Share Name Share Symbol Market Type Share ISIN Share Description
Rhythmone LSE:RTHM London Ordinary Share GB00BYW0RC64 ORD 10P
  Price Change % Change Share Price Bid Price Offer Price High Price Low Price Open Price Shares Traded Last Trade
  -1.00p -0.35% 283.00p 283.50p 286.50p 286.50p 283.00p 286.50p 26,881 13:57:14
Industry Sector Turnover (m) Profit (m) EPS - Basic PE Ratio Market Cap (m)
Software & Computer Services 118.8 -11.9 -3.5 - 145.00

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Date Time Title Posts
22/1/201813:21RTHM2,967
21/1/201813:18RHYTHMONE - new Name, new Beginning???6,434
20/1/201806:08RhythmOne - 2016 a new beginning11,911
03/1/201814:39No Rhythm All Blues195

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Rhythmone (RTHM) Most Recent Trades

Trade Time Trade Price Trade Size Trade Value Trade Type
14:00:28284.113188.07O
13:51:31283.00152430.16AT
13:51:31283.0062175.46AT
13:51:31286.001,5604,461.60AT
13:51:31285.506461,844.33AT
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Rhythmone (RTHM) Top Chat Posts

DateSubject
22/1/2018
08:20
Rhythmone Daily Update: Rhythmone is listed in the Software & Computer Services sector of the London Stock Exchange with ticker RTHM. The last closing price for Rhythmone was 284p.
Rhythmone has a 4 week average price of 235p and a 12 week average price of 206p.
The 1 year high share price is 500p while the 1 year low share price is currently 206p.
There are currently 51,235,968 shares in issue and the average daily traded volume is 64,945 shares. The market capitalisation of Rhythmone is £144,997,789.44.
21/12/2017
13:25
midasx: Very impressive I must say, you should ask edenbrook for a job 1gw ;-)) 1gw - 06 Dec 2017 - 06:31:44 - 11311 of 11563 RhythmOne - 2016 a new beginning - RTHM Cash alternative. Maybe it's the insomnia talking, but the more I think about this the more I like it. If R1 were to offer YuMe shareholders (excluding the 32% or so who have already agreed to the cash + paper deal) a cash alternative of somewhere between $4 and $4.50 it would achieve several things in my opinion: o It would allow R1 to present the cash alternative offer as being a good premium to the price prevailing immediately before it was revealed (i.e. a decent premium to the current $3.50-$3.70-ish range); o It would address Edenbrook's comment about the room for a cash offer; o To the extent YuMe shareholders took up the cash alternative it would effectively reduce the cost of YuMe to R1, viewed from the perspective of the original offer at $5.25 equivalent; o It would be likely (IMO) to lead to a reverse of the recent arb flows - as the arb on the cash+paper deal would likely turn decisively negative, those who had sold R1 to buy YuMe would have an incentive to take profits and sell YuMe and buyback R1 - this should have the effect of pushing up the R1 price while the YuMe price should be held up by new arb players arriving to play the margin between the cash alternative price and the actual YuMe price; o It would allow the merged R1-YuMe to start life with a relatively efficient capital structure including a reasonable amount of debt. So to me it seems more and more like a win-win, with the caveats being the increased execution risk due to the debt and the costs of funding such a move in the event a lot of YuMe shareholders elect for the cash alternative. If the move were interpreted as a sign of confidence in the future by R1 management then it might lead to a revaluation of R1 shares by the time the exchange offer begins, with the result that the cash alternative by then may not look so attractive. I note that, if I have my sums right, the 2nd tranche of the Silicon Valley Bank funding revealed with the 1H results ("Subject to satisfaction of certain conditions, the total Revolving Credit Facility may be increased by an amount not to exceed $75.0 million.") would be enough to fund the additional cost of a $4.50 cash alternative for the 68% of shares not promised under the tender and support agreements. Also worth noting perhaps, for the conspiracy theorists and maybe others, that such a scenario (cash alternative under negotiation) could explain why neither the YuMe side nor the R1 side appear particularly active in trying to halt the share price declines. The lower the YuMe shareprice goes before a cash alternative is presented, the smaller that cash alternative needs to be.
