We could not find any results for:
Make sure your spelling is correct or try broadening your search.
Register for Free to get streaming real-time quotes, interactive charts, live options flow, and more.
| Share Name | Share Symbol | Market | Stock Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Shaft Sink | SHFT | London | Ordinary Share |
| Price Change | Price Change % | Share Price | Last Trade
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.00 | 0.00% | 0.625 | 01:00:00 |
| Open Price | Low Price | High Price | Close Price | Previous Close |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.625 |
| Top Posts |
|---|
Posted at 03/9/2016 19:15 by hedgehog 100 I wonder why Muckshifter didn't post this in January, considering how closely he has been following this case ..."Shaft Sinkers and EuroChem agree to settle dispute BY ALLAN SECCOMBE, 21 JANUARY 2016, 06:05 SHAFT Sinkers, once a leading provider of shaft-sinking services to the mining industry, has reached an "amicable" settlement with EuroChem, which was pursuing the company for $917m in a dispute relating to a Russian potash mine. Citing conditions in the agreement, Shaft Sinkers acting CEO and chairman Marius Heyns said on Wednesday he could not offer any additional comment to a statement from EuroChem on the resolution. "EuroChem, Shaft Sinkers, Rossal No126 and International Mineral Resources announce that they have amicably resolved all matters relating to their dispute involving EuroChem’s potash mining project in Russia, and all litigation and arbitration associated therewith has been dismissed or withdrawn," EuroChem said on Monday. The arbitration, which cost Shaft Sinkers more than £10m and nearly destroyed the company, was one of the major factors that led to its South African division being put into business rescue and the termination of its listing in London. Impala Platinum and Royal Bafokeng Platinum cancelled large shaft-sinking contracts with Shaft Sinkers, which slashed staff and sold assets as its difficulties mounted. EuroChem alleged Shaft Sinkers’ grouting technology had failed in the sinking of the shaft at its Gremyachinskoe potash deposit, forcing a suspension of the project. EuroChem, Russia’s largest mineral fertiliser company, launched a claim with the Swiss Chambers of Commerce in Zurich and the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris against the South African arm of London-listed Shaft Sinkers in 2012, seeking compensation for lost profits and to recoup costs. Shaft Sinkers denied the allegations. The claims were ringfenced in the South African subsidiary, which was placed under business rescue. Mr Heyns outlined last year his vision for restoring Shaft Sinkers’ fortunes. The company still has contracts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, India and Kazakhstan, as well as other divisions unaffected by the EuroChem matter." In summary: My position was that Eurochem's SUBSTANTIVE claim against SHFT - for about a billion dollars (the precise amount changed over time) - was unjustified. But that a far lower amount might be. Muckshifter in contrast insisted that the full amount was justified, and that they would pursue it all the way. So what happened? Well, the arbitration disallowed the vast majority of EuroChem's claim, and shortly afterwards the parties settled voluntarily. |
Posted at 02/6/2016 16:27 by hedgehog 100 CAPD is experiencing slightly improved trading conditions this year, which at 35.25p is reflected in its strong share price performance over the last few months.18/05/2016 07:00 UKREG Capital Drilling Limited Q1 Trading Update "Capital Drilling Limited (CAPD:LN), the emerging and developing markets focused drilling company, today provides its trading update for the period 1 January to 17 May 2016. … Financial Highlights -- Payment of final dividend (US2.5cps) for 2015 financial year on May 6, 2016 -- Stable revenue over the traditionally weak 1st quarter, with revenue increasing into Q2 following the commencement of new short term exploration contracts -- Positive cash flow from operational activities maintained; Capital Drilling remains focussed on strict cost management and ongoing capital discipline, generating solid cash flows and a strong balance sheet Trading Update and Outlook Capital Drilling generated revenue of $19.1 million during 1Q 2016, which represents an increase of 1.1% on the previous period (4Q 2015 $18.9 million). The result reflects the continued stabilization of the Company's revenue with the Company's core production contracts contributing over 80% of Group revenue in Q1. The Group saw a slight increase in utilisation over the quarter, reflecting increased activity at the North Mara Gold Mine and new exploration contracts that commenced late in the quarter. ARORP was however marginally softer, primarily due to rigs commencing drilling in late March, therefore generating a marginal revenue contribution for the period, in addition to single shift drilling on a number of exploration programs. Of particular encouragement was the award of multiple exploration contracts during the period, indicating early signs of a measured industry recovery. It is also important to note that the Company was awarded the majority of the exploration contracts it tendered for. This significant achievement can largely be attributed to its Lean Operating Model ("the Model"), which was implemented in 2015. The Model enables Capital Drilling to provide competitive