Buy
Sell
Share Name Share Symbol Market Type Share ISIN Share Description
G4s Plc LSE:GFS London Ordinary Share GB00B01FLG62 ORD 25P
  Price Change % Change Share Price Bid Price Offer Price High Price Low Price Open Price Shares Traded Last Trade
  0.00 0.0% 244.80 245.00 245.10 0.00 00:00:00
Industry Sector Turnover (m) Profit (m) EPS - Basic PE Ratio Market Cap (m)
Support Services 7,758.0 27.0 -5.9 - 3,798

G4S PLC Statement re Review of London Olympic and Paralympic Games Security Contract

28/09/2012 7:10am

UK Regulatory (RNS & others)



 
TIDMGFS 
 
28 September 2012 
 
                                    G4S plc 
 
        REVIEW OF LONDON OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC GAMES SECURITY CONTRACT 
 
The  Board of G4S announces  the principal findings of  its review of the London 
Olympic and Paralympic Games Security Contract (the 'Olympic contract') together 
with  its overall conclusions  and a number  of key actions  arising out of that 
review (the 'Review'). 
 
The key points can be summarised as follows: 
 
  * The  Olympic  contract  was  unique  in  terms  of scale and complexity, but 
    notwithstanding  this, the Company  was capable of  fulfilling the contract; 
    the issue was in its delivery. 
 
 
  * Although the Company recognised the unique and complex nature of the Olympic 
    contract from an early stage, this was not properly reflected in its 
    handling of the contract.  The Company has management and other structures 
    and processes that have proved highly effective in delivering the Company's 
    regular business over many years but it did not recognise these structures 
    and processes needed augmenting for the Olympic contract. 
 
  * The monitoring and tracking of the security workforce, management 
    information and the project management framework and practices were 
    ineffective to address the scale, complexities and dependencies of the 
    Olympic contract.  Together this caused the failure of the Company to 
    deliver the contract requirements in full and resulted in the identification 
    of the key problems at a very late stage. 
 
  * The successful execution of the Home Office/LOCOG contingency plan including 
    deployment  of additional  military and  police together  with a substantial 
    contribution  from the thousands of G4S employees who worked alongside them, 
    led  to a safe and secure games  with continuously positive ratings on venue 
    security from games visitors. 
 
  * The  Board confirms that it  is in the best  interests of the Company and of 
    all  its stakeholders that Nick Buckles should remain Group CEO.  Whilst the 
    CEO  has ultimate responsibility  for the Company's  performance, the Review 
    did  not  identify  significant  shortcomings  in his performance or serious 
    failings attributable to him in connection with the Olympic contract. 
 
 
  * The  Board  has  accepted  the  resignations  of  David  Taylor-Smith, Chief 
    Operating  Officer and  Regional CEO  - UK  and Africa  and of  Ian Horseman 
    Sewell, Managing Director, G4S Global Events. 
 
  * Richard  Morris, currently the Group Managing Director of G4S Care & Justice 
    Services  in the UK, has been appointed as the CEO, UK Region.  Kim Challis, 
    who  currently runs a portfolio of  UK commercial and Government businesses, 
    will  take  on  direct  line  management  responsibility  for all Government 
    businesses  in the UK as  CEO, G4S Government and  Outsourcing Solutions - a 
    new  role created to enhance our focus  on this critically important area of 
    our business. 
 
 
  * The  Group Executive  will also  be strengthened  with the  appointment of a 
    Group  Chief Operating  Officer, who  will work  closely with  the CEO, with 
    responsibilities to include a specific focus on operational procedures, risk 
    management  and quality customer  service and delivery.   The Group COO role 
    will be an external appointment. 
 
  * The contract failings are largely specific to the Olympic contract. However, 
    G4S  will  take  a  number  of  further  actions, learning lessons from this 
    contract,  to  ensure  that  best  practices  are  applied across the entire 
    business.  Actions  will  include:  more  rigorous  risk  assessment for new 
    contracts  and improved  contract take-on  processes and project management. 
    Board  oversight will be enhanced including review and approval of contracts 
    where annual revenues exceed  GBP50m. 
 
  * The  Board will  be strengthened  by the  addition of  at least two new non- 
    executive directors. The recruitment process is underway. 
John Connolly, who joined G4S as Chairman on June 8, said: 
 
"G4S has accepted responsibility for its failure to deliver fully on the Olympic 
contract. We apologise for this and we thank the military and the police for the 
vital roles they played in ensuring the delivery of a safe and secure Games. 
 
