Share Name Share Symbol Market Type Share ISIN Share Description
Irvine Energy LSE:IVE London Ordinary Share GB00B0R2Q661 ORD 0.1P
  Price Change % Change Share Price Bid Price Offer Price High Price Low Price Open Price Shares Traded Last Trade
  +0.00p +0.00% 0.41p 0.00p 0.00p - - - 0 06:37:29
Industry Sector Turnover (m) Profit (m) EPS - Basic PE Ratio Market Cap (m)
- - - - 3.03

Irvine Energy (IVE) Latest News

Real-Time news about Irvine Energy (London Stock Exchange): 0 recent articles
More Irvine Energy News
Irvine Energy Takeover Rumours

Irvine Energy (IVE) Share Charts

1 Year Irvine Energy Chart

1 Year Irvine Energy Chart

1 Month Irvine Energy Chart

1 Month Irvine Energy Chart

Intraday Irvine Energy Chart

Intraday Irvine Energy Chart

Irvine Energy (IVE) Discussions and Chat

Irvine Energy Forums and Chat

Date Time Title Posts
09/2/201808:16IRVINE ENERGY - All aboard the Chattanooga Choo-Choo20,321
02/8/201219:37IRVINE ENERGY239
03/5/201019:41IRVINE ENERGY7
03/2/200921:56IRVINE ENERGY- serious thread!144

Add a New Thread

Irvine Energy (IVE) Most Recent Trades

No Trades
Trade Time Trade Price Trade Size Trade Value Trade Type
View all Irvine Energy trades in real-time