drilling programs on smaller site footprints and the Company has received positive client feedback relating to projects in Botswana, Egypt, Peru and Tanzania. A further operational achievement for the period includes Capital's mobilization of three new blast hole rigs for Acacia Mining's North Mara contract. This contract extends the Company's services at the site, where it was previously providing grade control drilling services only. The two-plus-two year contract with Acacia Mining was announced to the market on 14 December 2015 and increased the total rigs on site to 5. Recent increases in the gold price along with increased capital markets activity in the mining sector give the Group an encouraging outlook. The early signs of recovery in the sector, albeit measured, together with the award of new exploration contracts, reinforce Capital's position for revenue and earnings growth during the balance of 2016 and beyond. The Group continues to benefit from a strong balance sheet and solid cash generation, providing the platform for growth. Commenting on the trading update, Mark Parsons, Chief Executive Officer, said: "While the market continues to be subdued, the small signs of improvement in the tendering markets are encouraging, as is the recent uplift in capital markets activity in the resources sector. While we currently expect trading to remain in line with expectations for the remainder of the year, we are in a strong position to take advantage of opportunities as conditions improve. The large majority of our revenue is secured with long-term contracts, many of which are expected to operate beyond their forecast completion. Our low cost operating model also attracted several new contracts during Q1, supporting our growth strategy. For the balance of the year we will continue to: pursue growth in emerging markets; enhance our ability to offer additional drilling services; and execute strategic partnerships. I am confident we have established a solid platform for future growth, despite the challenges the industry continues to face." …" |
Posted at 03/12/2015 13:07 by muckshifter Another thought, from the information about the arbitration result, is that the flotation of shft might just have been hurried after events at Volgakaly. The BASF report of May 2008 indicating that some of the known bad ground was impenetrable to the intended grout, was finally delivered to the Head of Mine Construction at Eurochem, the man who “took the shft/IMR shilling”, in October 2010, less than three months before shft’s flotation but before the flotation was announced I believe. He apparently put it into a set of files containing more than a million pages, without drawing it to the attention of his bosses. But presumably, it became inevitable at that point that the report would eventually surface, because by then all sorts of other problems were surfacing, with likely serious contractual consequences.The owners of IMR, which was a 48% shareholder in shft after flotation – 54% before, have never imho shown the slightest regard for the laws of any country or any stockmarket regulations as far as I can see, so they may well have found a way to short sell their shareholding while the shares were flying high shortly after flotation without revealing it. Put it this way, I doubt if they suffered any loss from their purchase of shft. Regards. |
Posted at 02/12/2015 18:08 by muckshifter So the legal chess goes on then. My take on the New York action by IMR is that it’s a further attempt to limit the use of evidence from the arbitration in the Dutch Eurochem / IMR trial. Shft (and one thing I found quite surprising was the use of the terms “parent company” and “subsidiaryThe other thing which came across strongly was that the arbitration panel was clearly keen to avoid actions which could possibly conflict with the interests of other judicial authorities. If that is the normal protocol in terms of possible conflict between different court actions, I suspect that IMR are making another attempt to keep evidence provided at the arbitration out of the Dutch action by taking advantage of that protocol. In terms of the allegations of hacking etc. I would think there probably was quite a bit of hacking going on. Both shft and Eurochem accused each other of this sort of espionage, but the tribunal panel didn’t seem to attribute much importance to it, or the allegations of frequent attempts by people working for shft / IMR to intimidate the original shft project manager from the Volgakaly job, who had become a witness for Eurochem. The thing which astonishes me in that story is the pretence about leaks to the press. There were very regular bits of spin given to the press by IMR / Shft, clearly pushing their defence arguments, whereas the Eurochem side normally refused comment. Note also, the proliferation of “weasel words” after the first paragraph of the report. For example “Melnichenko, the lawsuit continues, "has personally, and through companies he owns, been associated with a number of allegedly improper and illegal activities throughout the world," including bribery allegations against executives at a chemical company where Melnichenko sat on the board of directors, and money laundering charges against a bank he founded” really doesn’t mean very much does it. PS. 2/1/16. On November 17-18, 2015, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued a series of decisions rejecting all allegations that the consulting expert hired by EuroChem-VolgaKaliy had engaged in unlawful information-gatherin |
