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| Share Name | Share Symbol | Market | Stock Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Clarkson Plc | CKN | London | Ordinary Share |
| Price Change | Price Change % | Share Price | Last Trade
|
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| -25.00 | -0.62% | 4,020.00 | 10:43:00 |
| Open Price | Low Price | High Price | Close Price | Previous Close |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4,005.00 | 4,005.00 | 4,030.00 | 4,045.00 |
| Industry Sector |
|---|
| INDUSTRIAL TRANSPORTATION |
| Top Posts |
|---|
Posted at 13/12/2023 08:39 by harry davis My pleasure. I am expecting Clarkson to beat expectations this year with 237p of EPS forecast and 134p delivered in the first half so we should get a robust trading statement in the first fortnight of January. It is amazing that more investors are not attuned to Clarkson because it has been a stunning long term stock. Jp Morgan recently bumped their target price to 3950p |
Posted at 17/5/2022 20:17 by mount teide Clarkson (CKN) - World's largest Shipbroker - the Apple and Exxon of their industry.Sanctioning of Russian oil has put a rocket under already very healthy Oil Tanker rates, propelling the ClarkSea Index to new highs, now double the 10-year average. Shipping’s tremendous start to 2022 is reaping huge profits across all the main sectors for the first time in many, many years. The ClarkSea Index created by Clarkson Research in 1990 has always been a wonderful barometer of shipping's fortunes and the health of the global economy. It is the weighted index of oil tanker, dry bulk carrier, containership and LNG carrier earnings. The Clarksea Index after bottoming with oil and copper in 2016 after a torrid 7/8 year cyclical downturn which saw it bottom over 90% down, recorded its highest annual average in 2021 since the boom peak of 2008. The charter rate good times rolled into 2022, and have become testosterone fuelled by the impact on global freight and O&G flows of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The ClarkSea Index has averaged $38,000 per day in the opening 4 months of the year, a 32% improvement over 2021’s average of $28,700 a day, and is now more than double the 10-year average. Trends in the container sector have continued in “spectacular vein”, Clarksons reported in its latest report while bulk carriers have registered the strongest start to a year since 2008 at $22,880 a day, up 28% year-on-year. However, it is in the tanker sector that earnings are seeing the most pronounced turnaround, helping propel the overall index still higher. In the first half of April average tanker earnings have jumped to around $40,000 a day, in the top 10% of all values since 1990, and are a dramatic improvement compared to an average of around $8,000 a day between mid-2020 and February 2022. As with the spectacular impact of 2022's average Brent oil price of $110 on the FCF generation of the O&G sector, the impact of the shipping sector's highest freight/charter rates since the peak of the last commodity/shipping cycle in 2008, are yet to be reported in the sector's results giving investors a chance to front run the smart money. AIMHO/DYOR Declaration: I have held a major portfolio holding in Clarkson since 2000, and believe the current valuation is a buying opportunity considering the scale of leveraged exposure they have to more than decade high ship charter rates across the 4 main shipping sectors, as the world's leading shipbroker. Clarkson's ship-broking decision earns a fixed percentage of the ship charter rate - the higher the Clarksea Index and Baltic Dry Index, the more Clarkson's earnings resemble the top end of an exponential curve, since their costs are largely fixed! |
Posted at 07/5/2019 08:47 by shiv1986 ADVFN is hosting an investor event for a firm within Industrial Transportation; Avation plc, on the 21st May to find out about their future prospects.Sign up to attend this event: |
Posted at 13/8/2018 12:17 by mount teide As expected, with the Baltic Dry Index rising close to 50% since Q1/2018, the world's largest shipbroker Clarkson's has experienced a stronger Q2/2018 across most of its main shipbroking and sale&purchase markets.The oil tanker market although still the exception is now seeing green shoots, moving up strongly off multi year lows; vessel charter rates have increased by over 100% since the start of Q3/2018 which should bode well for H2/2018 and 2019. Likewise the oil services sector, also recently made a bottom and entered a new cyclical recovery phase following a brutal 5 year recession which brought the industry to its knees. Clarkson's highly expensive takeover of Platou some 3 years ago - a specialist oil tanker and oil services sector shipbroker - could not have been more badly judged/timed but, following an awful post acquisition period should now start to generate better news and results going forward. Oil tanker rates dropped