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Share Name Share Symbol Market Type Share ISIN Share Description
Local Shop. LSE:LSR London Ordinary Share GB00B1VS7G47 ORD 20P
  Price Change % Change Share Price Shares Traded Last Trade
  +0.00p +0.00% 27.00p 0 05:00:01
Bid Price Offer Price High Price Low Price Open Price
26.20p 27.80p - - -
Industry Sector Turnover (m) Profit (m) EPS - Basic PE Ratio Market Cap (m)
Real Estate Investment Trusts -7.15 -8.67 22.3

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Local Shop. (LSR) Discussions and Chat

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Date Time Title Posts
12/12/201819:54LOCAL SHOPPING REIT :::: Corner shops, or more?2,959
20/2/201512:47*** LSR ***-
29/9/200814:04up 42%3

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Local Shop. (LSR) Most Recent Trades

Trade Time Trade Price Trade Size Trade Value Trade Type
2018-12-13 15:47:2327.80836232.41AT
2018-12-13 15:46:4126.2010,0002,620.00AT
2018-12-13 15:43:2326.1110,0002,611.31O
2018-12-13 15:40:0126.0010,0002,600.00AT
2018-12-13 15:40:0126.2010,0002,620.00AT
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Local Shop. (LSR) Top Chat Posts

Local Shop. Daily Update: Local Shop. is listed in the Real Estate Investment Trusts sector of the London Stock Exchange with ticker LSR. The last closing price for Local Shop. was 27p.
Local Shop. has a 4 week average price of 25.80p and a 12 week average price of 25.80p.
The 1 year high share price is 34p while the 1 year low share price is currently 25.80p.
There are currently 82,505,853 shares in issue and the average daily traded volume is 253,810 shares. The market capitalisation of Local Shop. is £22,276,580.31.
centipede: Just reminding myself and summarising for others what has been going on here. Is there anything I should add? I’m thinking of sending this to various people and financial bodies. Any suggestions? “LSR (Local Shopping Reit) has owned a range of basic commercial properties. Due to a significant discount of the share price related to the value of these, it was decided in July 2013 to dispose of the properties and to return the money to the shareholders. This has taken an inordinate amount of time, and it is only now (nearly 5 ½ yrs on) that LSR is finally starting to complete the process. Various management fees have been draining out of the company, and the sales have been at a general loss to the stated book prices. In 2016, a separate company Thalassa (which provides marine geophysical, and other, services), led by their chairman Duncan Soukup, then decided to buy a significant proportion of LSR’s shares (just below 25%). Following this, Thalassa then tried to get their own representatives onto the board of LSR, with an apparent view to unlock the ever-decreasing value in the company. This was defeated, and the process of selling the properties was then (finally) started by LSR. 2 yrs on, and LSR is now ready to start to distribute the amounts which remain. However, Thalassa has now swung into action and blocked the process, by virtue of now apparently owning more than 25% of the company. This seems particularly unjust, as apparently 99.96% of votes registered by the company, with the exception of Thalassa, to date, have voted for the liquidation option. As the properties have now mostly been sold, it is hard to see what Thalassa/Soukup can gain by this manoeuvre. If they were to somehow get more than their share of the proceedings, this could only be by taking money from the other shareholders in some way. Also, it seems very likely that if there is an argument based on technicalities (for instance that the board of LSR deliberately damaged the interests of shareholders), then this would result in an expensive legal battle. There will then presumably be even less money available to shareholders (including Thalassa/Soukup). As some background, there have also been some strange recent events at Thalassa, with the issuing of preference shares (with 10 votes each) to all existing holders. The thing is that once sold, the voting rights to these disappear. All of this will mean that over time, voting rights (and control) will quickly become concentrated into the hands of those holding onto their shares (presumably board members). As a private shareholder, I no longer have any trust in the intentions of any of the parties involved. I feel that this has brought the whole system into disrepute, and will therefore damage the normal process of investment and the development of businesses. ”
skyship: Pretty positive update - at this rate may end up with more than my planned 36p:
skyship: Simon Thompson - summary of an IC Online report: "Local shopping REIT’s (LSR) balance sheet is set to be debt-free by the end of June 2018, and in a substantial cash position by the end of September 2018. After taking into account operating costs incurred during the divestment process, and likely discounts offered to the buyers of its 151 remaining properties, this suggests the 23 per cent share price discount to spot net asset value (NAV) of 41p a share has scope to narrow. A six-month target price of 36p implies 14 per cent potential share price upside, and perhaps more if there is bid interest from rivals."
hindsight: Could anyone clarify the proprty gearing now. From the 31/03 accounts it was 66m vs 42m and would it be fair to say 61m vs 37m with the sales since. As such we are geared 1.6x to over/under NAV of including costs sale prices achieved. Im just trying to get a number on how bad it has to be to get the present 32p share price back. At 1.6x, I have ~ -16%
gfrae: Damille share price taking a bit of a tumble.
tiltonboy: Not certain why there is any confusion on strategy; this was only announced last month! Road map for Property Disposals As we have previously commented, our preferred approach was to dispose of the remainder of the portfolio, or the bulk of it, by way of a portfolio sale. Heads of terms were signed and significant work undertaken on three occasions with interested parties. However, for varying reasons none of these potential sales crystallised. Whilst that process was underway it significantly constrained our ability to dispose of individual assets. Now that constraint has been removed, we have initiated the disposal strategy set out below. The pace of that programme is dictated by the number of properties we believe the market can absorb at sensible prices, but also the ability to process sales (particularly bearing in mind that a significant number of property sales will be subject to the statutory pre-emption procedures applying to residential leases). Additionally, the road map below has been designed to maintain income whilst the smaller and less robust properties are sold. 1) October 2016 to December 2017: a. Dispose of approximately 90 smaller or management intensive properties for an aggregate sale price of GBP10 million representing an average lot size of GBP110,000. These properties will be sold in regional and London auctions. There are auction cycles every two months, so we will aim to sell approximately 15 properties per auction cycle; b. Market for private treaty sale approximately 25 properties with a combined value of GBP5 million, focussing on those that are geographically difficult to manage; c. Sell 10 low-yielding properties for an estimated GBP5 million, by auction or private treaty. The three categories above total GBP20 million in 125 lots. This equates to 25 property sales and GBP4 million in aggregate proceeds per quarter. Since implementing the above strategy, the Company has completed or exchanged for sale on a total of 22 properties for an aggregate sale price of GBP2.0 million representing a 1.75% premium to valuation before transaction costs. Furthermore, 25 assets have been scheduled for auctions in February, and agents have now been appointed on the majority of the planned private treaty sales. 2) Early 2018: The Company will be left with a 'core' portfolio of approximately GBP55 million (based on current valuations), comprising 200 of the larger and better-quality assets in a tighter geographic concentration. Furthermore, time away from the market will allow us to reposition the portfolio and undertake asset management initiatives at the individual property level in order to achieve maximum value. In early 2018 the portfolio will be marketed as a whole for a limited period, as the Board believes that this will be the optimum disposal route (bearing in mind that the revised nature of the portfolio should make it easier for a purchaser to raise finance against it).
ntv: looks like the share price got proped up for the end of year figures for some ones bonus lol!
gfrae: As almost all shareholders seem to want to sell, as the shares stand at a large discount to NAV and as the company has cash yielding virtually zreo,buying in or having a reverse auction for say 25% of the companies shares at around these levels could be beneficial to all. Recurring revenue would hardly be affected as foregone interest would be negligible, NAV per share would increase. The board could chose a period when further sales have been completed and subject to the share price still being at a substantial discount to NAV.
orinocor: LOL. The board of LSR must be thinking this guy has a cheek criticising their performance. 4.5 The credentials of Mr Duncan Soukup Mr Soukup has set out his credentials in the Thalassa statement. On 30 October 2013 Thalassa announced that it had raised £18.1m by way of an equity issue at £2.50 per share. It should be noted that at the close of markets on 21 November 2016, Thalassa's share price was 43p, a reduction of 83% on the equity issue price for the October 2013 placing. The Board will not comment further on Mr Soukup's credentials, but shareholders will no doubt wish to carry out their own research.