Posted at 02/12/2015 18:05 by muckshifter So the legal chess goes on then. My take on the New York action by IMR is that it’s a further attempt to limit the use of evidence from the arbitration in the Dutch Eurochem / IMR trial. Shft (and one thing I found quite surprising was the use of the terms “parent company” and “subsidiaryThe other thing which came across strongly was that the arbitration panel was clearly keen to avoid actions which could possibly conflict with the interests of other judicial authorities. If that is the normal protocol in terms of possible conflict between different court actions, I suspect that IMR are making another attempt to keep evidence provided at the arbitration out of the Dutch action by taking advantage of that protocol. In terms of the allegations of hacking etc. I would think there probably was quite a bit of hacking going on. Both shft and Eurochem accused each other of this sort of espionage, but the tribunal panel didn’t seem to attribute much importance to it, or the allegations of frequent attempts by people working for shft / IMR to intimidate the original shft project manager from the Volgakaly job, who had become a witness for Eurochem. The thing which astonishes me in that story is the pretence about leaks to the press. There were very regular bits of spin given to the press by IMR / Shft, clearly pushing their defence arguments, whereas the Eurochem side normally refused comment. Note also, the proliferation of “weasel words” after the first paragraph of the report. For example “Melnichenko, the lawsuit continues, "has personally, and through companies he owns, been associated with a number of allegedly improper and illegal activities throughout the world," including bribery allegations against executives at a chemical company where Melnichenko sat on the board of directors, and money laundering charges against a bank he founded” really doesn’t mean very much does it. |
Posted at 30/11/2015 12:04 by muckshifter The person “taking the shft/IMR shilling” was the Eurochem Head of Mine Construction, who seems to have had, in effect, powers similar to “The Engineer” in an ICE contract. This means that he had the power to approve, or withold, approval of sub contractors, thereby preventing or allowing them to be appointed, with similar powers in relation to changes to the programme, methods, senior contractors personnel, etc. It also meant that he signed off the monthly payment certificates for the contractors, and he may well have had powers to give contract time extensions, although a major extension would surely cause questions from above. Clearly he was exactly the right man from the shft /IMR perspective in terms of his powers on Volgakaly, which left the shft /IMR attempted justification of “the arrangement” on the basis that he would be useful in their efforts to expand within the old soviet territories, looking very lame.He seems to have been involved in many of the numerous scams mentioned, but one interesting point was the allegation that he deliberately obstructed Thyssen in their work on the skip shaft, by refusing to approve their subcontractors, etc., while writing emails to his “friend” at shft suggesting that shft should soon have the skip shaft contract, to add to their cage shaft. That might be thought of as an each way bet by him, as one of the ways used to induce a bribe offer, in my experience, is to be deliberately and clearly obstructive with whatever power you wield. By the time the Thyssen contract was prematurely terminated at the end of 2009, perhaps as a result of his efforts, I believe shft were struggling and unable to take advantage of their “lucky opportunity”. In the end Thyssen had to be brought back to sort out both shafts of course. Regards. |
Posted at 27/11/2015 12:06 by muckshifter The copy of the Eurochem statement in post 107 on the “Mining Services Companies – “Picks & Shovels Play” thread”, points out that the “victory&rdquoIt occurred during the period of the shft / Eurochem arbitration hearings, at the end of which, about a week after the IMR case result was announced, much more incriminating evidence would have been available to Eurochem. Eurochem seem to have managed to convince the Dutch court not to release the frozen IMR assets, presumably while discussing the appeal that they lodged and have pending, which puts the well publicised bluster by IMR about suing Eurochem for the losses because of the freeze, in context. Within that same statement, there is an indication that Eurochem think that the bankrupting of shft is yet another fraud. That makes me wonder again about the award to shft of the Kazchrome job, by a subsidiary of IMR/ENRC, just after the Eurochem arbitration hearings. I believe shft, and IMR’s Lawyer, who was permitted to attend the hearings, knew that there was a high probability that the game was up, after those hearings. So perhaps the long delay between the initial announcement on 29th August 13, which said that the contract should be in place by end September 13, and the contract award almost a year later, was an indication of IMR playing their options carefully. They could use the payment of the usual advance to the contractor to help keep shft afloat if they thought they were winning, and if it looked bad, not forgetting that they will have known the truth all along, award the contract to a carefully constructed local subsidiary and ship as much valuable equipment to the Kazchrome site as possible, before the bang. Such a move would be entirely in keeping, imho, with what was revealed at the arbitration. Regards. |