Our  Review of  the company's  performance on  this contract  has been extremely 
thorough  and,  whilst  the  failures  are  largely specific to the very special 
nature of this contract, we will learn from mistakes made. We are taking actions 
in  relation to both the management and  governance of G4S to ensure we continue 
to  deliver  the  highest  standards  of  customer service and contract delivery 
across the Group." 
 
For further enquiries, please contact: +44 (0) 1293 554400 
 
Helen Parris     Director of Investor Relations 
 
 Media enquiries: 
 
Adam Mynott     Director of Media Relations     +44 (0) 1293 554400 
 
David Allchurch     Tulchan Group       +44 (0) 20 7353 4200 
Ed Orlebar 
 
Notes to Editors: 
G4S  is  the  world's  leading  international  secure  outsourcing  group, which 
specialises  in outsourced  business processes  and facilities  in sectors where 
security and safety risks are considered a strategic threat. 
 
G4S  is  the  largest  employer  quoted  on  the London Stock Exchange and has a 
secondary stock exchange listing in Copenhagen.  G4S has operations in more than 
125 countries  and  657,000 employees.   For  more  information  on  G4S,  visit 
www.g4s.com. 
G4S plc 
 
                              THE REVIEW FINDINGS 
 
 
 
 1. Introduction 
On  13 July  2012, the  Company  announced  that  the Board would conduct a full 
review  of the  Company's performance  on delivering  the Olympic contract.  The 
Review  has  now  been  completed.   It  was  led  by a senior Company executive 
independent of the UK Region with the assistance of PwC and reported directly to 
the Chairman and the Board. 
 
The objectives of the Review were: 
 
  * to  understand  what  were  the  key  deliverables  under  the  terms of the 
    contract; 
  * to understand in detail what the actual outcomes were, including all the key 
    failings and shortfalls against the contract deliverables; 
  * to  determine what went wrong in the  execution of the contract and timeline 
    of the failures; 
  * to determine why the contract execution issues were not identified on a more 
    timely  basis at  contract team  level, senior  management level  and at the 
    Board level; 
  * to  identify  learnings  and  lessons  around  contract  take  on,  contract 
    execution, monitoring and review processes and risk management generally. 
The  Review  process  included  meetings  with  numerous  members of the Olympic 
project  team including all those in leadership roles, with members of the Group 
management team and the Board, including the Group CEO.  Charles Farr, Director- 
General  of the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism at the Home Office and 
Chair  of the Olympic Security Board, met with the review team to provide input. 
 Pending  completion  of  its  own  contract  audits, LOCOG felt unable to allow 
access to any of its personnel. 
 
 2. The Olympic Contract 
The  Olympic contract was  originally signed in  December 2010.  In broad terms, 
there were three separate deliverables:  deployment of a security workforce; co- 
ordination  of the multiple suppliers providing the combined security workforce; 
and  the management of operational  delivery including recruitment, training and 
logistics  among other activities.  Originally, the Company was only required to 
provide  up to a maximum of  2,000 security personnel but, in December 2011, the 
contract  was varied to increase this number  to 10,400.  The peak number was to 
be  deployed on 1 August 2012 but there was a "ramp up" prior to the Games.  For 
example,  around 750 security officers were deployed up to December 2011, around 
1,500 for  test events and venue  security up to the  end of June 2012 and then, 
with reference to the demand schedules issued by LOCOG, the Company was required 
to   have   approximately   3,500 deployable   security   personnel  on  2 July, 
approximately  7,000 by 18 July and around 8,500 on 27 July.  The contract value 
was approximately  GBP238 million. 
 
 
 
The Olympic contract was very complex.  The G4S workforce was part of an overall 
security  workforce  of  approximately  24,000 people, comprising G4S personnel, 
members  of  HM  Armed  Forces,  participants  from  within the Bridging the Gap 
programme, volunteers and a sub-contractor workforce. 
 
The  security  personnel  were  to  be  deployed over 125 Olympic venues and 72 
Paralympic  venues  and  were  divided  by  reference  to  49 skill requirements 
including  33 specialist skill  requirements.  All  potential security personnel 
had to go through a multiple stage recruitment process. This involved conducting 
more  than 100,000 initial  interviews and  then progressing  candidates through 
detailed  screening, licensing, training  and accreditation.  The  nature of the 
security contract necessarily required heavily back-end loaded time-scales.  The 
Company also had dependencies outside its control that would impact delivery, as 
matters   such   as   pay   rates,   workforce  characteristics,  venue-specific 
requirements,  timely approval of  expenditure and the  supply of personnel from 
Bridging the Gap programme and from sub-contractors were outside its control. 
 
