We could not find any results for:
Make sure your spelling is correct or try broadening your search.
Share Name | Share Symbol | Market | Type |
---|---|---|---|
Clarivate Plc | NYSE:CCC | NYSE | Common Stock |
Price Change | % Change | Share Price | High Price | Low Price | Open Price | Shares Traded | Last Trade | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
0.00 | 0.00% | 28.94 | 0 | 00:00:00 |
|
Jersey, Channel Islands
(State or Other Jurisdiction of
Incorporation or Organization) |
| |
Not Applicable
(I.R.S. Employer
Identification Number) |
|
|
Large accelerated filer
☒
|
| |
Accelerated filer
☐
|
|
|
Non-accelerated filer
☐
|
| |
Smaller reporting company
☐
|
|
| | | |
Emerging growth company
☐
|
|
|
Ordinary Shares
Warrants |
| |
Preferred Shares
Purchase Contracts Offered by Clarivate Plc |
| |
Debt Securities
Units |
|
| | |
Page
|
| |||
| | | | 1 | | | |
| | | | 1 | | | |
| | | | 1 | | | |
| | | | 3 | | | |
| | | | 5 | | | |
| | | | 6 | | | |
| | | | 7 | | | |
| | | | 28 | | | |
| | | | 36 | | | |
| | | | 37 | | | |
| | | | 38 | | | |
| | | | 39 | | | |
| | | | 45 | | | |
| | | | 47 | | | |
| | | | 47 | | | |
| | | | 47 | | |
|
Corporate law issue
|
| |
Delaware law
|
| |
Jersey law
|
|
|
Special Meetings of Shareholders
|
| |
Shareholders generally do not have the right to call meetings of shareholders unless that right is granted in the certificate of incorporation or by-laws.
However, if a corporation fails to hold its annual meeting within a period of 30 days after the date designated for the annual meeting, or if no date has been designated for a period of 13 months after its last annual meeting, the Delaware Court of Chancery may order a meeting to be held upon the application of a shareholder.
Under Delaware corporate law, a corporation is required to set a minimum quorum of one-third of the issued and outstanding shares for a shareholders meeting.
|
| | The Jersey Companies Law does not provide for a shareholder right to put a proposal before the shareholders at the annual general meeting. However, under the Jersey Companies Law, shareholders holding 10% or more of the company’s voting rights and entitled to vote at the relevant meeting may require the directors to call a meeting of shareholders. This must be held as soon as practicable but in any case not later than two months after the date of the deposit of the requisition. The requisition shall state the objects of the meeting. | |
| | | | | | |
Pursuant to the articles of association, no business may be transacted at any general meeting, other than business that is either:
(a) specified in the notice of meeting (or any supplement thereto) given by or at the direction of the directors (or any duly authorized committee thereof) or pursuant to a requisition of meeting by holders of ordinary shares as aforesaid,
(b) otherwise properly brought before an annual general meeting by or at the direction of the
|
|
|
Corporate law issue
|
| |
Delaware law
|
| |
Jersey law
|
|
| | | | | | |
directors (or any duly authorized committee thereof) or
(c) otherwise properly brought before an annual general meeting by any holder of ordinary shares who (1) is such a holder of record on both (x) the date of the giving of the notice by such holder provided for in the articles of association and (y) the record date for the determination of holders of ordinary shares entitled to vote at such annual general meeting and (2) complies with the notice procedures set forth in the articles of association.
|
|
| | | | | | | Under the Jersey Companies Law, the quorum requirements for shareholders meetings can be prescribed in a company’s articles of association. The Clarivate articles of association provide that holders holding in aggregate not less than a simple majority of all voting share capital of Clarivate in issue present in person or by proxy and entitled to vote shall be a quorum, provided that the minimum quorum for any meeting shall be two holders entitled to vote. See “— Voting rights.” | |
|
Interested Shareholders Transactions
|
| | The Delaware General Corporation Law contains a business combination statute applicable to Delaware corporations whereby, unless the corporation has specifically elected not to be governed by such statute by amendment to its certificate of incorporation, it is prohibited from engaging in certain business combinations with an “interested shareholder” for three years following the date that such person becomes an interested shareholder. An interested shareholder generally is a person or a group who or which owns or owned more than 15% of | | | The Jersey Companies Law has no comparable provision. As a result, Clarivate cannot avail itself of the types of protections afforded by the Delaware business combination statute. However, although Jersey law does not regulate transactions between a company and its significant shareholders, as a general matter, such transactions must be entered into bona fide in the best interests of the company and not with the effect of constituting a fraud on the minority shareholders. | |
|
Corporate law issue
|
| |
Delaware law
|
| |
Jersey law
|
|
| | | |
the target’s outstanding voting stock within the past three years.
