Share Name Share Symbol Market Type Share ISIN Share Description
Mercantile Port LSE:MPL London Ordinary Share GG00B53M7D91 ORD NPV
  Price Change % Change Share Price Bid Price Offer Price High Price Low Price Open Price Shares Traded Last Trade
  +0.00p +0.00% 6.125p 6.00p 6.25p 6.125p 6.125p 6.125p 100,000 08:00:00
Industry Sector Turnover (m) Profit (m) EPS - Basic PE Ratio Market Cap (m)
Industrial Transportation 0.0 -1.1 -2.0 - 25.36

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Date Time Title Posts
20/2/201818:24Mercantile Ports and Logistics 1,002
13/1/200613:40Montpelier Group820
17/2/200511:08Cash rich MONTPELLIER under priced27
06/2/200517:41what merit in montpelier27
10/12/200408:16Montpellier (MPL) CHEAP. Share price=25.5p,NAV=40-50p,EPS=5-6p,P/E=4-5903

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2018-02-20 10:16:336.001,60096.02O
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Mercantile Port Daily Update: Mercantile Port is listed in the Industrial Transportation sector of the London Stock Exchange with ticker MPL. The last closing price for Mercantile Port was 6.13p.
Mercantile Port has a 4 week average price of 6p and a 12 week average price of 6p.
The 1 year high share price is 9.75p while the 1 year low share price is currently 3.38p.
There are currently 414,017,699 shares in issue and the average daily traded volume is 75,381 shares. The market capitalisation of Mercantile Port is £25,358,584.06.
mount teide: My heartiest thanks to the utterly mendacious management of MPL. In 2016, after establishing beyond all reasonable doubt the management had repeatedly lied via verbal and written statements i, along with two industry colleagues elected to take a hefty loss and placed the proceeds into a quoted company operating in the mobile advertising sector, which has since been named AIM Company of the year in its sector for 2017. Delighted to report the returns have been spectacular, with Taptica's share-price finishing 2017 at an all-time high in a sector with a huge flood tide behind it - the mobile ad sector has quadrupled in size over the last 10 years and is forecast to continue growing in excess of 20% per annum through to 2022. In MPL's share-price terms the Taptica investment is now equivalent to £1.33, with some analysts forecasting MPL's IPO share-price of £2.50 for 2018. Sadly, those taken in by your lies now need a 19 bagger here just to match our Taptica investment performance to date! So certain are we of MPL being a commercial failure because of the appalling behaviour of the management, we are seriously considering breaking a habit of a lifetime and going short MPL in 2018 but, would prefer to see a few more token management buys before we do - to push the share price up so we can maximise our returns.
mount teide: Health Warning: MPL shareholders prone to high blood pressure or suffering with heart problems would do well to avoid reading the latest Interim Results RNS, as it has the potential to instantaneously elevate blood temperature to boiling point. The RNS will probably make you gasp in disbelief and stamp your feet in rage, and quite possibly reduce you to helpless laughter. It will also make you tremble in terror at the realisation that the people in charge of your investments here are, in many respects, totally incompetent at best. Many on ADVFN, with clarity, elegance and wit, have repeatedly laid bare the weaknesses of management clinically and entertainingly, all to little avail - since sadly, where MPL is concerned, it appears Warren Buffet is being proved right - that investors should only buy companies with assets so good, they could be run by an idiot - because one day they will be. For long term MPL shareholders, the Interims RNS will surely make deeply depressing reading and re-inforces why many AIM companies are high risk investments, particularly when they are run by bloated, massively overpaid boards with a penchant for spending £25,000 a month on international travel and luxury hotels. After desperately raising further funds last November from mostly clueless II's who carried out little due diligence worthy of the name, to have just £21m of cash left some 7 months later for so little progress since last June, suggests that unless industrial scale theft is involved, it demonstrates cost control incompetence on a truly breathtaking scale even by this board's previously appalling standards - perhaps best highlighted by the circa £44m of shareholders funds that disappeared without trace prior to the start up of on-site operations. If the latter it highlights spectacularly well just how out of totally out of touch commercially and operationally the senior management really is. Although the impression of whelk stalls and trust has repeatedly reared its head with MPL management over the last few years, what is both amazing and concerning is the fact that, to date not a single board member responsible for the appalling waste of investors money, has paid the price through the loss of employment - they all continue to earn ridiculous salaries for non performance with some gaining promotions. In reality, this RNS is a truly shocking cautionary tale. The cost of terrible operational blunders and massively overpaying senior employees(£millions over the last 7 years), to burn through circa £100m of shareholders cash delivering a 98% fall in share-price, and enormous amounts of damage to investor sentiment and market confidence. The lessons are clear. Cost control is paramount - development wise, play the percentages and don’t under any circumstances put out development cost forecasts or progress timetables that you can't to a very high level of consistency deliver on. Above all, listen, deliberate and ask yourself again and again - 'am i spending this money in shareholders best interests' before signing off any expenditure. Considering the huge funds management initially raised to develop this port terminal, along with the additional debt(£49m) and cash(£37m) raised since, the level of construction progress made to date for the funds 'spent' is totally unacceptable because it is totally implausible in our view for any port development that is not a financial scam. The fact that some shareholders in at the IPO in 2010, now need to see a 'forty bagger' just to get themselves back to break even, demonstrates well the sheer scale of the management incompetence. In companies where Management routinely fail to perform, as Harry Markopolis wisely remarked - "an investors first loss is usually the best loss!" AIOHO/DYOR