14/12/2017
22:07
stephen2010: ALBA currently trading at 0.39p target price 6p making a nice 15 bagger. Please read the following: MARKET CAP PUZZLE ❖ Alba (market cap £8.4m) is in a resources neighbourhood populated with listed companies with much enhanced market capitalisations, such as UKOG.L (£134m) and JAY.L (£172m). With either shared project interests or adjacent tenements to these companies, Alba should trade at a much higher valuation than its current token value. Like Bluejay, Alba owns 100% of its ilmenite project. Direct comparisons with UKOG are also instructive. While both companies own other projects, UKOG’s 49.9% of Horse Hill Developments Limited (HHDL), when compared to Alba’s 18.1% means that Alba has approximately one third of the value of Horse Hill compared to UKOG but only about 7% of the market capitalisation. Once the market recognises these disparities, the room for growth in Alba’s share price is undeniable. VALUATION RATIONALE - Our valuation in this First Equity Limited initiation note uses a risked valuation approach for Alba’s two main projects, at Horse Hill and TBS. The Horse Hill licences are valued using independent published technical data from Schlumberger, Xodus and Nutech on the oil potential of the licences, along with our own assumptions on recovery rates, oil discovery value, resource and development risks factors. From this a risked value of $127m net to Alba on a ‘Base Case’ basis is derived for Horse Hill. Given the similar geology and economic potential of both TBS and Dundas, we have adopted a risked closeology valuation approach, by computing an NPV for Dundas of $223m and then applying a three-tiered risked probability calculation to arrive at a value of $54.7m for TBS. Once Alba announce its JORC resource and exploration target at TBS and Bluejay its Feasibility Study results, this number is likely to be revised upwards very rapidly, possibly up to $200m, representing up to 7p per share in additional shareholder value. We compute a valuation of $185m (£139m) for Alba, equating to 6.0p per share, of which 4.1p is attributed to the stake in Horse Hill, 1.8p for TBS. Given this analysis and wealth of valuation catalysts anticipated across the project portfolio in the coming months, we recommend the shares as a ‘BUY, with a Target Price of 6.0p, representing a potential 15 times plus uplift from the current share price.
12/12/2017
08:42
football: MidasX - leluot3 is a hindsight trader tells you after stuff happens and seems to forget all the shorts she took in the teens before the share price went back up to 50p and would have been stopped out on all of them and lost a packet. Just like when she was taking shorts out in the 40s and popped up one day saying I'm long as the share price it 176p. You won't get a prediction and firm price as that would make her liable to getting things wrong why not ask in six months time and everything she posts will be 100% right in hindsight when you read the posts. leluot3 of all your shorts you took out only the 26p you been able to close if it wasn't stopped out! So the half a dozen plus you bragged about must have cost you a fortune.
06/12/2017
08:45
barkboo: Loaf - when you think about it, the share price is out of the companies hands and run by a kinda gangster tote. No point in taking on something you have a complete disadvantage with. Not to be worried about how their share price is being played with, shows confidence - I have said many times before, scaffolders have this as a royal flush, an unbeatable hand. RTHM know they will have a hand to play - when to play it is the sign of a good poker player. I am very confident they are trading a little better than they tell us...just like in 2010, and just like Au. when out of the blue they smashed a well known hedge fund character. lol I have it on good authority and from a scaffolder that is the best - RTHM are in complete control...the only point in which they have not been in the past, was when Edelman was brought in for a hatchet job. They have now covered that avenue...The share price has been delayed but not derailed.. Listen - I have a few quid involved here..one way or another - others that are never wrong, have a lot more......do we ever sound concerned? lol Enjoy the fun - enjoy the rags!
06/12/2017
07:54
midasx: The one thing that has kept Blinkx et al solvent over the last decade is lack of debt and capital raising when the share price was on a roll. The current share price has been manufactured by interested parties and will recover when the deal is completed. I would not like to see RTHM take on a huge pile of debt to restructure a deal already in the bag!