 3. Operating & Management structure 
The  management of the Olympic  project was initially drawn  largely from the UK 
Region's  specialist events  company, but  was increasingly  augmented by senior 
management  from  G4S  Secure  Solutions  (UK)  Limited.  Senior executives Mark 
Hamilton  (Managing  Director  Olympics)  and  Doug  Hewitson, (Group Management 
Director  of G4S Secure Solutions), attended regular project management meetings 
with LOCOG and reported to David Taylor-Smith, Group COO and Regional CEO - UK & 
Africa  who  chaired   a  contract  project  board which was established to have 
continuous contract oversight.  Mr Taylor-Smith reported on contract progress at 
monthly   Group  Executive  meetings  where  he  was  the  member  with  overall 
responsibility  for oversight of the Olympic  project with the objective that it 
was  delivered  on  time  and  in  line  with  budget.   The  Board of Directors 
considered  progress at each  of its meetings  based upon reports  from the CEO. 
 Ian  Horseman Sewell  was the  Account Director  responsible for  the Company's 
overall commercial relationship with LOCOG. 
 
 4. Contract Performance 
The  Company failed to deploy sufficient workforce numbers throughout the "ramp- 
up"  period starting 1 July and during  the Olympic Games.  A security workforce 
of  around 3,500 was  specified as  being required  on 2 July 2012 but only some 
2,500 were  deployable.  At this date,  Mr Taylor-Smith assumed complete day-to- 
day  responsibility for contract  delivery and introduced  a large number of new 
senior  executives into  the team  with the  immediate aim  of understanding and 
rectifying the delivery shortfall. 
 
By  10 July, a  workforce of  around 4,500 was  specified as being required, but 
only  around 3,000 were available.  Following the  notification to LOCOG and the 
Home  Office on 11 July that the Company could no longer guarantee to meet fully 
the  resource requirements, the Home Office/LOCOG contingency plan was launched. 
 The Company then informed the Home Office and LOCOG that it expected to be able 
to  provide  7,000 personnel  at  the  peak  date compared with a requirement of 
10,400.  On  1 August, the peak date,  approximately 7,800 G4S security officers 
were supplied. 
 
 
 
Ultimately,  the Company delivered  just 80% of the  required shifts by security 
personnel  across the entire  Olympic project duration  including the Paralympic 
Games.  Some aspects of the Olympic contract were performed well (e.g. logistics 
and  training) and LOCOG confirmed it was  happy with the quality and conduct of 
the security personnel provided by the Company.  G4S delivered substantially all 
of  its commitment in relation to the transition period between the Olympics and 
the  Paralympic Games and to the  Paralympic Games themselves, which enabled the 
additional  military personnel  deployed during  the Olympic  Games to  be stood 
down. 
 
The  military and the police,  together with thousands of  G4S employees, made a 
substantial contribution to the delivery of a safe and secure Games. 
 
 5. Loss on the Contract 
As  previously stated in the half yearly results announcement for the six months 
ended  30 June 2012, G4S estimates that the loss on the Olympic contract will be 
in the region of  GBP50m and this amount has been provided for at the half year and 
taken  as an exceptional item.  This estimate is based  on the Company's current 
expectation  of the  financial outcome  including reasonable  estimates of costs 
where  at this date there is still  uncertainty. This estimate is based upon the 
following: 
 
  * The  additional costs relating  to the deployment  of the increased military 
    and  police personnel based upon available  information. At the current date 
    the  Company has not been  advised of the actual  cost, but confirms that it 
    will  meet the  additional costs  in line  with the  commitment G4S  made in 
    July. 
  * The  Company's estimates of potential penalties and contractual liabilities; 
    and 
  * The  additional  costs  relating  to  the  provision  of  increased internal 
    resource to deliver the contract. 
The final contract loss will be impacted by the actual cost of the military and 
police deployment and by the outcome of negotiations in respect of potential 
penalties and contractual liabilities. The British taxpayer will not bear any 
additional costs. 
 
