Share Name Share Symbol Market Type Share ISIN Share Description
Mercantile Port LSE:MPL London Ordinary Share GG00B53M7D91 ORD NPV
  Price Change % Change Share Price Bid Price Offer Price High Price Low Price Open Price Shares Traded Last Trade
  +0.00p +0.00% 7.125p 7.00p 7.25p 7.125p 7.125p 7.125p 57,000 08:00:00
Industry Sector Turnover (m) Profit (m) EPS - Basic PE Ratio Market Cap (m)
Unknown - - - - 0.00

Mercantile Port (MPL) Latest News

More Mercantile Port News
Mercantile Port Takeover Rumours

Mercantile Port (MPL) Share Charts

1 Year Mercantile Port Chart

1 Year Mercantile Port Chart

1 Month Mercantile Port Chart

1 Month Mercantile Port Chart

Intraday Mercantile Port Chart

Intraday Mercantile Port Chart

Mercantile Port (MPL) Discussions and Chat

Mercantile Port Forums and Chat

Date Time Title Posts
26/5/201711:45Mercantile Ports and Logistics 360
13/1/200613:40Montpelier Group820
17/2/200511:08Cash rich MONTPELLIER under priced27
06/2/200517:41what merit in montpelier27
10/12/200408:16Montpellier (MPL) CHEAP. Share price=25.5p,NAV=40-50p,EPS=5-6p,P/E=4-5903

Add a New Thread

Mercantile Port (MPL) Most Recent Trades

Trade Time Trade Price Trade Size Trade Value Trade Type
View all Mercantile Port trades in real-time