This has the effect of limiting the ability of a potential acquirer to make a two tiered bid for the target in which all shareholders would not be treated equally. The statute does not apply if, among other things, prior to the date on which such shareholder becomes an interested shareholder, the board of directors approves either the business combination or the transaction which resulted in the person becoming an interested shareholder. This encourages any potential acquirer of a Delaware corporation to negotiate the terms of any acquisition transaction with the target’s board of directors.
|
| | | |
|
Interested Director Transactions
|
| |
Interested director transactions are permissible and may not be legally voided if:
•
either a majority of disinterested directors, or a majority in interest of holders of shares of the corporation’s capital stock entitled to vote upon the matter, approves the transaction upon disclosure of all material facts; or
•
the transaction is determined to have been fair as to the corporation as of the time it is authorized, approved or ratified by the board of directors, a committee thereof or the shareholders.
|
| |
An interested director must disclose to the company the nature and extent of any interest in a transaction with the company, or one of its subsidiaries, which to a material extent conflicts or may conflict with the interests of the company and of which the director is aware. Failure to disclose an interest entitles the company or a shareholder to apply to the court for an order setting aside the transaction concerned and directing that the director account to the company for any profit.
A transaction is not voidable and a director is not accountable notwithstanding a failure to disclose an interest if the transaction is confirmed by special resolution of shareholders (requiring a two-thirds majority of the shareholders voting) and the nature and extent of the director’s interest in the transaction are disclosed in reasonable detail in the notice calling the meeting at which the resolution is passed.
|
|
|
Corporate law issue
|
| |
Delaware law
|
| |
Jersey law
|
|
| | | | | | | Although it may still order that a director account for any profit, a court will not set aside a transaction unless it is satisfied that the interests of third parties who have acted in good faith would not thereby be unfairly prejudiced and the transaction was not reasonable and fair in the interests of the company at the time it was entered into. | |
|
Cumulative Voting
|
| |
Under Delaware corporate law, cumulative voting for elections of directors is not permitted unless the corporation’s certificate of incorporation specifically provides for it.
The certificate of incorporation of a Delaware corporation may provide that shareholders of any class or classes or of any series may vote cumulatively either at all elections or at elections under specified circumstances.
|
| | There are no provisions in relation to cumulative voting under the Jersey Companies Law. | |
|
Approval of Corporate Matters by Written Consent
|
| |
Under Delaware corporate law, unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation, any action to be taken at any annual or special meeting of shareholders of a corporation may be taken by written consent of the holders of outstanding stock having not less than the minimum number of votes that would be necessary to take that action at a meeting at which all shareholders entitled to vote were present and voted. In addition, a corporation may eliminate the right of shareholders to act by written consent through amendment to its certificate of incorporation.
All consents must be dated and are only effective if the requisite signatures are collected within 60 days of the earliest dated consent delivered.
|
| | Under the Company’s articles of association, shareholders may not pass a resolution by written consent. | |
|
Corporate law issue
|
| |
Delaware law
|
| |
Jersey law
|
|
|
Business Combinations and Asset Sales
|
| | With certain exceptions, a merger, consolidation, or sale of all or substantially all of the assets of a Delaware corporation must be approved by the board of directors and a majority of the outstanding shares entitled to vote thereon. | | | The Jersey Companies Law allows for the merger of two companies into either one consolidated company or one company merged into another so as to form a single surviving company. The merger or consolidation of two or more companies under the Jersey Companies Law requires the directors of the constituent companies to enter into and to approve a written merger agreement (in certain, but not all, circumstances), which must also be authorized by a special resolution of the shareholders of each constituent company (which as noted above requires the affirmative vote of no less than two-thirds of the votes cast at a quorate general meeting (or such higher threshold as may be set out in a company’s articles of association)). See “— Voting rights” above. In relation to any merger or consolidation under the Jersey Companies Law, unlike dissenting shareholders of a Delaware corporation, dissenting shareholders of a Jersey company have no appraisal rights that would provide the right to receive payment in cash for the judicially determined fair value of the shares. However, under Jersey law, dissenting shareholders may object to the Court on the grounds they are unfairly prejudiced by the merger. | |
| | | | | | | The Jersey Companies Law provides that where a person has made an offer to acquire a class or all of the company’s outstanding shares not already held by the person and has as a result of such offer acquired or contractually agreed to acquire 90% or more of such outstanding shares, that person is then entitled (and may be required) to acquire the remaining shares. In such circumstances, a holder of any | |
|
Corporate law issue
|
| |
Delaware law
|
| |
Jersey law
|
|
| | | | | | |
such remaining shares may apply to the courts of Jersey for an order that the person making such offer not be entitled to purchase the holder’s shares or that the person purchase the holder’s shares on terms different than those under which the person made such offer.
