Total Produce Investors - TOT

Total Produce Investors - TOT

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Stock Name Stock Symbol Market Stock Type
Total Produce Plc TOT London Ordinary Share
  Price Change Price Change % Stock Price Last Trade
0.00 0.0% 165.00 01:00:00
Open Price Low Price High Price Close Price Previous Close
165.00 165.00
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lmulhare: The game in US markets is: 1. Pump a stock, sell to retail investors as you short it down to book value. 2. When selling lose momentum, cover your shorts & accumulate by buying from weak hands who sell at a loss. 3. Let the stock rise as you buy from weak hands who sell at break-even. 4. Buy the stock until it becomes very overbought as retail starts buying again & return to step 1. On 2/12/21 DOLE earnings per-share of 4c was 20c below expected earnings. The stock bottomed the next day at $12.155 & has closed every week since above $13. If it dips below $13 again, I'll consider buying. Due to expected interest rate rises, the market is selling growth stocks & buying low P/E value stocks now.
lmulhare: Many websites give dates that are just estimates. The announcement of the date for financial results currently isn't on the company's website: hxxps://
lmulhare: Total Produce PLC Trading Update this morning: " for the 10 months ended 31 October 2020 has remained positive... Sales, Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted Earnings Per Share are now expected to be slightly ahead of full year 2019." hxxps://
quepassa: This share remains off the radar. Yes, astonishing for a Company with a Euro4.3bn turnover and growing fast. However, no bad thing and seems to be the house style not to court publicity. All I can say is that they seem to be doing A LOT of things right and building a global fresh foods empire in highly sought after key sector. The share price performance over recent years has been spectacular as well as paying a steadily increasing dividend. Personally, I think this has a long way still to go for the patient investor. Also, glad that management are focused on the business rather than the shenanigans of engaging publicly and frequently with brokers and the financial media circus. ALL IMO. DYOR. QP
quepassa: Indeed.Indeed. The Amazon t/o of Whole Foods will put a rocket under the sector. GMT is a hedge fund and they are an aggressive investor. They don't have such a big (indirect) stake for a lazy investment and likely expect big things in my view. Link to their website here: hXXps:// However, perhaps even more interesting is what another Hedge Fund, Highfield Capital said yesterday about Amazon's t/o of Whole Foods. Here is an article:- hXXp:// The FRESH PRODUCE sector is IN PLAY. It will be an M&A field day. With a very strong UK/European and USA footprint, Total Produce will be under scrutiny in my view. Remember its one-time sister company, Fyffes was taken over by Sumitomo just 6 months ago. Personally expecting Total Produce share price to rise precipitously now as a result of massive sector interest. ALL IMO> DYOR. QP
gateside: Profit taking... Investors putting money into FTSE100 which could rally big time, if EU vote is Remain.
wexboy: 2016 – The Great Irish Share Valuation Project (Part II): Company: Total Produce (TOT:ID) Last TGISVP Post: Here (former holding, also see here & esp. here) Market Cap: EUR 538 M Price: EUR 1.69 For such a dull stock originally, Total Produce has had an incredible run…actually quadrupling in the last 3-4 years! All despite the fact its fundamentals haven’t really changed – management continues to make 1-2 acquisitions a year (generally buying a 35-65% stake), adjusted EBITA margins remain in the 1.8-1.9% range, and earnings continue to grow at an average 9% clip in the last few years. Fortunately, I managed to capture a major portion of this revaluation…and to enjoy seeing so many investors only become interested after the stock doubled/tripled!? [Tom Claugus of GMT Capital (one of Jack Schwager’s new Market Wizards) has been building a 9% stake since late-2014, while Daniel Gladis of Vltava Fund now lists it as a top 5 position after (presumably) building his stake since late-2013]. But TOT management really takes the cake here: They finally pulled the trigger on a €20 million share buyback towards the end of last year…yup, I kid you not, the buyback actually came AFTER the share price quadrupled!?! And no, it’s not like there was some kind of prior financial constraint – management actually wallowed in €100 million+ of surplus cash for the past few years. Granted, I always had a pretty dim view of TOT’s capital allocation strategy anyway…but this must surely be the stupidest management decision I’ve seen in a long time. Anyway, FY-2015 results confirm a 1.9% adjusted EBITA margin – but if we allow for an average 19% minority interest in profits, this is equivalent to an underlying 1.5% margin, which deserves a 0.15 P/S multiple. And with a mere €18 million of net debt outstanding, we can adjust for cash (& investment property), plus an incremental debt adjustment – noting actual finance expense paid of €7.2 million, we could comfortably add another €49 million of debt, but let’s haircut that by our usual 50%. In terms of earnings, we can award a bit of a premium to TOT’s growth rate, recognising the underlying stability of the business (but not forgetting management’s poor capital allocation