We could not find any results for:
Make sure your spelling is correct or try broadening your search.
Customisable watchlists with full streaming quotes from leading exchanges, such as LSE, NASDAQ, NYSE, AMEX, Bovespa, BIT and more.
| Share Name | Share Symbol | Market | Stock Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| General Indus | GNI | London | Ordinary Share |
| Price Change | Price Change % | Share Price | Last Trade
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.00 | 0.00% | 44.50 | 01:00:00 |
| Open Price | Low Price | High Price | Close Price | Previous Close |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 44.50 |
| Top Posts |
|---|
Posted at 14/3/2005 13:16 by mertles ReferencesBarth, M. and A. Hutton. 2001. Financial Analysts and the Pricing of Accrurals. Working Paper. Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. Brennan, M. J., N. Jegadeesh, and B. Swaminathan. 1993. Investment analysis and the adjustment of stock prices to common information. Review of Financial Studies 6: 799-824. Brown, L.D., P.A. Griffin, R.L. Hagerman, and M.E. Zmijewski. 1987. Security analyst superiority relative to univariate time-series models in forecasting quarterly earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 9: 61-87. Chan, L.K.C., J. Jarceski, and J. Lakonishok. 2003. Analysts' Conflict of Interest and Biases in Earnings Forecast. Working Paper. SSRN Electronic Paper Collection. Elgers, P.T., M. H. Lo, and R.J. Pfeiffer, Jr. 2001. Delayed security price adjustments to financial analysts' forecasts of annual earnings. The Accounting Review. 76: 613-632. Francis, J and L. Soffer. 1997. The relative informativeness of analysts' stock recommendations and earnings forecast revisions. Journal of Accounting Research. 35: 193-212. Gleason, C. and Lee, C. 2003. Analyst forecast revisions and market price discovery. The Accounting Review. 78: 193-225. Grossman, S. and J. Stiglitz. 1980. On the impossibility of information efficient markets. American Economic Review. 70: 393-408. Healy, P.M. and K.G. Palepu. 2001. Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 31: 405-440. Hong, H., T. Um, and J. Stein. 2000. Bad news travels slowly: Size, analyst coverage, and the profitability of momentum strategies. Journal of Finance 55 (February): 265-295. Hong, H. and J.D. Kubik. 2003. Analyzing the Analysts: Career concerns and biased earnings forecasts. Journal of Finance 58 (February): 313-351. La Porta, R. 1996. Expectations and the cross-section of stock-returns. Journal of Finance. 41 (December): 1715-1742. Lys, T. and S. Sohn. 1990. The association between revisions of financial analysts' earnings forecasts and security-price changes. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 13: 341-363. Machuga, S.M. and R.J. Pfeiffer Jr. 2000. A comparison of financial-statement- McNichols, M. and P.C. O'Brien. 1997. Self-selection and analyst coverage. Journal of Accounting Research 35 (Supplement): 167-199. Park, C. W., and E. K. Stice. 2000. Analyst forecasting ability and the stock price reaction to forecast revisions. Review of Accounting Studies 5 (September): 259-272. Stickel, S.E. 1990. Predicting individual analyst earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 28: 409-417. Stickel, S.E. 1991. Common stock returns surrounding earnings forecast revisions: More puzzling evidence. The Accounting Review 66 (April): 402-416. Stickel, S.E. 1992. Reputation and performance among security analysts. Journal of Finance 47 (December): 1811-1836. Walther, B. R. 1997. Investor sophistication and market earnings expectations. Journal of Accounting Research 35: 157-179. Womack, K. 1996. Do brokerage analysts' recommendations have investment value? Journal of Finance 51 (March): 137-167. |
Posted at 14/3/2005 13:12 by mertles I wrote this a few months ago,,,please bare in mind that I only spent about 5 hours writing it. Might be of interest to some of you...The role of analysts' forecasts in establishing informationally efficient market prices. In a review of the disclosure literature, Healy and Palepu (2001, p. 417) conclude that analysts' forecasts "play a valuable role in improving market efficiency." Analysts' forecasts have been shown, for large firms at least, to be more accurate than time-series models as a result of being timely and based upon a large information set (Brown et al., 1997). Also, numerous papers (e.g. Lys and Sohn, 1990; Francis and Soffer, 1997) have shown that analyst forecasts do, themselves, affect stock prices therefore suggesting that they have a role in establishing informationally efficient market prices. Lys and Sohn (1991) reveal that even when preceded by accounting disclosures, analysts' earnings forecasts are still price informative. In comparing large and small firms, Lys and Sohn (1991) also show, that for larger firms, analyst forecast errors are smaller because the information environment is richer, and these larger, more diversified firms have lower earnings volatility. However, as a result of the scarce amount of information available for smaller companies, the effect of new analysts' forecasts were found to be more pronounced for smaller companies. A number of papers (eg. Walther, 1997; Elgers et al., 2001; Gleason and Lee, 2003) show that those firms that have a smaller analyst following exhibit greater price drift following the publication of a forecast or forecast revision. This suggests that the price discovery process, and therefore the efficiency of market prices, is greater as the number of analysts' forecasts increases. Elgers et al (2001) argue that those firms with little analyst coverage fail to efficiently reflect publicly available earnings forecasts and that abnormal trading profits (before transaction costs) are possible by exploiting, "cross-sectional rankings of price-scaled, early-in-the-year financial analysts' annual earnings forecasts." (p. 614) Brennan et al. (1993) presents similar findings, demonstrating that where firm size is held constant, prices react more expeditiously to new information when a larger number of analysts follow a firm, and that the returns on these firms lead those firms with a smaller analyst coverage. Furthermore, forecasts that show little innovation are likely to be less informative than high innovation forecasts because they may be simply 'herding' towards the consensus forecast (Stickel, 1990). Gleason and Lee (2003) conclude that highly innovative forecasts are associated to significantly higher price drifts than those that have low innovation. This suggests that the market