mount teide: Fraud can catch anyone out - ask probably the best fund manger in the city over the last two decades Anthony Bolton, who twice invested in foreign based companies when running his hugely successful Fidelity Special Situations Fund only to find years later neither company actually existed. The site photos were either fake or the management had been lying repeatedly via company statements and verbal communication on an industrial scale - further research confirmed the photos were not fake. Considering the enormous commercial success of the JNPT container terminals, the commercial prospects for a specialist break bulk/general cargo /ro-ro terminal equivalent on the Uran Peninsula is extremely sound - as its inevitable most of the 60m tonnes of cargo annually handled through Mumbai's Indira terminals will eventually migrate to the Uran Peninsula WHEN, a Port operator develops the terminal infrastructure and approach channel depths to attract the ship owners and managers currently operating dozens of liner services to the 30 odd Indira Harbour Terminals. Back in 2014, at an 80% discount to the IPO price, although an investment in MPL had the potential to make a good return, it still carried considerable risk, should the inexperienced executive management, take the wrong decision as to the Terminal's specification, optimum use and target traffic. I posted at the outset, that the professional experience of the SPL management left a lot to be desired but, we were prepared to overlook this major red flag on the basis that; The port design and build out were being carried out by reputable marine engineering organisations, that were known to us - Royal Haskoning and ITD Cementation (Royal Haskoning has since disappeared without trace along with their design to be replaced by a low build cost, poorly designed, draft restricted, high operating cost coaster and barge terminal) There was a £57m fixed price contract for the land reclamation, quay construction, approach channel and harbour dredging - the overwhelming majority of the build costs.( build cost to date is £96m for not even 50% completion of the terminal) The port was strategically located from a road, sea and rail perspective to benefit from the inevitable migration of general cargo/ro-ro/break bulk cargoes from the old Indira Harbour terminals to the Uran Peninsula over the decades ahead. (remains the case) We felt, provided: The inexperienced management did nothing more than ensure Royal Haskoning's port design specification and dredging plans for the access channel and berth pocket were adhered to. (they failed to do this, changing the terminal specification to a much lower spec and then having the gall to suggest it would cost at least 40% more to build) The port construction timetable kept on or close to schedule and budget, which should have included a 15% contingency allowance for general cost overruns. (MPL is now in year 5 of construction and still not yet reclaimed 50% of the 200 acres of land) The experienced NEDS did their job and provided quality oversight. (with the share price falling 97% since IPO and an emergency cash raise at a 96% discount to the IPO price - clearly, their huge industry experience and contribution has served shareholders extremely well, as they saunter off into the sunset with £750k of shareholders funds collectively in their pockets) An experienced Ports Sector professional was appointed to run the terminal (shareholders should not hold their breath) Then this new port development would have good prospects of becoming a commercial success - and offer a potentially attractive risk/reward investment at a share-price in the 50p-60p region. Unfortunately, following commencement of the build out, the passage of time slowly revealed the executive management had failed completely to carry out its responsibilities with respect to managing the port development project in a professional and commercial manner. Cash burn - we could not and still cannot in any way reconcile the physical progress made with the totally implausible level of cash burn - it simply makes no sense.(which is why no port operator was prepared to offer an alternative route to the massive shareholder dilution of the £37m cash raise at a 96% discount to the IPO price, by taking a financial interest in the project). Construction timetable - every construction progress target set by management subsequently proved to be a work of fiction. Materially important claims were made by management in RNS that were subsequently shown to be untrue - laughably, in some instances by subsequent photographic and written statements unwittingly provided by the clueless, hugely incompetent executive management. (why did the NEDS let them do this? - since both NED's have done a runner after pocketing £750k between them during the last 7 years for doing lord knows what, shareholders will probably now never know!) The executive chairman having a recent history of settling one high level investigation by regulatory authorities for insider dealing via an out of court settlement made highly concerning reading. Then to be the subject of writs for allegedly siphoning off tens of £millions of shareholders funds out of a company he had executive responsibility for, into companies owned by him and his family made extremely disturbing reading, considering our inability to reconcile the very high level of cash burn in MPL with the shocking pace of construction progress. Once this news became public knowledge, together with the fact Gandhi failed to step down immediately to clear his name, in our opinion, this alone made the company completely un-investible. AIOHO/DYOR
