Share Name Share Symbol Market Type Share ISIN Share Description
Venture Life LSE:VLG London Ordinary Share GB00BFPM8908 ORD 0.3P
  Price Change % Change Share Price Bid Price Offer Price High Price Low Price Open Price Shares Traded Last Trade
  +0.00p +0.00% 65.50p 64.00p 67.00p 65.50p 65.50p 65.50p 0.00 08:00:00
Industry Sector Turnover (m) Profit (m) EPS - Basic PE Ratio Market Cap (m)
Health Care Equipment & Services 14.3 -1.1 -3.8 - 24.13

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27/3/201712:59ValueGrowth Investing9,405.00
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Venture Life Daily Update: Venture Life is listed in the Health Care Equipment & Services sector of the London Stock Exchange with ticker VLG. The last closing price for Venture Life was 65.50p.
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There are currently 36,837,106 shares in issue and the average daily traded volume is 0 shares. The market capitalisation of Venture Life is £24,128,304.43.
apad: RSW From Oct update: "Trading activity Revenue for the first quarter of the current financial year was £112.8m, compared with £98.2m for the corresponding period last year, with growth of 15%. There was growth in all regions, especially the Far East at 22% (9% at constant exchange rates) and Europe at 13% (3% at constant exchange rates). By business sector, revenue in our metrology business increased by 16% to £108.8m compared with £93.7m last year, with underlying growth at constant exchange rates of 7%. Revenue in our healthcare business was £4.0m compared with £4.5m last year. Profit before tax for the first quarter amounted to £14.1m (including a currency benefit of £3.7m) compared with £16.3m last year." Share price dropped about 20% between this and the end of the year. So, why has the share price risen inexorably YTD, some 30%? More currency benefits perhaps. Free from the O&G market? Any ideas? Should be an update this month. apad
redartbmud: EI A bit long winded, and far from complete. RPC is not a bad business: RPC Period March ’12 to March’16 The major balance sheet movements £m: Plant etc 514: Intangibles 885: Inventories 130; Cash 96 = 1625 Borrowings 703: Provisions 127: Non-Current Liabs £146 = 976 Net 649, funded by Share cap/Premium 619 Debtors/Creditors neutral. In that time: Revenue has increased by 45.3%, of which 34.3% was in year ‘16 Operating profit +30.6% EPS flattish to up since 2013 Dividend up 22%, keeping pace and cover still around 3x Yield down to 1.98% from 3.34%, but explained by share price up x3 from Range £3.10 - £3.20 in March’12 ROCE has fallen from 15.07% to 8.20%, not surprising, given the additions. Excludes last addition, of course. The expansion has been stellar since Y/e March ’14, and despite the capital raisings, debt rose by £703m The three additions revenues equate to the total revenue for Y/e 2012. For Y/e 2016 it must have surpassed that by a good margin anyway. That is a pretty big leap in just over 2 years. I have no idea how much autonomy that they give to subsidiaries to run their own show, or what central controls they impose. No idea of market share they have in each sector, or the competition that they face. Pricing pressures, raw material cost inflation etc. Not looked at debt financing – term and terms. Not looked at FCF or cash conversion. Overall, debt aside, the changes are transformational, the last one has yet to be properly integrated. Nothing there to worry me. It would be interesting to see tintins forecasts for Y/e March ’18 and The results for March ’17 when they are published. The share price has trebled since March ’12, despite the deeply discounted rights issues. There is no reason to suppose that it will not continue to enjoy a lofty rating, or that it will not prosper from this point onwards. Not complete, but a start to more delving that I might just do. Might even take a position myself, when I have done more research. Thanks. red
apad: Lauders, SOU: Boards have some remarkably knowledgeable posters and scads of twerps. One needs ear defenders. If you are interested in a gamble, Lauders, watch the graph for a lull in the news. CEO makes this difficult! It is still a roulette wheel stock, but the wheel is, perhaps, a touch less random than the others. Here is my precis (note I have no expertise or experience in investing in hole-in-the-ground companies): CEO is good at publicity - keeps the share price up and as they buy assets in shares and cash is a good strategy. For a small cap they have significant shares of the different ‘assets’ as a result. Partnered with Schlumberger provides top drawer technical expertise (particularly compared with historical drilling in the area). They are also partnering with a big Morrocan institution, so have the politics sorted. Tendrara (Morocco) is the significant play at the moment (Badile (Italy) used to be and they are drilling there as well). They have had significant results in Tendrara (hence last share price hike). They are now drilling vertically 12 km away (TE8) (if successful they will drill horizontally as well) in order to determine the extent of the field. This is the big bet. If the field is large the share price will rocket, else it will collapse. Timetable: 19 February 2017 TE8 drilling started. Vertical 40/50 days 6 weeks (2 April) to 7 weeks if gas, 30day sidetrack 4 weeks (30 April) If successful the company will be sold to RDSB. apad