Irvine Energy (IVE) Top Chat Posts

rs2ooo: tommo41 10 Aug'14 - 14:42 - 20061 of 20070 0 0 ======================== I'm in exactly the same situation - paying £100 a year to a broker simply because I'm holding this stock, nothing else. Being fairly new to investing in 2008, I was sent a booklet by a large IVE house broker (can't remember their name right now, but a fairly well known outfit) recommending various stocks, and IVE was their shining star for 2008 with a share price of 4p and alleged assets valuing the company at 10p, and a potential price target of 18p. I was really taken in by it, you know, being a new investor and having such a large company take an interest in ensuring you invest wisely by laying out all the facts in a brochure. So I started watching the share price and sure enough every day it seemed to be going higher. I read everything I could about the company, and then this BB which had long term members calculating future valuations for this amazing little company. Well, I didn't need my savings at the time and felt quite comfortable investing it for a couple of years and being quite sensible I invested a 5th of all my savings into IVE, at, from memory around 4.5p. The share price started to dip and I thought, you know what, I've made a beginners error buying when the price is going up so fast, I should have waited for a correction. The correction went on for some days or Weeks, and started to move up a little, so I added 10% more of my savings to the holding, at around 4p. I think the 2nd tranch showed a profit for a day or 2, but I was quite underwater overall so I just held on. A short while later the price suddenly dipped to 2p, and stayed there for a while. The BB was full of experts talking about how solid this support is and how the market was really undervaluing IVE. As I'd just sold some other shares for a small profit I was feeling quite pleased with myself, and thought if I average down this IVE holding things wont look so bad in the account and of course, I stand to make quite some money out of this investment, so I added another 15% of my savings, essentially doubling my holding and bringing my average down to approximately 3.3p. Well, the rest is history. The only good that did come out of it is the fact that all these technical experts shouting "support" at 2p were all wrong, and this led me to find out for myself how to do technical analysis. I soon realised the outcome of T.A has a poor accuracy with small stock shares so I started trading currencies and Indices, and still do to this day, having never touched a penny stock since. The only other stock I hold is B.P which I bought some Weeks after the oil disaster as a long term investment for my pension. The Value of B.Ps shares means little to me in the medium term, my interest is in the quarterly dividends that pay so much more than you'd get in interest in a bank. So there's my IVE story! What does bother me is the fact they asked for additional investment to start a pay day loans type business and I'm sure many people invested based on that business plan, but now they're talking about a completely different kind of business which in my eyes means the shareholders have yet again funded a business that is never going to happen....In essence IVE hasn't changed what its always done....It takes, but never gives. You get to a time in life where you realise these directors are people just like you and I. The majority have nothing to give to a business that you or I couldn't give, in fact I believe I could run some of these fallen companies so much better than the people I stupidly trusted and invested in. Many are truly incompetent at what they do, and as the figures speak for themselves it can only be conscious incompetence, thus they are no different to conmen.
mwestern: I have received my new IVE share certificate this morning, confirming my meagre holding post consolidation. At the top of the share certificate it states "At the Annual General Meeting held on 21/09/2012, shareholders approved the consolidation". I had hoped it would be voted down. Oh well.
tommo41: Good point, bennywin. We don't know, of course, what the initial share price of any new entity is going to be, but I would guess that it is going to be in the very low pence department. Perhaps even in the fraction of a penny department. I'm quite prepared to give up a few quid just to see these shysters be unsuccessful in their project. These people can't be allowed to keep playing with other people's hard-earned cash, fail, then start again as if nothing's happened.
tommo41: Going by bluesbreaker's calculations my original 500k holding would be worth about £25 for every penny that any new company's share price might be. Oh well, at least we should have closure for CGT purposes.
upthediff: Frayne and Samaha at it again... Share price barely above the float price and they're already feathering thier nests. Oi, can whoever is currently "running" Irvine please do us a favour and wind the company up??!! Nobody is going to give you any more money to throw away, so get a proper job like the rest of us.
