Share Name Share Symbol Market Type Share ISIN Share Description
Clarkson LSE:CKN London Ordinary Share GB0002018363 ORD 25P
  Price Change % Change Share Price Bid Price Offer Price High Price Low Price Open Price Shares Traded Last Trade
  -55.00p -1.72% 3,135.00p 3,135.00p 3,140.00p 3,160.00p 3,060.00p 3,160.00p 18,212 16:35:13
Industry Sector Turnover (m) Profit (m) EPS - Basic PE Ratio Market Cap (m)
Industrial Transportation 324.0 45.4 104.4 30.0 947.79

Clarkson Share Discussion Threads

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Johnv - CKN v BMS Posted this analysis on the BMS thread a while back - to help other posters understand the relative underperformance of BMS as a result of being heavily weighted towards the oil shipping and service sectors, whose recovery is still in the very earliest of stages. 'A tale of two shipbrokers! Being heavily overweight in the oil tanker and oil service sector did BMS no favours after tanker rates weakened in mid 2016 just as a surge of new capacity hit the sector. The comparison with sector heavyweight Clarksons more diversified shipbroking approach is stark. Since mid 2016 the relative share price performance is astonishing considering they both operate in the same industry: -40% BMS +75% CKN £1000 put in CKN is now worth £1750, while in BMS £600. Nevertheless, I suspect the strengthening oil price from Q4/2017 onwards should now be generating a modest but very welcome recovery at BMS.'
mount teide
Walbrrok 'So, why the shares expensive? When it was a growth company in the late 90s and in early 2000s, earnings were growing at double digit (around 10%-12%) when PE multiple is around 10 times. After 2010, earnings growth slowed to 4%, and PE is trading at 30 times and forward-PE of 27 times in 2018!' From: 2000 to 2008 - BDI was in recovery/boom mode following an 8 year sector recession 2008 to 2016 - BDI fell an astonishing 98% in the deepest recession to hit the shipping industry since the Great Depression. 2016 to est 2023-2025 BDI is currently in the early stages of the next cyclical recovery/boom period. BDI is currently up around 350% from the all time 2016 low but still MORE than 90% below its 2008 all time high. Clarksons business, although now well diversified compared to 2000- 2008, still generates the overwhelming majority of its income from shipbroking and so its growth is directly linked to the performance of the BDI( Clarksons shipbroking revenue is mostly generated from earning a fixed percentage of each ship charter). Current market valuation - market is increasingly pricing in the expectation that the BDI (rates at which shipping is chartered out at) will appreciate rapidly over the years ahead - since the serious vessel oversupply issue which has largely been responsible for decimating charter rates over the last 8 years, is forecast to come to an end over the next 12 months or so.
mount teide
johns - think both will do very well over a 5 year outlook. CKN/BMS - With regard to risk/reward - its not comparing like with like. One is the global industry leader(CKN) - a well diversified global shipbroker The other a second tier broker(BMS) - heavy oil industry weighting(oil tanker and oil service sectors). Currently, recovery of the oil tanker and oil service sectors is lagging the rest of the shipping industry - i would expect this situation to continue well into next year. Hold a very large long term position in CKN which i added heavily to last year - sold a modest position in BMS last year and recycled it into CKN after becoming concerned BMS's oil sector weighting might act as a drag on the pace of recovery.
mount teide
Great company. it will not drop to 22 quid
Clarkson’s results are as expected, with sales slightly higher than expected, but profits lower. (Please ignore the adjusted profits because acquisition costs are part of doing business, not a one-off expense!) The real question is: “Are the shares expensive at current valuation?” As a value investor, yes, it is. Should you be selling the shares? Yes, but on a short-term basis. So, why the shares expensive? When it was a growth company in the late 90s and in early 2000s, earnings were growing at double digit (around 10%-12%) when PE multiple is around 10 times. After 2010, earnings growth slowed to 4%, and PE is trading at 30 times and forward-PE of 27 times in 2018! Therefore, a CORRECTION of 30%-35% is reasonable which will take the shares to £22 per share or PE of 20 times. For more reasons, why Clarkson will see its shares fall
MT, which is the better risk/reward here ckn or bms?