apad: Alphaville on IG (I still reckon it's the 70k share sale by the non-exec. IG Group Holdings PLC (IGG:LSE): Last: 525.50, down 21.5 (-3.93%), High: 544.00, Low: 522.00, Volume: 1.30m 11:27 am PM What's he saying? 11:27 am BE Partly a "tough trading" argument .... Plus a bit of regulatory change stuff that's interesting. 11:27 am BE ... in the sense that the argument is "we don't bloody know and neither do you: optimism isn't an investment strategy" 11:28 am BE (That's me paraphrasing.) 11:28 am BE Here's the gist of it. 11:28 am BE While our FY17E forecasts are broadly unchanged, we reduce our FY18E/19E EPS forecasts by 20%/12% mainly because we bring revenue/client down again, particularly in the UK (we still, however, forecast client growth, even in the UK). Thus, this remains a risk: should IG experience a contraction in the number of clients, the risk for our forecasts remains to the downside. It is our opinion that IG will be able to offset some of the anticipated revenue decline with cost reductions, and after growing underlying operating expenses by £32MM, or 13%, in FY17, we forecast underlying operating expenses to decrease by 5% in FY18, and then fall another 5% in FY19. 11:28 am BE We do not believe that further analysing the pending regulatory change will provide any additional clarity. Unfortunately, this overhang will likely persist as (1) the final regulations are announced (spring 2017), (2) the regulations become effective (likely summer 2017), (3) IG reworks its product offering, and revenue and profits decline (H1/FY18), (4) financial performance stabilisation occurs (H2/FY18 at the earliest), (5) a financial recovery occurs (FY19 at the earliest). In addition, it is likely in our opinion that further adverse regulatory measures will be implemented in some of IG’s other operating geographies. 11:29 am BE Price target increased 2% to 510p on higher valuation multiple. We still believe that a discount to IG’s historical forward trading multiple is warranted to reflect impaired earnings visibility and the potential for further adverse regulatory change. However, it is now our opinion that our FY18 forecasts are in the right ballpark (we still have low conviction in our FY19 forecasts), and thus we increase IG’s valuation multiple to 12x from 10x. We believe that a multiple between our previous valuation multiple (10x) and IG’s longer-term forward P/E multiple (15x) is now appropriate. We continue to incorporate surplus capital in our valuation. 11:29 am BE The key reason we downgrade IG to Underperform is because our 510p price target is below the current share price, despite assigning IG a valuation multiple 20% higher than our previous multiple. We believe that the current share price has yet to fully reflect the numerous challenges the business will encounter. Our Underperform rating is based upon (i) regulation contagion to other geographies is likely, (ii) client contraction is possible, yet we do not forecast it, (iii) the dividend policy could be maintained, which would result in a dividend cut, and (iv) financial performance stabilisation and recovery could take longer than we envision. 11:29 am BE ....... all of which looks fair enough. 11:29 am BE And needs to be seen, perhaps, in the perspective of IG being one of the better operators in the sector. 11:30 am PM Indeed -- still preferable to any of the others 11:31 am BE Though I don't know how much of that quality perception's already baked into the price. 11:31 am PM To which all these arguments and regulatory contagion apply 11:31 am BE .... RBC's valuation works like this. 11:31 am BE We utilise a 12x multiple to value IG, to reflect sector derating (which we believe is warranted) following the FCA announcement. In addition, we incorporate IG’s surplus capital in our valuation, utilising our end of FY17 surplus capital estimate of 22p per share. The multiple that we use to value IG is a two-turn valuation premium to the multiple we apply to IG's closest peer (CMC Markets). 11:32 am BE (I don't know what a two-turn valuation premium is. Perhaps you can help, ROTR.) 11:32 am BE Anyway. Target 510p.
