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Share Name Share Symbol Market Type Share ISIN Share Description
General Indus LSE:GNI London Ordinary Share GB00BPYP3Q26 ORD 5P
  Price Change % Change Share Price Shares Traded Last Trade
  0.00 0.0% 44.50 0.00 00:00:00
Bid Price Offer Price High Price Low Price Open Price
Industry Sector Turnover (m) Profit (m) EPS - Basic PE Ratio Market Cap (m)
General Industrials 4.75 -2.81 -10.66 15
Last Trade Time Trade Type Trade Size Trade Price Currency
- O 0 44.50 GBX

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General Indus (GNI) Discussions and Chat

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Date Time Title Posts
28/8/201411:45General Industries - the new Richard Wollenberg shell10
17/11/200509:59GNI users - Level 2 issue - urgent-
14/3/200514:55Analyst Earnings Forecasts6
25/4/200319:04Problems using the new GNI touch V3.4.0-
18/2/200319:12Market reports by email-

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DateSubject
17/11/2005
22:37
ntv: cat i noticed what i thought were a couple of changes mm's on stock i follow when checking the number of mm's on the bid say from 3 to two i had not noticed the change i just put it down to me not watching closely enoughbut this explains all mind you it doesn't affect me quite as much as your good self as i don't tade as much as you but fell better that it is another one of those little gni props and not me faling asleep
17/11/2005
09:54
cat: GNI users. The flash prompts we used to get when MMs moved around behind the scenes - altering the munber of MMs on bid or offer (without altering the bid/offer price) - have stopped. This has been going on for some time as the number of SEAQ stocks affected has dropped. GNI are aware of the situation and apparently put it down to a change of their feed info from the LSE. This attribute is one of the main reasons many traders use GNI. They dont seem too bothered about fixing it as they have only had 3 complaints so far. I guess many people havent noticed as so much stuff has moved across to setsmm. The more of us whinge, then the more likely they are to try and fix the problem.
14/3/2005
14:41
rob mack: Analyst News 03/11/05 British Airways "buy" UBS 03/09/05 British Airways names cost-cutting expert Willie Walsh as next CEO - update 2 newratings.com 03/04/05 British Airways "buy" Dresdner Keinwort W. 02/08/05 British Airways "buy," target price raised Deutsche Bank 02/07/05 British Airways "overweight" J.P. Morgan Securities 02/04/05 British Airways "buy" Dresdner Keinwort W. 02/04/05 British Airways ups full year revenue growth guidance - update 1 newratings.com 01/14/05 British Airways "buy" Dresdner Keinwort W. 01/14/05 British Airways "buy," target price raised UBS 11/09/04 British Airways "buy," target price raised UBS 11/09/04 British Airways "buy," estimates reduced Merrill Lynch 11/09/04 British Airways target price raised UBS 11/09/04 British Airways target price raised Credit Suisse First Boston 11/09/04 British Airways "overweight" J.P. Morgan Securities 11/08/04 British Airways "buy" Merrill Lynch 11/08/04 British Airways "hold" Dryden Financial 11/08/04 British Airways "buy" Dresdner Keinwort W. 11/08/04 British Airways posts robust 2Q profit growth newratings.com 10/11/04 British Airways "buy," target price reduced Deutsche Bank 10/05/04 British Airways "buy" Dresdner Keinwort W. 09/16/04 British Airways cancels about 1,000 Heathrow flights newratings.com 09/09/04 British Airways "buy," estimates reduced Dresdner Kleinwort Wasser. 09/09/04 British Airways sells Qantas' stake newratings.com 09/09/04 British Airways "overweight" J.P. Morgan Securities 09/08/04 British Airways to sell stake in Qantas newratings.com 09/07/04 British Airways "buy" Merrill Lynch 08/27/04 British Airways cancels additional flights newratings.com 08/18/04 British Airways "buy" Dresdner Kleinwort Wasser. 08/09/04 British Airways "buy" Dresdner Kleinwort Wasser. 08/09/04 British Airways more than doubles fuel surcharge newratings.com 08/06/04 British Airways "overweight" J.P. Morgan Securities 08/04/04 British Airways "buy" Dresdner Kleinwort Wasser. 07/14/04 British Airways "buy" Merrill Lynch 06/30/04 British Airways "buy" Merrill Lynch 06/29/04 British Airways upgraded to "overweight" J.P. Morgan Securities http://www.newratings.com/analyst_news/article_723328.html Shareprice went from £1.96 to £2.87 It has retraced to £2.75 Check OBV, there has been no major sell off..