mount teide: SPL/MPL - another example of why it's important for investors to NEVER again trust a management once their credibility has been seriously called into question, never mind their honesty. Back in JAN 2013 - after SPL's share price had fallen over 60% some 2.5 years post IPO, and well past the date white collar criminal Executive CHAIRMAN Nikhil Gandhi told shareholders to expect first revenues from the Port Facility, the management were finally forced to COME CLEAN and admit the COMPANY WAS STILL YET TO SECURE THE VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL CONSENTS TO ENABLE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PORT TO BEGIN - an SPL shareholder who shall remain nameless made the following post(my comments with the benefit of some further hindsight are in brackets): Ten reasons to invest in SKIL Ports & Logistics? 1. Approx 140p a share cash (80% rupee/20% sterling). Share price is 106p. Low burn rate at the moment (FAMOUS LAST WORDS!) 2. Minutes confirming final approval to commence construction expected very soon. Days not weeks? (IT WOULD BE ANOTHER TWO YEARS BEFORE THE FIRST AGGREGATE TRUCK WAS DRIVEN ONTO THE SITE TO COMMENCE LAND RECLAMATION WORK) 3. Board including two brits with shipping pedigree (ABP Ports CEO is one!) - (AND WHAT A MARVELLOUS JOB OF OVERSIGHT THEY HAVE DONE FOR £300K AND COUNTING OF SHAREHOLDERS FUNDS EACH!) 4. SKIL have done this before, which gives them an edge. Pipavav is listed on the Indian stockmarket. Nikhil Gandhi is very well connected. The new port project looks much less complicated - thus the quick construction. (HALL & OATES SAID - SOME THINGS ARE BETTER LEFT UNSAID - HOW RIGHT THEY WERE!) 5. Working 24/7, construction should be finished by end of 2013 and generating income by the end of the summer. Live streaming of progress likely to be available on their webite by March. (OH DEAR! - SEE POINT 4 - BIZARRELY, SHAREHOLDERS HIRED LIGHT AIRCRAFT FLYING OVER THE SITE FAILED TO PICK ANY OF THIS UP) 6. The nearest port (JNPT) is at 110% capacity so demand is clearly there locally.Ports up and down the West Coast are full of ships awaiting entry into Mumbai. (JNPT RESPONDED BY DOUBLING THE CAPACITY OF THE CONTAINER PORT BEFORE THE LITTLE BARGE AND COASTER TERMINAL AT KARANJA IS EVEN HALF BUILT!) 7. When launched at 250p in 2010, Cenkos gave a price target of 750p - has this investment case changed at all? ( UNDERSTATEMENT OF THE DECADE! - AT 4P THE CURRENT MARKET CAP IS £16M - CENKOS'S 'PRESCIENT' PRICE TARGET WOULD BE EQUIVALENT TODAY TO A MARKET CAP OF £3bn, or £270m pre dilution - BOTH ARE UTTERLY RIDICULOUS), 8. India has only 8% of India's port capacity but both economies still growing so long term demand for port capacity looks obvious. (READS LIKE ANOTHER SLICK, CAREFULLY CRAFTED MPL RNS!) 9. Indian government plan to spend $1 trillion on infrastructure from 2012-2017. No sign of this yet but in the first few weeks of 2013,we have seen a commitment - both nationally and locally to get things moving. (VERY LITTLE SIGN OF IT 5 YEARS LATER - MOST INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT HAS BEEN FUNDED BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR) 10. A small free float so any good news and there is a chance of a very sharp rally as investors wake up to the distressed valuation and market makers are caught short of stock. (FUNNILY ENOUGH IN THE 7 YEARS SINCE IPO, THE LAST THING MM'S HAVE HAD TO WORRY ABOUT IS FINDING THEMSELVES SHORT OF STOCK!) NOW WE GET TO THE INTERESTING BIT - IF ONLY THIS INVESTOR HAD ACTED ON HIS OWN JUDGEMENT/OBSERVATIONS/COMMENTS: To counter this bull case, debt will be required (£40m?) to finish the job. (£48M IN FACT - OF WHICH £17M PLUS £24M OF SHAREHOLDERS CASH DISAPPEARED INTO THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT ETHER BEFORE A SINGLE AGGREGATE TRUCK HAD SET A WHEEL ON THE SITE TO BE DEVELOPED!) I don't see a problem here but it does add to uncertainty and makes the investment speculative. (A VISIT TO SUPERSAVERS MAY BE IN ORDER BECAUSE TO MOST INVESTORS AND THE FRAUD SQUAD A £17M/LOAN + £24M IN CASH DISAPPEARING BEFORE ANY WORK ON SITE BEGAN IS THE LAST THING PROFESSIONAL INVESTORS IN THE PORTS SECTOR WOULD EXPECT TO SEE FROM PROFESSIONAL PORT MANAGEMENT. Currency risk also a factor although I have seen predictions of a 10% rally in the rupee in 2013 so it might work in our favour. (CURRENCY RISK PROVED TO BE THE LEAST OF SHAREHOLDERS WORRIES AT THE RATE THIS LOT WERE BURNING THROUGH IT!) The crebility of management has also been damaged by the long delays - can they really still build the port so quickly and to budget? Will they keep investors better informed going forward? (WHY OH WHY DID YOU NOT ACT ON YOUR EXCELLENT OBSERVATIONS, AFTER IT BECAME OBVIOUS WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF POSTING THESE COMMENTS THAT NOTHING HAD CHANGED!) For readers information, following this post, it was almost two years to the day and after circa £44m of cash 'burn' and a pack of lies masquerading as RNS statements THROUGHOUT 2014, before a truck finally dumped the first AGGREGATE load on the foreshore at Karanja! AND THEN THE REAL PROBLEMS STARTED FOR SHAREHOLDERS! The rest as they say is HISTORY - yet after all this, it simply beggared belief that the clueless, due diligence and common sense averse II's WOULD STUN PORT AND SHIPPING INDUSTRY PROFESSIONALS, BY THROWING ANOTHER £30m OF THEIR INVESTORS RETIREMENT FUNDS ONTO THE RAGING, COMPLETELY OUT OF CONTROL KARANJA BONFIRE. AIMHO/DYOR