redartbmud: SSE The dividend on 300 shares at 27.4p is £82.20 I have bought at £15.128466 = cost, including charges, £4570.18 If I sell at £15.29 = proceeds, including charges, £4578.25 The share price fell from the close, the day before, of £15.55 by approximately 42p to £15.13. In most cases, the share price recovers a significant proportion of the drop within a short space of time. I therefore get my money back, and the equivalent dividend. Of course, I hope to get back a little more, and return my cash for another foray elsewhere. On 21 Jan '16 the share price went xd for 26.9p. The day before closing price was £13.85. It could be bought at a low of £13.29. The highs in the next few days were: 22 Jan £13.90 25 Jan £13.95 26 Jan £14.07 27 Jan £14.32. I am not saying that the share price is guaranteed to rise in similar terms in the next few days, but I hope that it will recover such that I make more than the dividend. I already have a position in SSE and will get the dividend on my holding in due course. This will be an added extra. If I need to hold for a few weeks then so be it. Fingers crossed. red
modform: Apad, Although I respect paul Scott's views on many of the small caps and he gets more right than wrong, you have to remember he's an accountant (sorry red), and he's looking for numbers and will miss small early recovery stocks and the stocks in the early stage of growth. The clear example of it is when WAND published its results sometime ago, he called it the dog that needs to be put down and his view was that the company will go bust, because he was merely looking at the numbers. The share price then fell to well below 100p, but me and battlebus2 saw something unique about the company: 1) Their products in big data was head and body above the rest. 2) they were getting contracts with google, amazon, oracle and some of the large telcom companies were using their products, there surely must be something we are overlooking. 3) The company had no problem at time to go to the market and raise any amount of cash they needed, sometimes at the premium to the share price. So I bought a lot of shares (almost 7% of PF) at well below 100p, and when the share price doubled in no time, I took my original investment out and let the rest run for free. I recall me and battlebus2 were the only bull on that thread, everyone else was talking about "SELL : jam tomorrow", and sometimes good companies give jam tomorrow if you are patient. A few days ago WAND produced their results and the numbers looked really good, and Paul Scott bought them, so he went from bear to bull based on numbers, and the share price has 5 bagged since we bought them. So if you are buying solely based on numbers, you may lose the majority of a rise in a growth or a recovery stock, but as always it's risk and reward. So, in a nutshell, sometimes you need to look beyond numbers and see if there are any uniqueness about the company, how good are other competitors and can the company easily raise cash and at what discount. BTW, I have done no research on DIS, so can not make any comment on that.
redartbmud: tlatsatt Clln: The pension deficit is a big negative, but it is under control and may improve with inflation and valuations. The Harvard hedgies will get their nether regions well and truly toasted and move on to other opportunities. The slightly bigger percentage of revenue is provided by services that generate steady cash flow. Government construction contracts should come through in 2017. Hopefully they are on top of the two 'problems' highlighted on the Clln board and the impact on profits limited. They have a robust business model that has stood them in good stead over the years. PE and yield could improve from current levels, propelling the share price onwards and upwards. It gives me a lot of fun and reward to trade the shares on the swings. Whilst the share price has languished in 2016 it has provided a good return. It is not a growth stock but could do well in a difficult 2017. Gnk Pubcos like Gnk provide a service to the community. Of it's type it is my investment choice, looking at fundamentals. Lifestyles have changed and eating out regularly is very popular, particularly in this type of establishment. It caters for all types, families whose lifestyles mean that there is less time to cook at home all week, and wrinklies who meet friends over an inexpensive meal and make it an afternoon of gossip and chat - they have the disposable income to make it possible. That isn't going to change anytime soon. The current rating is hardly demanding, the share price is modest and there is room for growth in 2017. Neither will uproot trees, but in what is probably going to be a tough year, their returns could prove to be 'winners'. Tortoise v hare. red
