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Share Name Share Symbol Market Type Share ISIN Share Description
Sainsbury LSE:SBRY London Ordinary Share GB00B019KW72 ORD 28 4/7P
  Price Change % Change Share Price Bid Price Offer Price High Price Low Price Open Price Shares Traded Last Trade
  -0.70p -0.26% 267.10p 267.10p 267.30p 272.20p 266.90p 267.30p 2,108,519 11:10:50
Industry Sector Turnover (m) Profit (m) EPS - Basic PE Ratio Market Cap (m)
Food & Drug Retailers 23,506.0 548.0 23.9 11.2 5,141.45

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Sainsbury Daily Update: Sainsbury is listed in the Food & Drug Retailers sector of the London Stock Exchange with ticker SBRY. The last closing price for Sainsbury was 267.80p.
Sainsbury has a 4 week average price of 287.71p and a 12 week average price of 273.39p.
The 1 year high share price is 294.40p while the 1 year low share price is currently 221.30p.
There are currently 1,924,916,206 shares in issue and the average daily traded volume is 9,426,062 shares. The market capitalisation of Sainsbury is £5,178,024,594.14.
loganair: By Andrea Felsted and Chris Hughes: Sainsbury's £1.4 billion($2 billion) bid for Argos now looks like an accidental poison pill. A consortium involving the Qatar Investment Authority, which is Sainsbury's biggest shareholder, private equity group CVC and Canadian property giant Brookfield considered bidding for Sainsbury late last year, according to Sky News. The group reportedly abandoned the plan shortly after Sainsbury's surprise approach for the struggling online and catalog business was revealed in January. Some Sainsbury investors already had reservations about buying Argos, and the idea that the adventure may have cost them a juicy takeover premium will be galling. But while adding Argos does change the dynamics of a potential leveraged buyout of Sainsbury, it does not kill the logic entirely. Taste the Difference: The increase in Sainsbury's share price has made it a pricier purchase for a potential bidder. For starters, Argos is not such a big deal as to make Sainsbury too big to swallow. Adjust for the cash going out from Sainsbury to Argos shareholders under the terms of the transaction, and the combination would have a market capitalization of about £6.1 billion. Adding a standard 30 percent takeover premium would bump this up to £8 billion. Had any bidder made an approach in mid-December, it would have had to offer £6.7 billion, on the same premium. That's not a massive gap to bridge for such financially strong buyers. Moreover, QIA already has a big stake in Sainsbury, about 22 percent post-Argos. Exclude this, and the check to be written to buy the rest falls to £6.2 billion. Bidders' check could be about £6.2 billion. Secondly, owning Argos may ultimately help add leverage. The net debt position of a Sainsbury/Argos combination is expected to broadly stay the same, at about £1.5 billion. But the group gains some new sources of income to fund extra debt. Sainsbury's Ebitda is running at about £1.2 billion, Argos would bring about £80 million. Plus there are the combination's savings and revenue gains forecast to hit £160 million within three years. Gearing up to, say, 2 times Ebitda would add about £1.4 billion of extra debt capacity. That would both reduce the consortium's equity contribution and boost returns. The group could carve out a separate property subsidiary which would be the ideal vehicle for taking on the debt, thanks to its attractive collateral. So a bid for Sainsbury-Argos is doable in theory. No Quick Fix: It will take three years for Sainsbury to realise the full synergies from buying Argos. There are two big snags, and the first is the timing. In the short term, Argos is going to be more costly than profitable: Sainsbury has warned of a near-term hit from £270 million in integration costs and capital expenditure before the gains come through. The second is the family. In 2007, the last time the grocer was the subject of private equity interest, the Sainsbury family was unwilling to see the company loaded with more debt. The company's pension obligations were also a stumbling block. It looks like the scuppering of the consortium bid was accidental. Even if Sainsbury realized toward the end of 2015 that it needed a change of strategy to defend itself against continued pressure from aggressive discounters and tackle its languishing share price, it's hard to see that willingly making itself less attractive to the group of bidders was an intended consequence. But it ratchets up pressure on Sainsbury Chief Executive Mike Coupe to deliver on his masterplan to turn Sainsbury into a non-food powerhouse to challenge Amazon's creep into Britain and John Lewis, and mop up excess space in Sainsbury's stores at the same time. If Coupe had to make his bold Argos escapade work before, he really needs to now. His hurdle for success just got higher.