record) – a notch higher (for a 12.0 P/E ratio) now seems in order – and noting the Progressive Produce acquisition early this year & the recent trading update, using the top end of the €0.105-115 EPS range also seems appropriate: (EUR 0.115 Pros Adj Dil EPS * 12.0 P/E + (3,454 M Revenue * 0.15 P/S + 142 M Cash/Inv Property + 49 M Debt Adjustment * 50%) / 318 M Shares) / 2 = EUR 1.77 Total Produce is now fairly-valued. But there’s an obvious value-enhancing event still lurking on the horizon…a potential re-merger with Fyffes (FFY:ID). I mean, how ludicrous is it seeing two Irish fruit & veg companies (with basically the same €0.5 billion market caps) compete with each other, with both dead-set now on buying their way (however quixotically) into the North American market – the cost savings & revenue synergies to be harvested from, say, a nil-premium merger are blindingly obvious. But expecting something so rational from the TOT management team may be asking too much…we may have a very reluctant bride & groom on our hands still. Price Target: EUR 1.77 Upside/(Downside): 4% For related links/graphs/files, and more TGISVP analyses/price targets: Google the Wexboy investment blog.
quepassa: This week's Investors Chronicle runs a feature on Irish stocks. Total Produce gets a brief mention. "Fyffes isn't the only agriculture producer flying high on Ireland's equity markets. Since floating in 2007, Total Produce has seen its share price rise steadily as it's recycled strong cash flows into acquisitions to build up a leading position in global fresh fruit and vegetable markets". Page 23. Cannot disagree with a word of that! ALL IMO. DYOR. QP
waldron: May 07, 2007 TOT: Common Size Analysis of Total SA By William Trent, CFA of Stock Market Beat For a book project we are working on we conducted a common size analysis of Total SA's (TOT) financial statements. We figured it would be something worth passing along here. Total's common-size statements are presented below. The first step in conducting a common-size analysis is to review both the common-size income statements and common-size balance sheets to look for changes and trends that warrant further review. Once the trends are identified, explanations should be sought. Management's discussion of financial performance and the financial statement footnotes are good starting points, provided the reader maintains a healthy skepticism of management's explanations. These internal perspectives should be balanced by external sources such as industry reports, economic data, peer company financial statements and news reports. We present a common-size analysis of Total below including an initial assessment, income statement analysis and balance sheet analysis. Exhibit 1: Horizontal Common Size Income Statement Exhibit 2: Vertical Common Size Income Statement Exhibit 3: Horizontal Common Size Balance Sheet Exhibit 4: Vertical Common Size Balance Sheet Initial Assessment Total's horizontal common-size income statement is presented in Exhibit 1. Revenues grew 22.8% in 2005 and 39.2% cumulatively between 2004 and 2006. Total's horizontal common-size balance sheet is presented in Exhibit 3. Total assets increased by 22.3% in 2005 and declined slightly in 2006 for a cumulative increase of 21.3%. Assets grew at about the same rate as sales in 2005, but fewer assets produced a higher level of sales in 2006, indicating that Total used its assets more efficiently that year. In Total's Form 20-F filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, management notes that the "average oil market environment in 2006 was marked by higher oil prices, with the average Brent oil price increasing 19% to $65.10/b from $54.50/b in 2005." They further disclose that "Oil and gas production in 2006 was 2,356 kboe/d compared to 2,489 kboe/d in 2005, a decrease of 5% due principally to the impacts of the price effect (1) (-2%), shutdowns of production in the Niger Delta area because of security issues (-2%) and changes in the Group's perimeter (-1%). Excluding these items, the positive impact of new field start-ups was offset by normal production declines at mature fields and shutdowns in the North Sea." This explains the apparent productivity increase: rather than producing more petroleum with fewer assets the company produced less. However, due to higher oil prices the revenue from the production more than offset the decline in quantity. By comparing output rather than revenue we see that output declined 5% and assets declined less than 1%. By this measure, efficiency actually decreased rather than increased. Since management has control over production but not commodity prices, this may be a more appropriate measure. Income Statement An examination of Total's vertical common-size income statement, presented as Exhibit 2, shows that the while the company was profitable the entire time net profit margin declined steadily from 9.5% in 2004 to 9.2%in 2005 and just 7.9% in 2006. Investors will want to know if this trend is more likely to continue or to reverse. To do this we analyze the components of the income statement. Excise taxes declined steadily throughout the period, which increased net revenue available to the company. Whatever caused the decline in profit margin had to overcome this positive effect. Purchases offer a partial explanation. Rising crude oil prices hurt operating margins for the refining and retail businesses. However, while this expense