apad: Fundsmith, my fund management business, celebrated its fifth anniversary in the past month. What have I learnt over the past five years of running the fund? One thing I have observed is the obsession of market commentators, investors and advisers with macroeconomics, interest rates, quantitative easing, asset allocation, regional geographic allocation, currencies, developed markets versus emerging markets — whereas they almost never talk about investing in good companies. It seems to me that most of these subjects pose questions to which no one can reliably forecast the answers, and even if you could the connection to asset prices is tenuous at best. Take GDP growth — few things seem to obsess commentators more, yet no one has ever managed to demonstrate a positive correlation between GDP growth and stock market performance. Invest in something good What has continued to amaze me throughout the past five years is not just this largely pointless obsession with factors which are unknowable, largely irrelevant, or both, but how infrequently I hear fund managers or investors talk about investing in something which is good. Like a good company with good products or services, strong market share, good profitability, cash flow and product development. I suppose I had assumed that the credit crisis might have taught them that you will struggle to make a good return from poor-quality assets. No amount of CLOs, CDOs and the other alphabet soup of structured finance managed to turn subprime loans into a good investment. When the credit cycle turned down, even the triple-A rated tranches of these instruments turned out to be triple-Z. There’s a saying involving silk purses and a sow’s ears which encapsulates the problem. I am not suggesting that there is no other way of making money other than to invest in good companies, but investing in poor or even average companies presents problems. One is that over time they tend to destroy rather than create value for shareholders, so a long-term buy and hold strategy is not going to work for them. A more active trading strategy also has its drawbacks. Apart from the drag on performance from trading costs, it is evident from the performance of most funds that very few active managers are sufficiently skilled to buy shares in poor companies when their performance and share prices are depressed, and then sell them close to their cyclical peak. Another obsession I have been surprised about is that with “cheap” shares. I have been asked whether a share is cheap many more times than I have been asked whether the company is a good business. This obsession often manifests itself in the critique of our strategy which goes something like, “These companies may be high-quality, but the shares are too expensively rated.” This is almost certain to be true, as from time to time the share prices are sure to decline, but it misses the point. If you are a long-term investor, owning shares in a good company is a much larger determinant of your investment performance than whether the shares were cheap when you bought them. Ignore the siren song A fairly obvious lesson, but one I have re-learnt, is to stick to your guns and ignore popular opinion. I lost count of the number of times I was asked why we didn’t own Tesco shares, or was told that I had to own Tesco shares when our analysis showed quite clearly that its earnings-per-share growth had been achieved at the expense of returns on capital. In fact, its return on capital had deteriorated in a manner which pointed to serious problems in Tesco’s new investment in areas such as China and California. How investors ignored the warning signs at Tesco Since starting Fundsmith the stock which I have most frequently been asked about, and implored to buy, is Tesco. Similarly, it is important to ignore the siren song of those who have views on stocks which you hold, particularly if they are based on prejudices about their products. I also lost count of the number of comments I read about how Microsoft was finished as it “wasn’t Apple”. This included one investor who rang us to ask if we had seen the quarterly numbers from Microsoft which were not good. (It was tempting to respond saying No, of course we had not seen the quarterly results for one of our largest holdings and thank him for pointing this revelation out to us.) He said we would face questions at our AGM if we still held the stock then. It was of course just one quarter and the stock more or less doubled in price after that. Sadly no question was raised at the AGM. Stick to the facts Another of my observations is that impressions about stocks are often formed erroneously because people do not check the simplest facts. Sometimes they simply relate to the wrong company. We topped up our stake in Del Monte, a processed food and pet food business, on some share price weakness which resulted when a news service carried an article that dock workers in Galveston had gone on strike and so had stopped Del Monte’s ships being unloaded. The company it was actually referring to was Del Monte Fresh Foods, which imports tropical fruits like bananas and pineapples, not the one we were invested in. Or the client who contacted us to say how concerned he was about our large holding in Domino’s Pizza since the chief executive and chief financial officer had left. They had left the UK company, but we owned the US master franchiser. I would be hard pressed to name the least well-understood subject in investment given the wide choice available, but I suspect that currencies is among the leaders. Over the past five years I have heard lots of people talk or ask about the impact of currencies in a manner which betrays a complete lack of understanding of the subject. The commonest question or assumption about our