US oil exports to the Far East to boots Tanker Sector demand. US Shale Oil And Shipping: Expect The Unexpected? - Clarksons Research 28 Feb 2018 hTTp:// Sometimes in shipping, as in life, things come along that nobody really expects. US shale/tight oil production, which was barely on the radar ten years ago, seems to be one of those things. The most recent news, of US crude being unloaded in the Middle East and of output passing 1970s levels, has not come entirely out of the blue. But imagine saying ten years ago that the USA could soon be a net oil exporter... Ancien Régime Prior to 2017, the last time US total crude oil production stood at over 10m bpd was in the early 1970s, after which output was in decline for forty years. The early 1970s also saw the Yom Kippur War, the Arab Oil Embargo and US motorists queuing to fill up at gas stations where pump prices had quadrupled in under a year. Thus the 1975 US crude export ban and the quest for energy independence that (so far) has proved elusive. In fact, a decade ago, US seaborne crude imports stood at almost 8m bpd, equal to 20% of global seaborne crude imports and 40% of US oil consumption. Only in the area of oil products was a US export sector able to develop, based on intra-Americas exports and the transatlantic arbitrage of American and European refinery slates, with the US importing gasoline and exporting gas oils from its complex Gulf Coast refineries. The Shale Revolution Begins Things began to change on the US crude front in the late 2000s. This was due to the shale revolution enabled by advances in “fracking” and related technologies. US tight crude output increased by 3.4m bpd from 2010 to 2014 (almost 80% of the net increase in oil production globally in that time) and was a key factor in the oil price downturn beginning in 2014. The significant stimulus US shale has been giving to seaborne LPG and LNG trades is well documented. But for a while, shale oil production was a negative for shipping, displacing imports. In late 2015 though, the crude export ban was lifted. Small volumes of semi-processed condensate had already been exported under technicalities, but this opened the floodgates. US seaborne crude exports tripled in 2017 and are projected to hit 1.5m bpd in 2018 (4% of the global total). Given the need to blend lighter shale oil with heavy grades in US refineries, US oil imports look likely to remain a feature of seaborne trade. But talk is now all about rising US oil exports (e.g. to the Far East) creating tonne-mile demand. The Revolution Continues? During the downturn, shale has surprised most observers by its resilience, with oil price breakevens in many plays (notably in the Permian) falling greatly. Combined with firming oil prices, this has seen US tight oil output grow by 1.4m bpd from the Q3 2015 trough, to stand at almost 6.5m bpd - 65% of US total crude output. The consensus view is for further firm growth in 2018 and 2019 too, with a plateau not being reached until c.2025 (though shale has a history of surprising on the upside). So while there remain uncertainties related to oil prices and resource potential, the shale revolution looks here to stay. Clearly this could have further significant implications for seaborne oil trades. And looking back a decade, it just goes to show, not even the wisest heads can see some things coming.
mount teide
Strong chart looking ready for the next leg up.
mount teide
Cyber Attack - Telegraph says their security systems were breached earlier in the month yet, they waited until today to reveal it. Suggests they may have taken a calculated risk that the hackers would not release any stolen information before Clarksons notified the market and their clients, to give Management the time to investigate the breach and beef up their computer system security. Hmmmm.
mount teide
Now around £29-80p
In the Euroclear Short Report for the End of May 2017, of the 4.3% short position in Clarksons, it contained no disclosable positions(greater than 0.5%). S/P decline from the highs earlier this year, seems to be following the pullback in the BDI, after it tripled from the 2016 lows.
mount teide
I'm surprised at the lack of a following for CKN. It and IMB have been my best performing shares over the years by some way. CKN has appreciated by 700%, IMB rather more. Makes up for some disasters elsewhere.