14/3/2005
13:16
mertles: References Barth, M. and A. Hutton. 2001. Financial Analysts and the Pricing of Accrurals. Working Paper. Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. Brennan, M. J., N. Jegadeesh, and B. Swaminathan. 1993. Investment analysis and the adjustment of stock prices to common information. Review of Financial Studies 6: 799-824. Brown, L.D., P.A. Griffin, R.L. Hagerman, and M.E. Zmijewski. 1987. Security analyst superiority relative to univariate time-series models in forecasting quarterly earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 9: 61-87. Chan, L.K.C., J. Jarceski, and J. Lakonishok. 2003. Analysts' Conflict of Interest and Biases in Earnings Forecast. Working Paper. SSRN Electronic Paper Collection. Elgers, P.T., M. H. Lo, and R.J. Pfeiffer, Jr. 2001. Delayed security price adjustments to financial analysts' forecasts of annual earnings. The Accounting Review. 76: 613-632. Francis, J and L. Soffer. 1997. The relative informativeness of analysts' stock recommendations and earnings forecast revisions. Journal of Accounting Research. 35: 193-212. Gleason, C. and Lee, C. 2003. Analyst forecast revisions and market price discovery. The Accounting Review. 78: 193-225. Grossman, S. and J. Stiglitz. 1980. On the impossibility of information efficient markets. American Economic Review. 70: 393-408. Healy, P.M. and K.G. Palepu. 2001. Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 31: 405-440. Hong, H., T. Um, and J. Stein. 2000. Bad news travels slowly: Size, analyst coverage, and the profitability of momentum strategies. Journal of Finance 55 (February): 265-295. Hong, H. and J.D. Kubik. 2003. Analyzing the Analysts: Career concerns and biased earnings forecasts. Journal of Finance 58 (February): 313-351. La Porta, R. 1996. Expectations and the cross-section of stock-returns. Journal of Finance. 41 (December): 1715-1742. Lys, T. and S. Sohn. 1990. The association between revisions of financial analysts' earnings forecasts and security-price changes. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 13: 341-363. Machuga, S.M. and R.J. Pfeiffer Jr. 2000. A comparison of financial-statement-based and price-based earnings forecasts. Journal of Business and Economic Studies. 6: 21-41. McNichols, M. and P.C. O'Brien. 1997. Self-selection and analyst coverage. Journal of Accounting Research 35 (Supplement): 167-199. Park, C. W., and E. K. Stice. 2000. Analyst forecasting ability and the stock price reaction to forecast revisions. Review of Accounting Studies 5 (September): 259-272. Stickel, S.E. 1990. Predicting individual analyst earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 28: 409-417. Stickel, S.E. 1991. Common stock returns surrounding earnings forecast revisions: More puzzling evidence. The Accounting Review 66 (April): 402-416. Stickel, S.E. 1992. Reputation and performance among security analysts. Journal of Finance 47 (December): 1811-1836. Walther, B. R. 1997. Investor sophistication and market earnings expectations. Journal of Accounting Research 35: 157-179. Womack, K. 1996. Do brokerage analysts' recommendations have investment value? Journal of Finance 51 (March): 137-167.