orinocor: Dear Shareholder, Thalassa Holdings Ltd (Thalassa) (through two different nominees) recently acquired 23.48% of The Local Shopping REIT plc (LSR). We have a successful track record of unlocking value in underperforming assets and believe that with owner management, shareholder value could be realised more efficiently and faster than by third-party managers with no vested interest. Why we seek to replace the current Board Ÿ LSR's cost structure must be cut to reflect a company undertaking asset liquidation. Ÿ LSR's performance since admission has been disastrous and the Board must take substantial responsibility. Ÿ The management agreement between LSR and INTERNOS Global Investors Limited (Internos) (Internos Agreement) appears inequitable and not in shareholders' best interests: Ÿ since its appointment on 22 July 2013, Internos has been paid a total of £3.187m. Total administrative and property costs during this time of £18.5m while the return to shareholders has been £zero; Ÿ the Internos Agreement is excessive in comparison to LSR's revenue and profit and is not performance related (in 2015 Internos' fee was £1,016,461, while profit before tax a paltry £20,000); Ÿ on 7 August 2014 LSR announced the sale of 235 properties for £79.3m. Under the Internos Agreement, Internos was due a 0.5% fee on sales in excess of £50m (even though the property portfolio was worth £173.9m prior to Internos' appointment) and, by our calculations, have been paid £396,500 (£79.3m x 0.5%) notwithstanding the fact that LSR has incurred cumulative losses in excess of £92m; and Ÿ the Internos Agreement is on significantly worse terms than those entered into by Internos with other clients, such as Invista European Real Estate Trust (Invista). Invista paid a management fee of 1.25% on net assets whereas LSR are paying 0.7% on gross assets, subject to a minimum of £1m in years 1 and 2 and £950,000 in year 3. We estimate that this equates to more than twice what Internos would earn if the Invista formula were applied to LSR. Ÿ We are told that the Internos Agreement is not only in the best interests of shareholders but that it was entered into following a full and transparent process. In fact the appointment was made with no shareholder consultation - Steve Faber was appointed to the board before shareholders were informed about the Internos Agreement. The 2013 circular states Internos' appointment was not conditional on shareholder approval of the New Investment Policy - we conclude that Internos' appointment was clearly not something the Board wanted shareholders to vote on. Ÿ Why does the Internos Agreement include bonus terms for their core function - which is selling assets - without consideration to profit or loss and includes a terminal fee of 5.7% cash returned to shareholders in excess of 36.1p which was below NAV per share of 46p when they were appointed and is below current NAV per share of 43p. · Since admission, LSR has incurred cumulative losses totalling £92.023m, including total administrative and property operating expenses of £49.931m. By our calculations, the NAV per share was 164.86p at admission and has fallen 74% to 43p. Based upon the share price of 28.25p on 7 September 2016 (the day before Thalassa's first purchase) LSR's share price has declined 72.6% in that period, even when taking into account net dividends paid between 2008 and 2012 of 19.42p What would Thalassa do? If elected, Thalassa would: · review all contractual arrangements with a view to cutting costs, eliminating duplication, reducing property vacancies, whilst accelerating asset liquidation and substantially reducing debt; · meet shareholders to discuss representation on the Board, which the current Board has informed us they have in the past (in the case of Damille Investments Ltd, who requested two seats) rejected; and · improve corporate governance - the current Board is in breach of the LSR's articles of association which requires a minimum of three directors. It has therefore been operating in contravention of the Company's Act 2006 since April 2016. This on-going failure is worrisome and indicative of potential wider disregard of proper corporate governance by the current Board. We will be considering operations during this period and will seek redress on behalf of LSR, as appropriate. We are acutely conscious of the sensitivity of key relationships with other stakeholders in LSR and, as the company's largest shareholder, we have no interest in destabilising any of them. Sincerely Duncan Soukup
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