fund is the impact of the US dollar, since the majority of the companies we have owned since inception are headquartered and listed in the US. This makes little or no sense. A company’s currency exposure is not determined by where it is headquartered, listed or which currency it denominates its accounts in. Yet this does not seem to stop people assuming that it does and making statements about the exposure of our fund to the US dollar, based on where the companies are listed. We own one company which is headquartered and listed in the US, but which has no revenues there at all. Clearly this assumption would not work very well for that company, any more than it would work for the UK listed company we own which has the US as its biggest market and which, perhaps unsurprisingly, reports its accounts in US dollars. Nor could we understand the reasoning of the commentators who wrote that our holding in Nestlé had benefited from the rise in the Swiss franc. How? Ninety-eight per cent of Nestlé’s revenues are outside Switzerland. It may be headquartered and listed in Switzerland and report in Swiss francs, but the fact is that a company’s currency exposure is mainly determined by where it does business. In Nestlé’s case the Indian rupee is a bigger exposure than the Swiss franc. Does anyone read accounts? I have also discovered that hardly anyone reads company accounts any more. Instead they rely upon management presentations of figures which often present “underlying221;, “core” or “adjusted̶1; numbers. Not coincidentally, the adjustments to get to the core or underlying numbers almost always seem to remove negative items. Reading the actual accounts bypasses this accounting legerdemain. We have also discovered mistakes in accounts which no one else seems to have noticed. Like the $1.8bn mistake in the IBM cash flow. This alone did not prevent us investing in IBM, but it helped to support our conclusion that hardly anyone reads its accounts thoroughly. Don’t sell good companies I have also learnt that selling a stake in a good company is almost always a mistake. Take Sigma-Aldrich, a US chemical company based in St Louis. It supplies pots of chemicals to scientists around the world who use them in tests and experiments. Its financial performance fitted our criteria, as did its operational characteristics — supplying 170,000 products to more than a million customers at an average price of $400 per product. It fitted our mantra of making its money from a large number of everyday repeat transactions, as well as having a base of loyal scientists who relied on its service. It was a predictable company of exactly the type we seek. That was until it was revealed that it was trying to acquire Life Technologies, a much larger company which supplies lab equipment. Given the execution risk involved, we sold our stake. As it happens, Sigma-Aldrich did not acquire Life Technologies as it was outbid. But having gone public on its willingness to combine with another business, it was in no position to defend its independence and succumbed to a bid itself from Merck at a price about 40 per cent above the price we has sold at. Selling good companies is rarely a good move. The good news is that we don’t do it very often. Our best share The best performing share contributing to Fundsmith’s performance over the past five years was Domino’s Pizza Inc, with a return of over 600 per cent from the initial stake purchased on the day the fund opened. What might we learn from this? ● People often assume that for an investment to make a high return it must be esoteric, obscure, difficult to understand and undiscovered by other investors. On the contrary — the best investments are often the most obvious. ● Run your winners. Too often investors talk about “taking a profit”. If you have a profit on an investment it might be an indication that you own a share in a business which is worth holding on to. Conversely, we are all prone to run our losers, hoping they will get back to what we paid for them. Gardeners nurture flowers and pull up weeds, not the other way around. ● Domino’s is a franchiser. If you regard a high return on capital as the most important sign of a good business, few are better than businesses which operate through franchises, as most of the capital is supplied by them. The franchiser get a royalty from revenues generated by other people’s capital. ● Domino’s has focused on the most important item for success in its sector — the food. This is in sharp contrast to other fast food providers, such as McDonald’s, which are struggling. ● Domino’s is mostly a delivery business. This means that it can operate from cheaper premises in secondary locations, and so cut the capital required to operate compared with fast food operators who need high street restaurant premises. ● Domino’s was owned by Bain Capital. Like a lot of private equity firms, Bain leveraged up the business by taking on debt to pay themselves a dividend before IPO, so it started life as a public company with high leverage. This can enhance equity returns. In a business which can service the debt there is a transfer of value to the equity holders as the debt is paid down and the equity is de-risked. Please note — this does NOT indicate that leverage always enhances returns.