over 10 fold peak to trough following Clarkson's takeover of Platou and the oil services sector completely collapsed, with large sections of many major fleets put in to long term lay-up. With many sectors of the shipping markets forecast to be at/close to a demand/supply balance for the first time in a nearly a decade in 2019, I'm maintaining my earlier target of a £100 Clarkson share price by 2023/25 as the shipping markets continue to strengthen into this new shipping /commodity cycle recovery stage, which like all previous recovery stages will come with the high stomach churning volatility these markets are renown for. The shipping and commodity markets may not be for the fainthearted, widows or orphans perhaps - but for those with the constitution to withstand the volatility, with careful stock selection the once in every 15-20 year recovery/boom stage of these long term, highly cyclical markets offer investors the opportunity of tremendous multi year outperformance compared to the wider market indexes. |
Posted at 12/3/2018 14:54 by walbrock82 Clarkson’s results are as expected, with sales slightly higher than expected, but profits lower. (Please ignore the adjusted profits because acquisition costs are part of doing business, not a one-off expense!)The real question is: “Are the shares expensive at current valuation?” As a value investor, yes, it is. Should you be selling the shares? Yes, but on a short-term basis. So, why the shares expensive? When it was a growth company in the late 90s and in early 2000s, earnings were growing at double digit (around 10%-12%) when PE multiple is around 10 times. After 2010, earnings growth slowed to 4%, and PE is trading at 30 times and forward-PE of 27 times in 2018! Therefore, a CORRECTION of 30%-35% is reasonable which will take the shares to £22 per share or PE of 20 times. For more reasons, why Clarkson will see its shares fall |
Posted at 05/7/2016 18:48 by clarksons1 The Shipping Finance Crisis - P Slater CEO First International - 23 June 2016It is now clear that the demands for shipping services are way below the availability of the fleets of existing ships in most sectors. While the tanker markets remain finely balanced, as the price of crude oil does not seem to affect demand, orders for new crude carriers are cause for concern. The dry-bulk and container sectors are grossly over-tonnaged causing most companies in these sectors to record growing losses. Most financial analysts and some major shipbrokers now concede that this shipping crisis will continue through the remainder of this decade and maybe well into the next one. The publicly traded shipping companies provide a window of information on the crisis, but represent less than 25% of total fleet capacity, and are the area where most of the new equity has been invested and lost. Other companies which are subsidiaries of major industrial companies such as Maersk, Mitsubishi, Hyundai and the Oil Majors, do not publish detailed financial statements but some have recorded financial problems with their fleets. The Asian shipbuilders are in deep trouble with capacity down by over 50% and the volume of ships on order is at a level last seen in the late nineties. The Chinese will continue to support their shipbuilders, as part of its plan to keep freight rates down on its primary routes, by building new ships for Chinese owners or those chartering ships to Chinese companies. Thus the shipping industry has reverted to its traditional structure with large private owners and the industrial groups contracting for ship charters on terms that are rarely published, while the new public companies fight for business in the spot markets. Estimates show that more than $50 billion from Private Equity and Hedge Funds has been invested in the public companies. Another $50 billion has been invested in Germany by the German KGs. These equity funds were supplemented by huge levels of bank finance which was recklessly lent with no secure income streams in place. The German shipping crisis has created more than $50 billion of non-performing loans in the German banks and an estimate of a similar level of losses in the KG funds. Estimates of the total bank losses exceed $100billion. The publicly traded shipping companies are today hardly solvent, generating revenues that barely cover vessel operating expenses, do not cover debt service or generate cash reserves for essential maintenance, and are in many cases managed by the investor funds that do not understand how shipping works. Also the fundamental financial fact is that ships are depreciating assets that have operating lives that rarely exceed 20 years. The GAP accounting rules depreciate the ships over 25 years and the NAV is therefore not in line with true values and in this crisis the market values are invariably below NAV. This summary identifies the crisis but the cause is mostly self-inflicted. The Chinese industrial boom of the last decade was always temporary and