 6. The Review Findings 
The  Review  has  concluded  that  the  contract  was unique and complex and the 
Company's performance needs to be viewed against this background. The Review has 
found, however, that the Company was capable of fulfilling the Olympic contract. 
   There were  a series  of project  management and  project execution failings. 
 There was no single reason for the failure to deliver the contract commitments. 
The  failings are largely associated with  the specific nature and complexity of 
this  contract, which  was markedly  different to  any other project or contract 
undertaken  by the  G4S Group.  Although the  Company recognised  the unique and 
complex  nature  of  the  Olympic  contract  from  an  early stage, this was not 
properly  reflected in its handling of the contract.  The Company has management 
and  other  structures  and  processes  that  have  proved  highly  effective in 
delivering  the  Company's  regular  business  over  many  years  but it did not 
recognise  that these structures and processes needed augmenting for the Olympic 
contract. 
 
The  Review  has  identified  two  major  failings  together  with  a  number of 
significant contributory factors. 
 
Major  failing 1:  The  monitoring and  tracking of  the security  workforce was 
inadequate during the various recruitment, training and accreditation phases and 
the   management   information   put   in  place  to  track  the  workforce  was 
disaggregated. 
 
The  process  through  which  potential  security  personnel had to progress was 
complex  and involved  many stages  including recruitment,  screening, training, 
accreditation  and  deployment  by  reference  to  many  skill requirements. The 
indicative  analysis performed as part of the review of the workforce numbers at 
the  beginning of  July suggests  that the  principal reason  for the difference 
between  the numbers of people  thought to be deployable  by the Company and the 
numbers  actually deployable was that many recruits had not completed all of the 
stag es of the process. 
 
Originally,  it  was  intended  to  adopt  a  sequential management of the steps 
through which recruits were processed, however, delays and complexities resulted 
in  it being recognised that a  concurrent management approach was necessary.  A 
serious  problem then arose because the management information failed to monitor 
the  aggregated process.  The  large numbers of  people being taken through each 
stage  of the process gave a  sense of comfort that all  was well, but failed to 
identify  the extent to which individuals were actually deployable having passed 
through  all the required stages. The problem  was not, however, the result of a 
failure  in  any  of  the  Company's  core  IT  systems,  but  one of inadequate 
marshalling and interpretation of data from multiple sources. 
 
One   serious   consequence  of  this  was  that  the  project  management  team 
continuously  reported through to the Group Executive  and to the Board that the 
required  workforce numbers  would be  met and  it was  only at  the time of the 
significant   "ramp-up"   from  1 July  that  the  inherent  inaccuracy  in  the 
information was identified, when looked at on an aggregated basis. 
 
Major   failing   2:  The   project  management  framework  and  practices  were 
ineffective to address the scale, complexities and dependencies of the contract. 
 
The  uniqueness and complexity of the contract  were recognised, but there was a 
lack  of understanding and true appreciation as to the scale and exact nature of 
the  project and hence  a failure to  plan appropriately and  to manage risk and 
report  effectively  against  key  objectives.   Thus,  for  example,  whilst  a 
feasibility  assessment was performed  during contract acceptance  to assess the 
deliverability  of 10,400 security  personnel, the  underlying assumptions (e.g. 
that  screening and vetting  would take 3 weeks  when in fact  it took up to 12 
weeks),  which were  central to  this assessment  were not properly incorporated 
into  the project management framework. As  a result, the direct consequences of 
these underlying assumptions not being borne out were not appreciated. 
 
More generally, the Olympic contract was not treated as a stand-alone project in 
terms of management approach. The Olympic contract was managed, largely, through 
the  normal management  structure of  the events  company and  no individual was 
clearly  positioned as the  overall Programme Director.  This led to ineffective 
management of programme processes across multiple work streams. 
 
Contributory factors 
 
As  indicated, in addition to  the major failings, there  were a number of other 
factors which contributed to the Company's overall performance. 
 
Contributory factor 1:  The project plan was inadequate. 
 
Ultimately, the project plan proved deficient as it failed to manage performance 
against  the key deliverables in pursuit of the project's fundamental objective, 
which  was  to  deliver  a  'ready  to  deploy'  security workforce in the right 
numbers, with the right skills, to the right venues on the right day. 
 
Other  issues  that  arose  from  the  lack  of  an appropriate plan include the 
continual  slippage  allowed  on  tasks  in  the programme.  The effect was that 
allowing  activities to  slip, when  no critical  path and task dependencies had 
been defined, meant that the impact of slippage in a single task did not clearly 
indicate  the potential knock  on effect on  other tasks or  on the project as a 
whole. 
 