midas: Taylor Wimpey, where speculators dare Edmond Jackson 15.01.09 15:11 Shares in Taylor Wimpey (TW-) have been decimated from the FTSE 100 to Small Cap index, over 500p recently below 10p, currently at about 15p having tested 30p just amid speculation it might resolve matters with creditors. Such wild volatility illustrates two key aspects of the current stockmarket. Firstly, high risk/return offered in shares where the companies have substantial debt to resolve. This category is most likely to deliver some of the best performers from 2009 onwards although the market justifiably fears dilution and there will be some upsets too. Such shares are highly speculative; you need a strong stomach and diversified portfolio. Secondly, the housing market will eventually recover. Demographics, more single person households, and low interest rates offer a long-term commercial prospect despite the pervading gloom currently. This is being accentuated for example by the trading statement from Barratt on 15 January. Barratt's like-for-like completions have dropped by nearly 24%. Yet steeled investors should be aware, it is just when the news appears to be dire that you should be paying attention as a prospective buyer. Despite the financial risks in Taylor Wimpey, the company and its shares merit following even by investors who would prefer a company with less debt. Its operating progress is a bellwether for the industry. The share price is likely to remain highly volatile even if management concludes a successful outcome with its lenders and the group progressively trades its way out of a corner. With £1.55 billion debt (relative to equity now capitalised at about £160 million), the fear factor is whether and what terms lenders may agree. Shareholders were thrown something of a lifeline just before Christmas when lenders agreed to wait until the end of March before carrying out checks that otherwise could have resulted in loans being called in early. Without this grace period, Taylor Wimpey may have breached covenants this month. Although the situation seems dire and undoubtedly high risk, when a company is in this much debt it is effectively more the creditors' problem. In principle, they ought to allow Taylor Wimpey to trade itself out of its financial dilemma. Credit issues pervade all aspects of judging house builders currently. The Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors has just recently cited UK house sales at the lowest level for 30 years, the main obstacle being a lack of affordable mortgage credit. Yet with Government intervention to spur lenders to reduce rates in all aspects of commercial life, this could mark a low point. Lower mortgage rates will undoubtedly benefit a wide range of the population, possibly enough to outweigh the negative effect of rising unemployment. Management has said in its latest trading statement and conference call, the cost of its new refinanced debt should be similar to other house builders; that discussions continued with debt providers and they are confident of finding a solution involving new debt. You could regard Bovis Homes as a benchmark: having to pay £8 million to renew a £220 million credit facility. Weighing probability, it looks as if lenders are more likely to want to help the house builders and earn fees from refinancing, than appoint an administrator and call in loans. The right actions are being taken to manage costs, with land spend being reduced below £400 million this year, job cuts (1,400 last year) and pressure on contractors. About 20% of revenue is derived from North America where the outlook remains difficult, although management cites some attractive opportunities emerging to buy land. You can get a useful overview of the group via Despite the humiliation of penny share status, Taylor Wimpey has a record of substantial profitability, in the order of £300 million to £400 million over past years. This would have been aided by the years of readily available mortgage credit and soaring house prices but at least shows you are dealing with a business of proven profitability. Company REFS shows that in December, brokers' analysts projected a wide range of outcomes for 2009, the overall consensus being a £60 million loss. The shares deserve a 'highly speculative' rating because it is so hard to forecast meaningfully into 2010 onwards, or guess the risk and extent of shareholder dilution. Earnings per share have previously trended in a 40p range. There has not been any worthwhile directors' share buying to report, however restrictions may well apply given that management remains in such sensitive discussions with lenders. The prospect here is therefore summarised as a speculation on renewed financial facilities that could easily see the shares double, with the risks progressively reducing if Taylor Wimpey's trading can gradually improve. Probably the main risk with this scenario is fundamentals within the housing market, if UK recession is prolonged. Currently there is overcapacity in housing with builders having to offload properties in a desperate attempt to improve their finances; so the pain is liable to be acute for a while yet. However, Government intervention could mitigate this risk, for example buying via housing associations. At least there is no doubt the Government understands it is essential to stabilise the housing market for wider economic recovery to be achieved. With 2008 prelims likely due in early March, this puts all the emphasis on the outcome of negotiations with lenders; news that is potentially of interest to very short-term traders, say intra-day, besides medium to longer-term players. I draw the line at saying 'investors' because there is no way you can identify a margin of safety in Taylor Wimpey shares. You are just going to have to follow events and react accordingly. Yet if they come together in a way that eases current gloom, this (and other house builders) can prove a sensational recovery play. Keep your eyes focused.
poppa07: Remember that petition that was doing the rounds to stop short-selling? I've just had a mail detailing the governments response to it.... Anyone fancy stating a petition to get the IVE share price above 10p?? ;-)