mount teide: British Pensions Funds would have paid £110k at IPO for a shareholding the size of that 44k that went through earlier today. Its now worth £1.8k! Barely 2 days of management's average travelling expenses over the last seven years - which have totalled £2m since IPO; during which they have destroyed shareholder value on an almost unprecedented scale, reducing the share price from 250p to 4.25p. For which shareholders have not seen resignations but, Board promotions! The management were so embarrassed about shareholders publicising the scandal of their travelling and 5 star hotel expenses, they stopped reporting that information in the latest set of prelims, presumably because it has continued to rise and they want to keep the little perk of office and continue living in the lifestyle they have become accustomed to at shareholders expense. Some more details have emerged with respect to Sunny Varkey, the billionaire education entrepreneur and philanthropist, and Unesco Goodwill Ambassador serving writs on former Everonn Education directors Nikhil Gandhi and P Kishore(MD) in connection with allegedly carrying out fraudulent transactions and siphoning off huge sums of funds from Everonn, of as much as £12m: MPL Executive Chairman Gandhi's immediate family have been implicated in the alleged fraud and cases filed against them too. The matter is now being investigated by the Serious Crime Branch of the Special Fraud Office following a formal complaint from a livid Sunny. Following Sunny's takeover of Everonn Education, his accountants found the company's books to be a work of fiction and the accounts manipulated. Talking of works of fiction - despite TWO reminders to the NOMAD, we are still to see any developments with respect to the Shareholders Circular to raise £37m being in breach of the Port Operating Concession: Here is the latest reminder to the Head of Compliance at the Nomad Cenkos: Good afternoon Ms Wood, Thank you for the long overdue clarification by way of RNS, of the situation with respect to Mr N Gandhi’s subscription shares. Although, in view of Grant Thornton’s involvement as Mercantile’s auditors, it would have been a little more re-assuring if the RNS had also included confirmation that the funds had actually been received in the Guernsey bank account, as stated in the Jan 2017 RNS. You may recall Grant Thornton audited AIM fraud Globo's accounts. Shortly after Globo issued an audited financial statement cheerfully claiming the Company had circa £100m on deposit, it proved to be a total fabrication. In light of this, i recently wrote to Grant Thornton asking what methodology they use, to ensure cash funds claimed by the management of Companies like Mercantile, that they get paid extremely well to audit, are actually in the bank accounts. I received the following rather unhelpful reply: Thank you for your email enquiry. We owe a duty of confidentiality to our client and cannot discuss any details relating to the client about which you are seeking information. Your sincerely For and on behalf of Grant Thornton (UK) LLP You will recall i also sent you the following email message on 16 June 2017: 'There is an Risk Factor detailed in the IPO document, concerning a condition of the Karanja Port Operating Dead of Lease, which has been breached by the management when they elected to proceed with the £37m cash raise in October 2016. For which we are yet to find a Company statement confirming this matter has been satisfactorily dealt with, in order to protect shareholders interests.' 'IPO - Risk Factors Reliance on SKIL as the promoter of the Project: 'It is a condition of the Deed of Lease that SKIL, KIPL and their respective promoters and affiliates retain a minimum 26%, directly or indirectly, in the Project (the ‘‘Minimum Threshold’R17;). If that interest is not maintained the MMB may seek to terminate the Deed of Lease, which would have a material adverse effect on the Group’s business, financial condition and results of operations, as well as acting as a potential deterrent to potential acquirers of the Company.' 'The Board believes it is unlikely that the Minimum Threshold will be breached in the foreseeable future. In the event that a transaction was proposed in the future that would be likely to cause a breach of the Minimum Threshold, the Board would have to determine whether or not to proceed with such a transaction, taking into account all of the circumstances at that time. The Board believes that it may be possible to reach agreement with the MMB in the future with respect to reducing or eliminating the Minimum Threshold ONCE THE PROJECT HAS BEEN DEVELOPED AND IS OPERATIONAL,ALTHOUGH THERE CAN BE NO ASSURANCE THAT ANY SUCH AGREEMENT WILL BE REACHED.' Incredibly, the breach was news to the your account representative Stephen Keys when i first brought it to his attention many, many months ago. Yet, as detailed in the IPO documentation, despite the breach carrying the risk of loss of the Operating Concession and, the total loss of all shareholder value, it is simply extraordinary that some 8 months later, after completely overlooking its importance and significance in the production of the Shareholders Circular to