Share Name Share Symbol Market Type Share ISIN Share Description
Shangri-LA Asia LSE:SHA London Ordinary Share BMG8063F1068 ORD HK$1
  Price Change % Change Share Price Shares Traded Last Trade
  +HKD0.00 +0.00% HKD24.85 0 01:00:00
Bid Price Offer Price High Price Low Price Open Price
HKD0.00 HKD0.00 - - -
Industry Sector Turnover (m) Profit (m) EPS - Basic PE Ratio Market Cap (m)

Shangri-LA Asia (SHA) Latest News

Real-Time news about Shangri-LA Asia (London Stock Exchange): 0 recent articles
More Shangri-LA Asia News
Shangri-LA Asia Takeover Rumours

Shangri-LA Asia (SHA) Share Charts

1 Year Shangri-LA Asia Chart

1 Year Shangri-LA Asia Chart

1 Month Shangri-LA Asia Chart

1 Month Shangri-LA Asia Chart

Intraday Shangri-LA Asia Chart

Intraday Shangri-LA Asia Chart

Shangri-LA Asia (SHA) Discussions and Chat

Shangri-LA Asia Forums and Chat

Date Time Title Posts
20/4/201908:06Share Ideas: macro & micro.92,612
24/10/201616:40Ichimoku resource centre.162
08/12/201515:11SHA 2014 share comp7
13/4/201318:03Company Accounts & Valuation Ratios: video tuition.-
13/1/201209:38Candle resource centre.78

Add a New Thread

Shangri-LA Asia (SHA) Most Recent Trades

No Trades
Trade Time Trade Price Trade Size Trade Value Trade Type
View all Shangri-LA Asia trades in real-time