Mercantile Port (MPL) Top Chat Posts

Mercantile Port Daily Update: Mercantile Port is listed in the Unknown sector of the London Stock Exchange with ticker MPL. The last closing price for Mercantile Port was 7.13p.
Mercantile Port has a 4 week average price of 7.13p and a 12 week average price of 7.13p.
The 1 year high share price is 11.25p while the 1 year low share price is currently 7.13p.
There are currently 0 shares in issue and the average daily traded volume is 49,015 shares. The market capitalisation of Mercantile Port is £0.
mount teide: tyran - you're in good company! - when the dust finally settles, very, very few, other than those responsible for taking the share-price from 250p to 6.75p will walk away from SPL/MPL with anything other than a material loss. SPL/MPL's business is clearly based on the tried and tested modus operandi of Junker's EU and Blatter's FIFA - first class travel, hotel and Michelin star restaurant lifestyle organisations - all highly secretive and totally unaccountable, and run by either hugely over-remunerated scam artist's or the totally inept, at someone's else expense! SPL/MPL is a real estate investment disaster in the Ports industry, which is in fact a very rare bird indeed, in an industry where Port capacity has grown more or less in line with the annual 2% long term average annual growth of the World economy. Consequently, average asset prices and operating profits in the private sector of the Ports industry have been on a very gently rising trend for decades, offering good low risk investment returns - Dubai Ports World(we are long term holders) being a good example. However, there is one other organisation who like MPl has been bucking the 'almost guaranteed returns' long term trend, with some truly terrible 'investments' in the port's industry over the last 15 years. The EU leadership will be nervously looking over their shoulders at MPL, who are clearly giving the hard earned, unenviable and legendary reputation of Junker's Crew for wasting/losing other people's money in Ports sector investment, some stiff competition. A staggering one third of all audited European Union port investment was "wasted" according to a recent report of the EU's OWN auditors. Almost €400m of European Union investment into ports and maritime infrastructure within the bloc since 2000 has been wasted, according to the European Court of Auditors. Much of it seems to be the handiwork of the usual suspects - Southern EU Nation fraud - work given to carefully selected(very carefully!) building companies to build high spec port capacity that had little or no realistic chance of being commercially viable and now sit inactive, other than as very expensive sea bird roosts and to provide free moorings for the local fishing fleets! AIMHO/DYOR
mount teide: As mentioned in earlier posts, we are still to receive a reply to correspondence requesting technical information from both ITD(as a shareholder) and the MMB. It would seem that Indian companies and Government regulatory authorities are either very, very slow at responding or are a very 'close knit' family. Likewise, we have emailed SPL/MPL/Jay/Pavan previously requesting clarification on a number of matters, many previously mentioned in RNS statements, with a similar result, forcing us to go through the highly defensive NOMAD representative to secure access to the information. A few examples of the obfuscation used by MPL management to render any attempt to monitor on-site construction progress totally impossible. Incredibly, we have seen more site update photographs provided by Google Earth since June 2016, than the SINGLE one made available by MPL during the last 11 months - from a management who stated that now the build out was progressing with a fully mobilised workforce, they will keep the market regularly updated. Well, the cynic might suggest they did in a way with 8 photographic site updates in 6 months before the surprise notification of a £37m cash raise for a company that the Board stated 'was not cash strapped'. RNS - 16th June 2016 - 58 Piles have been laid for the construction of the jetty RNS - 22nd Sept 2016 - Piling for 100 meters of jetty completed RNS - 13th Mar 2017 - Piling for approx 40% of final quay length completed I defy anyone regardless of technical knowledge and experience to determine what the actual progress has been from that information; designed clearly make any attempt to hold management accountable for the abject failure to get remotely near the hugely misleading progress targets that went in the Shareholders Circular date 31 October 2016 and, the passage of time has shown to be a complete work of fiction - most notably that the land reclamation and quay piling had continued without material interruption since October 2015, and the land reclamation and quay piling construction progress targets post June 2016 were many multiples of anything previously achieved. Likewise, an attempt to conceal that just 4 acres of land reclamation had occurred against a Shareholders Circular to raise £37m that stated an expected target of 105 additional acres, can be seen in the few RNS statements updating the market as to the progress achieved. A clear attempt to mix hectares and acres to complicate matters for those not technically inclined and NO attempt to provide an update as to the progress achieved against the expected targets given to the market in the RNS statements. RNS - 16th June 2016 - 30 hectares to be completed by the end June RNS - 22nd Sept 2016 - 30 hectares of reclamation now complete RNS - 13th Mar 2016 - 79 acres(40%) of overall reclamation target achieved. MPL management should stop issuing construction progress targets since they serve no purpose other than to routinely publicise their total incompetence and ineffectiveness and, reduce their shareholders to nothing more than a laughing stock. As always, the market has 20 - 20 vision and has no trouble seeing the management for what they are: reducing the share-price from 250p to a staggering 7.65p for what is the build out of a largely fixed price real estate construction project. AIOHO/DYOR
mount teide: lefrene - I've emailed independent forensic accounting and financial fraud investigator Harry Markopolos - to ask for his hourly rates! Sent over a copy of the SPL/MPL post IPO share-price chart, various other data, and news of the recent fundraise for £37m at a staggering 96% discount to the IPO price, in order to complete what is in effect a real estate development! According to Harry's boss at the time, Harry took one look at the performance chart of Madoff's fund and said "its a fraud". Within four hours using complex mathematical models to recreate Madoff's performance, he could prove it was a 'fraud' Somehow, like us i don't think he'll need to use too many complex mathematical models to work out there could be a problem here with the cash burn rate versus progress made.