petersinthemarket: Like I said apad, I sometimes use more aggressive versions of the above: The Holding To keep the maths simple, assume 6000 shares are bought at £1 with a 90p stop and partial exits proposed for each additional 10% share price gain. Maths - Sell 25% of the position for each 10% rise in the share price The first stage of the plan might be to sell 6000sh x 25% = 1500 shares at £1.10 and this plan is then followed by taking further 25% slices of the original position at 2x and 3x Initial Risk. The remaining 25% could be sold later or left in the market, depending on prospects: Buy 6000sh at £1 each = £6000 Place a stop loss order at -10% = 90p per share Assume share price rises to £1.10:Sell 25%£6000x25% =1500sh x £1.10=£1650 in the bank) Assume share price rises to £1.20:Sell 25%(£6000x25% =1500sh x £1.20=£1800 in the bank) Assume share price rises to £1.30:Sell 25%(£6000x25% =1500sh x £1.30=£1950 in the bank) For an share price rise of 30% the trader now has £5400 (£1650+£1800+£1950) in the bank after selling 75% of his position, which is 90% of the cost of the original trade. So he has 25% of his holding still in but at only 10% of the cost. There are 1500sh with a remaining Book Value of only £600 still in the market and if the share price continues to rise these can be left to run with little risk whilst the rest of the capital is used elsewhere. Even if the share price finally runs out of energy and falls all the way back to £1 the final portion could still be sold at its original cost: 1500sh x £1 = £1500, making the total return £6900 (£1650+£1800+£1950+£1500), to leave a small profit of £900, or 15% (minus charges). I throw the above in FWIW, knowing that I am mostly talking to long termers. We all do things in different ways more comfortable for ourselves. Different numbers can be inserted into a similar maths process and I have calculated various examples at different splits and percentages. The intention is always the same: to take fairly regular profits for investment elsewhere without completely exiting a successful run plus protecting the portfolio capital. Without capital, we are out of the game. GL, pete
apad: Interesting Bearbull article in the IC: Let’s call it ‘the dilemma of growth’. It’s what happens when an investor seeks to fit a growth stock into an income fund. It’s natural enough to want to do it; after all, including the growth stock will add oomph to what might otherwise be dull and pedestrian. But the new inclusion will struggle to justify its place because too much hope and expectation is factored into its price. As a result, it’s almost inevitable that it will look expensive when put amongst securities whose prices are set to minimise the chances that they will deliver unpleasant shocks and maximise the likelihood that low but satisfactory returns will materialise. Slotting shares in utilities-services provider Telecom Plus (TEP) into the Bearbull Income Portfolio (see last week’s Bearbull) triggers this dilemma, prompting two related questions: are shares in Telecom Plus wildly overrated, and why does the Bearbull fund get such a low rating? Let’s focus on the first question. Recall that, superficially at least, a holding in Telecom Plus offers good things for the income fund. At their current 989p, the shares come with a 4.7 per cent yield on 2015-16’s promised 46p payout. Simultaneously, a combination of the high volatility in Telecom Plus’s share price, the above-average monthly gain in the price and its low correlation with price movements in the Bearbull income fund make Telecom Plus’s shares a useful addition to the portfolio. These benefits aren’t in question – although that doesn’t mean they are certain to materialise – but it may be that I’m paying too high a price for them. Put bluntly, it’s difficult to find value in the shares that’s remotely close to the current share price. Given that Telecom Plus’s shares are rated at about 22 times forecast earnings for the year to end-March, that may not be surprising. True, I pay little attention to PE ratios. Even so, a high earnings multiple can indicate useful things – in particular, that the interest rate that capitalises a company’s earnings is very low. This infers that most of the future growth is already factored into the share price and that, therefore, anyone buying around current prices must expect low returns (and that – paradoxically – is pretty well the opposite of what’s expected by punters who buy on high earnings multiples). We can turn this proposition around and find out how much profit Telecom Plus should make in order to justify its current share price. True, an investor can’t answer that without first supplying the return that he wants from holding the shares. For Bearbull, that’s usually 8.5 per cent. To satisfy that requirement, either Telecom Plus should make twice last year’s £38m operating profit or its share price must first halve.................
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