blue85: found this.... A Toothless Market That Offers No Liquidity And Locks Its Directors Out - Just What Exactly Is The Point Of An Aim Listing? By Alastair Ford What is it with the Aim regulators? Are they blind, ignorant or simply somnolent? To many it seems that amid the summer's conflagration of valuation all the Aim authorities did was fiddle while the market burned. It may be more to do with the market itself, of course - structurally flawed, the regulators are powerless to make a difference. One way or another, resources companies listed on Aim took a beating over the summer. And the whole year hasn't exactly been a bed of roses. Of course, it hasn't been easy elsewhere either. The Toronto market sank under a deadweight of disinterest this summer too, and after some tentative steadying of the ship over the last couple of weeks, is now waiting nervously to see what autumn has in store. The picture's not been too much better in Australia, although overall it's to Australia that most of the surviving near-term bulls seem to have migrated. Across the globe, weaker commodities prices and the wider withdrawal of cash from equities in general has hit hard, but on Aim the crunch was especially pronounced. Two factors really put the squeeze on. One is the structure of the market itself, and the way trades in most Aim-traded junior companies go through the market maker system rather than being settled on a matched-bargain basis. This is a question of a liquidity, the perennial weakness of Aim, but one that has looked particularly pronounced this summer. And regulators take note: one that is far less of a problem in Toronto and Sydney. When juniors in Canada complain of thin trading, they do not mean no trades at all for days on end. The second factor is that those in charge of Aim have little or no understanding of junior resources companies. This has several ramifications, including a constant befuddlement on the market's part as to what constitutes price sensitive information. No-one at Aim really seems to have worked that one out, so the consequence is that virtually any information is deemed price sensitive. In fact, and especially this year, not much has moved markets, not in the way of company-specific information anyway. You only have to track newsflow against volume for a company like African Eagle to know that whatever good news the company had was released into an indifferent market. In recent years London's junior market has gone global, marketing in all sorts of glamorous and exotic overseas locations. It's managed to pull in listings from all around the world. But the real success has been in resources companies, in mining and oil & gas, and particularly those from Australia and Canada, with a few from the USA and elsewhere thrown in for good measure. The attraction for these companies is the vast pool of capital that the City has access to. Regulators take note: it's the City's money that interests these companies, not the Aim market per se. Many City institutions, especially the generalist funds, want a local listing, and that means Aim. Good for the Aim market, but not so good for the companies concerned, as Aim's inability to draw in any retail interest means that unless the market is constantly drip-fed, the trading pressure is almost always on the downside because there just isn't much interest – and it doesn't matter how good the story. The way it works is as follows: a company lists on Aim, raising a certain number of millions of pounds from institutions along the way. Those institutions will have heard the company's story in a pre-listing roadshow, and will surely have liked that story if they've put money in. They will, therefore, not be particularly disposed to sell any shares once the listing gets away, although the early seed money and the hedge funds do sometimes take profits. More likely though, a small resources company listing on Aim will be viewed by those funds that take a favourable stance as a "buy and hold", to be tucked away until some really big news comes along. So far so good. The problem comes when anyone actually wants to trade the shares. Where are these shares supposed to come from? Who's marketed to the general punter who ought to be relied upon to drive volume? The answer is: no-one. And where's the volume? There isn't any. It's the same old story. And there aren't many other places to go. Directors often have sizeable stakes, but for reasons we'll get onto in a minute, aren't often in a position to trade. The institutions don't want to sell, especially into a market where there's so little volume that a major transaction will trash the share price at a stroke. Easy as ABC, a liquidity vacuum is built into the heart of the structure of the Aim market. Canada and Australia don't have this problem for the simple reason that retail and small-time investors are actually encouraged to buy in. In Canada and Australia the small time punters drive the volume and the price, while the institutions bide their time, sitting on profits or losses as the case may be. Not so in London, where brokers aren't allowed to market companies to anyone outside their own specific client base, anyone, in short, who isn't something called a "sophisticated investor". The catch with that is that by definition an existing client base is already in the market. Getting new buyers in is therefore something that market regulations effectively block. So Aim has its own self-inflicted liquidity problem. How to get around this? The answer is the market maker system. This is actually in theory the perfect solution for Aim, in that the junior market ends up licensing other people to make a market within a market. The idea is that market makers build a book in a