Shangri-LA Asia (SHA) Top Chat Posts

hpcg: Interesting trading update from PLUS that has knocked the sector, hardly surprisingly. PLUS is a fantastic share to demonstrate how everyone can be wrong. When I last had any direct interest I was short at I think approximately the level it is now. The share price rise after was dramatic, as has been the fall from the peak. It makes a great case study in market timing. The lesson is that people will buy unsustainable profits, value and growth factors combined, but don't be the smarter person that bets against them until the story breaks. N.B. I didn't lose heavily, it is straight forward to limit losses by respecting the chart. Where I failed was not to monitor the story and short when it cracked; text book exponential top as well.
hosede: Good piece today from Capital conflict. Shouldn't borrowing money to buy back a Company's shares be made illegal? Corporate share buybacks, and debt. Last year, corporate share buybacks rose an incredible 48%. Why do they do this? Supposedly to return value to shareholders. If you own 100 out of 1000 shares, you own 10% of the company. If the company buys back shares for a few years, that could become 100 out of 700, which is over 14%. When you didn’t even buy any more. This entitles you to a greater share of the profits of the company. That’s how earnings per share rises as companies buy back shares. The amount of the company earns is split between fewer shares. Supposedly that’s why companies do this. Why don’t they just pay dividends? Management incentives. Imagine you are a CEO. Your salary is big, but the shares your firm has given you offer even bigger rewards. If the share price does well. What’s an easy way to boost the share price? Buy some back! Rising earnings per share, and a large buyer in the market (the company itself) will push the share price higher. Then a few years on, you sell your shares for an excellent price, and take all the praise for a job well done. But where does the money come to buy so many shares back? From company earnings? Not recently. It’s come from debt. Interest rates have been so low for so long that borrowing money has been seriously cheap. There are two ways to increase earnings per share. Increase earnings, or decrease the number of shares. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Why bother going to all that effort to increase earnings? Much easier to just borrow money, and buy shares, improving your earnings per share that way. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- America has seen record levels of this short-term thinking. US corporate debt has doubled since the financial crash. Global debt is now three times the size of the world economy. There’s no sign of a slowdown either. In the second quarter of 2018, US companies announced $430 billion of buybacks. This nearly doubled the record, which the market had set in the first quarter.
skyship: PTO - Again re TFG: Coincidentally today received this from Keppler Trust Intelligence: Tetragon Financial Group 47.4% Tetragon Financial Group (TFG) has net assets of $2.1bn and trades on a discount to NAV of around 47% (Numis estimate). There are US$ and £ denominated shares, but both give exposure to the same underlying investments and dollar exposure. A discount this wide clearly raises eyebrows, but we believe TFG passes the sniff test. The company is certainly complex – it comprises investments in a number of “alternative” funds – as broad as convertible bonds, event driven equity strategies, bank loans and real estate which shouldn’t exhibit much volatility. However, it also has stakes in a number of asset management companies (held within TFG Asset Management, representing 30% of NAV), many of which manage the company’s capital, and the valuations of which could be quite volatile over the medium term. However, TFG has largely achieved steady positive returns since launch, and certainly since the current strategy has been adopted. Indeed, over the past five years, the NAV total returns have been 10.3% pa. Given the underlying asset classes, we hazard that the NAV should be relatively uncorrelated with equity markets going forward. The company’s objective is to provide stable returns across cycles, and generate distributable income and capital appreciation. TFG’s shares currently offer a dividend yield of 6.1%. The principals and employees at TFG own around 26% of the shares, which certainly aligns them with shareholders, however it is worth noting that the shares are “non-voting”, which puts shareholders at the mercy of Tetragon’s principals: Reade Griffith and Paddy Dear, who also control the investment manager. Historically there has been a certain about of discord between some non-voting shareholders and Tetragon evidenced by the recent buyback tender for 4.5% of the shares, which according to Numis was executed at a c. 49% discount to the prevailing NAV estimate, and a 6% discount to the share price which certainly reflects some dissatisfaction. One other wrinkle for potential investors might be the fees which are charged at 1.5% of NAV and a 25% performance fee (also on NAV) above a hurdle of Libor +2.65%. The stated OCF of TFG is 1.74% (as at 31st December 2017) and the KID RIY cost is 5.66%. In our view, there is a price for everything, and so corporate governance issues aside, the discount of 47% on a portfolio of uncorrelated assets which have delivered solid returns in the past is worth a closer look for those who aren’t too fainthearted.