In addition, where the company and its creditors or shareholders or a class of either of them propose a compromise or arrangement between the company and its creditors or our shareholders or a class of either of them (as applicable), the courts of Jersey may order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors or of the company’s shareholders or class of shareholders (as applicable) to be called in such a manner as the court directs. Any compromise or arrangement approved by a majority in number representing 75% or more in value of the creditors or 75% or more of the voting rights of shareholders or class of either of them (as applicable) if sanctioned by the court, is binding upon the company and all the creditors, shareholders or members of the specific class of either of them (as applicable). Whether the capital of the company is to be treated as being divided into a single or multiple class(es) of shares is a matter to be determined by the court.
|
|
| | | | | | | The court may in its discretion treat a single class of shares as multiple classes, or multiple classes of shares as a single class, for the purposes of the shareholder approval referred to above, taking into account all relevant circumstances, which may include circumstances other than the rights attaching to the shares themselves. | |
|
Corporate law issue
|
| |
Delaware law
|
| |
Jersey law
|
|
| | | | | | | The Jersey Companies Law contains no specific restrictions on the powers of directors to dispose of assets of a company. As a matter of general law, in the exercise of those powers, the directors must discharge their duties of care and act in good faith, for a proper purpose and in the best interests of the company. | |
|
Election and Removal of Directors
|
| | Under Delaware corporate law, unless otherwise specified in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws of a corporation, directors are elected by a plurality of the votes of the shares entitled to vote on the election of directors and may be removed with or without cause (or, with respect to a classified board, only with cause unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise) by the approval of a majority of the outstanding shares entitled to vote. | | | As permitted by the Jersey Companies Law and pursuant to the articles of association, directors of Clarivate can be appointed and removed in the manner described in the section headed “— Directors” above. | |
|
Fiduciary Duties of Directors
|
| | Under Delaware corporate law, a director of a Delaware corporation has a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders. This duty has two components, the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. The duty of care requires that a director act in good faith, with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances. Under this duty, a director must inform himself of, and disclose to shareholders, all material information reasonably available regarding a significant transaction. The duty of loyalty requires that a director must act in a manner he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation. A director must not use his or her corporate position for personal gain or advantage. This duty prohibits self-dealing by a director and mandates that the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders take precedence over | | | Under the Jersey Companies Law, a director of a Jersey company, in exercising the director’s powers and discharging the director’s duties, has a fiduciary duty to act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the company; and a duty of care to exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances. Customary law is also an important source of law in the area of directors’ duties in Jersey as it expands upon and provides a more detailed understanding of the general duties and obligations of directors. The Jersey courts view English common law as highly persuasive in this area. In summary, the following duties will apply as manifestations of the general fiduciary duty under the Jersey Companies Law: a duty to act in good faith and in what he or she bona fide | |
|
Corporate law issue
|
| |
Delaware law
|
| |
Jersey law
|
|
| | | | any interest possessed by a director, officer or controlling shareholder and not shared by the shareholders generally. In general, actions of a director are presumed to have been made on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the corporation. However, this presumption may be rebutted by evidence of a breach of one of the fiduciary duties. Should such evidence be presented concerning a transaction by a director, the director must prove the procedural fairness of the transaction and that the transaction was of fair value to the corporation. | | |
considers to be the best interests of the company; a duty to exercise powers for a proper purpose; a duty to avoid any actual or potential conflict between his or her own and the company’s interests; and a duty to account for profits and not take personal profit from any opportunities arising from his or her directorship, even if he or she is acting honestly and for the good of the company. However, the articles of association of a company may permit the director to be personally interested in arrangements involving the company (subject to the requirement to have disclosed such interest).