It is great to see the share price up again although the Baltic Dry Index looks if it is heading for Jan 2016 territory. I don't know if any one is reading this. No posts for 3 months. Read the RNS announcing the analyst and investor's day on Sunday Evening and realised that it was for earlier that same day giving very little notice; the RNS only serving as a reminder for those already in the in the know who check their emails before the sun is above the yardarm on a Sunday Morning.
Seaborne Trade - 2016 In 2015, growth in global seaborne trade slowed, falling to an estimated 1.9% in the full year, following an expansion of 3.4% in 2014. Indicators suggest that there has been a pick-up in trade growth in the year to date, and there are a range of views on how things might fare in the remainder of 2016. But whether you’re an optimist or a pessimist, a basket of monthly volume data might tell you something... Checking The Basket Annual projections of seaborne trade can be useful demand side indicators. However, often it is difficult to get a real understanding of short-term trade trends. A year ago we looked at a ‘basket’ approach, which took monthly seaborne trade flows for a range of commodities, to help show year to date global seaborne trade trends. Although monthly data can be difficult to use, is not comprehensively available, and is generally subject to a lag of several months, the same monthly ‘basket’ approach examined a year ago remains a helpful indicator of short-term seaborne trade trends. Promising Contents? In January the index stood at -1%, but four months later it reached 7%. Furthermore, the index has picked up compared to 2015 average levels, averaging 2.1% in Q1 2016 and 4.3% in Q2. Some of this trend is accounted for by a rise in dry bulk trade which fell last year, with China’s dry bulk imports growing 6% y-o-y in 1H 2016, following a 2% drop in 2015. An increase in box trade growth has also been apparent, with expansion in Asia-Europe trade back in positive territory and growth in intra-Asian trade picking up. Elsewhere, seaborne crude and products trade, which were two of the fastest growing elements of total seaborne trade in 2015, expanded firmly in 1H 2016. This was underpinned by robust growth in crude imports into China (16%), India and the US, despite the disruptions to Nigerian crude exports in recent months. Half Full Or Half Empty? Taking a wider view, even since the financial crisis there have been clear peaks in the index. The peak in early 2011 was partly on the back of strong growth in Chinese dry bulk, oil and gas imports and box exports from Asia. The index picked up again in 2012, supported by several months of strong growth in iron ore and coal trade to Asia. The next peak was in late 2013, when once again coal imports into Asia grew robustly and expansion in intra-Asian and Asia-Europe box trade was very strong. Today, you might conclude, if you’re a ‘basket half full’ type, that we’re heading steadily upwards again. But, if you’re a ‘basket half empty’ person, you might note that the peaks each time have been short-lived and have been getting lower. Is There Something In It? Our index appears to be on the up, although still at a relatively moderate level in historical terms, and with a volatile track record behind. There’s something in the ‘basket’ for both the optimist and the pessimist! HTTP:// Report Source : Clarksons
So much for the profit warning. Now they say: Robust performance despite continued challenging market conditions in many of our markets.