company's shares, which they then price up with a bid-ask spread that ensures they can make a little bit for their own trouble. Any investor going into the market will then find instant volume in the form of the market maker's book. The more market makers, the more competitive the spreads, and so efficiency is regained even in the face of general illiquidity. But the practical reality reveals several drawbacks. First, market makers don't always like to build their own book, especially in markets like these when they may well be sitting on lots of shares that nobody wants. As Aim grew it was intriguing to watch the number of market makers grow too. In theory that was even better for volume, as they would compete on price, and so spreads would narrow. But in fact they now mark their prices to match each other, and if one slashes prices in order to find a buyer, instead of hoovering up stock in order to pass on to their own customers, all the other market makers slash prices too, for the simple reason that they don't have any customers. So if anyone does come into buy, a market maker will often find, contrary to the original idea, that it's necessary to go out into the market to secure shares to fulfil the order. And the way to secure those shares is to mark the price up dramatically enough to attract someone else in. Likewise with a sell order: the price is marked down and down and down, until the shares are so ridiculously cheap that some "sophisticated" bargain hunter can't resist. Hence extreme share price volatility on virtually no trading. Hence, killer spreads. And that doesn't make anyone feel relaxed. Directors, of course, can usually be relied upon to buy shares. Investors want to see their directors backing their own companies, and directors, to their credit, tend to want to back them. When directors do move into the market, the impact can be immediate, as director buying instils confidence, and gives the market makers something to work with. But the Aim regulators are less sure it's a good idea. Oilresources carried out an unscientific, but fairly extensive, survey of directors of Aim-traded resources companies, and found a high degree of frustration about reporting requirements and allied restrictions on directors' dealings. One director commented - perhaps inadvertently summing up the whole mentality of the regulators - that the rules are set up in such a way as to assume a director is guilty until proven innocent. Thus directors have their hands tied for much of the calendar year, prevented either from buying or selling shares in their own companies by what's termed a "closed period", an arbitrary two month ban on trading shares ahead of a given set of financial results, be they interims or finals. Directors are also, rightly in the opinion of virtually all that were surveyed here, restricted from trading when they have access to price sensitive information. But the irony for Aim's resources companies is that financial results are generally not price sensitive, since the majority of companies are explorers and will book a loss every time. What is price sensitive are the results of drilling or other exploratory activities. And since these activities are the meat and drink of explorers and are ongoing most of the year, directors are locked out once again. This matters, for several reasons. From Aim's point of view, the restrictions are much more onerous than they are in Australia, where the rules sensibly focus simply on price sensitive information, and don't lock directors out of the market for long arbitrary periods ahead of financials that have no material impact. Many Australian company directors are sick of Aim's restrictions, because of course it means they are locked out of their own market too, while directors of their non dual-listed peers can, with far greater frequency, support their companies. Lots of Australians are considering de-listing from Aim. Tianshan Gold has already gone. More may follow. One problem is that the restrictions on directors' dealing are not widely known. Investors find it bemusing that company directors don't go into the market to prop up an ailing share price, and often get on the phone to demand an explanation. All in a day's work for a director, you may say, and you'd be right. But the net result is that you're left with an unhappy investor and an unhappy director. Again, not great for the Aim market when it's competing on a global stage. So we come back to the simple fact that the Aim regulators don't understand resources companies. Another company director comments succinctly, that "the only financial number of materiality for exploration companies is cash in the bank". Broadly speaking that's true. Investors need to know if a company can afford to keep exploring, and if not, how long it's got before the sharks start circling. The profit and loss account bears little relevance. Even less a cash flow statement. In light of this, many directors feel that a reduction of the close period, by, say, a half, to one month, would be a sensible move. It's to be doubted whether the Aim authorities will take note, however, or even understand the argument. Back in the day, the London stock exchange used to employ a dedicated resources specialist to oversee companies trading in London, but also, crucially, to provide a voice for them at the regulatory table. But that was long before the current boom got going. The stock exchange does say it has somebody on post, but no-one knows who it is. Or if there is anyone, what they do. Now and again if there is a transgression of the rules, Aim does call in a panel of so-called Wise Men to advise it. These Wise Men like to keep their