careful: cannot work out logic here. share price should rise because consensus was sbry would need to raise offer. i suspect our friends the shorters. so many open postions would be burned, so they put on a few more to kill sentiment. to the long term investor this is good news. ..but what will sbry do from now on?
harvester: Trading statement looks good in most respects. I expect the sales/profit improvement in 4th quarter is already reflected in share price after the Kantaar results. Also , as usual in the City of London some friends , wives etc of insiders will have already placed their bets before the official RNS. Not a level playing field in the City !!! Predicted that FTSE100 to open down this morning. I will be putting in a few limit buy orders for sbry before market open but at prices well below yesterdays closing price. The buy orders will be for CFD's to avoid stamp duty and with my new broker since moving away from Iweb . The cfd's I'll buy will incur no interest costs since they are un-leveraged, i.e. I have to risk same capital as for buying shares and same , low trading commission costs as for shares .
careful: what a load of old tosh. how can you analyse the SBRY share price with so many short positions open. over 10% on loan. i do not understand the logic of the shorters here. short at 400p ok that makes sense. ..but short at 270p is crazy. there must be better targets.
kompressor: but this is all about the share price. if they raise the offer and share price falls, the value of the bid falls too. it does not make any sense to raise the offer. if sainsburys shares rise to 296p, that values Home at 175p. so mike coupe needs to convince Home shareholders that Sainsburys shares are worth at least 300p. that is not difficult given the £11bn property. sainsburys at 400p would put Home at 208.4p so i suspect many Home shareholders would still prefer the sainsburys offer.
loganair: Sainsbury CEO Mike Coupe says its offer for Home Retail Group is about baking a bigger cake, one that neither British retailer could rustle up alone. Sainsbury is making sure it's getting the best slice - financially at least. On the face of it the supermarket chain's offer looks decent for shareholders in Home Retail, which owns the Argos general goods stores. At a price of 162.9 pence - thanks to a 2 percent rise in Sainsbury's share price on Tuesday morning - it’s a more than 60 percent premium to where Home Retail traded before the bid interest was made public. But the price includes 25 pence per share from selling Home Retail's Homebase shops to Australia's Wesfarmers, which Home Retail shareholders would probably have got anyway, as well as 2.8 pence in lieu of a final dividend. Take that off, and the premium falls to about a third, pretty standard for a takeover. Some Home Retail investors had hoped - unrealistically - for 200 pence, explaining why the shares barely moved on Tuesday morning. That's not to say that the deal makes sense for Sainsbury strategically. As Gadfly's noted before, it was doing pretty well on its own. Sainsbury needs to fill excess space in its big supermarkets and the Argos concessions already operating in its stores are trading well, indicating there might be some mileage in putting the brands together. Sainsbury will become the biggest non-food UK retailer and hopes the Argos delivery network will help it compete with Amazon. The combination is risky, though. Sainsbury estimates more than half of Argos's 800 or so stores have less than five years to run on their leases. But closing and relocating shops is a delicate business, and Sainsbury is banking on sales migrating from those high street stores to its supermarkets. Sainsbury has enough to contend with without a tricky integration. Supermarket rivals Tesco and Wm Morrison are steadying, while German price-cutters Aldi and Lidl are expanding apace. It’s a good thing, then, that Coupe has at least shown discipline on price. Still, Sainsbury needs the 120 million pounds of promised yearly synergies to make the deal pay. They're by no means guaranteed, and will cost a hefty 140 million pounds to implement. Plus there's another 140 million pounds needed to put Argos concessions into Sainsbury supermarkets. Sainsbury will get its hands on about 250 million pounds of Argos cash. Then there's its 600 million-pound customer loan book. So out of the 1.1 billion-pound element of the deal that Sainsbury is funding, it reckons it's getting Argos for 250 million pounds. Coupe's right not to overpay. Home Retail had a difficult Christmas, while Sainsbury shareholders must take it on trust that it'll do better in a combined group.