grew substantially faster than sales during the three years (48.8% compared to net revenue growth of 39.2%) it does not account for the entire decline in net margins. In fact, Figure 5-1 shows that operating income as a percentage of sales increased in 2005 and the decline in 2006 still left the income from operations higher than it was in 2004. Instead, we see that the decline in net profitability was due to non-operating items: specifically "other income" and an increase in income taxes. Turning to the 20-F for information, we learn that the biggest reason for the decline was a one-time gain recognized in 2004: "The gains (losses) on sales of assets included a pre-tax dilution gain on the Sanofi-Aventis merger of 2,969 M € in 2004." Without the gain in 2004, other income would only have been 0.1% of sales, and the apparent decline in margins would not have occurred. With regard to income tax, the effective tax rate has been rising relative to pre-tax income, with the major factor being the difference between French tax rates and foreign tax rates. In particular, "The Venezuelan government has modified the initial agreement for the Sincor project several times. In May, 2006, the organic law on hydrocarbons was amended with immediate effect to establish a new extraction tax, calculated on the same basis as for royalties and bringing the overall tax rate to 33.33%. In September, 2006, the corporate income tax was modified to increase the rate on oil activities (excluding natural gas) to 50%. This new tax rate will come into effect in 2007." Some expenses can be crucial to a company's future success. For example, pharmaceutical companies rely heavily on research and development. Improved margins due to lower R&D spending may actually be bad news. For oil companies, the equivalent of R&D is exploration costs – expenses related to trying to find new sources of oil. Total's exploration costs were fairly stable as a percentage of revenue. Another industry-specific expense is depletion, which is the counterpart to exploration and the equivalent of depreciation for fixed assets. When new oil discoveries are made an estimate of the total available oil is added to assets. The depletion charge represents the amount used up each year from the resources. For forecasting future net margins, we would probably want to use the more recent years as a guideline. Tax rate increases should be considered permanent, and the 2004 net gain appears to have been a one-time event. Balance Sheet Note that Total presents its balance sheet with long-term assets and liabilities above current assets and liabilities. This presentation is fairly common outside the United States. Remember that revenues grew 22.8% in 2005 and 39.2% cumulatively between 2004 and 2006. Total assets increased by 22.3% in 2005 and declined slightly in 2006 for a cumulative increase of 21.3%. When reviewing common-size balance sheets, particular attention should be paid to individual items that are not in line with this trend. Assets Beginning with long-term assets, intangible assets rose faster than sales or total assets while tangible assets (property, plant and equipment) grew slower. By their nature intangible assets are difficult to value, and subjective judgment is involved. Investors should always investigate the composition of intangible assets. Looking at Note 10 in Total's 20-F we find that the increase in 2005 was mostly due to acquired mineral rights. Assuming the valuation was performed appropriately this is a valid asset. In 2006 acquisitions of other companies resulted in the change. Rapidly growing intangible assets and slow-growing property and equipment indicates the company may be pursuing a "buy versus build" strategy. In aggregate, long-term tangible and intangible assets amounted to 43.9% of total assets in 2004, 42.3% in 2005 and 43.1% in 2006 – a fairly constant proportion. Equity and other investments also stayed fairly consistent as a percentage of assets. Hedging instruments of non-current financial debt declined as a percentage of assets. However, looking further down the balance sheet we see that the non-current debt increased in both absolute and percentage terms. It is possible that the company reduced the amount of overall hedges, or that the hedges declined in value (which would normally be offset by a similar change in the fair value of the hedged liability.) The discussion in the 20-F reveals losses is limited to the change between 2005 and 2006, so it is necessary to refer to the 2005 20-F to learn about the large decline between 2004 and 2005. In doing so, we find that currency and interest rate swaps lost value. Currency and interest rate movements were of a favorable direction, so any currency and interest rate hedges were unfavorable. Although the amount of debt changed year/year it is possible to gauge the overall impact by comparing debt maturing in specific years. For example, in 2004 Total had $2,241 million of bonds issued that mature in 2008. In 2005, the amount of 2008 maturities was similar at $2,256. However, the fair value of interest and currency swaps on the 2008 maturities had fallen from $398 million to $117 million. Similar declines were seen across other maturity dates. From 2005 to 2006 there was a decline in "other non-current financial assets." Note 14 of the 20-F explains that the company used up some deferred tax assets during the year. As discussed in Chapter 