06/12/2017
06:31
1gw: Cash alternative. Maybe it's the insomnia talking, but the more I think about this the more I like it. If R1 were to offer YuMe shareholders (excluding the 32% or so who have already agreed to the cash + paper deal) a cash alternative of somewhere between $4 and $4.50 it would achieve several things in my opinion: o It would allow R1 to present the cash alternative offer as being a good premium to the price prevailing immediately before it was revealed (i.e. a decent premium to the current $3.50-$3.70-ish range); o It would address Edenbrook's comment about the room for a cash offer; o To the extent YuMe shareholders took up the cash alternative it would effectively reduce the cost of YuMe to R1, viewed from the perspective of the original offer at $5.25 equivalent; o It would be likely (IMO) to lead to a reverse of the recent arb flows - as the arb on the cash+paper deal would likely turn decisively negative, those who had sold R1 to buy YuMe would have an incentive to take profits and sell YuMe and buyback R1 - this should have the effect of pushing up the R1 price while the YuMe price should be held up by new arb players arriving to play the margin between the cash alternative price and the actual YuMe price; o It would allow the merged R1-YuMe to start life with a relatively efficient capital structure including a reasonable amount of debt. So to me it seems more and more like a win-win, with the caveats being the increased execution risk due to the debt and the costs of funding such a move in the event a lot of YuMe shareholders elect for the cash alternative. If the move were interpreted as a sign of confidence in the future by R1 management then it might lead to a revaluation of R1 shares by the time the exchange offer begins, with the result that the cash alternative by then may not look so attractive. I note that, if I have my sums right, the 2nd tranche of the Silicon Valley Bank funding revealed with the 1H results ("Subject to satisfaction of certain conditions, the total Revolving Credit Facility may be increased by an amount not to exceed $75.0 million.") would be enough to fund the additional cost of a $4.50 cash alternative for the 68% of shares not promised under the tender and support agreements. Also worth noting perhaps, for the conspiracy theorists and maybe others, that such a scenario (cash alternative under negotiation) could explain why neither the YuMe side nor the R1 side appear particularly active in trying to halt the share price declines. The lower the YuMe shareprice goes before a cash alternative is presented, the smaller that cash alternative needs to be.
05/12/2017
18:42
1gw: LCWA - because they need another 18% of YuMe shares offered in the tender agreement to get the deal through. By "non-committed" shareholders I mean the 68% of shares not promised through the tender & support agreements. If the main objection of Edenbrook and any similar-minded shareholders is that the deal price based on the current R1 price is a long way below the headline $5.25 and that there's plenty of room for a cash offer, then why not make a cash offer (somewhere between the current deal price and the $5.25) to those shareholders, if R1 can finance it? Those YuMe shareholders who think the current share price is down to arb or other shenanigans and believe in the medium-term value of the combination may be happy to stick with the original offer, while those who just want out could take the cash. R1 shareholders would have a win by getting the deal through and suffering less dilution, picking up the YuMe shares for less than they thought they would be paying when the deal was announced. Seems to me it could be a win-win, IF it could be financed. Having seen the extent of the funding lined up with Silicon Valley Bank it seems to me financing might no longer be an issue.
01/12/2017
14:51
midasx: When the takeover was announced the share price of RTHM was 360p with a 12 month high of 485p. Games have been played to get the share price down to current levels. Informed YUME shareholders should be well aware of this and the likely recovery when the takeover is completed. Why should a sweetener be required when the share price has been artificially reduced to such low levels? 31 October 2017 RHYTHMONE PLC NOTICE OF RESULTS London, England and San Francisco, CA. - 31 October 2017 - RhythmOne plc ("RhythmOne" or the "Company") announces that it will release interim results for the six months ended 30 September 2017 on Monday 4(th) December 2017. The Company notes the recent weakness in its share price and confirms that it is not aware of any developments since the release of its Trading Update on 17(th) October 2017 that would change the outlook contained in that statement. RhythmOne PLC 17 October 2017 RHYTHMONE PLC H12018 TRADING UPDATE London, England and San Francisco, CA. - 17 October 2017 - RhythmOne plc ("RhythmOne" or the "Company") today provides a preliminary update on its expected performance for the half year ended 30 September 2017 ("H12018" or "the Period"). This update is based on unaudited, pre-close figures that may be subject to change. Financials During the Period, RhythmOne successfully executed against three key objectives it set forth at the start of the financial year: -- Growth of programmatic platform revenues; -- Integration of recent acquisitions, with performance in line with management plan; -- Continued profitability on an adjusted(1) EBITDA basis. Performance for H12018 is expected to be in line with management expectations across key metrics, as follows: -- Revenues of $112-114M (H12017 revenues from continuing operations: $67M), driven by programmatic platform growth; -- Gross profit margin of approximately 38.0% (H12017 gross profit margin of 35.4% from continuing operations); -- Adjusted(1) EBITDA of $1.5-2.0M (H12017 Adjusted(1) EBITDA loss: ($2.6M)). The Company expects cash on hand and marketable securities to total approximately $37M as at 30 September 2017. This includes net cash used of c.