There  was also  an acceptance  of changes  from the  client without appropriate 
challenge even though there was a clear, contractual, change management process. 
 For  example, a revised demand  schedule was issued by  LOCOG, but this was not 
formally  accepted by the Company  and, as a result,  LOCOG and G4S subsequently 
reported  against  different  targets,  not  only  in terms of overall workforce 
numbers, but also the numbers by venue and specialist skill requirement. 
 
 
Contributory  factor 2:  A failure  to act decisively  on early signals (delays, 
invalid assumptions, customer concerns) did not allow for early risk mitigation. 
 
The  Review has not uncovered  any suggestion that people  within the Company or 
others  were wilfully withholding information.  Before  early July, there was no 
obvious  single moment or issue that indicated  the scale of the problems, which 
were  subsequently  experienced.   Throughout  the  life of the project, various 
issues  were raised in the  project team and escalated  to the Company's Olympic 
Project  Board for discussion  and decision.  However,  the impact those various 
issues were having on the overall programme was not fully recognised.  Moreover, 
issues were also discussed in isolation with the result that the full picture as 
to the overall risk to delivery was unclear. 
 
An  example  of  this  was  the  increasing  backlog  of unanswered queries from 
prospective  recruits who  were trying  to engage  with the  Company in order to 
ascertain their status within the recruitment process. 
 
The  Review has concluded that inadequate  communication with recruits was not a 
major  contributing factor  to the  eventual shortfall  in numbers. However, the 
volume  of unanswered  emails and  extended response  times to phone calls might 
have not only indicated problems with the recruitment process, but also the risk 
of  an  increasing  detachment  from  (and  potential alienation of) prospective 
recruits,  which  might  hinder  effective  deployment  at  the  back-end of the 
process. 
 
Contributory  factor 3:  Lack of sufficient review by persons independent of the 
process to oversee/quality assure progress 
 
There  was an insufficient level of independent review and assurance in light of 
the  fact that the project was identified at  the outset as 'high risk' and also 
as  being unique in  terms of its  scale and complexity.  Furthermore, the 'high 
risk'  nature of the Olympic contract was heightened by the significant increase 
in  the  security  workforce  requirement  from  December 2011 and the resultant 
substantially increased contract value and accelerated timeline. 
 
In  light of the categorisation as 'high risk', the Board sought regular updates 
as to progress.  However, these were made without reference to a set of headings 
appropriately   focused   on   risk  factors  associated  with  recruitment  and 
mobilisation.   The failure of the senior management associated with the project 
to recognise adequately the early warning signs and their aggregate impact meant 
that  the reporting and escalation  did not allow the  Board to appreciate fully 
the project's actual progress or performance of the Olympic contract. 
 
Contributory factor 4: There was no overall and continuous ownership of the risk 
management process. 
 
The  risk  management  process  governing  the  Olympic  contract  did not fully 
differentiate  "real risks" from  the many less  significant contract challenges 
and did not clearly define owners and mitigation strategies for each risk. 
 
While  the unique and complex  nature of the contract  was considered during the 
contract  take-on phase this  did not then  effectively influence how risks were 
identified,  planned and managed during  the mobilisation phase.  In particular, 
the  dependencies that existed  with LOCOG (e.g.  in relation to  setting of pay 
rates,  the timing of the delivery  of demand schedules, operating practices for 
training  and  provision  of  bridging  the  gap  resource)  were  not  properly 
identified. 
 
Third party reports 
 
The  Company has  now learned  that four  independent reports  relating to venue 
security  were  commissioned  by  the  Home  Office  and/or LOCOG.  One of these 
reports,  "The Deloitte Report", was commissioned by LOCOG in April 2012 and the 
report was passed to G4S. However, the other three reports were not disclosed to 
G4S.   Two  of  these  reports  were  commissioned  by  the Home Office from Her 
Majesty's  Inspectorate of Constabulary ("HMIC")  in September 2011 and February 
2012 and the third was an Internal Audit Report produced by KPMG for LOCOG. 
 