raise £37m in October 2016, for which Cenkos were extremely well remunerated, shareholders are still yet to see an appropriate response from the Nomad/Company, in line with their duties and responsibilities with respect to the UK Corporate Governance Code and AIM Rules for Nominated Advisors. I would politely remind Cenkos that during this period, the market capitalisation of Mercantile Ports & Logistics has dropped by some 60% - do you think that shareholders might consider the lack of regulatory oversight from the Nomad in this connection, despite it being repeatedly brought to its attention, may have been a contributing factor in the appalling loss of shareholder value since October 2016 and indeed, at other times since IPO, where a lack of due diligence by the Nomad has resulted in RNS, Financial Statements and Shareholders Circulars being issued by Mercantile, that the late Alan Clarke MP might, with the benefit of hindsight, describe as being extremely ‘economical with the actualite’. Kind regards, AIOHO/DYOR
mount teide: Looks like M&G reduced on Friday - remarkable that the share-price fell 98% from IPO and 55% from the recent placing, before it dawned on them that MPL may not be similar to 99% of the Ports Sector - i.e. safe, well managed, dividend paying, low-risk infrastructure asset investments. If they had stuck their money in low risk Dubai Ports World (DPW) in 2010, instead of being 98% down here, they would have received nearly 30% of their original investment back in dividends and seen their capital appreciate 225%. No investment advice intended or offered. AIOHO/DYOR Seems MPL's II's not only failed to carry out any Due Diligence worthy of the name - but also failed to heed any of Warren Buffet's stock market basic warnings for beginners: “Never invest in a business you don't understand.” particularly if you fail to carry out any quality due diligence “In the business world, the rearview mirror is always clearer than the windshield.” MPL's failure to hit any progress targets/timelines whatsoever should have had II's and PI's stampeding for the exit doors long ago or demanding wholesale changes to the Board - not supporting Shareholders Circulars to raise another £37m! “It’s far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price.” Just because the MPL share-price had dropped 95%, it did not necessarily make a £30m placing cheap. "If a business does well, the stock eventually follows.” MPL never achieved a single construction target or timeline - share-price is down 98%. "I try to buy stock in businesses that an idiot can run. Because sooner or later, one will.” Uniquely, MPL's II's invested in a business run by an entire executive management of idiots. Led by an Executive Chairman charged with securities fraud and served with writs alleging he stole tens of £millions from another company he had executive responsibility for. “If you are in a poker game and after 20 minutes you don't know who the patsy is, then you’re the patsy." Correct - particularly, if it takes 7 years of investing in MPL and losing 98% for you to work out who the mug is! “Beware of geeks bearing formulas.” Correct - or more precisely, beware of MPL Executives bearing IPO Documents and Shareholders Circulars! Moral of the story - always carry out plenty of post investment due diligence - and if you realise you have made a mistake, get out sooner rather than later - as these situations rarely change and end happily! AIOHO/DYOR
mount teide: Looking forward to the Preliminary results which i understand are imminent. Apparently, the Executive 'Management' and their advisors have been working on them for a month. Since the lot of them have not got any senior level Port or Shipping Industry operating experience between them, the results should be treated with extreme caution for investment purposes. Particularly, after last year, where they miraculously managed to lose and find £16.6m between mid June 2016 and the end of June 2016, despite saying in the mid June Prelims that the cash burn and debt drawdown had been as expected during the previous 6 months. Sadly, the market had to wait until the September Interims for this horrendous cash burn forecasting error to be revealed and amended! In the meantime what shareholders prospective and existing, should take no notice of with regard to the port asset they would be buying into with an investment in this company, is the Website front page pictorial of the port layout design of their only asset under construction, or the '1,000m cargo handling quay and ship to shore cranes' in the accompanying text detailing the berth/cargo handling equipment specification. Shareholders, will i'm sure be looking forward to confirmation, written and photographic, that the expected Project progress targets detailed in the Shareholders Circular dated 31 October 2016 to raise an additional £37m have been met, after the company's appalling history of don delivery, which has seen the share price fall from 250p at IPO to 6.5p today. Shareholders Circular: Subject to the Company being able to secure the Funding by the end of the first quarter of 2017, the Company is working to the following timetable in order to achieve full operational completion of the Facility by the end of the third quarter of 2017: Expected Progress targets: By the end of January 2017 the Company expects to have: • completed the dredging requirement; • reclaimed 70%(140 Acres) of the land; • constructed two berths, one of which will be capable of receiving vessels. Actual Progress Achieved: * APPROACH CHANNEL & BERTH DREDGING STOPPED DURING H2/2017 MONSOON SEASON * ZERO LAND RECLAMATION PROGRESS - same 75 acres as reported IN June 2016 * CONSTRUCTED ZERO BERTHS - No berth piling