Under the articles of association, directors who are in any way, whether directly or indirectly, interested in a contract or proposed contract with Clarivate must declare the nature of their interest at a meeting of the board of directors. Following such declaration, a director may vote in respect of any contract or proposed contract notwithstanding his interest; provided that, in exercising any such vote, such director’s duties remain as described above.
|
|
|
Limitations on Director’s Liability and Indemnification of Directors and Officers
|
| | A Delaware corporation may include in its certificate of incorporation provisions limiting the personal liability of its directors to the corporation or its shareholders for monetary damages for many types of breach of fiduciary duty. However, these provisions may not limit liability for any breach of the duty of loyalty, acts or omissions not in good faith or that involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law, the authorization of unlawful dividends, stock purchases, or | | |
The Jersey Companies Law does not contain any provision permitting Jersey companies to limit the liabilities of directors for breach of fiduciary duty. However, a Jersey company may exempt from liability, and indemnify directors and officers for, liabilities:
•
incurred in defending any civil or criminal legal proceedings where:
•
the person is either acquitted or receives a judgment in their favor;
|
|
|
Corporate law issue
|
| |
Delaware law
|
| |
Jersey law
|
|
| | | |
redemptions, or any transaction from which a director derived an improper personal benefit.
Moreover, these provisions would not be likely to bar claims arising under U.S. federal securities laws.
A Delaware corporation may indemnify a director or officer of the corporation against expenses (including attorneys’ fees), judgments, fines, and amounts paid in settlement actually and reasonably incurred in defense of an action, suit, or proceeding by reason of his or her position if (i) the director or officer acted in good faith and in a manner he or she reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, and (ii) with respect to any criminal action or proceeding, the director or officer had no reasonable cause to believe his or her conduct was unlawful.
|
| |
•
where the proceedings are discontinued other than by reason of such person (or someone on their behalf) giving some benefit or suffering some detriment; or
•
where the proceedings are settled on terms that such person (or someone on their behalf) gives some benefit or suffers some detriment but in the opinion of a majority of the disinterested directors, the person was substantially successful on the merits in the person’s resistance to the proceedings;
•
incurred to anyone other than to the company if the person acted in good faith with a view to the best interests of the company;
•
incurred in connection with an application made to the court for relief from liability for negligence, default, breach of duty, or breach of trust under Article 212 of the Jersey Companies Law in which relief is granted to the person by the court; or
•
incurred in a case in which the company normally maintains insurance for persons other than directors.
|
|
| | | | | | | To the fullest extent permitted by law, the articles of association provide that the directors and officers of Clarivate shall be indemnified from and against all liability which they incur in execution of their duty in their respective offices, except liability incurred by reason of such director’s or officer’s actual fraud or willful default. | |
|
Variation of Rights of Shares
|
| | Under Delaware corporate law, a corporation may vary the rights of a class of shares with the approval of a majority of the outstanding shares of such class, | | | Under Jersey law and the articles of association, if Clarivate’s share capital is divided into more than one class of shares, we may vary the rights attached to any class | |
|
Corporate law issue
|
| |
Delaware law
|
| |
Jersey law
|
|
| | | | unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise. | | | (i) without the consent of the holders of the issued shares of that class where such variation is considered by the board of directors of Clarivate not to have a material adverse effect upon such rights or (ii) with either the written consent of the holders of two-thirds of the shares of such class or with the sanction of a special resolution passed at a general meeting of the holders of the shares of that class. | |
|
Appraisal Rights
|
| | A shareholder of a Delaware corporation participating in certain major corporate transactions may, under certain circumstances, be entitled to appraisal rights under which the shareholder may receive cash in the amount of the fair value of the shares held by that shareholder (as determined by a court) in lieu of the consideration the shareholder would otherwise receive in the transaction. | | | In relation to any merger or consolidation under the Jersey Companies Law, unlike dissenting shareholders of a Delaware corporation, dissenting shareholders of a Jersey company have no appraisal rights that would provide the right to receive payment in cash for the judicially determined fair value of the shares. However, under Jersey law, dissenting shareholders may object to the Court on the grounds they are unfairly prejudiced by the merger and the Court’s powers extend to specifying terms of acquisition different from those of the offer (which could include terms as to price or form of consideration). | |
|
Shareholder Suits
|
| | Class actions and derivative actions generally are available to the shareholders of a Delaware corporation for, among other things, breach of fiduciary duty, corporate waste, and actions not taken in accordance with applicable law. In such actions, the court has discretion to permit the winning party to recover attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with such action. | | |
Under Article 141 of the Jersey Companies Law, a shareholder may apply to court for relief on the ground that the conduct of a company’s affairs, including a proposed or actual act or omission by a company, is “unfairly prejudicial” to the interests of shareholders generally or of some part of shareholders, including at a minimum the shareholder making the application.
