Share Name Share Symbol Market Type Share ISIN Share Description
Venture Life LSE:VLG London Ordinary Share GB00BFPM8908 ORD 0.3P
  Price Change % Change Share Price Bid Price Offer Price High Price Low Price Open Price Shares Traded Last Trade
  +0.00p +0.00% 58.00p 56.00p 60.00p 58.00p 56.50p 56.50p 15,091 08:00:05
Industry Sector Turnover (m) Profit (m) EPS - Basic PE Ratio Market Cap (m)
Health Care Equipment & Services 14.3 -1.1 -3.8 - 21.37

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Date Time Title Posts
20/8/201722:11ValueGrowth Investing13,099
20/8/201719:39Venture Life Group plc87
02/4/201510:58Venture Life Group - Intro video-

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Venture Life Daily Update: Venture Life is listed in the Health Care Equipment & Services sector of the London Stock Exchange with ticker VLG. The last closing price for Venture Life was 58p.
Venture Life has a 4 week average price of 54p and a 12 week average price of 54p.
The 1 year high share price is 87.50p while the 1 year low share price is currently 41.50p.
There are currently 36,837,106 shares in issue and the average daily traded volume is 40,690 shares. The market capitalisation of Venture Life is £21,365,521.48.
redartbmud: APAD Spx is tightly held, so a few more trades than the daily norm move the share price well beyond what you might expect. Up or down there is major overcompensation. Maybe the tintins will sway the movement with their mainly superficial comments. Could we see good results and a share price fall because they were expecting more? With such a highly rated stock it is tough to buy before the announcement. Just a ramble. red
apad: FT: "Fever-Tree Tonic Water ingredients: Carbonated Spring Water, Cane Sugar, Citric Acid, Natural flavouring, Quinine. Tonic Water price: 37.5p per 100ml. Share price change since November 2014: 1,171.2 per cent. Britvic Tonic Water ingredients: Carbonated Water, Sugar, Citric Acid, Flavourings, Quinine, Preservative (Potassium Sorbate), Sweetener (Saccharin). Tonic Water price: 31.2p per 100ml. Share price change since November 2014: 3.4 per cent."
lauders: Apad - Had to look at the share price to see what you were talking about! Oh dear :-( I think a vet will still be needed, have to try and get the heart to start pumping again! Luckily not a significant holding, but just wondering whether I should top-up? (tongue in cheek!). DOTD looked OK to me. Perhaps there will be a delayed positive share price reaction? Still not holding but if there are any BTFD opportunities that may change. Missed the BVXP opportunity the other day damn! Think I am on the same timing as you. Didn't pick-up on the Thailand link and I am typing from Thailand! PS - Perhaps the puppy will survive the vet and do a FENR one of these days? ;-)
redartbmud: Big I am playing in the fast lane with Kaz and trying to use the volatility in the share price to my advantage. Regrettably, my last foray was a buy at £4.837p, which from hindsight was another of my Brittany moments :-( I will come out of it with sufficient profits to buy a cup of coffee, but that might be all this time round. Not so long ago the share price hit £5.80. I am not so sure we will see that repeated anytime soon. red
thelongandtheshortandthetall: Ive been thinking about letting your winners run. Assuming a share price roughly mirrors the progress or lack of made by a company then great companies will see thd shsre price rise and the share price fall for companies that over time dont perform. Think it was hydrus that said yhe other day thst fever directors sold some stock around 160p and questioned weather they even knew the potential of yhe budiness. To a certain degree success like fever tree are enjoying is a combination. Hard work, products, luck, management, good timing, contacts, a new fashion or an existing one really kicking off. My point is for a growth company to really get going beyond even management's initial projections the budiness needs to have many things working in its favour. Once the share becomes a winner in ones porfolio and has by hook or crook found itself with the magic combination why would not conitue in the same vein. Yes competition etc but if the story doesnt change it should continud its succesful run. IE being more profitable than mosts stocks available. So better to let your winners run. Even they become massive parts of your portfolio. Because to sell some and put yhe money in an average business that does not have the magic combination is silly. So run Your winners as theyve alresdy proved they are making above average returns. Hot today.