edmundshaw: Deal is worth over 160p even if you assume Sainsburys share price was fair at 240p. What? So Coupe accepts 240p as the new normal for SBRY share price? While accepting that 100p was a vastly depressed share price for HOME? Seems that "We will not overpay" is director code for "we are prepared to overpay substantially and screw out own shareholders". Must remember that for future reference :-(
spob: FT Alphaville today BE Anyway, HOME a bit weak this morning. PM hxxp://www.theguar...eam-football-story BE Some talk around among the short sellers this morning, which as absolutely not been backtested, to be clear. BE The idea being that Sainsbury will bid again, but it's likely to be an incremental bump rather than a knockout. BE And HOME would struggle to accept an incremental bump. PM hmm Real time stream connected. New messages will appear here the moment they are published. BE Note the HOME short interest, though. BE PM 8% or so BE Yup, still nearly 9% of free float. There's a plenty to be made from spreading bear stories. BE Anyway, let me get Haitong BE Tony Shiret, who absolutely hates Argosbury. PM does he now BE Or Argbury. Perhaps that's better. BE Clearly the only things that can save Home Retail (HOME) as an independent company now would be pressure on Sainsbury (JS) (SBRY LN, 236p, Neutral, FV 235p) management not to proceed to make an offer, or a derisory low-field price. For Sainsbury CEO Mike Coupe either would represent a significant personal blow and we would expect management to be even more determined to continue despite the almost universally negative response to his proposed strategy. The HOME team’s surprise move to sell Homebase to Wesfarmers of Australia does raise the question of whether the subsequently de-levered Argos rump could be taken private, which we examine in this note. However, our main finding having done this work is that divisional profits as shown by HOME may have been boosted for Argos by re-allocation of Financial Services EBIT and that this undermines the overall valuation. Our FV rises to 135p from 95p. BE We have tested the various elements of Buy-Out arithmetic here. Private Equity could generate significant returns if the Argos Transformation Plan is successfully delivered in private ownership. But this is based in part at least on the starting point of very low profitability, which both highlights the risks involved for PE and limits the leverage a private vehicle could support initially and hence the exit price for HOME shareholders. Any consideration of the exit value of Argos must also be based on assuming that the Argos business model – which we believe has become more dependent on the contribution of consumer finance – is sustainable in private ownership (see below). As part of this exercise we have also had a much closer look at the composition of profits as stated by HOME. We believe that the Financial Services (HFS) business achieves far greater profits than stated and that these are re-allocated to Argos (mainly) and Homebase. We have estimated that over half of current year Argos EBIT is in fact re-allocated HFS profits, suggesting that the erosion of product based profitability has been greater than investors would generally believe. (We have received no co-operation from HOME in our analysis which incorporates a number of assumptions which may limit the accuracy of our conclusions.) The implication here is that Argos needs the support of a consumer finance structure to sustain its operations. BE Having performed the analysis we feel that there is a bit less to HOME than meets the eye. While HOME management may be motivated to offer for Argos, we believe that the valuations of Argos and HFS have to be considered together by investors rather than assuming a separate valuation for HFS based on its debtor book, because the returns implicit in a separate valuation of HFS would effectively be double-counted as its profits are mainly shown currently within the Argos EBIT. We assume that Sainsbury has probably done the same work we have managed in a couple of days over the last six months. So we would expect that it does not want to double-count assets either. This said the logic of its approach eludes us so its valuation is likely to as well. BE Canaccord also advising caution into the deadline. PM Hang on PM We assume that Sainsbury has probably done the same work we have managed in a couple of days over the last six months. PM That's a bit cheeky no? PM But go on PM Canaccord BE Similar conclusion, slightly more tame argument. BE With the clock ticking down to the 5pm deadline on 2 February (or potentially later if agreed by the Takeover Panel), by when J Sainsbury has to decide whether or not to make an increased bid for Home Retail, the answer should soon become clearer as to whether Argos is to continue with its Digital Transformation plan as an independent operator or (potentially) as a subsidiary of J Sainsbury. Home Retail is currently just over three years through its five-year plan, so it is a case of unfinished business at this stage. This will, of course, be dependent on a number of factors. First and foremost is whether Sainsbury does return with an enhanced bid. Assuming it does, we must see at what level this is pitched and whether shareholders are willing to accept this. In turn, this may depend on the mix of cash and paper offered. Given Sainsbury's own travails and challenges in its core grocery market, we would assume that