added since the 100m OF Sept 2016 By the end of the Q1/2017 the Company expects to have: • reclaimed 90%(180 acres) of land • constructed four berths, three capable of receiving vessels • entered into commercial agreements with end users. Actual Progress: * RECLAIMED 79 ACRES OF LAND - JUST 4% OF THE 105 ACRE TARGET IN 9 MONTHS * CONSTRUCTED ZERO BERTHS - ADDED JUST A FURTHER 30M of piling SINCE Sept 2016 * NO SIGNED AGREEMENTS - A SINGLE MOU WITH AN OILFIELD MAINTENANCE COMPANY By the end of the Q2/2017 the Company expects to have: • completed the balance of reclamation work; • carried out further ground improvement works; • constructed the remaining berths, four will be capable of receiving vessels • completed the sourcing of all necessary equipment. So in the Preliminary Results shareholders should look out for written confirmation of the following, accompanied by website photo's: 200 ACRES OF LAND RECLAMATION BERTH PILING COMPLETE - 6 BERTHS CONSTRUCTED - 4 READY TO RECEIVE VESSELS. ALL PORT CARGO HANDLING EQUIPMENT SOURCED The market is always supremely confident of making predictions where MPL is concerned, because of the management's perfect track record of proving their own progress targets to be nothing more than a work of complete fiction. We predicted that at best 20% of the progress the management expected to achieve by end of Jan 2017 would be made - sadly, even we were shocked to find it was Zero for land reclamation, and about 10% for berth piling. Our prediction for end of Q2/2017 is: 100 acres of land reclaimed - just 25 acres added in 12 months Zero berths complete - 200m of jetty piling only - 140m added in 12 months Zero port cargo handling equipment on site. This would at best represent around 20% of the expected target for land reclamation and berth piling/construction, while a circa £6.4m a year debt interest payment demand is running! As mentioned previously, the figure to look out for will be the cash burn since the June 2016 Preliminaries and September 2016 Interims. The Management travelling expenses should also prove interesting - we have a book going on whether it will be above or below £300k/year or £25k a month. The smart money is on it being above, unless of course they have been able to convince their auditors Grant Thornton(of the £100m Globo AIM fraud fame!), that a decent chunk could be shovelled into the huge general administrative costs. AIOHO/DYOR
mount teide: Readers will be aware that as a ITD Cementation shareholder i have written to ITD on three occasions requesting information as to the current status of the £57m MPL Karanja Contract. Particularly since ITD is now a shareholder in MPL and a beneficiary of considerable additional revenue from the project outside of the original contract specification. Still yet to receive an acknowledgement never mind a reply! It is interesting to note that on the ITD website under 'Marine Structures' there is very detailed information of all the existing Major contracts currently under construction or recently completed, many with photographs. Karanja Port - despite being of greater contact value than a considerable number of the Major Projects detailed on the website, is conspicuous by its absence! One ITD Project that may be of interest to MPL shareholders is the CONTAINER TERMINAL AT MUNDRA FOR ADANI PORT. It has a fixed quay wall and terminal infrastructure very similar to what MPL shareholders were expecting at see at Karanja, albeit with an engineering specification an order of magnitude greater. Since it is the only port on the Indian West coast capable of handling the latest generation of containerships, which have deadweights in excess of 160,000 tonnes. (A cargo capacity some 40 times larger than the largest vessel now expected to be handled at Karanja). hTTp:// The Adani Port Container Terminal has a super-heavyweight specification quay of length 713m, with a width of 30m and minimum draft of 17.5m for handling ultra large container ships, with lengths in excess of 400m and beam of 60m. Ships so large even the JNPT terminals are unable to handle them due to draft restrictions in the approach channel that would need an estimated £700m of dredging to deepen the channel by a further 2m to handle these ships. To put the size of these vessels and the engineering specification of the quay and port facilities to handle them in some perspective: the largest ships capable of directly using the Karanja facility are 4,000 deadweight tonne dry bulk coasters - Adani Port's target containerships are so large they would be able to carry on board up to eight of these little coasters as deck cargo! Adani Port has 80 acres of reclaimed hardstanding, heavily re-inforced to enable 5 high stacking of heavyweight deep sea containers and handling within the storage compound using twelve 41 tonne high capacity container gantry cranes. The port's annual container design capacity is more than twice that of Karanja at 1.4m TEU's. It was recently completed 3 months ahead of schedule - a remarkable achievement since it started construction some considerable time after Karanja. Total cost? - try £152m MPL's management's latest estimated cost of Karanja Terminal to provide a 360m lightweight open jetty for small coasters serviced by a yet be be verified -3.5m below CD access channel and, probably around 150 acres of reclaimed land, strengthened to a specification considerably below that at Adani - £148m. A good example of why the MPL share-price has fallen from 250p to 6.5p for a project that according to management's cash burn forecasts, has a £6.4m per annum bank debt interest payment now running, with no revenue and less than half the heavily scaled back berth piling and land reclamation work completed.
