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TRIN Trinity Exploration & Production Plc

40.00
0.00 (0.00%)
28 Mar 2024 - Closed
Delayed by 15 minutes
Share Name Share Symbol Market Type Share ISIN Share Description
Trinity Exploration & Production Plc LSE:TRIN London Ordinary Share GB00BN7CJ686 ORD USD0.01
  Price Change % Change Share Price Shares Traded Last Trade
  0.00 0.00% 40.00 35,759 08:00:28
Bid Price Offer Price High Price Low Price Open Price
39.00 41.00 40.00 40.00 40.00
Industry Sector Turnover Profit EPS - Basic PE Ratio Market Cap
  -
Last Trade Time Trade Type Trade Size Trade Price Currency
16:14:15 O 250 40.475 GBX

Trinity Exploration & Pr... (TRIN) Latest News

Trinity Exploration & Pr... (TRIN) Discussions and Chat

Trinity Exploration & Pr... Forums and Chat

Date Time Title Posts
28/3/202421:43Trinity: OIL PRODUCER 20207,276
21/3/202410:36Trinity Exploration - bickering thread 20203,641
08/3/202116:06Trinity Going to 1p3
10/12/202021:46Trinity Exploration & Production 20188,953
02/4/201915:49Trinity Exploration & Production PLC6,470

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Trinity Exploration & Pr... (TRIN) Most Recent Trades

Trade Time Trade Price Trade Size Trade Value Trade Type
2024-03-28 16:14:1640.48250101.19O
2024-03-28 15:42:3940.50800324.00O
2024-03-28 15:17:2440.0010,0004,000.00O
2024-03-28 12:06:5040.691,175478.08O
2024-03-28 12:06:4939.241,229482.26O

Trinity Exploration & Pr... (TRIN) Top Chat Posts

Top Posts
Posted at 29/2/2024 10:49 by nocents
The difficulty now is the return to lack of communication. We should hear Q1results in April and FY in May. But the absolutely laughable share price reflects lack of confidence in management decisions and what they promise. Why are we not updated re. the pump or the Jacobin upper strata testing for production? I am not sure that change of management is the panacea. It may be. I don’t know. No matter what we do, we can’t seem to get them to communicate on a real-time basis though.
I have emailed Vigo, but even this never used to happen!! Trinity would answer emails personally. This hands-off approach is pure defensiveness.
I think sinking back to 40p just brings out the grinch. Trinity’s slump( after personal massive losses in 4D and Ncyt) have changed life this end dramatically.
Jacobin was sold in a great fanfare as a 63% appraisal well. Looking back, how amateurish that was.
2024 could just be dead-zone without some kind of action. I hold a twelfth in value of 2018. Losses have devastated life and more importantly health. For the first time in 10 years, I have lost confidence in the company and, although I may well be talking tripe, I would consider any action whatsoever if I thought it could revive the share price….and along with it, life and mental health.
So, it seems to be just a waiting game but not sure what we are waiting for. I doubt news of a farm-in for Galeota is imminent. At this price, how foolhardy to self-fund Galeota. Risk would go through the roof. No onshore drills( so much for Hummingbirds). BA not until next year I would say. April results would reflect no hedging, no spt at all and a good realized price around $68. May results ..we know already. If Jacobin were going to pay for itself, it would be yielding something. It is March. Why do we know nothing( except for a pump)?
According to asset value, we should be at £2.
40p. What is going to change this?
Newlands? Segel? Winther? Castro? Etc. They need to unite to bring about change. I don’t believe they are inactive, but , as ACQ says, are we past the point of no return here? Do they need to bring radical change if no clear plan is in sight??
I need the share price to rise 200% just to break even. Life has become unexpectedly very tough , and I am not sure I see any clues ahead as to the way forward, apart from the spt bonus. That won’t bring us back. News of a partner( anyone interested?? Hello Perenco!!) . ANY news on Jacobin whatsoever. Any communication would be nice!
“ Shareholders of the world unite” K.Marx revisited
I may be wrong about much I write. But we sit below the 55p (5.5p) of Covid Lockdown and at the level in 2016 when Trinity was on the road to Administration!
So where to from here. Communicate please, Trinity.
Posted at 25/2/2024 20:25 by andrewbyles
Shareholders have suffered the most as a consequence of the substantial fall in Trinity’s share price, but that fall has affected the directors too.

