HUM may have failed BUT how can you pay BETTS 4M while stiffing every small share holder The FSA are weak and will fob off a couple of letters from disgruntled shareholders but will NOT be so dismissive, if you copy in the Labour Trade minister, their shadow minister and your local MP. Sure it might not get your investment back but at the very least we may be able to get the BOD payoffs stopped and any of the BOD & NON EXECS barred from future office. IMVHO, we should reject the offer and every one of us write to the FSA. What have you got to lose. |
How long has the Betts Metals "invest in responsibly mined gold" page been "under construction" for now? Hummmmmmmm..................? |
I'm thinking about whether or not I should be accepting the current offer of 2.67p per share. Do people know if it is likely a better offer could be made if other shareholders don't agree with this? I agree with many previous posts that this whole process reeks of corruption and feel very hard done by the many recent announcements. Especially when not even 12 months ago shareholder presentations painted a totally different picture. |
trader465 Great information. Thanks for taking the time to compile this. |
AIM Rule 31: Directors’ Responsibilities
AIM Rule 31 requires directors of AIM-listed companies to:
Act in the Best Interests of the Company as a Whole:
Directors must prioritize the success of the company for the benefit of all shareholders, not just specific groups (e.g., majority shareholders or creditors).
Treat Shareholders Equitably:
Directors must ensure that all shareholders are treated fairly, avoiding actions that disproportionately benefit or harm minority shareholders compared to major shareholders.
Ensure Compliance with AIM Rules:
The board must implement appropriate corporate governance and maintain systems for timely and accurate disclosures to the market.
How AIM Rule 31 Applies to HUM's Situation
In the case of Hummingbird Resources (HUM), AIM Rule 31 has critical implications for the conduct of the board during the ongoing
financial difficulties and restructuring:
Debt Restructuring and Shareholder Fairness
HUM is negotiating debt restructuring with Coris and CIG, entities that hold significant financial leverage over the company.
Conflict of Interest Risk:
CIG is not only a lender but also HUM's largest shareholder through its subsidiary, Nioko Resources Corporation. Coris, which holds $90 million in secured debt, and CIG are controlled by the same principal. This interconnected relationship creates a potential conflict of interest that could prioritize the interests of CIG and Coris over minority shareholders.
Director Obligation under Rule 31:
The board must ensure that the restructuring terms are equitable and do not disproportionately benefit CIG, Coris, or Nioko at the expense of minority shareholders. Failure to do so could violate Rule 31, exposing directors to potential regulatory scrutiny.
Transparency and Disclosure
HUM must provide clear, accurate, and timely disclosures about:
The financial status of the company.
The terms of any restructuring agreements.
The valuation of assets used as security.
Director Obligation under Rule 31:
The board must ensure that minority shareholders are informed of any risks or consequences stemming from restructuring.
Any omission or manipulation of material facts would breach Rule 31 and AIM's disclosure obligations.
Asset Risk
Coris holds $90 million in secured debt, tied to HUM’s assets. If restructuring fails, assets could be seized and transferred to entities controlled by CIG or Coris.
Director Obligation under Rule 31:
The board must prevent undervaluation of assets or any arrangements that disproportionately benefit secured creditors (e.g., allowing them to acquire assets on the cheap). Directors should explore all avenues to protect shareholder value, such as seeking alternative financing or asset sales at fair market value.
Minority Shareholder Protection
Minority shareholders are at risk of dilution or total loss if the restructuring results in:
Asset seizure or undervaluation.
A debt-for-equity swap that favors CIG or Coris.
Director Obligation under Rule 31:
The board must balance the interests of all shareholders and avoid preferential treatment for entities like Nioko or CIG.
Concerns in HUM’s Case
There are several red flags where AIM Rule 31 could be at risk of breach:
Conflict of Interest:
The principal controlling CIG and Coris may exert undue influence on HUM's board, leading to decisions that prioritize creditor interests over shareholder value.
Lack of Independent Oversight:
No evidence suggests an independent third party is ensuring fairness in restructuring negotiations.
Transparency:
Limited information is available on how asset valuations are being handled or whether alternative financing options have been explored.
What Minority Shareholders Can Do
Demand Transparency:
Shareholders can request detailed disclosures about the restructuring terms, creditor relationships, and asset valuations.
Push for Independent Oversight:
Shareholders can advocate for the appointment of an independent advisor or auditor to oversee the process and ensure fairness.
Report Concerns to AIM Regulation:
If shareholders suspect a breach of Rule 31, they can raise the issue with AIM Regulation, which oversees compliance with AIM rules.
Conclusion:
Under AIM Rule 31, HUM’s directors have a duty to act in the best interests of all shareholders and ensure fair treatment during the restructuring process. However, the interconnected relationships between HUM, CIG, Coris, and Nioko pose significant risks of conflicts of interest. Minority shareholders should closely monitor the situation and demand transparency to safeguard their interests. If evidence of unfair treatment emerges, regulatory intervention may be necessary. |
I'd say Prat was over exposed to HUM, 9.23 posts per day since 2018 and nothing since the 62% one day fall here. I had lots of fights with him over the years but I do hope he's ok. I dont think theres a lot holders can do to prove wrongdoing becaue the AIM rules are too relaxed, but the conflict of interest between the controling parties raise more than an eyebrow.
Stakeholder Relationships
Nioko Resources Corporation (Nioko):
Nioko is Hummingbird's largest shareholder and a wholly owned subsidiary of CIG, giving CIG significant influence over the company's direction.