14/3/2005
13:12
mertles: I wrote this a few months ago,,,please bare in mind that I only spent about 5 hours writing it. Might be of interest to some of you... The role of analysts' forecasts in establishing informationally efficient market prices. In a review of the disclosure literature, Healy and Palepu (2001, p. 417) conclude that analysts' forecasts "play a valuable role in improving market efficiency." Analysts' forecasts have been shown, for large firms at least, to be more accurate than time-series models as a result of being timely and based upon a large information set (Brown et al., 1997). Also, numerous papers (e.g. Lys and Sohn, 1990; Francis and Soffer, 1997) have shown that analyst forecasts do, themselves, affect stock prices therefore suggesting that they have a role in establishing informationally efficient market prices. Lys and Sohn (1991) reveal that even when preceded by accounting disclosures, analysts' earnings forecasts are still price informative. In comparing large and small firms, Lys and Sohn (1991) also show, that for larger firms, analyst forecast errors are smaller because the information environment is richer, and these larger, more diversified firms have lower earnings volatility. However, as a result of the scarce amount of information available for smaller companies, the effect of new analysts' forecasts were found to be more pronounced for smaller companies. A number of papers (eg. Walther, 1997; Elgers et al., 2001; Gleason and Lee, 2003) show that those firms that have a smaller analyst following exhibit greater price drift following the publication of a forecast or forecast revision. This suggests that the price discovery process, and therefore the efficiency of market prices, is greater as the number of analysts' forecasts increases. Elgers et al (2001) argue that those firms with little analyst coverage fail to efficiently reflect publicly available earnings forecasts and that abnormal trading profits (before transaction costs) are possible by exploiting, "cross-sectional rankings of price-scaled, early-in-the-year financial analysts' annual earnings forecasts." (p. 614) Brennan et al. (1993) presents similar findings, demonstrating that where firm size is held constant, prices react more expeditiously to new information when a larger number of analysts follow a firm, and that the returns on these firms lead those firms with a smaller analyst coverage. Furthermore, forecasts that show little innovation are likely to be less informative than high innovation forecasts because they may be simply 'herding' towards the consensus forecast (Stickel, 1990). Gleason and Lee (2003) conclude that highly innovative forecasts are associated to significantly higher price drifts than those that have low innovation. This suggests that the market is not efficient in making the distinction between the two types of forecast. Hong et al. (2000) demonstrate a profitable investment strategy based on the principle that subsequent returns momentum is stronger for those firms with low analyst coverage. In contrast to the above studies, La Porta (1996) reveals that investors may also over-rely on analysts' forecasts with security prices impounding the information of five-years earnings growth forecasts even though latter forecasts are normally too extreme. He demonstrates that significant abnormal returns could be earned using contrarian strategies. Such 'over-reliant' anomalies suggest that analysts' forecast can lead to inefficient information being impounded into market prices. In a study of the association between analysts' forecasts and the pricing of accruals, Barth and Hutton (2001) show that investors also ignore useful information and prices remain mis-priced until the actual earnings report is released. Stickel (1991, p. 415) finds that investors "do not immediately assimilate the information in [revised] forecasts." One reason for such 'inefficiency' could be that analysts' forecasts are merely a change in opinion and not a change in fact (unlike earnings announcements) (Womack, 1996). Further, a number of studies show that analysts' do not capture all price information. For example, Barth and Hutton (2001) found that only 25% of analysts revised their future earnings forecasts in a direction consistent with the concept that accruals reverse, and Machuga and Pfeiffer (2000) show that price-based forecasts and financial statement-based forecasts complement analysts' forecasts in that they contain unique information that is overlooked by analysts. A reason for this may be because analysts have been shown to follow those companies they view favourably, and as a result of this, and other factors (e.g. discouragement by the analyst's firm's investment bankers, or self-interest in there own career), they have upward bias in their forecasts (see McNichols and O'Brien, 1997; Chan et al., 2003; Hong and Kubik, 2003). Analysts may be reluctant to make earnings downgrades and one could make the conjecture that they may purposefully overlook 'bad news'. Stickel (1992) and Park and Stice (2000) show that the immediate, short-window, market response to a forecast revision is greatest for those analysts that are ranked highly. Gleason and Lee (2003) and also find that the effect of an analyst revision is impounded into price more quickly, and with less subsequent price drift, for 'celebrity analysts' than for those revisions made by equally capable (measured by accuracy) but more obscure analysts. This implies that the market discovery process is facilitated not only by an analyst's forecasting ability but also by reputation. Finally, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that prices cannot perfectly reflect all available information, because there is a cost to obtaining this information and therefore the information gatherers must be compensated for their spent resources. They see a, "fundamental conflict between the efficiency with which markets spread information and the incentives to acquire information." (p. 405) If one views these information retrieval costs as 'part and parcel' of an efficient capital market then analysts must, as information intermediaries, play an important role in establishing informationally efficient market prices. The fact that 'the analyst forecast' still exists, and has not yet become obsolete, suggests that it can contain valuable information that will, in time, be impounded into price and for which the analyst will be compensated.