The  Home Affairs Select Committee expressed  surprise that all the reports were 
not  shared more  widely with  relevant parties,  and said  that "it may well be 
that,  had this been done,  the potential scale of  the problems might have been 
realised  earlier". Unquestionably, the HMIC  reports indicate matters that were 
of  importance and, in particular,  the delays and other  issues that formed the 
background to the execution of the Olympic contract. However, the Board's Review 
has  concluded that the failure to disclose these reports to the Company was not 
a  significant  contributory  factor  to  the  Company's  failure to perform the 
Olympic contract. 
 
 
 
 7. Actions 
The  Board of  G4S has  considered the  findings of  the Review  and is taking a 
series of actions in the light of them: 
 
  * The  Review  has  identified  serious  failings  but  these failings are not 
    attributable  to the CEO, Nick Buckles.  The  Board has concluded that it is 
    in  the best  interests of  the Company  and all  its stakeholders  for Nick 
    Buckles to remain as CEO. 
 
 
  * The  Board  has  accepted  the  resignations  of  David  Taylor-Smith, Chief 
    Operating  Officer and  Regional CEO  - UK  and Africa  and of  Ian Horseman 
    Sewell, Managing Director, G4S Global Events. 
 
 
  * Richard  Morris, currently the Group Managing Director of G4S Care & Justice 
    Services  in the UK, has been appointed as the CEO, UK Region.  Kim Challis, 
    who  currently runs a portfolio of  UK commercial and Government businesses, 
    will  take  on  direct  line  management  responsibility  for all Government 
    businesses  in the UK as  CEO, G4S Government and  Outsourcing Solutions - a 
    new  role created to enhance our focus  on this critically important area of 
    our business. 
 
 
  * Recognising  the scale and growth ambitions of G4S, and having regard to the 
    lessons  learned from  the issues  with the  Olympic contract,  a new senior 
    management  role  will  be  added  to  the  Group  Executive  team  with the 
    appointment  of a  Group Chief  Operating Officer  (COO), which  shall be an 
    external  appointment.   The  COO  and  the  Regional  CEOs and other senior 
    corporate  executives will report to the CEO.  The COO will support the CEO, 
    with   particular  emphasis  on  the  exercise  of  rigorous  controls  over 
    operational  procedures, risk management, major contract take on and quality 
    of customer service and delivery. 
 
 
  * The  Olympic contract failings are largely specific to the Olympic contract. 
    However,  G4S will take a  number of actions, learning  the lessons from the 
    Olympic  contract,  to  ensure  that  best  practices are applied across the 
    entire  business. In particular  it will put  in place steps  to implement a 
    more  rigorous, up-front  process to  assess the  complexities and  risks of 
    contracts  and  projects  and  consider  the consistency and robustness with 
    which  its  project  management  methodologies  and  practices  address  the 
    monitoring and direction of contracts. 
 
 
  * With  a view to ensuring  that its own oversight  of the Company is enhanced 
    the  Board  will  in  future  require  new contracts with annual revenues in 
    excess  of  GBP50m to be presented to the Board for consideration and approval. 
    The  Board review will focus on adherence with Company standards around risk 
    assessment and project management. 
 
 
  * The  Board will review and refresh its  mandate for the Group Risk Committee 
    which will be chaired by the new COO and report to the CEO and to the Board. 
 
 
 
  * The  Board will  be strengthened  by the  addition of  at least two new non- 
    executive directors. The recruitment process is underway. 
Concluding comment 
 
The  Board considers that the lessons learned from this contract failure and the 
actions  taken will  improve the  Group's processes  around contract take on and 
execution  and the Group's risk management processes.  This will ensure that G4S 
continues to deliver globally, the highest quality customer service. 
 
 
 
 
This announcement is distributed by Thomson Reuters on behalf of 
Thomson Reuters clients. The owner of this announcement warrants that: 
(i) the releases contained herein are protected by copyright and 
    other applicable laws; and 
(ii) they are solely responsible for the content, accuracy and 
     originality of the information contained therein. 
 
Source: G4S plc UK  DK via Thomson Reuters ONE 
[HUG#1644451] 
 

1 Year G4s Chart

1 Year G4s Chart

1 Month G4s Chart

1 Month G4s Chart
Your Recent History
LSE
GFS
G4s
Register now to watch these stocks streaming on the ADVFN Monitor.

Monitor lets you view up to 110 of your favourite stocks at once and is completely free to use.

Log in to ADVFN
Register Now

By accessing the services available at ADVFN you are agreeing to be bound by ADVFN's Terms & Conditions

P: V:gb D:20230127 18:02:35