Posted at 27/11/2015 09:48 by muckshifter Now that the issues between Eurochem and shft are just about over, I’m going to post a few, hopefully interesting points about the dispute, for those who were either shareholders, or managed to avoid losses here, despite the relentless pushing of the shares by Hedgehog.Firstly though, it might be worth revisiting the big picture at the time of shft’s flotation. I only read the prospectus after getting drawn into arguements about shft a couple of years after flotation, but the big picture I gained from reading it, which I would have gained after careful reading if I had been thinking of buying at flotation was:- • Shft spent most of its 35 year history under the wing of a big company, It then was sold and operated for a few years as an independent, not very successfully it seems, as it was then bought for a song by IMF. • IMF was a company owned by the same people who originally owned ENRC, and had a reputation, based on regular allegations of corruption, notorious enough to impress the mafia, imho. • Two of the three executive directors of shft, at the time of the expansion and the negotiation / award of the jobs in India and Russia were actually employed by IMR. • Shft’s turnover then increased almost five fold in less than three years. • A very large chunk of the increase in turnover came from the award of the two very large overseas contracts, each of which looked bigger than anything that had been on shft’s books. • There was no evidence in the prospectus of shft carrying out major international projects after leaving the security of being a subsidiary of a big mining conglomerate, which had operations all over the world, before the IMR purchase. • The two major new international contracts were awarded in countries which score very badly in corruption studies. • A working lifetime in major civil engineering meant that I knew that major civils projects are a high risk element of the construction industry; that such work undertaken overseas (in this case outside of shft’s home base in South Africa) carries even higher risks; and that the highest risk element of heavy civils contracting is underground works. But even for those who knew nothing about civils contracting, the clues were there in the prospectus. There were mentions of delays and negotiations to resolve them by achieving extensions of contract period, mentions of earlier disputes, and the description of shft’s opposition within the prospectus revealed that they had almost no independent specialised opposition – there is a reason for that – they don’t survive. To compensate for these negative points, to be gleaned from careful reading of the prospectus, there was lots of positive spin about prospects and two years of good and growing turnover and profit, with indications of good dividends to come. That big picture would have certainly put me off any thoughts of investing in the flotation, but I’m a long term investor not a short term trader. So, how did that big picture work out? One of Hedgehog’s favourites was his contention, posted about fifty times after he attended the 2013 AGM, that “in the unlikely event” that shft lost the arbitration, they could simply bankrupt the contracted subsidiary, and the rest of Shaft Sinkers would continue unaffected. My contention in a couple of posts was that Eurochem are not stupid enough to have contracted with a subsidiary of this asset-less nature. In fact, SHFT were unable to perform this little trick and the whole group went bang, but the arbitration revealed some interesting information. Don’t forget, the date of Hedgehog’s “AGM report” in early June 2013. The trickery employed by that “fine old company” as Hedgehog often called SHFT, and of course their majority shareholder at that time, the “excellent businessmen” as he often called them, from IMR/ENRC, in terms of the use of an asset-less subsidiary company to avoid risk to the parent company was interesting, to me anyway. If you read the initial notification of the commencement of the arbitration process in both Eurochem and Shaft Sinker’s RNSs, both refer to Shaft Sinkers (Pty) Ltd being the company contracted to carry out the work, and therefore the company subjected to the dispute. At some stage, Eurochem must have realised something was up, because they added Rossal into the claim as joint defendent with Shaft Sinkers (Pty) Ltd. In March 2013, SHFT asked the tribunal to give a preliminary ruling on whether or not the tribunal had jurisdiction over Rossal ie. they tried to get Rossal taken out of the arbitration. It turned out that SHFT had gone through the pre-tender qualification process and submission of offer etc. as Shaft Sinkers (Pty) Ltd, the long established “fine old company” which owned the company’s assets, and had even formed and agreed the original small “design” contract between this company and Eurochem VolgaKaliy (which is the subject of another arbitration, I believe – it started as an 11 month contract to be completed in 2008 and ended up still being performed in 2011), before changing the name of the original Rossal to Shaft Sinkers (Pty) Ltd, and vice versa, in secret, in time to sign up the main contract (and perhaps the one in India) using “new” asset-less Shaft Sinkers (Pty) Ltd. Needless to say this little ploy failed, and with that failure went all hope of bankrupting the subsidiary without significant effect. This seems to have been typical of events at Eurochem, and shows what happens, imho, when “a fine old company” is run by “excellent businessmen” from IMR. Regards. |