redartbmud: jane Over the years there have been many occasions when my timing of purchases has been poor. If you look back on the board at my timing of sales then it is considerably worse! When I take a position, it is based on judgment and conviction. Most stocks I look to hold long term in my portfolio. After an initial purchase, I have usually added more, inevitably at higher prices as the business has grown and profits improved. I have also developed a little strategy to go short-term overweight when the share price is temporarily depressed, or where there is volatility in the markets. I sell enough shares to recover the capital and keep the rest. It reduces my average cost and future dividends and the yield improve. APAD sometimes refers to my 5% trades. Often the profit it is only 3% or 4% of the trade, but every little helps. I usually only hold for a few days before the share price recovers. It is quite surprising how effective it can be, when you have traded 10 or more times. It is just a pity that this wasn't available until trading platforms like Hargreaves became available, with low cost dealing. I am not into shorting or spread betting, so that is my antidote. Good luck with your latest acquisition. red
apad: Lauders, SOU: Boards have some remarkably knowledgeable posters and scads of twerps. One needs ear defenders. If you are interested in a gamble, Lauders, watch the graph for a lull in the news. CEO makes this difficult! It is still a roulette wheel stock, but the wheel is, perhaps, a touch less random than the others. Here is my precis (note I have no expertise or experience in investing in hole-in-the-ground companies): CEO is good at publicity - keeps the share price up and as they buy assets in shares and cash is a good strategy. For a small cap they have significant shares of the different ‘assets’ as a result. Partnered with Schlumberger provides top drawer technical expertise (particularly compared with historical drilling in the area). They are also partnering with a big Morrocan institution, so have the politics sorted. Tendrara (Morocco) is the significant play at the moment (Badile (Italy) used to be and they are drilling there as well). They have had significant results in Tendrara (hence last share price hike). They are now drilling vertically 12 km away (TE8) (if successful they will drill horizontally as well) in order to determine the extent of the field. This is the big bet. If the field is large the share price will rocket, else it will collapse. Timetable: 19 February 2017 TE8 drilling started. Vertical 40/50 days 6 weeks (2 April) to 7 weeks if gas, 30day sidetrack 4 weeks (30 April) If successful the company will be sold to RDSB. apad
redartbmud: SSE The dividend on 300 shares at 27.4p is £82.20 I have bought at £15.128466 = cost, including charges, £4570.18 If I sell at £15.29 = proceeds, including charges, £4578.25 The share price fell from the close, the day before, of £15.55 by approximately 42p to £15.13. In most cases, the share price recovers a significant proportion of the drop within a short space of time. I therefore get my money back, and the equivalent dividend. Of course, I hope to get back a little more, and return my cash for another foray elsewhere. On 21 Jan '16 the share price went xd for 26.9p. The day before closing price was £13.85. It could be bought at a low of £13.29. The highs in the next few days were: 22 Jan £13.90 25 Jan £13.95 26 Jan £14.07 27 Jan £14.32. I am not saying that the share price is guaranteed to rise in similar terms in the next few days, but I hope that it will recover such that I make more than the dividend. I already have a position in SSE and will get the dividend on my holding in due course. This will be an added extra. If I need to hold for a few weeks then so be it. Fingers crossed. red
modform: Apad, Although I respect paul Scott's views on many of the small caps and he gets more right than wrong, you have to remember he's an accountant (sorry red), and he's looking for numbers and will miss small early recovery stocks and the stocks in the early stage of growth. The clear example of it is when WAND published its results sometime ago, he called it the dog that needs to be put down and his view was that the company will go bust, because he was merely looking at the numbers. The share price then fell to well below 100p, but me and battlebus2 saw something unique about the company: 1) Their products in big data was head and body above the rest. 2) they were getting contracts with google, amazon, oracle and some of the large telcom companies were using their products, there surely must be something we are overlooking. 3) The company had no problem at time to go to the market and raise any amount of cash they needed, sometimes at the premium to the share price. So I bought a lot of shares (almost 7% of PF) at well below 100p, and when the share price doubled in no time, I took my original investment out and let the rest run for free. I recall me and battlebus2 were the only bull on that thread, everyone else was talking about "SELL : jam tomorrow", and sometimes good companies give jam tomorrow if you are patient. A few days ago WAND produced their results and the numbers looked really good, and Paul Scott bought them, so he went from bear to bull based on numbers, and the share price has 5 bagged since we bought them. So if you are buying solely based on numbers, you may lose the majority of a rise in a growth or a recovery stock, but as always it's risk and reward. So, in a nutshell, sometimes you need to look beyond numbers and see if there are any uniqueness about the company, how good are other competitors and can the company easily raise cash and at what discount. BTW, I have done no research on DIS, so can not make any comment on that.