identities under wraps, partly, one suspects, because although the advice they dispense is indeed wise, it's not always acted upon. Thus, in the recent shenanigans involving Meridian Petroleum, although consulted, the Wise Men were given such limited scope for action that they served as little more than a rubber stamp for the wrap over the knuckles that Aim eventually dished out to Meridian. So, it's hardly a regime with teeth. Which is probably another reason why directors suffer from so many restrictions, under the old totalitarian maxim that if you prevent people from doing anything, you are also preventing wrong-doing along the way. Nevertheless, the directors that Oilresources consulted did have some sympathy with the market's predicament. No-one wants their shares trading on a shonky market with a reputation for dodgy dealings. So several suggestions were proffered, the most popular one being, as mentioned above, a shortening of the close period to one month. Other helpful ideas for the Aim authorities to consider included a special dispensation to trade to be given by the market on application, and on the assurance that all price-sensitive information was already out in the market. One director suggested some sort of tie-in with Germany, possibly through Euronext, where the retail interest is much greater, and the liquidity issue could be tackled head on. Another suggested that directors could have their share dealing accounts locked in escrow for a given period in order to ensure that trading wasn't just occurring ahead of specific, as-yet undisclosed events. All of which goes to show that Aim isn't dead in the water yet. The number of new listings may have dried up, but there is plenty of willingness to try to make this market work, through the bad times as well as the good. But let's hope that the powers-that-be wake up and realise what an asset its stable of resources companies is – before it's too late.
steelwatch: Making sense of dramatic movements in volatile stock markets By James Clunie Last Updated: 6:24am BST 30/07/2008 Why is it that the prices of some UK shares move 10pc or more on days on which no company specific news is released? If, like me, you've been watching the stock market recently, this question has probably crossed your mind more than once. Our collective understanding of how shares should get priced in a "perfect" world struggles to explain such moves. Fortunately, help is at hand. In recent years, stock market researchers have identified a series of activities that can move share prices temporarily and dramatically away from fair value, possibly explaining some of the violent moves we have seen recently. Two of the more interesting phenomena are known as "predatory trading" and "crowded exits". Consider, first, "predatory trading" - a practice explained in lurid, theoretical detail in some recent academic papers. A "predator" learns about the trading position of some other market participant and begins to trade against him. If the predator is strong enough, he can move the market price of the stock away from fair value. This imposes losses on the other party, and as the losses build, the victim struggles to hold on to his stock position. Eventually, the victim capitulates and closes out his position at a loss, and at around the same time, the predator closes out his own position at a profit. The share price eventually recovers to its fair value. Who might fall victim to predatory trading? Victims could include anyone with a position that they might be unable to maintain as losses mount. This could include an investor in financial distress, a hedge fund unable to meet a margin call, or an open-ended fund having to sell shares to meet client redemptions. A more topical example is an underwriter left with an unhedged stock position after a rights issue. Other traders would quickly surmise that the underwriter held unwanted stock. If the share price were driven lower, the underwriter's losses would mount. For risk control reasons, the underwriter might be unable to hold on to the losing position and might sell low. Predators would cover their own positions by buying cheap stock from the distressed seller. Now, I do not know for sure that predatory trading was taking place in some UK bank shares recently, but the pattern of share prices and trading volumes that we saw in HBOS shares last week certainly matches the theoretical model. Another phenomenon that could explain some of the recent, violent share price moves is the concept of "crowded exits". We know that the hedge fund industry has grown rapidly in recent years, and that there has been a noticeable increase in short-selling, the practice that involves selling shares that are not owned and buying them back at some later date, hopefully at an advantageous price. Now, there is plenty of evidence that heavily shorted stocks perform, on average, badly and this suggests a simple trading strategy for short-sellers: namely, to identify heavily shorted stocks and build further short positions in those stocks. However, such acts of "imitation" change the market dynamics and can lead to unexpected consequences. In this case, imitation can lead short positions to become large relative to the number of shares that are normally traded each day in stock...the short position is then said to become "crowded". If a catalyst of some sort were to prompt short-sellers to change their minds rapidly and simultaneously, we would have short-sellers rushing to buy, but no new rush of people seeking to sell. This is known as a crowded exit. The idea is akin to the audience in a crowded theatre rushing to a narrow exit door once the fire alarm sounds?...?only