The Shipping Finance Crisis - P Slater CEO First International - 23 June 2016 It is now clear that the demands for shipping services are way below the availability of the fleets of existing ships in most sectors. While the tanker markets remain finely balanced, as the price of crude oil does not seem to affect demand, orders for new crude carriers are cause for concern. The dry-bulk and container sectors are grossly over-tonnaged causing most companies in these sectors to record growing losses. Most financial analysts and some major shipbrokers now concede that this shipping crisis will continue through the remainder of this decade and maybe well into the next one. The publicly traded shipping companies provide a window of information on the crisis, but represent less than 25% of total fleet capacity, and are the area where most of the new equity has been invested and lost. Other companies which are subsidiaries of major industrial companies such as Maersk, Mitsubishi, Hyundai and the Oil Majors, do not publish detailed financial statements but some have recorded financial problems with their fleets. The Asian shipbuilders are in deep trouble with capacity down by over 50% and the volume of ships on order is at a level last seen in the late nineties. The Chinese will continue to support their shipbuilders, as part of its plan to keep freight rates down on its primary routes, by building new ships for Chinese owners or those chartering ships to Chinese companies. Thus the shipping industry has reverted to its traditional structure with large private owners and the industrial groups contracting for ship charters on terms that are rarely published, while the new public companies fight for business in the spot markets. Estimates show that more than $50 billion from Private Equity and Hedge Funds has been invested in the public companies. Another $50 billion has been invested in Germany by the German KGs. These equity funds were supplemented by huge levels of bank finance which was recklessly lent with no secure income streams in place. The German shipping crisis has created more than $50 billion of non-performing loans in the German banks and an estimate of a similar level of losses in the KG funds. Estimates of the total bank losses exceed $100billion. The publicly traded shipping companies are today hardly solvent, generating revenues that barely cover vessel operating expenses, do not cover debt service or generate cash reserves for essential maintenance, and are in many cases managed by the investor funds that do not understand how shipping works. Also the fundamental financial fact is that ships are depreciating assets that have operating lives that rarely exceed 20 years. The GAP accounting rules depreciate the ships over 25 years and the NAV is therefore not in line with true values and in this crisis the market values are invariably below NAV. This summary identifies the crisis but the cause is mostly self-inflicted. The Chinese industrial boom of the last decade was always temporary and with the appointment of a new government in 2010 the excesses of the previous one were revealed and steps taken to re-balance the economy and centralize controls again away from the Regions. The shipping industry, fueled by huge amounts of new risk capital and careless bank debt, embarked on a new-building program that enlarged fleet capacity by more than 50% in the dry-cargo and container sectors and by 30% in the products carrier sector. Large orders for new deep-ocean oil rigs and fleets of offshore supply ships combined, with the ships, to fill the world’s shipyards through 2010. By the time most of these ships were delivered it was obvious that the China boom was over and along with the banking crisis the global economies were heading for another recession. As the share prices of the public companies dropped more Funds entered the markets buying on the false assumption that ship prices would recover to the heady levels of the last decade. This ignored the fact that voyage revenues were not covering all the operating costs, including maintenance and repair, or generating cash reserves to meet fleet replacement costs. Ship values continued to decline but instead of closing out the risks by selling the ships, various forms of restructuring were instigated by the Funds which served only to compound the problems. These included: - more Secured Debt; Perpetual Preferred Equity and Reverse Stock Splits, all designed to keep the companies afloat while effectively wiping out the original equity. As the Funds had no experience or way of increasing voyage revenues they focused on operating expenses, but have adopted measures that can seriously affect the safety and reliability of the ships. These measures include: cheap or under-paid crews; little or no spare parts on-board; minimal maintenance and no cash reserves for statutory dry-dockings. The Head of one large dry-cargo company, and an ex-banker, recently boasted the he had got costs down to $4,000 per ship per day. To which one major Greek shipowner commented “which part of the ship is he running?” Comparatively the Chairman of Nordic American Tankers also stated that his operating costs were $11,000pd. He is a long term shipping expert who does understand the industry. Consolidation has also been trumpeted but so far the largest one in the dry-cargo sector is a disaster and will likely end in total collapse. Like restructuring these activities generate huge legal and banking fees and so far fail to generate increased revenues. Charterers are increasingly unwilling to fix ships from most of the public companies on anything more than voyage charters, yet some of the dry-cargo companies still report period charters at rates that fail to cover costs. The solution is to sell the ships that are not financially viable before their running costs increase and their values decline further with age, pay off the secured debt and distribute the balance, if any, to the equity holders. This needs to be done soon and certainly by the end of this year as the public share prices continue to decline and the global economic outlook is gloomy.
The words horse and stable door spring to mind.............
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