the higher the mix of cash over paper, the higher the chances of success in securing Home Retail's shareholders' agreement. BE The market is not privy to the level at which Sainsbury's rebuffed offer last November was pitched (although press speculation centres at around 130p). There have been three key events since then - the proposed sale of Homebase to Wesfarmers for £340m (c 42p per share); a further profit warning from Home Retail; and market weakness and volatility. These will all play a part in Sainsbury's thinking for what it views as both a "strategically compelling transaction" but also "not a must do deal". As the potential bidder, it is only Sainsbury's (and its shareholders') view on the strategic compulsion of the transaction that matters. We do not have adequate insight into Sainsbury's strategy to comment in an informed manner, but it is clear from some of its published materials that the company (and its advisors) are serious in their deliberations and justifications on this matter. This has certainly changed our initial scepticism on the probability of a higher, follow-up approach. BE As long-term observers of Home Retail, we remain less convinced of the strategic logic and rationale of such a deal. However, just as beauty is in the eye of the beholder, value is in the eye of the bidder. Our analysis of the value of "rump" Home Retail, excluding Homebase at a £340m value, shows that any bid for the total group above 135p values this rump at a premium to the wider sector, compared with the 13% discount Wesfarmers has proposed to pay for Homebase. Only a "strategically compelling transaction" could justify that in our view. BE In light of our 10% forecast cuts following Home's Q3 IMS and some sector de-rating, in the absence of a bid approach we would have cut our fundamental valuation to 100p (from 115p). Ascribing a two in three chance to a bid at the current share price and a one in three chance of no further - or failed - bids, in which case fundamentals would re-apply, this gives our new target price of 134p. We therefore retain our SELL recommendation. BE All of which plays into the bear stuff above rather neatly. BE There's a quite startling disconnect between what the buyside says HOME is worth -- remember the flush of "we won't sell for less than 200p!" articles a while back -- and the value the sellside sees in the business. BE One can be cynical about both sides, of course. Though only the former is talking its book. 11:38AM
loganair: Time to go shopping for Sainsbury’s? By Robert Sutherland Smith: Sainsbury at 253p after the interim results. The traditional quoted food retail sector is still undergoing a big change on an undetermined time scale. On that basis, Sainsbury shares may not look an obvious buy. However, I argue that the shares are attractive when the financial fundamentals are recognised. The shares, after the results of the first half of the current year, are priced at 253p and look pretty bombed out on those fundamentals. Our home grown food retailers (who of course sell more than food) have been in the grip of an insurmountable problem: losing market share to outside competitors who have been increasing their market share. Nothing can be more debilitating for a big business than the loss of scale and economic and financial benefits that come with scale of operations, whilst the competitive interlopers (in this case Lidl and Aldi, the Hengist and Horsa of UK retailing) are increasing and improving theirs. That is a bit like their fighting with one arm tied behind their back. The big question is how long it will take before the now more competitive sector settles down into a new equilibrium. No one knows and it is difficult to guess. Moreover, there are other threats to the current sector players – including the invaders. As our legacy retailers of staple products spot ‘on line’ shopping as a lower cost opportunity, internet operators like Amazon spot ‘on line’ sales of food stuff as a new market opportunity. We are clearly only part way through some pretty momentous changes in this sector; none of which are susceptible to clear visibility and easy prediction and certainly not credible forecasting. However, as always, there is the usual solution of some future consolidation amongst the retreating traditional players like Sainsbury, Tesco, Morrison and Waitrose etc. I suspect that will become a genuine prospect in due course, particularly if Amazon come into the food retailing business – taking even more British Exchequer tax revenue to other taxation jurisdictions no doubt. So, is there a case for buying UK food retailers and Sainsbury in particular? The elementary factors guiding us in answering such a question, include the following: that all companies in their activities are subject to degrees of uncertainty; share prices over time move to discount evolving news, facts and prospects; long term investors with wealth to preserve and hopefully grow, need a spread of investments and risk. That includes food retail shares of course. Coming to Sainsbury specifically, the best argument for investing money in it in comparison with other retail shares is that the share price is now discounting the difficulties. The share price last seen was 253p after the last interim results. About two years ago, the share price was over 400p. What does an investor now get for his or her money? First, a lot of sales revenue; on the basis of last year’s sales annual revenue at £23.5 billion