Under Article 143 of the Jersey Companies Law (which sets out the types of relief a court may grant in relation to an action brought under Article 141 of the Jersey Companies Law), the court
|
|
|
Corporate law issue
|
| |
Delaware law
|
| |
Jersey law
|
|
| | | | | | |
may make an order regulating the affairs of a company, requiring a company to refrain from doing or continuing to do an act complained of, authorizing civil proceedings and providing for the purchase of shares by a company or by any of its other shareholders. There may be customary personal law actions available to shareholders which would include certain derivate and other actions to bring proceedings against the directors of the company as well as the company.
In principle, Clarivate will normally be the proper plaintiff and a class action or derivative action may not be brought by a minority shareholder. However, a minority shareholder can seek in limited circumstances agreement from the court for special dispensation if the shareholder can show:
•
that there are wrongdoers in control of the company;
•
those wrongdoers are using their power to prevent anything being done about it;
•
the wrongdoing is unconscionable and oppressive; and
•
in certain other limited circumstances.
|
|
| | | | | | | Under our articles of association, unless we consent in writing to the selection of an alternative forum, the courts of the Island of Jersey are the sole and exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or proceeding brought on our behalf, (ii) any action asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any director, officer or other employee to the us or our shareholders, (iii) any action asserting a claim arising pursuant to any provision of Jersey law or | |
|
Corporate law issue
|
| |
Delaware law
|
| |
Jersey law
|
|
| | | | | | | the articles of association or (iv) any action asserting a claim governed by the internal affairs doctrine. This choice of forum provision may limit a shareholder’s ability to bring a claim in a judicial forum that it finds favorable for disputes with us or our directors, officers or other employees, which may discourage such lawsuits | |
|
Inspection of Books and Records
|
| | All shareholders of a Delaware corporation have the right, upon written demand, to inspect or obtain copies of the corporation’s shares ledger and its other books and records for any purpose reasonably related to such person’s interest as a shareholder. | | |
Shareholders of Clarivate will have the right under the Jersey Companies Law to inspect Clarivate’s register of shareholders and, provided certain conditions are met, to obtain a copy. Shareholders of Clarivate will also be able to inspect the minutes of any shareholder meetings.
The register of directors and secretaries must during business hours (subject to such reasonable restrictions as the company may by its articles of association or in general meeting impose, but so that not less than two hours in each business day be allowed for inspection) be open to the inspection of a shareholder or director of the company without charge and, in the case of a public company or a company which is a subsidiary of a public company, of any other person on payment of such sum (if any), not exceeding £5, as the company may require.
|
|
|
Amendments of Governing Documents
|
| | Amendments to the certificate of incorporation of a Delaware corporation require the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the outstanding shares entitled to vote thereon or such greater vote as is provided for in the certificate of incorporation. A provision in the certificate of incorporation requiring the vote of a greater number or proportion of the directors or of the holders of any | | | The memorandum of association and articles of association of a Jersey company may only be amended by special resolution passed by shareholders in general meeting or by written resolution passed in accordance with its articles of association. | |
|
Corporate law issue
|
| |
Delaware law
|
| |
Jersey law
|
|
| | | | class of shares than is required by Delaware corporate law may not be amended, altered or repealed except by such greater vote. Bylaws may be amended with the approval of a majority of the outstanding shares entitled to vote and may, if so provided in the certificate of incorporation, also be amended by the board of directors. | | | | |
|
Dissolution and Winding Up
|
| | Under the Delaware General Corporation Law, unless the board of directors approves the proposal to dissolve, dissolution must be approved by shareholders holding 100% of the total voting power of the corporation. Only if the dissolution is initiated by the board of directors may it be approved by a simple majority of the corporation’s outstanding shares. Delaware law allows a Delaware corporation to include in its certificate of incorporation a supermajority voting requirement in connection with a dissolution initiated by the board of directors. | | |
Under the Jersey Companies Law and the articles of association, Clarivate may be voluntarily dissolved, liquidated or wound up by a special resolution of the shareholders. In addition, a company may be wound up by the courts of Jersey if the court is of the opinion that it is just and equitable to do so or that it is expedient in the public interest to do so.