mount teide: As mentioned in earlier posts, we are still to receive a reply to correspondence requesting technical information from both ITD(as a shareholder) and the MMB. It would seem that Indian companies and Government regulatory authorities are either very, very slow at responding or are a very 'close knit' family. Likewise, we have emailed SPL/MPL/Jay/Pavan previously requesting clarification on a number of matters, many previously mentioned in RNS statements, with a similar result, forcing us to go through the highly defensive NOMAD representative to secure access to the information. A few examples of the obfuscation used by MPL management to render any attempt to monitor on-site construction progress totally impossible. Incredibly, we have seen more site update photographs provided by Google Earth since June 2016, than the SINGLE one made available by MPL during the last 11 months - from a management who stated that now the build out was progressing with a fully mobilised workforce, they will keep the market regularly updated. Well, the cynic might suggest they did in a way with 8 photographic site updates in 6 months before the surprise notification of a £37m cash raise for a company that the Board stated 'was not cash strapped'. RNS - 16th June 2016 - 58 Piles have been laid for the construction of the jetty RNS - 22nd Sept 2016 - Piling for 100 meters of jetty completed RNS - 13th Mar 2017 - Piling for approx 40% of final quay length completed I defy anyone regardless of technical knowledge and experience to determine what the actual progress has been from that information; designed clearly make any attempt to hold management accountable for the abject failure to get remotely near the hugely misleading progress targets that went in the Shareholders Circular date 31 October 2016 and, the passage of time has shown to be a complete work of fiction - most notably that the land reclamation and quay piling had continued without material interruption since October 2015, and the land reclamation and quay piling construction progress targets post June 2016 were many multiples of anything previously achieved. Likewise, an attempt to conceal that just 4 acres of land reclamation had occurred against a Shareholders Circular to raise £37m that stated an expected target of 105 additional acres, can be seen in the few RNS statements updating the market as to the progress achieved. A clear attempt to mix hectares and acres to complicate matters for those not technically inclined and NO attempt to provide an update as to the progress achieved against the expected targets given to the market in the RNS statements. RNS - 16th June 2016 - 30 hectares to be completed by the end June RNS - 22nd Sept 2016 - 30 hectares of reclamation now complete RNS - 13th Mar 2016 - 79 acres(40%) of overall reclamation target achieved. MPL management should stop issuing construction progress targets since they serve no purpose other than to routinely publicise their total incompetence and ineffectiveness and, reduce their shareholders to nothing more than a laughing stock. As always, the market has 20 - 20 vision and has no trouble seeing the management for what they are: reducing the share-price from 250p to a staggering 7.65p for what is the build out of a largely fixed price real estate construction project. AIOHO/DYOR
mount teide: Firstly, apologies for the long post. Interestingly, James Sutcliffe currently markets himself as a Business Transformation Non Executive Director in the Ports Sector. 'As a natural leader he is happy to represent major business and handle media and difficult situations diplomatically. As a Board Director he is particularly focused on improving Corporate Governance, effective financial reporting and achieving business strategies within the companies he works for.' How's that working out for SPL/MPL shareholders? With the share-price having lost 97% of its value since James Sutcliffe joined the board pre IPO, and the company massively diluting shareholders in November 2016 by raising another £37m of funds at an eye-watering 96% discount to the IPO price to 'finance'(and some would use that word in its loosest possible sense), the completion of the construction of a small, shallow water Port Terminal asset, to the Boards 'preferred' specification, James Sutcliffe's industry experience and expertise is clearly proving of huge value to shareholders in looking after their investment interests. Shareholders were told the reason for the additional £37 million of funds was to complete the build out of the Port Terminal to the 'preferred' specification of the Directors. Consequently, it would have been ENTIRELY REASONABLE for shareholders to assume that a request for further massive additional funds totalling around 55% of that raised at IPO together with the £49m of bank debt also raised for the project, would have resulted in the Directors 'preferred' specification delivering a higher specification to that contained in the IPO documentation and extremely detailed 2013 Arden Partners BUY Note and, what went out in the Tender Documentation to secure bids from the contractor/s they selected to approach to build the Port Terminal. In easy to understand non sector specialist terms, what shareholders originally were sold at IPO was a 'BMW 5 series' specification small port. The Directors then said in October 2016 Shareholders Placing and Open Offer documents, that we are not in any way cash strapped but by providing us with another £37m, we would be able to complete the construction to our 'preferred' specification - so shareholders were in effect being asked to now fund a BMW M5 standard Port terminal, the Directors preferred specification. The reality of the shameless revised port terminal specification drawn out under questioning by those in attendance at last weeks meeting(i understand some II's may have been made aware of this news some weeks ago, without necessarily understanding its full implications on their investment imho), is that shareholders were clearly misled in the October 2016 additional fund raise. Since they will not now be getting a shiny new BMW M5 Port Terminal, nor even a BMW 5 Series model, but if they are lucky a bog standard 1 Series Bread Van model with a price tag of TWO BMW M5's after taking in the impact of the bank debt. I have spoken at length to James Sutcliffe twice in the last three years by telephone, and on each occasion, i was telling him facts about the build out at Karanja(or lack of it!), he should have known about but was completely unaware of. Also, i suggested he speaks to the NOMAD because SPL/MPL has issued RNS statements( i provided examples), that evidence gathered by shareholders often at some considerable financial cost(hiring light aircraft to take photos over the site) have proved, and i'll be generous, to be wildly inaccurate at best, although the less charitable might consider 'wilful deception' to be a more accurate description. The situation with regard to the accuracy of the Official Market Statements has clearly not improved because if the NOMAD had travelled to India(which i understand they did late last year) to work with management to prepare the Documentation for the Shareholders Circular for