First, Jeremy Bridglalsingh owns 565,591 shares, James Menzies owns 115,000 shares and Nick Clayton owns 30,000 shares. Angus Winther, who stepped down at the 2023 AGM, owns 3,213,299 shares (8.10% of the company). Since January 2023, the value of their shareholdings has fallen by about £450,000, £91,000, £18,000 and £2.55 million respectively. Further, David Segel was a director until February 2022 and his family trusts have lost about £3 million since January 2023.

Second, a generous package of long term share incentives was awarded to the executives in 2017. As the 2023 Annual Report explains, “The final vesting of the 2017 One Off Award was due to occur on 30 June 2022. However, as the three-month average VWAP to 30 June 2022 of 130.Op was below that prevailing at 30 June 2021 the remaining 1,214,744 unvested options lapsed.” Had the required targets been met, those shares would have vested at zero cost to management and would have been worth at least £1,579,000 (assuming that the share price had to be at least 130p). Further, at the current share price it’s unlikely that any of the outstanding a LTSIs are vest-able. Moreover, considering production levels and the share price, it’s unlikely bonuses are payable.

If management wants more than their base salaries, they need to get the share price and production up.
Posted at 25/2/2024 19:43 by aqc888
If Trinity were a house it would be a worn out old shack on some prime real estate.
The discussions over whether management can maximise returns are now as pointless as talking to a builder about whether to repair the roof of the Trinity shack or improve the insulation etc.
Forget it. The only serious value shareholders will now see is the sale of Trinity or a substantial part. The management took their opportunity to create value and have failed with the share price hitting crazy lows. The management have not decisively exploited these lows by buying shares themselves, and have thereby sealed their fate as busted.
Trinity shareholders have been battered, the situation in Trinidad shows that total production of Trinidad is reducing. It’s the time for consolidation of oilers in Trinidad as a country, due to its dwindling bopd, and its most certainly time for a weaker oiler like Trinity to be bought out.
Posted at 25/2/2024 04:29 by andrewbyles
We’re nearly two months into 2024 and Trinity’s share price continues to disappoint - it’s lost two thirds of its value since the beginning of 2023 and for now has settled at that level.

It’s worth remembering some of the recent comments made by Trinity’s management. First, on September 20th 2022, as part of the interim results, shareholders were told, “The first six months of 2022 was a period of consolidation for Trinity, positioning the Company strongly for the second half of the year and beyond. Stable production and higher oil prices boosted our revenues in the period, the benefit of this will be fully felt when our hedges expire at the end of 2022. Towards the end of the first half the Company commenced a potentially transformational drilling programme onshore Trinidad. The six-well programme is ongoing, with drilling of the most notable wells, a horizontal well and a deeper appraisal well, due to start in the coming months. I believe this has the potential to meaningfully increase our scale, and as such prove to be the start of one of the most exciting periods in the Company’s history. I am also pleased to announce the Company’s intention to implement a new Capital Allocation Policy which is likely to include the payment of a regular dividend and a share buy-back programme to further deliver value to our shareholders.”

Second, on June 2nd 2023, in the Annual Report, shareholders were told, “During 2022 Trinity put in place the foundations for an ambitious growth programme, developing a series of catalysts to drive shareholder value that we are now starting to execute in 2023. This important process has involved taking tough decisions based on identifying the most efficient allocation of capital across the portfolio” and “We are a forward-thinking company, harnessing the benefits of new datasets, software, processes and technologies to drive efficiency and responsibly deliver hydrocarbon-based energy. Trinity’s investment case is based upon resilient, low-cost production; near term, deliverable catalysts with the potential to achieve incremental growth; and a medium-term hopper of organic opportunities capable of delivering transformational growth. On behalf of our shareholders, we are focused on delivering significant growth in production and free cash flow, allowing us to pursue new growth opportunities and deliver sustainable returns to shareholders. Our strategy and business model are designed to deliver this core objective.”