Alternatively, a creditor with a claim against a Jersey company of not less than £3,000 may apply to the Royal Court of Jersey for the property of that company to be declared en désastre (being the Jersey law equivalent of a declaration of bankruptcy). Such an application may also be made by the Jersey company itself without having to obtain any shareholder approval.
|
|
| | |
Ordinary Shares
Being Offered Hereby |
| |||||||||
Beneficial Owner
|
| |
Number
|
| |
Percent
|
| ||||||
Leonard Green & Partners, L.P.(1)
|
| | | | 116,666,507 | | | | | | 17.3% | | |
Onex(2) | | | | | 42,855,384 | | | | | | 6.36% | | |
Cambridge Information Group(3)
|
| | | | 23,348,148 | | | | | | 3.46% | | |
Partners Group Access 946 L.P.(4)
|
| | | | 16,444,070 | | | | | | 2.44% | | |
A-PQ Holdings, LLC(5)
|
| | | | 12,259,847 | | | | | | 1.82% | | |
Jerre Stead(6)
|
| | | | 12,455,963 | | | | | | 1.85% | | |
Michael Klein(7)
|
| | | | 11,655,104 | | | | | | 1.73% | | |
Partners Group Private Equity (Master Fund), LLC(8)
|
| | | | 8,345,985 | | | | | | 1.24% | | |
Simon Webster
|
| | | | 5,290,227 | | | | | | * | | |
Entities Affiliated with The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.(9)
|
| | | | 4,085,081 | | | | | | * | | |
Robert N. Snyder
|
| | | | 3,324,753 | | | | | | * | | |
Sheryl von Blucher(10)
|
| | | | 3,056,684 | | | | | | * | | |
Piramal Enterprises Limited
|
| | | | 2,895,638 | | | | | | * | | |
AB Beteiligungs GmbH(11)
|
| | | | 1,957,870 | | | | | | * | | |
Dechomai Asset Trust
|
| | | | 1,931,330 | | | | | | * | | |
Toni Nijm
|
| | | | 1,378,745 | | | | | | * | | |
Paul Woolf
|
| | | | 1,030,384 | | | | | | * | | |
Mark Best
|
| | | | 815,990 | | | | | | * | | |
Patrice Durand
|
| | | | 726,774 | | | | | | * | | |
Melanie Fitzpatrick
|
| | | | 718,400 | | | | | | * | | |
Matitiahu Shimon Shem-Tov
|
| | | | 678,781 | | | | | | * | | |
James Gordon Samson
|
| | | | 613,571 | | | | | | * | | |
| | |
Ordinary Shares
Being Offered Hereby |
| |||||||||
Beneficial Owner
|
| |
Number
|
| |
Percent
|
| ||||||
Mark Nieuwendijk
|
| | | | 560,739 | | | | | | * | | |
Balakrishnan S. Iyer(12)
|
| | | | 532,279 | | | | | | * | | |
Karen G. Mills(13)
|
| | | | 532,279 | | | | | | * | | |
Tyron J. Stading 2016 Grantor Retained Annuity Trust(14)
|
| | | | 514,268 | | | | | | * | | |
Hemington Consultants B.V(15)
|
| | | | 487,579 | | | | | | * | | |
Alexander Cregan
|
| | | | 403,238 | | | | | | * | | |
David Cramer
|
| | | | 400,000 | | | | | | * | | |
Partners Group – FPP Op. Co., L.P.(16)
|
| | | | 396,502 | | | | | | * | | |
Partners Group Summit VCPV, L.P. Inc.(17)
|
| | | | 396,502 | | | | | | * | | |
Stephen Hartman(18)
|
| | | | 342,231 | | | | | | * | | |
Anton Wallner
|
| | | | 334,013 | | | | | | * | | |
Ascent Investments(19)
|
| | | | 277,952 | | | | | | * | | |
Loic Depelley
|
| | | | 276,329 | | | | | | * | | |
Martin Broughton
|
| | | | 258,279 | | | | | | * | | |
Forrest Porterfield
|
| | | | 257,206 | | | | | | * | | |
Isogones SC(20)
|
| | | | 245,593 | | | | | | * | | |
Vithalle Société de Droit Commun(21)
|
| | | | 241,734 | | | | | | * | | |
Richard Hanks(22)
|
| | | | 216,174 | | | | | | * | | |
Robert VanHees
|
| | | | 187,967 | | | | | | * | | |
James Lee
|
| | | | 109,338 | | | | | | * | | |
Hans-Jürgen Wels
|
| | | | 105,779 | | | | | | * | | |
David Friedman
|
| | | | 100,000 | | | | | | * | | |
The Gruler-Mayer Family Trust(23)
|
| | | | 100,000 | | | | | | * | | |
Jim Holmes
|
| | | | 96,885 | | | | | | * | | |