the 31 October 2016 Placing and Open Offer, then at the very least, they should have checked that what management were claiming and went in that documentation(that the build out has continued without material interruption since October 2015) was in fact true. The NOMAD clearly failed to do this simple check, because if they had carried out some basic due diligence, they would have discovered that NO Land reclamation work had been carried out during the four months since the mid June 2016 update, when the Market was given news that 75 acres were now reclaimed. As a consequence, the expected build out progress targets that went into the Shareholders Circular were not only many multiples of the pace of progress previously achieved, but in fact were a work of complete fiction because NO reclamation work was actually going on, and by the Company's own written and photographic updates would not commence again until Jan 2017. June 2016 - company state 75 acres of land reclaimed Oct 2016 - company say work has continued without material interruption since Oct 2015. And as a consequence state the following expected progress targets in the documentation to raise £37m of additional funds: OUTLOOK - 'the Directors believe that the Company has sufficient resources to finance the continued construction of the Facility, WITHOUT DELAY, through to the end of the first quarter of 2017' By the end of January 2017 the Company expects to have: • completed the dredging requirement; • reclaimed 70 per cent. of the land(140 acres); and • constructed two berths, one of which will be capable of receiving vessels. 'By the end of the first quarter of 2017 the Company expects to have: • reclaimed 90 per cent. of the land; (180 acres) • constructed four berths, three of which will be capable of receiving vessels; and • entered into commercial agreements with end users.' Indeed, such was the Directors confidence that the build out was on track they stated in the Shareholders Fund Raising Circular (just two months from year end)that: '...the Directors expect that the Facility will be capable of receiving vessels by the end of this year(2016)....' Using information subsequently provided by the Company/Nomad, a comparison of the statements made above with reality, make sobering reading: Land Reclamation: June 2016 - 75 acres of land reclaimed Jan 2017 - expects to have reclaimed 140 acres - actual result 75 acres(ZERO progress for 6 months because NO land reclamation had been carried out since June 2016 - an easily verifiable fact that the Nomad could have checked in October 2016 when preparing the fund raising circular) Mar 2017 - expected to have reclaimed 180 acres - actual result 79 acres( 4 acres in 9 months!) Piling/Berths June 2016 - 58 piles(65m) via written update Sept 2016 - 100 piles (100m) via written update Jan 2017 - 68 piles (80m) via website photo update (clearly they overstated Sept position) Around 10 jetty piles were driven between June and Sept 2016, and then work stopped until Jan 2017, against the target of the completion of the construction of two berths! Land reclaimed March 2017 - 79 acres (against target of 180 acres) Apparently, despite claiming to have worked continuously without material interruption, during the last 9 months they achieved the grand total of just 5% of the progress expected in the circular to raise an additional £37m of funds! Can't wait to see the end of 2016 cash position and bank debt left to draw down - we should see that no later than the Prelims - it should make fascinating reading, since hardly any work on site occurred in H2/2016. A Google Earth image update for the end of Feb 2017, reveals just 104 jetty piles laid/ around 100m of progress, against a target of four berths complete by the end of Mar 2017. We calculate, if the progress achieved since Jan 2017 is maintained it would suggest the heavily scaled back 400m of jetty will still not see piling completed before H2/2018 at the earliest and, this assumes work through the next two monsoon seasons is maintained at the same rate of progress as during the current dry season, something that has not remotely been the case since construction eventually got started some three years ago, after four years of delays securing the necessary approvals. Some further thoughts: Contrary to what the Board was claiming, I posted on the SPL thread immediately after reading and discussing with industry colleagues, the 31 October 2016 Shareholders Circular to raise an additional £37m of funds: 'It would not suprise me, that for around £150m, all shareholders will see before the money again runs out, is around 300m-400m of berths with 4.5m of water availability, and around 75-100 acres of reclaimed land - something that could probably be built today to a very high spec for £40-50m.' The passage of time and news of the revised terminal specification suggests, this is likely to prove very close to what shareholders may see at best - along with its dire shareholder investment implications. MPL shareholders may be aware that Singapore has one of the three largest deep sea container ports in the world(currently three times the size of all the JNPT terminals combined). The port of Singapore has been enlarging its Port land area for decades and their current land reclamation costs are around US$25/sqm - US$100,000/acre. If Singapore can reclaim 200 acres of coastal land for around £25m today(including buying in the sand land fill material) - how come SPL need £150m to: Reclaim what will now be much less than 200 acres, and Construct a 400m shallow water piled jetty to handle barges and small coasters, and Provide basic port infrastructure facilities and cargo handling equipment. This strongly suggests(not for the first time) the MPL executive management are at best breathtakingly incompetent and totally out of their depth to a level that simply beggars belief. It also brings into question what due diligence the Nomad routinely carry's out to check the accuracy of the content of the statements issued to the market; in particular the Oct 2016 Fund Raising Documentation. As i understand it, the person responsible at the Nomad for the MPL account has no shipping/ports sector professional qualifications or operational experience and, only very limited industry knowledge, if my judgement of the numerous telephone discussions i've had with him are a reliable guide. Also, he seemed to find it highly amusing(before quickly correcting himself), that one PI i know, who lost £3m in the Globo AIM fraud, as a result of relying on Grant Thornton(MPL's auditors), allegedly checking and being satisfied that Globo had £100m of cash in the bank, only for the market to find out a short while afterwards, that the figure was in fact barely £100 not £100m, as a result of criminal activity on an industrial scale by the CEO, who turned out to be nothing more than a first class villain! Financially, as previously stated, the cash burn for this port development project was making very little sense. Following the £37m fund raise and shocking news of the considerably scaled down terminal specification for the project, it now makes absolutely NO SENSE whatsoever. AIOHO/DYOR
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