In addition to those specific comments, for many years Trinity has ended it RNSs with, “Trinity's portfolio includes current production, significant near-term production growth opportunities from low-risk developments and multiple exploration prospects with the potential to deliver meaningful reserves/resources growth.”

Unfortunately, 2023 wasn’t Trinity’s year and, instead of growing, the business shrank (Trinity produced 2,975 bopd in 2022, but in 2024 is forecast to produce between 2,600 and 2,700 bopd - if Jacobin manages to contribute any meaningful production there’s a possibility that figure may be revised upwards). Obviously this isn’t good enough.

Whilst I’m not in favour of replacing the board (at least not yet), things cannot continue as they have before.

In the first instance, the board needs to consider whether the company has the ability to deliver on the aims set out above (eg, does it have the necessary expertise and financial resources). Trinity has a core net asset value of 201.5p (arguably the company is worth much more than that as the core net asset value doesn’t take into account the company’s significant 2C resources, the investment in Buenos Ayres, the investment in the Hummingbird prospects or even the VAT refund), which is more than four times the current share price. If the board isn’t confident that the company can deliver, it has a duty to explore selling the company or part of the company to a larger company that can deliver on those aims and in doing so close the gap between the current share price and core net asset value.

If the company believes it does have the ability to deliver, it needs to set out clearly and compellingly how it will do so. I think that will include:

1. Reducing costs so as to maximise profitability from the base production;

2. Explaining exactly what has been learned from Jacobin and why it’s appropriate to drill further wells, especially on Buenos Ayres;

3. Demonstrating that base production can be maintained (when you strip out ABM-151, 2023 was a terrible year for base production even allowing for the one-off problems with Trintes following the fire);

4. Bringing in a partner to develop Buenos Ayres and Galeota (a partner will provide two things: confidence in the drilling programme and a financial contribution towards the cost of that drilling);

5. Maximising returns to shareholders (reducing costs, maintaining base production and bringing on board a partner to fund fresh drilling will each make dividends more affordable); and

6. Making more of an effort to engage with shareholders and potential shareholders. Trinity urgently needs to set out a deliverable vision and set about persuading people of it (eg, by attending the various investor presentations).
Posted at 16/2/2024 11:06 by aqc888
With the current share price at less than 25% of the recently reported NAV why is everyone dancing around what should happen next? Is Trinity a family heirloom that makes everyone want to hold it anyhow? Nope. Does Trinity hold some kind of emotional attachment that would be hard to let go?!?! Nope. Would its asset be difficult to sell? Nope! Does everyone want to see the disaster of Trinity’s share price loss removed from their portfolio? Yes. Do management have to follow shareholders wishes if pressed? Yes. Would just the mere mention of the start of a formal process to sell Trinity/assets make the share price rise? Seriously though, one has to ask will Trinity ever be priced at a premium to its nav? Highly highly unlikely I’d say, therefore an offer of a slight discount would be ideal for everyone…
Posted at 10/2/2024 18:44 by arlington chetwynd talbott
Yes, the BoD are saying let us bank our salaries for another year and then we might have something meaningful for you. Not good enough, but they will undertake some kind of charm offensive in a few months to keep the natives (a disappointingly complacent lot) from becoming restless and it will all likely trundle on.

Sleveen suggests switching into TXP, but after all this time, although it is clear to me that TRIN no longer has a competent BoD and that things are finally happening at TXP, it is also clear that Trinidad itself appears to be part of the problem.

If the TRIN share price recovers modestly at some point in the coming months and folk then switch into a solid non-tech blue chip of their choice (one paying substantial but well covered dividends that they can reinvest), the majority of those folk will in the medium term (if not the short term) likely find themselves doing better than those remaining in TRIN - even if its dividends do continue - and wondering why on earth they ever bothered with TRIN and companies like it.