hpcg: Ptolemy, to echo Hosede 2009 was a great time to buy almost anything, 10 years of bull run later and ideas a) necessarily have less conviction, and b) can get run over by the macro picture and market beta even if they turn out solid. Secondly, my observation is that market mechanics have changed dramatically. More or less everyone is aware of share price technicals, and big market moves up and down happen in the blink of an eye. An idea can be out of date within a few days. Thirdly, information platforms aggregating fundamental data are commonly used. A lot of use here use either Stockopedia or Sharepad, or if not the likes of finViz have free screeners. I (we) don't need someone to outline a bull case documenting 5 years of growing sales and expanding margin, from the ticker I can review all of that in minutes. Fourthly, as EI has posted another example, the micro cap space is riddled with risk. The best way of making money is to buy the ramp and sell the ultimate reality. How does the proposition 'XYZ is gathering a cult following, it has no sales, no product even, and the execs are all convicted fraudsters ... from China. I think it will 10 bag.' Fifthly, personally I take individual share discussion to the board in question. Discussion there is likely to have more detail, sometimes. A general board will tend to general discussion. The macros discussion is more useful I find. In the past year I reckon 60% of my investing energy has been focused on Sterling, USD, US interest rates and QT. 10-20% of the remainder was crypto shorting, which most here didn't care about. Having said all the Brexit talk has been a complete disruption and often pointless. What is pertinent to us as investors is not what we want to happen, but front running what turns out to happen. Personally I think the HoC will pass the deal on the table as a) that is the only deal, b) only about 90 MPs want a no deal crash out. However given the timing I can't discount that. 90% of my current thinking is do I have too much Sterling and not enough dollars?
henryatkin: many companies or index actually got anywhere near 1x NTAV in any recession. At the market trough in 2009 ARM for instance had a share price of 82p compared to its NTAV of 15.17p per share. ASC had a trough share price of 245p compared to NTAV of 33. Its quite conceivable that in a deep recession AMZN would trough at >6x NTAV and may be a lot more.
skyship: Hosede – Are these fellows friends of yours? Sorry a bit long….but CRV’s comments well worth the read: As mentioned in previous communications with shareholders, it is our belief that risks to the global economy in general and the capital markets in particular are misunderstood and greatly underestimated. Asset prices have been wildly distorted by nearly a decade of aggressive monetary policy while fiscal policy remains equally accommodative for politicians accustomed to making generous promises to an electorate unwilling to pay for ever greater government largesse. The effects of these twin phenomenon include: Listed shares trading at historically high prices, bonds trading at historically high prices (low rates) and an explosion in public and private sector debt. Globally, the total amount of government debt now exceeds $63.1 trillion, according to a Pew Research Center analysis of International Monetary Fund data. Corporate debt continues to grow as a percentage of global new issuances. According to data provided by Deal Logic corporations borrowed 55% of the $6.8 trillion in syndicated bond sales completed in 2017. Where did these record borrowings go? Certainly some of the proceeds went towards productive capital investment; bridges and ports for governments and new plant and equipment for companies. However, we suspect far more went to towards social welfare spending, military adventures and public sector pay for the government borrowers and share buy backs and dividend recapitalizations for corporate debtors. On the corporate side, where we spend our time analysing balance sheets and share prices, the continuation of share buybacks accelerated. There is nothing inherently wrong with buy backs. In fact a share buy back can be one of the most effective tools for increasing shareholder value. When the shares of a publicly traded company are selling at a discount to their intrinsic value and the company is generating free cash flow the highest and best use of capital may indeed be reducing the shares in issue. Sadly, we are not seeing much of that. What we are seeing is well paid managers, who own very little of the company they manage, spending shareholder's funds to purchase shares at or near all-time highs (Earnings multiple and share price). This has the effect of increasing earnings per share in the short term and thus often triggering bonus packages for management that further takes more capital out of the company. This capital may well be needed in the future. In many cases shareholders fail to notice that their employees with very little skin in the game, are making decisions that maximise their compensation while they have little or no exposure to future downside. This lack of skin in the game is rapidly becoming a threat to long term shareholders and will become readily apparent at the first economic downturn or financial crisis. It also continues completely unchecked in an environment where individual securities are purchased largely because of the money pouring into passive funds. With this market dynamic as a framework, poor decisions can be rewarded as long as the index continues to attract net capital flows. INVESTMENT MANAGER'S REPORT FOR THE SIX MONTH PERIODED 30 NOVEMBER 2017 As discussed at the opening of this report, we believe we are in a period where the market perceives the risks to be far less than reality. At some point sooner rather than later, we believe there will be a very disruptive reversal which will at a minimum see asset prices reverting to the historical mean. Or it could be much worse. Rather than mean reversal, we may experience an asymmetrical reversal that brings asset prices down to well below historical averages as measured by earnings multiples in shares or yield in bonds and property. We believe the latter scenario becomes more and more likely as the 'everything bubble' continues to inflate. We may be wrong. Perhaps we fail to comprehend a new economic paradigm. If this is the case than we shareholders will have to reconcile the opportunity cost of a lost decade when almost everything except Craven House shares rose in price. Perhaps we should have spent the past half decade chasing expensive deals geared to the maximum level without worrying about the downside. If, however, as we expect, this time is not different, we should be in an excellent position to capitalise on distressed prices sometime in the not too distant future. Desmond Holdings Ltd, Investment Manager to Craven House Capital Plc