3, deferred tax assets represent differences between earnings reported to shareholders and earnings reported to the tax authorities. Assets arise when book earnings are lower than tax earnings, frequently because of tax loss carry-forwards. As the company earns money in future periods it can use these carry-forwards to offset current period taxes. By contrast, deferred tax liabilities arise when the company's reported book earnings are higher than reported tax earnings. This can be caused by use of accelerated depreciation for tax purposes, for example, and represents a tax payment that has been recognized in the income statement but not yet paid. Looking further down the balance sheet, we see that deferred tax liabilities grew in both years, though at a slower rate than either sales or total assets. As a result, they declined as a percentage of assets from 7.2% in 2004 to 6.8% in 2006. In aggregate, non-current assets declined from 62.0% of total assets in 2004 to 59.3% in 2006. Turning to current assets, both inventories and accounts receivable grew faster than sales or assets in 2005, but declined in 2006. Over the entire two-year period inventories grew faster than total assets but slower than sales. Since sales are made directly from inventory and often result in accounts receivable, the comparison to sales indicates that working capital was efficiently managed in 2006. Prepaid expenses and other current assets rose faster than assets and in line with sales for the entire period. Investors frequently devote special attention to the "other" category because changes there sometimes indicate earnings management since such assets arise when more earnings appear on the income statement than are collected in cash. Here the 20-F doesn't help, as Note 16 provides a table breaking the category down further but the drivers of the change remain classified as "other." Cash and equivalents declined considerably. Half of the decline in 2006 was due to currency issues. Current financial assets were up sharply over the two years, which also contributed to the cash decline. According to the 20-F, "Certain financial instruments hedge against risks related to the equity of foreign subsidiaries whose functional currency is not the euro (mainly the U.S. dollar). They qualify as "net investment hedges". Changes in fair value are recorded in shareholders' equity. The fair value of these instruments is recorded under "Current financial assets" or "Other current financial liabilities"." Given that the latter category declined considerably, favorable changes in the value of such hedges would seem to be a likely explanation for both shifts. Liabilities Total's long-term liabilities grew just 7.1% in 2005 and declined in 2006. As a percentage of total assets they fell from 18.8% to 15.6%. The main driver of the overall decline was a reduced liability for employee benefits. Looking at Note 18 in the 20F, we find that the expected future obligation has been reduced by approximately €900 million between 2005 and 2006. Specifically, the reduction was due to actuarial gains and losses, which reduced the reported obligation by €1.15 billion but merely reflect actuarial estimates. In addition, currency translation adjustments reduced the expected future liability by €900 million. Investors might want to ignore these adjustments or make their own adjustments to reflect their arbitrary and possibly unsustainable nature. Without these two adjustments the liability would have increased rather than decreased. Non-current debt increased 25.6% cumulatively, which was faster than the growth in total assets but slower than the growth in sales. Short-term borrowings increased substantially, particularly in 2006. This resulted from a larger portion of the non-current debt coming due in 2007. Accounts payable ballooned in 2005 but were reduced in 2006 such that cumulative growth was in line with the growth in sales and assets. The large increase in 2005 could have been resulted from an unusually large amount of purchases late in the year. Other current liabilities grew at a slower rate than sales or assets in both periods. Disclosure: Author is long UNITED STS OIL FD LP UNITS (USO) at time of publication.
ariane: Total S.A Form 20-F Filing RNS Number:6641U Total S.A. 11 April 2007 Filing of Form 20-F for the year 2006 Paris, April 11, 2007 - On April 10, 2007, Total SA filed its Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2006 with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The 2006 Form 20-F can be downloaded from the Company's website (, under the heading Investor Relations / Publications), or from, the website of the SEC. Printed copies of the Form 20-F can be requested, free of charge, at under the heading Investor Relations/ Contact or by calling +33 (0)1 47 44 58 53 or, from the United States, 1-201-626- 3500 Total is one of the world's major oil and gas groups, with activities in more than 130 countries. Its 95,000 employees put their expertise to work in every part of the industry - exploration and production of oil and natural gas, refining and marketing, gas trading and electricity. Total is working to keep the world supplied with energy, both today and tomorrow. The Group is also a first rank player in chemicals, This information is provided by RNS The company news service from the London Stock Exchange END MSCGCGDSDXBGGRB
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