on an equity capitalisation of £4.8 billion; put another way a share price of 253p buying historic sales revenue of an estimated 1,237p per share. Second, a very low price to book valuation. In fact the share price last seen stands at a 13% discount to balance sheet net assets in March. The market capitalisation of Sainsbury equity, currently standing at a value of £4.8 billion, commands an enterprise value which is three and a half times larger. In the balance sheet of 14th March last, total assets were stated as £16.5 billion. Also note that last year’s EBITD (basically profits before interest, taxation and depreciation are charged) amounted to £770 million putting Sainsbury shares on an EBITDA ratio of only 6.2 times on the basis of last year’s figures. Despite the gearing, interest costs were reportedly covered 6 times on an annual basis and 7.4 times on an interim basis. The shares price also stands at only 3.7 times last year’s annual cash and near cash held. Such valuations are strikingly low. Turning to the latest interim results, the disappointing news include the facts that the interim dividend was cut 20%; that there was a loss of market share and thinner margins; that sales fell 2%; and that underlying profits fell by 18%. The company is responding, we are told, by improving its own branded ‘taste the difference’ products, which, against the 2% fall in sales, actually grew by a reported 2% in volume terms. However, the incoming new CEO Mike Coupe talks of cutting costs according to a programme that seems ahead of schedule. The company is also increasing its convenience stores (very much the fashion in the sector) where sales have risen by a reported 11%, on the back of a one fifth increase in the number of such stores. Moreover, the retailer is developing its new Tu clothing offer – sales up 10% over the first half – as well as building its Sainsbury banking operation which is for the moment absorbing transformation cost. At a given point the bank should obviously be making a contribution to net profits. The market is estimating a 17% fall in earnings this year to earnings per share about 22p, putting the shares on a forward estimated price to earnings ratio of just over 11 times. The consensus estimate, at this juncture, is for a further 2% decline in earnings the year after that. Interestingly, it forecasts top line sales revenue for this year as being static at £23.75 billion and pretty close to that again in the following year at an estimated sales revenue figure of £23.52 million. In essence then, the market seems to be calculating that Sainsbury will hold its sales, with a well understood fall in earnings this year but holding on to most of those earnings the following year. The market consensus also estimates that the annual dividend will be reduced twenty per cent in line with the cut in the interim dividend. At the 10.5p dividend payout estimated for this year and next year the estimated annual dividend yield for this year and next is 4.4% p.a. As I always say on such occasions, I am no more gifted in seeing the future than the rest of humanity. However, as a compensation for that lack of prophetic vision, I can identify value in the here and now. Sainsbury at this level shows quite a lot of what we call fundamental value, as indicated above. With the share price at a discount to balance sheet net assets, investors now are arguably being asked to pay nothing for earnings. It will be interesting to see whether at this stage and at these levels of valuation, the bears will be tempted to fold up their short positions together with their tents. Sainsbury is reported to have been one of the most shorted shares in the market. Technically, the shares have been moving sideways for over a year in a trading range of roughly between 220p and 290p. Arguably, the share price looks as though it might have broken out of the earlier downtrend that took it into that range. Have a look and see if that is your interpretation.
loganair: Why I Won't Be Buying Shares In J Sainsbury By John Kingham: J Sainsbury along with the other major supermarkets, has been through the wars in recent years. Most people know the story by now, if only because of the more severe and highly publicised problems at Tesco. J Sainsbury: It's a supermarket Here's my extremely short version of the backstory for J Sainsbury. The big four UK supermarkets (Tesco, WM Morrison, J Sainsbury and, to a lesser extent, ASDA) had it fairly easy. As long as they did a half decent job, millions of shoppers would continue to shop with them. But then along came the Financial Crisis and the Great Recession, and shoppers had far fewer pennies to spare and more time on their hands to shop around. The result was a change of shopping habits to more frequent and smaller shopping trips, at local stores that focus on price more than anything else. That played right into the hands of discounters Aldi and Lidl, who fitted this new shopping behaviour like a glove. The initial response from the big supermarkets was to ignore the discounters, but that was a massive mistake and the big four have been losing market share and struggling to adapt quickly enough ever since. A highly successful company, until recently: things had been going very well. The company has a long and unbroken record of dividend payments and, in recent years, revenues, profits and dividends had all been going strongly. Its statistics for the last 10 years look like this: •Growth Rate (covering revenues, profits, dividends) of 6.4%, well ahead of the FTSE 100's anaemic 0.8% •Growth Quality (frequency of revenue/profit/dividend increases) of 75%, also ahead of the FTSE 100's mediocre 50% •Net ROCE (median over 10 years, net of interest and tax) of 5.4%, below the large company median of 10% So J Sainsbury has grown fairly quickly and smoothly over the last decade, including the profit and dividend decline in the 2015 results. However, its profitability as measured by Net ROCE (Return on Capital Employed) is weak. Because I use post-interest and tax profits as the "return" part of ROCE, this low profitability figure could be because Sainsbury's core business isn't very profitable, or because the company has lots of debt (and hence large interest payments) or other non-operational expenses, or both. In fact, Sainsbury's profitability is so low that it effectively rules the company out as an investment for me. I currently use the following rule of thumb: Only invest in a company if its 10-year median Net ROCE is above 7% J Sainsbury fails that test, so that's the first reason I would be buying the company's shares. But there are other reasons too. Its financial obligations are too large for my liking One of the reasons for Sainsbury's weak profitability is its large debt obligations. It has £2.8bn of total interest-bearing debts as at the 2015 annual results. That sounds like a lot and it is, especially as the company has "only" earned an average of £0.5bn in post-tax profits over the last 5 years. Another large financial obligation is its defined benefit pension scheme. Because the company must ensure that its pension fund assets exceed the fund's liabilities, it must pour cash into its pension fund if there is a deficit. And that's exactly what it's doing today. The pension fund obligations stand at £7.7bn, while the pension deficit is £0.7bn. That deficit must be closed, and the company has agreed to pay £49m into the scheme each year until 2020, which currently amounts to almost 10% of the company's post-tax profit. And so for J Sainsbury we have: •Debt Ratio (ratio of total borrowings to 5-year average post-tax profit) of 5.2 •Pension Ratio (ratio of pension obligations to 5-year average post-tax profit) of 14.4 •Combined Debt and Pension Ratio of 19.6 Unfortunately, those ratios break some of my other rules of thumb: •Only invest in a defensive sector company if its Debt Ratio is below 5 •Only invest in a company if its Pension Ratio is below 10 •Only invest in a company if its Combined Debt and Pension Ratio is below 10 So along with "too low" profitability, J Sainsbury also has "too high" financial obligations for me. As a result, I won't be buying the company's shares anytime soon, no matter what the price. The shares are attractively valued, if you ignore the other problems Even though I wouldn't consider buying the company's shares at the moment, I'm crunching through the accounts anyway so I might as well take a look at what share price might be considered "fair value" given its financial history. The caveat here is that this fair value would only apply if the company wasn't breaking any of my rules of thumb, but it's still an interesting value to calculate. As J Sainsbury has a slightly above average record of growth, its shares, according to my valuation system, deserve a slightly above average rating. With its shares currently at 261p, the company's valuation multiples look like this (compared to the FTSE 100 at 6,700): •PE10 (price to 10-year average EPS) of 10.9, which is lower than (better than) the FTSE 100's 14.0 •PD10 (price to 10-year average dividend per share) of 18.5, which is lower than (better than) the FTSE 100's 32.9 •Dividend yield of 5.0%, higher and better than the FTSE 100's 3.5% So in terms of valuation, J Sainsbury is significantly more attractively valued than the FTSE 100. Its share price is cheaper than average, relative to past earnings and dividends, and the dividend income yield is above average. And remember, the company also has a better track record of growth than average, so if anything it should be on higher valuation multiples than the index (ignoring its various problems, of course). To calculate fair value for the company's shares, I can adjust its share price until it has a middling rank on my stock screen. At its current 261p, J Sainsbury has a rank of 47 out of 230 companies on the screen, so it is one of the most attractively valued (again, ignoring its problems). For the shares to be "fairly valued," they would have to increase to 450p, which is some 72% above their current share price. At that level, the shares would have a historic dividend yield of 2.9%, which I think would be reasonable as long as the company's successful past could be replicated in future. However, the company's profitability is too low for me, and its financial obligations are too large, so I won't be investing at the moment. Note: Last time I looked at J Sainsbury's shares, I was much more upbeat. However, since then (May 2014), I have become more cautious about both profitability and financial obligations (partly as a result of the problems with Tesco and Morrisons), so under my now much stricter system, the company has gone from a buy to uninvestible.

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Trade Type Trade Size Trade Price Trade Date Trade Time Currency
AT 564 267.10 05 May 2016 11:10:50 GBX
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