$20M relating to the RadiumOne acquisition cash consideration and working capital, c.$7M used in broader group operating activities to fund a first half working capital investment - driven by increased revenues and in line with normal seasonal working capital trends, c.$6M in exceptional charges related to acquisition and restructuring charges and c.$5M in capitalized development and capital expenditures as a result of continued investment in infrastructure and platforms of the newly combined entities. The Company expects to recover a majority of the first half working capital investment and also anticipates to realize the benefit of c.$5M of the acquired RadiumOne working capital in the second half of the financial year. Operations During the Period, RhythmOne continued to build and scale its industry leading programmatic platform, which now serves as the Company's principal growth engine and infrastructure to integrate acquisitions - on both supply and demand sides of the value chain. Across the business, H12018 saw a significant rise in volume of 124% year-on-year, coupled with an as-expected, corresponding drop in fill rate, in line with rapid volume growth. During the Period, inventory also saw a strong year-on-year increase in pricing of 74%, driven by monetization of high-value, high-impact and high-margin video and rich media inventory, and the packaging of premium inventory through turnkey private marketplaces - with substantial data and quality (brand safety) overlays. Key operating metrics are outlined below:
14/11/2017
18:57
dagsteeth: I have a clear understanding of what's happening: 1. There's only 30% free float in RTHM - none of the large holders are selling/trading. Approximately 9% is on loan - lent by Tosca - which means 35% of the free float is being shorted, Hence the huge volatility. Some of the shorts have guaranteed stop losses in place, the set ups of which further drive price down 2. The adtech sector is going through a wobble and consolidation phase at the moment, from which there will be winners and losers. Rthm/Yume is well placed 3. The Rthm/Yume deal makes strategic sense but given the time needed for F4 filings and the inability to provide forward guidance has created an information vacuum and shorters' paradise. The Rthm "no reason for fall in share price" and credit facility adds substance to the rationale for the deal being on track. Yume has no other buyers and this is as close to a done deal as it gets 4. The arbirtage trade 1gw has described has an impact but Yume's price follows Rthm's and Yume is not being shorted but some US investors are bailing since they don't want to hold a UK company. 5. The level of algo trades, especially post US opening suggest a concerted and professional group of shorters given none is above 0.5%. If short closing is effected through guaranteed stop losses, the professional shorters will be closed out when the deal closes/post F4/Rthm H1 results on 4 Dec. The amateur shorters will be significantly short squeezed. Arguably, some -ve posters across the bbs are associated with the campaign 6. By the time the deal completes, the Rthm share price will be around 300p. Tosca are then very well placed to launch a bid at 500p and find people falling over themselves to sell given the premium from a low base. hence their current complicity in driving down the stock price now by being prepared to lend stock out. Fast forward 2 years, one refinancing and special dividend later, Tosca will sell to a larger adtech/facebook/google etc. if all goes according to plan, Tosca will make a 3x return from a 500p base.
06/11/2017
12:20
barkboo: Fluffy - you're a poster that has claimed to have held from the early days, seen two substantial share price rises but have not taken a penny profit. The most harden investors have realistic targets - most take stage payments...you now say, "if a counter-offer comes in for Yume I can't see how R1 can increase their bid and although wrongly, I feel the market will punish the share price of R1 rather than Yume" Fluffy - RTHM wont increase their bid! Yume would then have to weigh off RTHM with the penalty. The share price has come under pressure, "fears of" RTHM are stretching themselves - So RTHM previously sailing along nicely, share price moving in the right direction, only the deal has reversed things. If Yume pull out of the deal - we will still be in the strong position, but with a shedload more of Yume cash! You feel the market would then punish the SP, lol scamster at his worst!
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