Posted at 26/11/2015 09:16 by muckshifter Now that the issues between Eurochem and shft are just about over, I’m going to post a few, hopefully interesting points about the dispute, for those who were either shareholders, or managed to avoid losses here, despite the relentless pushing of the shares by Hedgehog.Firstly though, it might be worth revisiting the big picture at the time of shft’s flotation. I only read the prospectus after getting drawn into arguements about shft a couple of years after flotation, but the big picture I gained from reading it, which I would have gained after careful reading if I had been thinking of buying at flotation was:- • Shft spent most of its 35 year history under the wing of a big company, It then was sold and operated for a few years as an independent, not very successfully it seems, as it was then bought for a song by IMR. • IMF was a company owned by the same people who originally owned ENRC, and had a reputation, based on regular allegations of corruption, notorious enough to impress the mafia, imho. • Two of the three executive directors of shft, at the time of the expansion and the negotiation / award of the jobs in India and Russia were actually employed by IMR. • Shft’s turnover then increased almost five fold in less than three years after IMR bought them. • A very large chunk of the increase in turnover came from the award of the two very large overseas contracts, each of which looked bigger than anything that had been on shft’s books. • There was no evidence in the prospectus of shft carrying out major international projects after leaving the security of being a subsidiary of a big mining conglomerate, which had operations all over the world, before the IMR purchase. • The two major new international contracts were awarded in countries which score very badly in corruption studies. • A working lifetime in major civil engineering meant that I knew that major civils projects are a high risk element of the construction industry; that such work undertaken overseas (in this case outside of shft’s home base in South Africa) carries even higher risks; and that the highest risk element of heavy civils contracting is underground works. But even for those who knew nothing about civils contracting, the clues were there in the prospectus. There were mentions of delays and negotiations to resolve them by achieving extensions of contract period, mentions of earlier disputes, and the description of shft’s opposition within the prospectus revealed that they had almost no independent specialised opposition – there is a reason for that – they don’t survive. To compensate for these negative points, to be gleaned from careful reading of the prospectus, there was lots of positive spin about prospects and two years of good and growing turnover and profit, with indications of good dividends to come. That big picture would have certainly put me off any thoughts of investing in the flotation, but I’m a long term investor not a short term trader. So, how did that big picture work out? One of Hedgehog’s favourites was his contention, posted about fifty times after he attended the 2013 AGM, that “in the unlikely event” that shft lost the arbitration, they could simply bankrupt the contracted subsidiary, and the rest of Shaft Sinkers would continue unaffected. My contention in a couple of posts was that Eurochem are not stupid enough to have contracted with a subsidiary of this asset-less nature. In fact, SHFT were unable to perform this little trick and the whole group went bang, but the arbitration revealed some interesting information. Don’t forget, the date of Hedgehog’s “AGM report” in early June 2013. The trickery employed by that “fine old company” as Hedgehog often called SHFT, and of course their majority shareholder at that time, the “excellent businessmen” as he often called them, from IMR/ENRC, in terms of the use of an asset-less subsidiary company to avoid risk to the parent company was interesting, to me anyway. If you read the initial notification of the commencement of the arbitration process in both Eurochem and Shaft Sinker’s RNSs, both refer to Shaft Sinkers (Pty) Ltd being the company contracted to carry out the work, and therefore the company subjected to the dispute. At some stage, Eurochem must have realised something was up, because they added Rossal into the claim as joint defendent with Shaft Sinkers (Pty) Ltd. In March 2013, SHFT asked the tribunal to give a preliminary ruling on whether or not the tribunal had jurisdiction over Rossal ie. they tried to get Rossal taken out of the arbitration. It turned out that SHFT had gone through the pre-tender qualification process and submission of offer etc. as Shaft Sinkers (Pty) Ltd, the long established “fine old company” which owned the company’s assets, and had even formed and agreed the original small “design” contract between this company and Eurochem VolgaKaliy (which is the subject of another arbitration, I believe – it started as an 11 month contract to be completed in 2008 and ended up still being performed in 2011), before changing the name of the original Rossal to Shaft Sinkers (Pty) Ltd, and vice versa, in secret, in time to sign up the main contract (and perhaps the one in India) using “new” asset-less Shaft Sinkers (Pty) Ltd. Needless to say this little ploy failed, and with that failure went all hope of bankrupting the subsidiary without significant effect. This seems to have been typical of events at Eurochem, and shows what happens, imho, when “a fine old company” is run by “excellent businessmen” from IMR. Regards. |