is not efficient in making the distinction between the two types of forecast. Hong et al. (2000) demonstrate a profitable investment strategy based on the principle that subsequent returns momentum is stronger for those firms with low analyst coverage. In contrast to the above studies, La Porta (1996) reveals that investors may also over-rely on analysts' forecasts with security prices impounding the information of five-years earnings growth forecasts even though latter forecasts are normally too extreme. He demonstrates that significant abnormal returns could be earned using contrarian strategies. Such 'over-reliant' anomalies suggest that analysts' forecast can lead to inefficient information being impounded into market prices. In a study of the association between analysts' forecasts and the pricing of accruals, Barth and Hutton (2001) show that investors also ignore useful information and prices remain mis-priced until the actual earnings report is released. Stickel (1991, p. 415) finds that investors "do not immediately assimilate the information in [revised] forecasts." One reason for such 'inefficiency' could be that analysts' forecasts are merely a change in opinion and not a change in fact (unlike earnings announcements) (Womack, 1996). Further, a number of studies show that analysts' do not capture all price information. For example, Barth and Hutton (2001) found that only 25% of analysts revised their future earnings forecasts in a direction consistent with the concept that accruals reverse, and Machuga and Pfeiffer (2000) show that price-based forecasts and financial statement-based forecasts complement analysts' forecasts in that they contain unique information that is overlooked by analysts. A reason for this may be because analysts have been shown to follow those companies they view favourably, and as a result of this, and other factors (e.g. discouragement by the analyst's firm's investment bankers, or self-interest in there own career), they have upward bias in their forecasts (see McNichols and O'Brien, 1997; Chan et al., 2003; Hong and Kubik, 2003). Analysts may be reluctant to make earnings downgrades and one could make the conjecture that they may purposefully overlook 'bad news'. Stickel (1992) and Park and Stice (2000) show that the immediate, short-window, market response to a forecast revision is greatest for those analysts that are ranked highly. Gleason and Lee (2003) and also find that the effect of an analyst revision is impounded into price more quickly, and with less subsequent price drift, for 'celebrity analysts' than for those revisions made by equally capable (measured by accuracy) but more obscure analysts. This implies that the market discovery process is facilitated not only by an analyst's forecasting ability but also by reputation. Finally, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that prices cannot perfectly reflect all available information, because there is a cost to obtaining this information and therefore the information gatherers must be compensated for their spent resources. They see a, "fundamental conflict between the efficiency with which markets spread information and the incentives to acquire information." (p. 405) If one views these information retrieval costs as 'part and parcel' of an efficient capital market then analysts must, as information intermediaries, play an important role in establishing informationally efficient market prices. The fact that 'the analyst forecast' still exists, and has not yet become obsolete, suggests that it can contain valuable information that will, in time, be impounded into price and for which the analyst will be compensated. |
Posted at 26/1/2005 22:36 by topvest FT article - good news for current shells?Cash shells face tighter Aim rules By David Blackwell Published: January 26 2005 02:00 | Last updated: January 26 2005 02:00 Aim is set to tighten its rules on cash shells, which have become an increasingly popular route to market. The London Stock Exchange will next week publish for consultation proposals intended to keep the more speculative shells from joining the junior market. If the plans win the approval of the nomads (nominated advisers) and other Aim participants, they could take effect from March. They will apply to cash shells that have already joined the market but which have not yet done a deal. The main plank of the rule change is a proposal to give cash shells just 12 months to do a deal. If no deal were to be completed in that period, the shares would be suspended - although the shells would be allowed a further six months to find a deal before being delisted. The rule changes will also suggest that cash shells must raise a minimum of £3m through the flotation, and must also submit a much more detailed business plan than has hitherto been required. "Cash shells have a valid role on Aim," the LSE said yesterday. "But the success of Aim is dependent on maintaining its reputation." There are about 30 cash shells among the 1,000-plus companies listed on Aim. They can offer much promise, but they require health warnings. The most commonly cited case is Knutsford, a vehicle for Archie Norman, Julian Richer, Nigel Wray and Nicholas Leslau, who were planning to bid for a large retailer six years ago. Excited investors quickly drove the stock from 1p to 270p - but no such deal materialised. Instead it eventually bought an investor relations firm and now trades under the name WILink.com. Interest in cash shells has picked up again following the success of David Page, the former chief executive of PizzaExpress, who started Clapham House Group as a cash shell in order to build another restaurant chain. He was quickly followed by Urban Dining, which raised an initial £2.75m through a placing with six institutions including Henderson Global, Framlington, Isis and Unicorn. All six took part in the secondary fund raising five months later, when Urban acquired Tootsies, a chain of 23 burger bars. In September, Augean floated as a cash shell, with institutional backing for a plan to take advantage of consolidation moves in the hazardous waste and water supply industries. It initially raised just £2m at 125p, quickly returning to market two months later to raise a further £100m at 180p for the acquisition of two hazardous waste companies. The company, which has yet to report any results, now has a market capitalisation of £165m. |
Support: +44 (0) 203 8794 460 | support@advfn.com
By accessing the services available at ADVFN you are agreeing to be bound by ADVFN's Terms & Conditions
Hot Features
Premium