apad: Fundsmith, my fund management business, celebrated its fifth anniversary in the past month. What have I learnt over the past five years of running the fund? One thing I have observed is the obsession of market commentators, investors and advisers with macroeconomics, interest rates, quantitative easing, asset allocation, regional geographic allocation, currencies, developed markets versus emerging markets — whereas they almost never talk about investing in good companies. It seems to me that most of these subjects pose questions to which no one can reliably forecast the answers, and even if you could the connection to asset prices is tenuous at best. Take GDP growth — few things seem to obsess commentators more, yet no one has ever managed to demonstrate a positive correlation between GDP growth and stock market performance. Invest in something good What has continued to amaze me throughout the past five years is not just this largely pointless obsession with factors which are unknowable, largely irrelevant, or both, but how infrequently I hear fund managers or investors talk about investing in something which is good. Like a good company with good products or services, strong market share, good profitability, cash flow and product development. I suppose I had assumed that the credit crisis might have taught them that you will struggle to make a good return from poor-quality assets. No amount of CLOs, CDOs and the other alphabet soup of structured finance managed to turn subprime loans into a good investment. When the credit cycle turned down, even the triple-A rated tranches of these instruments turned out to be triple-Z. There’s a saying involving silk purses and a sow’s ears which encapsulates the problem. I am not suggesting that there is no other way of making money other than to invest in good companies, but investing in poor or even average companies presents problems. One is that over time they tend to destroy rather than create value for shareholders, so a long-term buy and hold strategy is not going to work for them. A more active trading strategy also has its drawbacks. Apart from the drag on performance from trading costs, it is evident from the performance of most funds that very few active managers are sufficiently skilled to buy shares in poor companies when their performance and share prices are depressed, and then sell them close to their cyclical peak. Another obsession I have been surprised about is that with “cheap” shares. I have been asked whether a share is cheap many more times than I have been asked whether the company is a good business. This obsession often manifests itself in the critique of our strategy which goes something like, “These companies may be high-quality, but the shares are too expensively rated.” This is almost certain to be true, as from time to time the share prices are sure to decline, but it misses the point. If you are a long-term investor, owning shares in a good company is a much larger determinant of your investment performance than whether the shares were cheap when you bought them. Ignore the siren song A fairly obvious lesson, but one I have re-learnt, is to stick to your guns and ignore popular opinion. I lost count of the number of times I was asked why we didn’t own Tesco shares, or was told that I had to own Tesco shares when our analysis showed quite clearly that its earnings-per-share growth had been achieved at the expense of returns on capital. In fact, its return on capital had deteriorated in a manner which pointed to serious problems in Tesco’s new investment in areas such as China and California. How investors ignored the warning signs at Tesco Since starting Fundsmith the stock which I have most frequently been asked about, and implored to buy, is Tesco. Similarly, it is important to ignore the siren song of those who have views on stocks which you hold, particularly if they are based on prejudices about their products. I also lost count of the number of comments I read about how Microsoft was finished as it “wasn’t Apple”. This included one investor who rang us to ask if we had seen the quarterly numbers from Microsoft which were not good. (It was tempting to respond saying No, of course we had not seen the quarterly results for one of our largest holdings and thank him for pointing this revelation out to us.) He said we would face questions at our AGM if we still held the stock then. It was of course just one quarter and the stock more or less doubled in price after that. Sadly no question was raised at the AGM. Stick to the facts Another of my observations is that impressions about stocks are often formed erroneously because people do not check the simplest facts. Sometimes they simply relate to the wrong company. We topped up our stake in Del Monte, a processed food and pet food business, on some share price weakness which resulted when a news service carried an article that dock workers in Galveston had gone on strike and so had stopped Del Monte’s ships being unloaded. The company it was actually referring to was Del Monte Fresh Foods, which imports tropical fruits like bananas and pineapples, not the one we were invested in. Or the client who contacted us to say how concerned he was about our large holding in Domino’s Pizza since the chief executive and chief financial officer had left. They had left the UK company, but we owned the US master franchiser. I would be hard pressed to name the least well-understood subject in investment given the wide choice available, but I suspect that currencies is among the