TRIN is a frustrating itch that I have resolved to stop scratching until the next (meaningful) RNS. I am clearly not persuading anybody to see TRIN for what it has become, let alone sack even one single member of the BoD.
Posted at 28/1/2024 22:47 by andrewbyles
In the new blog, I’ve argued that Trinity is potentially worth at least $166.3 million (£131 million or 336p per share). That sounds like a lot compared with the current £18.5 million market capitalisation/47.75p share price, but: (i) it’s based upon prices offered for two of Trinity’s three asset groups within the past 8 years; and (ii) is dwarfed by the $226 million of additional funds that shareholders have poured into Trinity since 2012.

If my estimate is wrong, it’s because oil assets have fallen significantly in value since 2016 (which seems unlikely in Trinidad given the fiscal reforms - which are now worth between $7.5 to $8.5 million per year to Trinity, and much more if we get some production from Galeota) and/or because management have squandered the $226 million (there have been several unsuccessful drills, but that’s part of oil exploration and there hasn’t been $226 million worth of failed drills or for that matter $226 million worth of payments to managers - the combined salaries for senior management have been between about $1.2 and $1.8 million per year for years).

If my estimate is wrong, I’d be surprised if it’s out by more than 50%, which would still give a share price of 168p.

Obviously, it would be helpful if Trinity or its brokers set out their opinion on asset value and I’ve asked them to do that.
Posted at 24/1/2024 18:21 by andrewbyles
There are a couple of beneficial scenarios: the slow one and the quick one.

In the slow one, Trinity spends 2024 reducing costs and accumulating cash (Jeremy’s done it several times before), whilst reading drilling plans for 2025. As cash builds up and fresh drilling draws nearer the share price will drift up.

In the quick scenario, Trinity also reduces costs and accumulates cash, but also takes steps now to realise value from its assets (eg, by selling or partially selling Galeota or even the entire company).

In either scenario, returning cash to shareholders and providing information through presentations, Q&A opportunities etc will assist. Hopefully, we’ll all feel a bit better after the 2024 projections, which are due this month (so within the next week), have been issued.

As for bad a scenario, I think one would only arise if there were some sort of extreme event: a collapse in the oil price, a production problem with Trintes (the rest of Trinity’s production comes from small wells that probably wouldn’t all have a problem at the same time, whereas with Trintes about 1,000bopd comes from three platforms) or some sort of political instability in Trinidad. All those things have happened in the past (albeit they were short lived - in 1990 there was an attempted coup in Trinidad), so can’t be ruled out. However, none is especially likely and Trinity fared pretty well during the turmoil of 2020.
Posted at 24/1/2024 15:36 by andrewbyles
In 2015 Trinity had a $13 million debt balance with Citibank that it defaulted on. It was given 38 loan extensions, but was refused a 39th in July 2016. The shares were then suspended and Trinity had to use the Trinidad debt moratorium laws to save itself from administration. At the end of 2016, Trinity raised $15 million from shareholders at 49.8p (a 165% premium to the suspended share price - which is pretty unusual; it’s also when Jeremy Bridglalsingh started buying shares - he invested almost £40,000 at that price).

It’s pretty ridiculous that Trinity could raise money at more than the current share price to stave off administration in 2016. In 2024, with net cash of about $5.8 million, highly profitable operations thanks to fiscal reform and high oil prices, and expected cash inflow for the year of $16 to $17 million, Trinity is in considerably better shape than 2016.

Trinity’s share price soon recovered from the loan default. By the end of January 2017 it was in the 80s, by June 2017 it was 125p and by December 2017 it was in the 150s. By April 2018, it was 240p.
Posted at 22/1/2024 03:32 by andrewbyles
As we know, Trinity’s balance sheet contains just over $30 million of intangible assets related to the cost of drilling TGAL-1 on the Galeota licence. As we also know, Trinity has about $163 million of tax losses connected with the Galeota licence (Trinity has some other tax losses attached to other assets).

Those tax losses point to another reason why Galeota might appeal to a larger oil company. They arose, at least in part, because TGAL-1 wasn’t the only well drilled on Galeota. There were others and their cost is responsible for much of the tax losses (investment in Trintes is presumably responsible for the other part).