25/10/2004
09:48
thepublisher: I'm one of those rare birds who extolls the virtues of Halewood International around here. They look after two CFD's for me and are both good value and efficient. But they become costly when it comes to US options. I'm interested in doing Covered Calls on a basket of US stocks. I am sure that US on line brokers offer the best value but I'm (probably totally incorrectly) reluctant to deposit my life savings in America. My first thought is to talk with GNI. Whilst I am doing so I'd be keen to hear from anyone here doing Covered Calls on US stocks and to hear of who they use to operate them. TP
18/2/2003
19:13
sw11: http://boards.fool.co.uk/Message.asp?mid=7749499 does anyone here receive the GNI market reports by email, and what do they think of them?
12/8/2002
16:25
spiretown: Mathewa I to have had problems with GNI slowing down after 2.30 to 3pm over the last 3 to 4 weeks but not to the extent that you have , my problem is the index data feeds freeze and sometimes individual stocks yellow stip prices slow down, in addtion my pc will start to use 100% cpu time all going to the touch software, witch is the only software running on this PC as I have a mini network of 4 PC's and run CMC, ADVFN etc on the other 3 My comms is BT ADSL and the PC is a 1.2g + 512meg ram Win 2k OS I offer a possible explaination for your problems but note I am no expert on this subject, but I wonder if somewhere between you and GNI if the data traffic gets to heavy if its throttled back thus causeing a bottle neck, one reason I say this is that last year BT said that they were going to do just that because of the increase in people useing sites such as GNI,CMC or sites were large volumes of data are streamed to a user who is connected for long periods to the same site , thus using condiderabley bandwith on their network, I beleive that BT backed down because their was such a backlash about it , as people were saying why pay for ADSL if the data feed was going to be throttled back. You could check you data transfer rate at http//www.pcpitstop.com
01/8/2002
15:55
royce: matthewa i run gni and spreadbet on two isdn lines. i first noticed it about two weeks ago when gni prices were behind cmc so just wait for them to upgrade and keep your money,i know one person who went to a private line and its still the same.but i added more memory and that made alot of difference now 700+mb ram.
01/8/2002
15:07
royce: matthewa your not the only one,they sent this out the other night. 30 th July, 2002 The performance of our touch trading system has caused us great concern over the last couple of weeks. The main issue is the general slowdown of the service in the afternoon particularly from 3:00 p.m. to the close of the UK market. One factor is the increasing number of trades (especially programmed trades) being processed by our International desk in Pan European equity markets. GNI’s core trading system (Fidessa) has to throttle execution of trades during peak demand causing some delays to submit, amend and cancel orders. Also with the increasing number of users on the touch system the touch servers are under constant pressure to cope with the high level of requests for price information and volume of price updates (ticks) per stock. Our Fidessa system has been analysed by a consultant from Royalblue and over the weekend of 27 th July we acted on his recommendation to increase the amount of memory in our servers, which has improved capacity during fast market conditions. We also aim to release a new version of touch (version 3.0) by the 30 th August 2002, which will provide improved resilience, reliability and capacity. Longer term we are committed to introducing new and even more efficient hardware that will significantly increase performance. This together with an upgrade to the latest version of trading software running on this hardware will maximise the gains in performance. Please be assured that we will continue to improve the system at the very earliest opportunity. Should you have any queries or require more detailed information please contact the touch Support Desk or your account handler. Kennis Bubb Manager GNI touch Sales and Support GNI Limited Tel: +44 (0) 20 7002 3992 Fax: +44 (0) 20 7002 3995 Email: help@gnitouch.com
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