Posted at 14/9/2015 15:18 by muckshifter RCTurner2,Don't know if you remember all that nonsense he posted about the arbitrations and the IMR/Eurochem case, but many of the points I made, and Hedgehog evaded, look to have been vindicated by this: Page 28 of the numbered document pages, under section 26 heading: legal proceedings:- “In October 2012, the Group filed a claim against SHAFT SINKERS (PTY) LTD and ROSSAL 126 (PTY) LIMITED (formerly known as SHAFT SINKERS (PTY) LTD.), (“Shaft Sinkers”), the contractor involved in the construction of the mining shafts at the Gremyachinskoe potash deposit, seeking US$ 800 million compensation for the direct costs and substantial lost profits arising from the delay in commencing potash production, due to the inability of that construction company to fulfil its contractual obligations. Based upon the damages report provided by an independent expert, the amount of the claim was increased up to the US$ 1.06 billion which includes net wasted costs to the amount of US$ 248 million and lost profits in the amount of US$ 812 million. In December 2012, Shaft Sinkers filed a counterclaim against the Group, seeking US$ 44 million without Russian VAT of 18% or US$ 52 million with VAT under the construction contract. In its counterclaim, Shaft Sinkers admits that it will give credit, in respect of any sums awarded to it, for a deduction of US$ 30.6 million in respect of advance payments made by the Group with the result that the maximum net claim from Shaft Sinkers is US$ 14 million. Management believes that this counterclaim is without merit. The above disputes are subject to arbitration as specified in the contract. In March 2013, the Group filed a claim against International Mineral Resources B.V. (“IMR”) which, the Group believes, held a controlling interest in Shaft Sinkers, claiming IMR is responsible for its subsidiary’s actions. In July 2013, the Dutch Court granted EuroChem definitive leave for levying the requested prejudgment attachments against IMR’s Dutch assets, while fixing the amount for which the leave is granted, including interest and cost at EUR 886 million. The court held an in-depth hearing on 21 January 2014 where it considered the arguments and witnesses of both sides. Following that hearing, the court rejected IMR’s request to suspend the case and stated that IMR would not be permitted to submit any additional evidence. On 25 June 2014, the Dutch court denied the Group’s claim against IMR and on 18 September 2014, the Group filed a writ supported by newly discovered additional evidence with the Dutch appeal court. In accordance with the procedure the Group submitted the grievances to the Dutch court on 17 March 2015. IMR has submitted their grievances at 23 June 2015. The date of hearing will be announced after 18 August 2015.” The first paragraph above from page 28 section 26 verifies, imho, my contention of two years ago that the fundamental basis of the main arbitration claim against shft is probably “breach of contract” – failure to fulfil their contractual obligations. It was always my contention that Eurochem knew that they couldn’t get any significant compensation from shft – simply put, under any of the approximately 20 civil engineering Conditions of Contract I’ve been involved with, the $248m direct cost incurred because of the failure to fulfil the contract would become payable by shft, and would bankrupt them. My view was that the arbitration referal was skewed to provide evidence against IMR, who effectively owned and ran shft at the time the contract with Eurochem was formed (they owned 54% and provided two of the three executive directors from their own organisation). I believe that Eurochem, by the time the shft failure to fulfil the contract became clear, and the information about the supressed report and the shft payments to a Eurochem employee were uncovered, were running out of time for taking court action against IMR. As a result, the court action against IMR occurred before Eurochem were able to have “discovery&rdq In terms of the arbitration, although the outcome has not yet been publicly released, I would think that there was very little confidence that they could win in the shft camp, because if they were sure of a win, the banks, financiers and creditors would surely have been prepared to support them while waiting for the huge inflow of cash Hedgehog kept predicting that they would receive, “when they won the case”. And the final adversarial opinion that is now clearly settled was Hedgehog’s prediction, made in about fifty posts, that shft could even lose the arbitration, bankrupt the relevant subsidiary, and carry on as normal, as opposed to my position that in my experience that never happens in the Civil Engineering industry – when a subsidiary goes bang, so does the parent company – which was what happened here. Regards. |
Support: +44 (0) 203 8794 460 | support@advfn.com
By accessing the services available at ADVFN you are agreeing to be bound by ADVFN's Terms & Conditions
Hot Features
Premium