hpcg: The great thing about quarterly reporting is one gets to adjust quickly to a change in trend. A PE of 25 is fine so long as a company can up its profits by 25% in the next 12 months. When the economy and more specifically a company is growing faster over time then one can buy at a higher multiple because one can anticipate a higher multiple, or at worst that the company will still have a higher share price even if the multiple compresses a bit. However if growth slows the multiple compression is not self regulating with a static price, the price also has to drop. So the question is: after the as good as it gets Q2 will profit growth and the share price have adjusted for the slower growth in the next 12 months? Apologies, as the table below is unlikely to display well but it models a constant 25% YoY growth and PEG of 1 compared with a second model where the growth drops to 20%. To maintain a PEG of 1 the share price must remain the same (actually drop a bit, but not much). In terms of share price behaviour this literally means a year of consolidation, after which the price can start moving up, but at a slower pace. The real world is not as clean and the bigger the disconnect between current expectations and new expectations the worse the share price reaction. Go from a price which assumes 25% growth to one which assumes 15% growth and the share price needs to drop by a third and it will take 4 years to recover to where it was. A chart of CMG, Chipotle Mexican Grill, is a good illustration of a reset and new assumed lower growth trajectory. Consolidation and correction are just the market following some simple mathematical guidance based on growth expectations. price now 100 195.3125 244.140625 305.1757813 381.4697266 476.8371582 profit in 12 months 5 6.25 7.8125 9.765625 12.20703125 15.25878906 forward PE 25 25 25 25 25 25 PEG 1 1 1 1 1 1 profit now 2 5 6.25 7.8125 9.765625 12.20703125 trailing PE 50 39.0625 39.0625 39.0625 39.0625 39.0625 growth to 20% price now 100 195.3125 187.5 225 270 324 profit in 12 months 5 6.25 7.8125 9.375 11.25 13.5 forward PE 25 25 20 20 20 20 PEG 1 1 1 1 1 1 profit now 2 5 6.25 7.8125 9.375 11.25 trailing PE 50 39.0625 30 28.8 28.8 28.8
tewkesbury: Powerhouse Energy (PHE) possible 2000 bagger: englishlongbow 25 May '18 - 10:49 - 6554 of 6556 Keith Allaun says PHE could be a FTSE 100 company based on their UK rollout plans i.e. at least 300p share price; and they are expecting 2.5x more rollout in the EU, and roll out in other geographies like Australia, Far East, Midddle East, etc. So in terms of the share price: 300p for the UK + 750p for the EU + more elsewhere, gives an eventual share price well over 1000p (£10) making it a 2000+ bagger from here. £1000 investment now could be worth £2 million in future. That is a mind boggling return on investment.
simon gordon: John Lee in the FT - 4/5/18: I write this having just returned from the two-day Mello private investors conference in Derby, where I spoke about my 60 years as a private investor. This highly entertaining event — covered elsewhere on these pages — had 500 or more investing enthusiasts and 50 companies either presenting or available to talk at stands. There was a real buzz about the place. The most absorbing session I attended was on profit warnings, given by Ed Page Croft from the team at Stockopedia, an investment website. All investors are on the receiving end of these from time to time, with the unwelcome news usually delivered at the start of the day. Stockopedia analysed 245 profits warnings made between January 2013 and August 2016 and made a number of findings. First, in the six months before the warning, the relevant PLC’s shares had fallen by an average 6 per cent; second, the average immediate fall on the warning was 19 per cent; third, the price decline continued over the next six months; and fourth, 12 months on, only 13 per cent of those shares were standing at a higher share price than that prevailing when the warning was issued. Finally, of the 245, 64 per cent delivered one warning, 25 per cent two, 5 per cent three, and 6 per cent four. The conclusion seems inescapable: unless there are special factors or one is taking a very long-term view (and particularly if the company concerned is not strong), then you should sell as soon as possible on the first warning. There are two points relating to my own holdings. As I operate a concentrated portfolio, my individual holdings are fairly large, thus much less marketable and easy to sell quickly. Second, while I am very much focused on small-cap companies, those I hold are generally strong and able to maintain or even increase dividends through difficult periods. Two recent examples come to mind: PZ Cussons and Air Partner. With the former, a large-cap healthcare and consumer goods manufacturer, difficult trading in the UK and Nigeria caused a warning in March that “profits for the full year will fall short of expectations”, resulting in an immediate 16 per cent fall in their shares. However, this is very much a long-term holding on which I still show a substantial profit. I have no qualms about its ability to maintain dividends; thankfully its shares have started to edge back up. Air Partner, a small-cap aviation services group, was rather more complex. It announced on April 3 that an “accounting issue” had been discovered dating back to 2010-11: “a non-cash item that has no bearing on the company’s cash balances”. The suggested total sum in question was £3.3m, and unfortunately this announcement, which advisers said had to be made immediately, raised more questions than answers. The shares plunged — investors being understandably unnerved — halving to 70p over the next few days. I believed this was a substantial overreaction, albeit a nasty blow to confidence, but one the company should be robust enough to withstand. A more reassuring announcement followed on April 11, indicating that the total cumulative impact will not exceed £4m, cash balances were strong and the dividend for the year was actually going to be increased. The shares have now recovered significantly, to around £1. For both PZ Cussons and Air Partner, after taking everything into account, I stayed put. At the end of my Mello presentation I felt compelled to draw investors’ attention to the worrying situation at failed stockbrokers Beaufort Securities, in which, thankfully, I have no involvement. For those of you, like me, who believed our assets with brokers — cash, shares in nominees, Isas and so on — were ringfenced and protected, then think again. Beaufort’s administrators, in this case accountants PwC, can seemingly take administration costs from clients’ funds where they are not covered by the failed firm’s assets. PwC has indicated that its administration could take four years and cost up to an eyebrow-raising £100m. Beaufort had 29,500 clients; the intention is that those with small funds will be repaid relatively soon and those up to £50,000 will be covered by the compensation scheme. Those above that — estimated to be as many as 700 — will bear the brunt of the costs and take the haircut. In the House of Lords I have put down a written question, “To ask her Majesty’s government what is the legal basis that allows administrators of failed stockbroking firms to levy charges on clients’ assets held by those firm”. I await a response. The Beaufort saga is only just starting to unfold. There are clearly serious wider implications here and it may well develop into a cause célèbre.