The Galeota licence previously belonged to Bayfield, which was listed on the AIM in July 2011 and raised about $87 million via its IPO (primarily to fund Galeota exploration). By the time Bayfield announced its results on May 28th 2012, it had carried losses of $26,298,182 (of which at least $3.3 million were related to exploration) - see

In 2012, “Capital expenditure for the year was US$69.8 million (2011: US$41.3 million) comprising Trintes field development costs (US$22.9 million) and exploration costs (US$46.9 million)” - see Those exploration costs were connected to Galeota.

At the end of 2012, Trinity, which was then a privately owned company run by Bruce Dingwall, merged with Bayfield via a reverse takeover and the listed company took the name Trinity. Another $90 million was raised at that time and in 2013 capital expenditure on TGAL-1 was $23.7 million (total capital expenditure that year was $92.1 million and some of it may have been spent on Trintes).

By the end of 2014, carried losses were $118.3 million. In the years that followed (and in the years before 2011; Bayfield started work on Galeota in 2008), smaller amounts were spent on TGAL/Galeota and the losses continued to grow (probably a combination of investing further in TGAL/Galeota and investment in Trintes) until they reached the current $163 million.

My point is that to establish 2C reserves of 37.1 million on Galeota, Bayfield/Trinity has spent around $100 million (and more on Trintes) and hasn’t yet produced a drop of oil. That’s the oil exploration business for you. But, if you were running a medium to large sized oil company interested in doing business in Trinidad would you start at the beginning of this process by bidding for a new shallow marine licence so that you can spend the next ten years drilling exploration wells at a cost of $100 million or would you consider acquiring Galeota (or even Trinity) in order to quickly bring proven reserves into production? It seems to me that Trinity has, at great expense, de-risked Galeota.

As part of the abandoned farm-down process, Trinity arranged for Netherland, Sewell & Associates Inc to prepare an Independent Competent Person’s Report on Galeota in late 2021. I’ve asked Trinity to disclose that report either in part (I’ve suggested that Cavendish be instructed to prepare a research note on Galeota’s likely value making reference to it) or in full (other companies I’ve invested in have published their ICP reports) so that shareholders can be better satisfied of the considerable value in this asset, which clearly isn’t reflected in the share price.

Bruce Dingwall certainly considered Galeota to be of great value. When Trinity struggled in 2015/16, he was ready to sell the Onshore assets and then the West Coast assets so that the Company could concentrate on Galeota (in the end, he was able to raise more money from shareholders so that he didn’t have to).

PS I’ve paid a visit to the other place. It’s no secret that I was optimistic about Jacobin (as Trinity’s management clearly were). It’s incredibly disappointing that the well is neither producing vast quantities of oil nor likely to (150 to 200bopd seems to be most we can hope for now and it might not even be that much), but success was never guaranteed and I never claimed that it was. It seemed to me at the time that success was more likely than not (a belief based upon Trinity’s estimate of a 62% chance of success), and that even if the deeper levels failed to produce there was the even more likely consolation of oil from the upper levels (which is where it now seems that the oil will come from). It was worth the risk. However, I think Trinity need to explain in some detail what lessons have be learned from the well, why they carried on putting money into the well, what the actual cost is ($10.5 million is the headline cost, but the 12.5% VAT is refundable, there may be tax allowances and there may be tax losses) and what the payback period will be once production starts (at the December presentation, Jeremy stated that the well should eventually recover its cost). I don’t think it was misleading to describe the well as essentially an appraisal well as there was oil in most of the places they expected it to be. I should add, although Jacobin’s failed to generate the expected cash flow (it was supposed to cost $4.5 million and repay that cost within a year), the reforms to marine SPT, which weren’t anticipated at the start of 2023, should generate that much in 2024 alone. There can be little doubt that Trinity has played a major role in campaigning for those reforms - as previously mentioned the Energy Minister specifically stated that they are for the “Trinity’s, the Touchstone’s” when debating the Finance Bill in Parliament (I don’t think Touchstone actually has any marine assets).
Trinity Exploration & Pr... share price data is direct from the London Stock Exchange

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