Larisa Trainor
|
| | | | 87,264 | | | | | | * | | |
Pankaj Sharma
|
| | | | 87,247 | | | | | | * | | |
Christine Archbold(24)
|
| | | | 81,926 | | | | | | * | | |
Joachim Kräuter
|
| | | | 79,398 | | | | | | * | | |
Yair Amsterdam
|
| | | | 72,612 | | | | | | * | | |
Oded Scharfstein
|
| | | | 71,373 | | | | | | * | | |
Shlomi Kringel
|
| | | | 70,235 | | | | | | * | | |
Oren Beit-Arie
|
| | | | 69,724 | | | | | | * | | |
Asa Le Fustec
|
| | | | 67,328 | | | | | | * | | |
Christoph Mann
|
| | | | 56,695 | | | | | | * | | |
Godfrey Ryan
|
| | | | 53,729 | | | | | | * | | |
Régis de Boisé
|
| | | | 51,693 | | | | | | * | | |
Roger Valade
|
| | | | 50,738 | | | | | | * | | |
Jane Okun Bomba
|
| | | | 50,000 | | | | | | * | | |
Ofer Mosseri
|
| | | | 43,653 | | | | | | * | | |
Eric Hines
|
| | | | 43,639 | | | | | | * | | |
Omri Gerson
|
| | | | 40,690 | | | | | | * | | |
Marian Roberge
|
| | | | 40,609 | | | | | | * | | |
Johan Deforseau
|
| | | | 38,908 | | | | | | * | | |
| | |
Ordinary Shares
Being Offered Hereby |
| |||||||||
Beneficial Owner
|
| |
Number
|
| |
Percent
|
| ||||||
Yariv Kursh
|
| | | | 36,042 | | | | | | * | | |
Chris Burghardt
|
| | | | 27,699 | | | | | | * | | |
Charles Neral
|
| | | | 26,427 | | | | | | * | | |
Kevin Norris
|
| | | | 26,087 | | | | | | * | | |
Julie Carroll-Davis
|
| | | | 25,719 | | | | | | * | | |
Dvir Hoffman
|
| | | | 24,626 | | | | | | * | | |
Biao Wang
|
| | | | 23,783 | | | | | | * | | |
Tamar Sharir Beiser
|
| | | | 23,395 | | | | | | * | | |
Ilja Ikonnikov
|
| | | | 22,500 | | | | | | * | | |
Yaniv Cohen
|
| | | | 21,029 | | | | | | * | | |
Guido Vallosio
|
| | | | 20,722 | | | | | | * | | |
Ido Peled
|
| | | | 20,210 | | | | | | * | | |
Andy Kidle
|
| | | | 18,377 | | | | | | * | | |
Sonja Bajic
|
| | | | 18,172 | | | | | | * | | |
Guy Ben-Porat
|
| | | | 17,983 | | | | | | * | | |
Yawo Dodzro
|
| | | | 16,000 | | | | | | * | | |
Craig O’Dell
|
| | | | 14,965 | | | | | | * | | |
Davide Chiesa
|
| | | | 14,723 | | | | | | * | | |
Yaniv Alus
|
| | | | 14,198 | | | | | | * | | |
Benjamin Kaube
|
| | | | 13,997 | | | | | | * | | |
Anja Weizert-Meister
|
| | | | 13,268 | | | | | | * | | |
Andrew Wright
|
| | | | 13,214 | | | | | | * | | |
Ronda Sue Majure
|
| | | | 13,214 | | | | | | * | | |
James Lynch
|
| | | | 12,742 | | | | | | * | | |
Dietmar Körbler
|
| | | | 12,169 | | | | | | * | | |
Stephen Hawthorne
|
| | | | 11,294 | | | | | | * | | |
Eshkol Amor
|
| | | | 11,020 | | | | | | * | | |
Garret Tate Nunley
|
| | | | 10,930 | | | | | | * | | |
Alexander Heck
|
| | | | 9,654 | | | | | | * | | |
Eyal Kirshner
|
| | | | 9,570 | | | | | | * | | |
Neil MacCormick
|
| | | | 9,436 | | | | | | * | | |
Jan-Eric Reichelt
|
| | | | 8,997 | | | | | | * | | |
Daniela Sunmonu
|
| | | | 6,693 | | | | | | * | | |
Francis Paleno
|
| | | | 6,607 | | | | | | * | | |
Jeffrey Huntsman
|
| | | | 6,607 | | | | | | * | | |
Jeffrey Mastendino
|
| | | | 5,307 | | | | | | * | | |
Spencer Slaine(25)
|
| | | | 4,585 | | | | | | * | | |
Nikola Vujic
|
| | | | 4,000 | | | | | | * | | |
Yasemin Agatan
|
| | | | 3,607 | | | | | | * | | |
Myriam Bou About
|
| | | | 3,045 | | | | | | * | | |
| | |
Amount to
Be Paid |
| |||
Registration fee
|
| | | $ | *† | | |
Printing
|
| | | | * | | |
Legal fees and expenses
|
| | | | * | | |
Trustee fees
|
| | | | * | | |
Rating agency fees
|
| | | | * | | |
Accounting fees and expenses
|
| | | | * | | |
Miscellaneous
|
| | | | * | | |
Total
|
| | | $ | * | | |
|
Exhibit No.