temmujin: RKBeekeeper Investment Case: Zanaga Iron Ore Company (ZIOC) Wednesday, Sep 06 2017 by Ash Deans 0 comments 3 Every now and then I come across a share that I was not expecting to find and that I’ve never heard anything about before, this is a classic example of one of those shares. Yesterday Zanaga Iron Ore Company popped up on my radar due to a very strange action in the share price and some very large trades moving through a stock that typically sees very few trades per day. This much un-loved stock may actually prove to be one of AIMs biggest movers this year! Let’s start with the fundementals Shares in issue: 279m Free Float: Approx: 75m (27%) Current MCap: £17m 52 Week High: 212p 52 Week Low: 4.6p All-time High: 212p (No dilution since this high!) All-time Low: 1.35p Cash in Bank: Approx $4.5m Zanaga Project Details The bare fact is that the company sits with a mineral resource situated in the Republic of Congo that is one of the world’s largest with up to 6.9bn tonnes and of which 2.1bn is iron ore at a 66% fe. These figures have been produced in compliance with the key JORC code and the iron ore NPV (after financing and net of production and transportation) has been valued at anywhere up to $966m net to ZIOC based upon the current iron price of approx $55/tonne. (If the price of Iron Ore moves back closer to the $80 range then this puts the value up to $1.4bn!!) The project is a 50/50 collaboration with Glencore ($40bn Mcap), with Glencore hold 1 share more than Zanaga to give them control of the project. Zanaga management have been playing the long game this last two years, steadily progressing the project through, in the most important instance, the ratification of its Mining Convention and the lodging of the Environmental Permit that is now VERY OVERDUE and that will be another potential major milestone in the progress towards exploitation of this world class ore resource. Next Catalyst This project is waiting on the Environmental Permit to be obtained, this was expected at the end of the 2016 fiscal year which means it is now several months overdue and can land any day now! Once the permit has been agreed this could spark a chain of events that will send this share price on a crazy journey. With the permit in place I would expect ZIOC to look at selling their stake in the project and due to Glencore’s huge success over the past couple of years they are now in a cash rich position and according to their chairman they are looking to buy out projects that they already have a stake in. “We are looking for opportunities around,” he said, adding Glencore was particularly interested in assets where it already had stakes or partnerships. This would put ZIOC firmly on their radar, the only outstanding issue being the Environmental Permit which should land very soon. My View: What happens next Based on my research I strongly believe that once the Environmental Permit has been obtained ZIOC will look to sell their half of the project, either to their partner Glencore or to another party, potentially a Chinese interest as there have been rumours of interest from China in the past. This is backed up by the share transfer announced on the 3rd April 2017, which I believe was to get everything ready for the sale of the asset. I also see the directors holding a huge percentage of the shares in issue here which is a sign of confidence in my mind that they know what is coming. It would not surprise me if the deal is already in place and the permit being obtained is the catalyst to finalise it. In regards to the price for the sale of the asset, based on it being one of the world’s leading iron ore assets I would be surprised if it were to sell for less than $100m (fire sale price), with my estimate being somewhere between $200m-$300m. When you compare this to the current Mcap of £17m you can see the huge value here! The Mcap appears to only be this low as it is so far off people’s radars at the moment and the overdue nature of the Environmental Permit. Downsides? Are there any risks here? Of course, as with all shares there is a potential risk here that there will be further delay in the Environmental Permit, or that it might not be granted. However, given that all other permits and licenses have been obtained I see this as extremely unlikely. The risk to reward here is huge in my mind. Very low risk, massive reward. Targets The movement in the share price here is going to be driven by the Environmental Permit being obtained… On that news I would expect the share price to move to around 50p per share (600%+ Rise) I would then expect the share price to continue to rise up to the point of the asset sale, which would likely be over £1 per share (1300%+ Rise) Due to the Very Low free float in this share it moves incredibly quickly which will make it very difficult to by once the RNS lands so this is one you want to be in before the news lands. If you wish to check the figures here in this post then I suggest you take a look at the most recent investor presentation here to get an understanding of the size of this asset: hxxp:// The share price at the time of writing this post was 6.125p Note: I have emailed the company to obtain answers to a couple of outstanding questions. I will update this post once I get a reply.
Shangri-LA Asia share price data is direct from the London Stock Exchange
Your Recent History
Register now to watch these stocks streaming on the ADVFN Monitor.

Monitor lets you view up to 110 of your favourite stocks at once and is completely free to use.

By accessing the services available at ADVFN you are agreeing to be bound by ADVFN's Terms & Conditions

P: V: D:20190420 08:13:03