leaders. Over the past five years I have heard lots of people talk or ask about the impact of currencies in a manner which betrays a complete lack of understanding of the subject. The commonest question or assumption about our fund is the impact of the US dollar, since the majority of the companies we have owned since inception are headquartered and listed in the US. This makes little or no sense. A company’s currency exposure is not determined by where it is headquartered, listed or which currency it denominates its accounts in. Yet this does not seem to stop people assuming that it does and making statements about the exposure of our fund to the US dollar, based on where the companies are listed. We own one company which is headquartered and listed in the US, but which has no revenues there at all. Clearly this assumption would not work very well for that company, any more than it would work for the UK listed company we own which has the US as its biggest market and which, perhaps unsurprisingly, reports its accounts in US dollars. Nor could we understand the reasoning of the commentators who wrote that our holding in Nestlé had benefited from the rise in the Swiss franc. How? Ninety-eight per cent of Nestlé’s revenues are outside Switzerland. It may be headquartered and listed in Switzerland and report in Swiss francs, but the fact is that a company’s currency exposure is mainly determined by where it does business. In Nestlé’s case the Indian rupee is a bigger exposure than the Swiss franc. Does anyone read accounts? I have also discovered that hardly anyone reads company accounts any more. Instead they rely upon management presentations of figures which often present “underlying221;, “core” or “adjusted̶1; numbers. Not coincidentally, the adjustments to get to the core or underlying numbers almost always seem to remove negative items. Reading the actual accounts bypasses this accounting legerdemain. We have also discovered mistakes in accounts which no one else seems to have noticed. Like the $1.8bn mistake in the IBM cash flow. This alone did not prevent us investing in IBM, but it helped to support our conclusion that hardly anyone reads its accounts thoroughly. Don’t sell good companies I have also learnt that selling a stake in a good company is almost always a mistake. Take Sigma-Aldrich, a US chemical company based in St Louis. It supplies pots of chemicals to scientists around the world who use them in tests and experiments. Its financial performance fitted our criteria, as did its operational characteristics — supplying 170,000 products to more than a million customers at an average price of $400 per product. It fitted our mantra of making its money from a large number of everyday repeat transactions, as well as having a base of loyal scientists who relied on its service. It was a predictable company of exactly the type we seek. That was until it was revealed that it was trying to acquire Life Technologies, a much larger company which supplies lab equipment. Given the execution risk involved, we sold our stake. As it happens, Sigma-Aldrich did not acquire Life Technologies as it was outbid. But having gone public on its willingness to combine with another business, it was in no position to defend its independence and succumbed to a bid itself from Merck at a price about 40 per cent above the price we has sold at. Selling good companies is rarely a good move. The good news is that we don’t do it very often. Our best share The best performing share contributing to Fundsmith’s performance over the past five years was Domino’s Pizza Inc, with a return of over 600 per cent from the initial stake purchased on the day the fund opened. What might we learn from this? ● People often assume that for an investment to make a high return it must be esoteric, obscure, difficult to understand and undiscovered by other investors. On the contrary — the best investments are often the most obvious. ● Run your winners. Too often investors talk about “taking a profit”. If you have a profit on an investment it might be an indication that you own a share in a business which is worth holding on to. Conversely, we are all prone to run our losers, hoping they will get back to what we paid for them. Gardeners nurture flowers and pull up weeds, not the other way around. ● Domino’s is a franchiser. If you regard a high return on capital as the most important sign of a good business, few are better than businesses which operate through franchises, as most of the capital is supplied by them. The franchiser get a royalty from revenues generated by other people’s capital. ● Domino’s has focused on the most important item for success in its sector — the food. This is in sharp contrast to other fast food providers, such as McDonald’s, which are struggling. ● Domino’s is mostly a delivery business. This means that it can operate from cheaper premises in secondary locations, and so cut the capital required to operate compared with fast food operators who need high street restaurant premises. ● Domino’s was owned by Bain Capital. Like a lot of private equity firms, Bain leveraged up the business by taking on debt to pay themselves a dividend before IPO, so it started life as a public company with high leverage. This can enhance equity returns. In a business which can service the debt there is a transfer of value to the equity holders as the debt is paid down and the equity is de-risked. Please note — this does NOT indicate that leverage always enhances returns.
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