so many can leave the building in any given interval of time. The effect would be temporary upward pressure on the share price. A variety of catalysts for a crowded exit are possible: a broker could change a recommendation on a stock, an investor could place a large buy order, or a rumour could cause a rapid change in sentiment. Recent patterns of share price moves and short-seller activity in companies as diverse as Punch Taverns, Bellway and Trinity Mirror have been consistent with the notion of a crowded exit. In fact, the shares of these three companies rose by an average of 43pc in just four days last week. A study into crowded exits* using UK stock lending data from Index Explorers shows that crowded exits are associated with significant losses for short-sellers who are unable to cover their positions rapidly. Traditional, long-only investors would generally be unable to exploit this finding by buying into crowded exits, as by definition these are illiquid positions. If short-sellers continue to grow in importance on the London Stock Exchange, it is likely that we will experience many more crowded exits. For an active stock market trader, it is vital to be aware of the risk of crowded exits, and to avoid at all costs the risk of becoming a victim of predatory trading. At the same time, astute traders who feel that they understand the reasons for extreme volatility can trade to benefit from temporary mis-pricings. If they are right and the share prices are eventually restored to fair value, they can earn excess profits. For the rest of us, and in particular for long-term, fundamental investors, the advice is much simpler. Crowded exits and predatory trading are technical events that have nothing to do with the fundamentals of a company. Fundamental investors should simply ignore the extreme volatility and stick to estimating companies' cash flows. James Clunie is Investment Trustee at The CBF Church of England Funds *Caveat Venditor - Crowded Exits! University of Edinburgh Centre for Financial Markets Research Working Paper. Clunie, Moles and Gao, 2008.
boat2: Escondido The various indicators that you use are statistical models based on hypotheses about how share price and or volume patterns might be analysed to give clues as to when prices might have topped or bottomed out. In other words, they are an attempt to look at past data in order to achieve the aim that we all share of buying high and selling low. The first point I would make is that a number of these indicators tend to say sell when the price has risen very rapidly by a large amount and buy when it has fallen very rapidly by a large amount. If we concede that these models have some merit then we must understand their limitations. These models like any partial analysis (eg in economics, supply and demand theory)include implicit assumptions about exogeneous factors remaining constant. Exogeneous factors are things not explained within model but do have an impact on share price. In the long run these models are more likely to be more successful when applied to broad market indices or at least sectoral indices. After that, they might be reasonably good at apparently predicting the tops and bottoms for big companies in a sector. In relation to broad or sectoral indices or big companies, the exogeneou factors that affect them are stuff like general economic news, expectations, general sentiment and so on. These are not accounted for in the models but they are obviously the main drivers of share price in the long run and short run. So, in relation, to the oil sector index, hydrocarbon futures, GDP growth estimates, inventory reports and so on are the specific exogeneous factors. The models will not work when there is great volatility in the exogeneous factors because the overwhelming cause of specific share price movement is determined outwith the model. They will work best when these factors are more stable. In other words they may help prediction in a more predictable world. In relation to a tiny company like IVE all the exogeneous factors mentioned above apply to. However, in a case such as this traded volumes are very low and the individual share price is very dependent on news specific to the company. Therefore, it is more unpredictable even when the macro environment is fairly stable. However, when there is no news, other things being equal, its share price will tend to be correlated with peers. Also, in the case of oil companies, small explorers will tend to be less correlated to near term oil futures than large producers. The asset value they are attempting to grow is key, along with financing. In my opinion, the indicator of a solid upward movement in the IVE share price is when an upward trend in price is accompanied by a sustained increase in trading volumes - this inrease in volume, of course, being determined by exogeneous factors. So, in short, Escondido, you might as well use astrological charts in relation to IVE - they are about as useful. One more thing I should add is that if enough people make their decisions based on the theoretical signals, they might become self-fulfilling prophecies but it might be difficult to distinguish this effect from the exogeneous drivers. Dorset - there are two ways to skin a cat
Irvine Energy share price data is direct from the London Stock Exchange
Your Recent History
Gulf Keyst..
FTSE 100
UK Sterlin..
Stocks you've viewed will appear in this box, letting you easily return to quotes you've seen previously.

Register now to create your own custom streaming stock watchlist.

By accessing the services available at ADVFN you are agreeing to be bound by ADVFN's Terms & Conditions

P:30 V: D:20180220 01:51:24