|
| |
Document
|
| ||||
| | | 1.1 | * | | | | Form of Underwriting Agreement | |
| | | 3.1 | | | | | | |
| | | 3.2 | | | | | Statement of Rights of the 5.25% Series A Mandatory Convertible Preferred Shares of Clarivate PLC, effective June 14, 2021 (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 3.1 to the current report on Form 8-K of the Company filed with the SEC on June 14, 2021) | |
| | | 3.3 | | | | | | |
| | | 4.1 | | | | |
Form of Indenture between the Company and the trustee to be named therein (incorporated by
reference to Exhibit 4.1 to the Registration Statement on Form S-3 filed with the SEC on June 19, 2020) |
|
|
Exhibit No.
|
| |
Document
|
| ||||
| | | 4.2 | | | | | | |
| | | 4.3 | | | | | Warrant Agreement dated as of September 6, 2018 between Churchill Capital Corp and Continental Stock Transfer & Trust Company, as warrant agent (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 4.4 to Churchill Capital Corp’s current report on Form 8-K filed on September 12, 2018) | |
| | | 4.4 | * | | | | Form of Warrant Agreement | |
| | | 4.5 | * | | | | Form of Purchase Contract | |
| | | 4.6 | * | | | | Form of Unit Agreement | |
| | | 5.1 | | | | | | |
| | | 5.2 | | | | | | |
| | | 23.1 | | | | | | |
| | | 23.2 | | | | | | |
| | | 23.3 | | | | | | |
| | | 23.4 | | | | | | |
| | | 24.1 | | | | | | |
| | | 25.1 | * | | | | Statement of Eligibility on Form T-1 | |
| | | 107 | | | | | |
|
Signature
|
| |
Title
|
|
|
/s/ Jonathan Gear
Jonathan Gear
|
| |
Chief Executive Officer & Director
(principal executive officer) |
|
|
/s/ Jonathan Collins
Jonathan Collins
|
| |
Executive Vice President &
Chief Financial Officer (principal financial officer) |
|
|
/s/ Michael Easton
Michael Easton
|
| |
Senior Vice President, Finance &
Chief Accounting Officer (principal accounting officer) |
|
|
/s/ Andy Snyder
Andy Snyder
|
| |
Chairman of the Board
|
|
|
/s/ Valeria Alberola
Valeria Alberola
|
| |
Director
|
|
|
/s/ Michael J. Angelakis
Michael J. Angelakis
|
| |
Director
|
|
|
/s/ Sheryl von Blucher
Sheryl von Blucher
|
| |
Director
|
|
|
/s/ Jane Okun Bomba
Jane Okun Bomba
|
| |
Director
|
|
|
/s/ Usama N. Cortas
Usama N. Cortas
|
| |
Director
|
|
|
Signature
|
| |
Title
|
|
|
/s/ Kosty Gilis
Kosty Gilis
|
| |
Director
|
|
|
/s/ Balakrishnan S. Iyer
Balakrishnan S. Iyer
|
| |
Director
|
|
|
/s/ Adam T. Levyn
Adam T. Levyn
|
| |
Director
|
|
|
/s/ Anthony Munk
Anthony Munk
|
| |
Director
|
|
|
/s/ Dr. Wendell E. Pritchett
Dr. Wendell E. Pritchett
|
| |
Director
|
|
|
/s/ Richard W. Roedel
Richard W. Roedel
|
| |
Director
|
|
|
/s/ Roxanne White
Roxanne White
|
| |
Director
|
|
1 Year Clarivate Chart |
1 Month Clarivate Chart |
It looks like you are not logged in. Click the button below to log in and keep track of your recent history.
Support: +44 (0) 203 8794 460 | support@advfn.com
By accessing the services available at ADVFN you are agreeing to be bound by ADVFN's Terms & Conditions