Panel Clears 737 MAX's Safety-Approval Process at FAA -- 2nd Update

By Andy Pasztor and Doug Cameron 

A federal advisory panel evaluating the safety-approval process for Boeing Co.'s 737 MAX concluded regulators adhered to policies in certifying the plane and determined it wouldn't have been safer if it had received the scrutiny of an all-new aircraft.

Lee Moak, co-chair of the independent committee set up last year, declined to identify mistakes made during certification of the now-grounded jets, instead describing current procedures as "appropriate and effective."

Previous reports by outside experts have sharply criticized the Federal Aviation Administration's approval process, and the agency itself has acknowledged errors. The FAA and various investigative agencies and safety experts have all said lapses in both engineering and procedural issues led to two fatal MAX crashes in less than five months that killed 346 people.

Mr. Moak, former head of the largest North American pilots union, told reporters his panel concluded an overhaul of the process isn't warranted. The panel provided its initial report Thursday.

Citing "thorough work by aviation professionals" involved in clearing the MAX to enter service in 2017, Mr. Moak urged the FAA to push ahead with delegating additional certification authority to Boeing and other aircraft manufacturers.

The report also calls for enhancing FAA-sponsored safety-management techniques, along with increasing the size and experience of the FAA staff.

The thrust of the latest study, commissioned nine months ago by Transportation Secretary Elaine Chao, differs from earlier panels' findings as well as bipartisan comments from senators and members of the House calling for reversing decades of increased delegation of such FAA oversight to industry.

"It would be the height of irresponsibility to leave the [delegation] system as is and just hope for the best," Democratic Rep. Peter DeFazio of Oregon, chairman of the House Transportation Committee, said Wednesday.

With the MAX's grounding likely to stretch into late spring, Boeing's new management is scrambling to rebuild trust among airline customers and international regulators.

Thursday's report and press conference largely endorsed the way the MAX was certified as safe to fly. That conclusion is at odds with recent findings by other advisory groups, testimony at congressional hearings and statements by Boeing itself, which has acknowledged shortcomings in the certification process.

The five-member panel didn't lay out technical slip-ups or mistaken design assumptions on the part of the FAA or Boeing. It concluded that the FAA properly followed its own regulations and processes in approving the plane, and exerted appropriate oversight on MCAS, the automated flight-control system that misfired and put both jets into fatal nosedives.

Reaction to the latest report by some victims' families was immediate. Michael Stumo, whose daughter was killed in one of the accidents, said the document is "divorced from reality" and "endorses the FAA as paper pushers without technical expertise and direct oversight."

Through a spokesman, FAA Chief Steve Dickson -- who has publicly blasted Boeing for pressuring his staff to accelerate approval of MAX software fixes and pilot training changes -- said, "The agency will carefully consider the committee's work, along with the recommendations identified in various investigative reports and other analyses."

A Boeing spokesman said, "We will study these recommendations closely, as we continue to work with government and industry stakeholders to enhance the certification process."

Mr. Moak said the panel, as part of its deliberations, didn't consider a batch of recently released internal Boeing employee messages that ridiculed regulators, misled airlines and portrayed a cavalier attitude toward safety. Lawmakers have said the messages show Boeing employees sought to hide important safety issues and trick regulators world-wide.

The panel -- also headed by retired Air Force Gen. Darren McDew -- urged stepped-up analysis of human factors that could lead pilots in the cockpit to behave differently than existing assumptions, in line with earlier recommendations by other groups.

The MAX's certification was the 13th time the FAA has updated and extended its original approval for the 737 family of jets, originally approved in 1967.

The panel said interviews with industry and government experts found a clear consensus that evaluating the MAX as an all-new aircraft wouldn't have produced "more rigorous scrutiny" or "a safer airplane." Lawmakers and other FAA critics have reached conclusions at odds with those points.

In two of its potentially most significant recommendations, the panel urged earlier and greater involvement of FAA pilots and agency training experts in aircraft design considerations. And it urged the FAA to step up efforts to promote enhanced pilot qualifications as it locks in minimum training requirements for new jetliners.

Write to Andy Pasztor at [e-mail] and Doug Cameron at [e-mail]

(END) Dow Jones Newswires

January 16, 2020 18:20 ET (23:20 GMT)

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