CIG and Coris:
Both CIG (a lender) and Coris (the primary secured creditor) are controlled by the same principal, meaning there is shared leadership and overlapping interests between these two entities.
CIG has provided unsecured loans, while Coris holds secured debt, putting Coris in a favorable position to seize assets in the event of default.
Implications of Control and Influence:
Interconnected Interests:
With control over both equity (via Nioko) and debt (via Coris), the principal behind these entities has substantial leverage over Hummingbird's financial strategies and decision-making.
Debt Restructuring and Asset Security:
Coris holds $90 million in secured debt tied to Hummingbird's assets, and CIG is providing unsecured funding. In a worst-case scenario (e.g., administration or insolvency), Coris would be first in line to claim Hummingbird's secured assets, potentially at a discount.
Potential for Undervalued Asset Acquisition:
If restructuring negotiations fail, there is a risk that the company could default on its secured debt, leading to asset seizures. Given the interconnected relationships, it is conceivable that these assets could be transferred to entities controlled by the same principal (e.g., CIG or Coris), effectively allowing them to acquire valuable assets at a reduced cost.
Corruption or Conflict of Interest?
While this scenario does not automatically suggest corruption, it does present a conflict of interest that could be exploited:
Manipulating Liquidity Events: By leveraging Hummingbird's liquidity challenges, the principal controlling CIG and Coris could engineer a financial situation where assets are acquired cheaply, bypassing market mechanisms.
Suppressing Shareholder Value: The concentration of control might lead to decisions that prioritize the interests of CIG and Coris over private shareholders, potentially undervaluing assets or restructuring terms to the detriment of minority investors.
Opaque Governance:
The interconnections and lack of transparency between these entities could mask actions that serve insiders at the expense of other stakeholders.
Questions for Investors
To ensure fairness and transparency, private investors should demand answers to critical questions:
Independent Oversight:
Is there a truly independent board or third party overseeing the restructuring process to protect minority shareholders?
Fair Valuation of Assets: Are the company's assets being fairly valued, and are restructuring terms reflective of their true worth?
Transparency in Stakeholder Actions:
How are the overlapping roles of Nioko, CIG, and Coris being managed to prevent conflicts of interest?
Regulatory Scrutiny:
Has the AIM regulator reviewed these relationships for potential governance issues?
Conclusion:
While not definitive proof of corruption, the interconnected relationships between Hummingbird, Nioko, CIG, and Coris create a perceived risk of unfair practices that could harm private shareholders. Investors should remain vigilant and advocate for transparency, independent oversight, and regulatory scrutiny to ensure that any restructuring or asset sales occur at fair market value and in the best interests of all stakeholders. |
Tigerbythetail, have been pushing that one for a longtime, but nobody wanted to listen, so I hope you did and multiplied your investment rather than watch it melt away here. |
This is the standard FCA reply. They're useless - underfunded and uninterested.
The lack of a regulator fit for purpose is one of the primary reasons why the London stock market is in such dire straits.
I still wonder about the Bunker Hill investment. It was such an obvious scam and the previous "form" of its management was public knowledge. Was there a backhander involved? Would that explain the otherwise inexplicable? I'll never know. |
Tiger. I know for a fact that specific information was sent to the "authorities" that suggested "something" wasn't right here many years ago. The well supported info posted on here by trader 465 suggested the same thing. The reply from the "authorities" was that it would be "looked into" but they were "unable to comment on specific company matters or provide updates" In other words, 4K off, we're not interested. |
BT, I agree that misleading the market is an offence and anyone guilty of that should be punished.
The real lesson here though lies in your final point - the CEO had no experience running a gold mine. The rest of the management team did not bring much to the table either. Those are not matters for regulation. They are matters for potential investors to consider before buying the shares.
For a long time that has been obvious. Well over two years ago several posters pointed out that the management was making serious mistakes. Others said 'Oh, they are inexperienced, they are learning, they won't ake the same mistakes again.' To which I well recall that my reply was that their education had been and would continue to be very expensive for shareholders as they had made every mistake in the book, and were writing new chapters.
The responsibility for any loss which any shareholder has sustained over at least the past 3 years, and arguably much longer, lies at the doors of those shareholders: they could see the problem and failed to get out.
I put my hands up. I made an initial small purchase years ago at 36, hung on in the face of all the evidence that I had made a bad purchase decision, eventually sold most of the holding at about a quarter of the price I had paid but STILL retained a (very small) holding in the forlorn hope that perhaps HUM was turning the corner, and now stand to lose even more than if I had acted decisively and sold the loss when (far later than I should have done) I sold the bulk of my holding. For that I have only myself to blame. I hope I remember the lesson.
As for anyone who has been buying more over the past 2 or 3 years, 'averaging down' (a sure fire way to increase your losses on a duff stock), or fooling himself that an incompetent management would miraculously become competent, such purchasers should seriously reflect on whether they are competent to manage their own financial affairs, let alone invest in stocks. The stock market is designed to transfer the money of such people to others, and does so very efficiently.
Quality of management is crucial. If the management is bad, it does not matter how good the opportunity is. That is specially true of explorer and mine development miners where (taking the sector as a whole) net losses are made, and the very few winners are invariably run by top class managements.
It is difficult to learn anything useful from our successes, but at least marginally easier to learn from our mistakes. The opportunity to do so from our losses in HUM should not be allowed to go to waste. |
farrugia But they get away with it because they know they can. The more complaints from investors that get their fingers burnt with unscrupulous management, the more chance there is of something being done. Obviously we won't get money back but at least there would be some satisfaction. |
Same at RMM too |
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