with the appointment of a new government in 2010 the excesses of the previous one were revealed and steps taken to re-balance the economy and centralize controls again away from the Regions. The shipping industry, fueled by huge amounts of new risk capital and careless bank debt, embarked on a new-building program that enlarged fleet capacity by more than 50% in the dry-cargo and container sectors and by 30% in the products carrier sector. Large orders for new deep-ocean oil rigs and fleets of offshore supply ships combined, with the ships, to fill the world’s shipyards through 2010. By the time most of these ships were delivered it was obvious that the China boom was over and along with the banking crisis the global economies were heading for another recession. As the share prices of the public companies dropped more Funds entered the markets buying on the false assumption that ship prices would recover to the heady levels of the last decade. This ignored the fact that voyage revenues were not covering all the operating costs, including maintenance and repair, or generating cash reserves to meet fleet replacement costs. Ship values continued to decline but instead of closing out the risks by selling the ships, various forms of restructuring were instigated by the Funds which served only to compound the problems. These included: - more Secured Debt; Perpetual Preferred Equity and Reverse Stock Splits, all designed to keep the companies afloat while effectively wiping out the original equity. As the Funds had no experience or way of increasing voyage revenues they focused on operating expenses, but have adopted measures that can seriously affect the safety and reliability of the ships. These measures include: cheap or under-paid crews; little or no spare parts on-board; minimal maintenance and no cash reserves for statutory dry-dockings. The Head of one large dry-cargo company, and an ex-banker, recently boasted the he had got costs down to $4,000 per ship per day. To which one major Greek shipowner commented “which part of the ship is he running?” Comparatively the Chairman of Nordic American Tankers also stated that his operating costs were $11,000pd. He is a long term shipping expert who does understand the industry. Consolidation has also been trumpeted but so far the largest one in the dry-cargo sector is a disaster and will likely end in total collapse. Like restructuring these activities generate huge legal and banking fees and so far fail to generate increased revenues. Charterers are increasingly unwilling to fix ships from most of the public companies on anything more than voyage charters, yet some of the dry-cargo companies still report period charters at rates that fail to cover costs. The solution is to sell the ships that are not financially viable before their running costs increase and their values decline further with age, pay off the secured debt and distribute the balance, if any, to the equity holders. This needs to be done soon and certainly by the end of this year as the public share prices continue to decline and the global economic outlook is gloomy. |
Posted at 04/3/2016 09:11 by postiga08 They release their results then. I believe that they've done quite well, given the market, and that will give confidence to investors |
Posted at 21/11/2015 17:07 by mount teide Market timing? - current shipping industry fundamentals and Clarkson's Clarksea Index may offer shipping investors some clues as to where the industry is in the current market cycle.The Clarksea Index is a measure of the four main shipping sectors: dry bulk, oil tankers, gas tankers and containers - and is perhaps a more reliable guide as to the overall health of the industry than the more narrow dry bulk index, the worst performing sector currently by some margin. |
Posted at 04/11/2015 07:16 by suetballs As a fairly new investor all a bit disappointing - a sub £15 share price would not please me.Suet |
Posted at 25/8/2011 22:59 by amitkoth Have you considered how many top notch/super-major FTSE 100's and Dow co's are trading under a P/E of 9 atm?If one really had to park money somewhere, there's much safer/larger plays out there imo. This is a bit cyclical and not that predictable. Investors pay for the future, not for what's on the balance sheet, which can quickly get gobbled up by fixed costs or bad acquisitions. Further, even if they have mounds of cash - I can't see where they'd invest to make it work harder. Any ideas? Lots of cash earning very little interest is not a great business. Also - how much sales people are compensated is a bit opaque. If they return cash to shareholders, that's also not great news. It tells me that they have nowhere to get the cash to work and produce higher ROCE. Looks toppy on the big scale. Notice the size of the drop on bad news. All imo of course. Great company nonetheless in its existing businesses, and will keep a watch. |
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