mount teide: orinocor - I am against shorting as a matter of principle. Book? - too busy enjoying early retirement! Regarding our investment in SPL/MPL I posted at the outset, that the professional experience of the SPL management left a lot to be desired but, we were prepared to overlook this potential red flag on the basis that; The port design and build out were being carried out by reputable marine engineering organisations, that were known to us - Royal Haskoning and ITD Cementation There was a fixed price contract for the land reclamation, quay construction, approach channel and harbour dredging - the overwhelming majority of the costs involved. The port was strategically located to benefit from the inevitable migration of general cargo/ro-ro/break bulk ship cargo handling operations from the old Indira Harbour to the Uran Peninsula over the decades ahead; in much the say way the JNPT terminals has seen with container shipping. We felt that provided: The inexperienced management did nothing more than ensure the port design specification and scope of work for the access channel and berth pocket dredging (for dredged depth) was adhered to. The port construction timetable kept on or close to schedule and budget(which should have included a 15% contingency allowance for general cost overruns). The experienced NEDS did their job and provided quality oversight. An experienced port operator was contracted to run the terminal Then the port development would have decent prospects of becoming a commercial success - and offer a potentially attractive risk/reward investment at a share-price in the 50p-60p region, for what is the construction of a physical asset with a 30 year renewable operating concession. Unfortunately, in our opinion, the passage of time has shown the executive management has failed totally to carry out its responsibilities to manage this port development project in a satisfactory and professional manner. Cash burn - we cannot in any way reconcile the progress made to date with the cash burn - makes no sense. Construction timetable - every construction progress target set by management has subsequently proved to be a work of total fiction. Materially important claims were made by management in RNS that were subsequently shown to be untrue - in some instances by subsequent photographic and written evidence unwittingly provided by the totally incompetent executive management. In others by shareholders contracting a light aircraft operator to fly over the site and take photographic images. The Directors 'preferred' final design that was used to support the £37m additional cash raise should have seen a highly material improvement to the original design, considering it was equivalent to 65% of ITD's winning fixed price tender price of £57m to build the major civil engineering elements of the development. It has done no such thing. Indeed, in our opinion, the revised port design specification should in fact have seen a material reduction in construction cost compered to the original specification - and therefore should not have required any further funds to be raised. The executive chairman having a recent history of settling one regulatory investigation against him for alleged insider dealing via an out of court settlement made highly concerning reading. Then to be the subject of writs for the alleged siphoning of tens of £millions of shareholders funds out of a company he had executive responsibility for, into companies owned by him and his family made extremely disturbing reading to us, considering our inability to reconcile the very high level of cash burn in MPL with the construction progress to date and, the final likely cost for the original design specification against its potential market value, never mind the scaled back, lower cost revised design. Since he did't step down immediately to clear his name, once this news became public knowledge - in our opinion, it made this company un-investible on this matter alone - never mind the catalogue of red flags mentioned above. AIOHO/DYOR
mount teide: The level of misrepresentation and incompetence by the MPL executive management is truly breathtaking for a London Stock Exchange quoted company and, incredibly continues to plumb new depths despite numerous complaints to the Nomad. The new MPL website has the following introduction about the activities of the company for prospective investors: Mercantile Ports & Logistics was established to develop, own and operate port & logistics facilities. Its maiden project is the development of a multipurpose terminal and logistics facility at Karanja. The Terminal will be comprised of: * A 1,000 metre quay which will be serviced by a combination of ship to shore and multipurpose cranes * 200 acre back-up area for cargo storage. Of course, this is what shareholders were told they were going to get when they paid 250p a share back in October 2010, to enable the company to raise £73m to part fund the project. Ah, the benefit of hindsight! In 2013, in Arden Partners 2013 Note investors were again given the same terminal specification, supported by detailed plans drawn up by Royal Haskoning the principle engineers appointed to design the terminal. Then, some 7 years later after endlessly being told over the years that the company was not in anyway cash strapped, it was explained to shareholders, that if they put their hand in their pockets for another £37m at an eye-watering 96% discount to the IPO share-price they could have a range of modifications/enhancements(the Directors preferred design) to the basic specification all completed by Q3/2017. Incredibly, some 6 months later what shareholders foolish enough to support the additional fundraising find out they are actually going to get - probably completed sometime in 2019 if they are lucky(look at the implications this will have for bank debt interest payments), provided the present dry season rate of progress is maintained for the next 18 months to two years is: No 1,000m Quay No ship to shore cranes because cranes with 150metre jibs have not yet been invented No 4.5m dredged access channel No 200 acres of storage No new 2 mile port access road to replace the current heavily potholed dirt track Instead, shareholders for £150m are to get: A 400m Jetty Small mobile jetty cranes A 3.5m dredged ship access channel Around 120 to 140 acres of storage hardstanding What shareholders will most definitely not see is anything resembling the port image that is on the front page of the current MPL website, or in the video made of the proposed port development, or in the Arden Partners Note or IPO documentation, since something similar to that would cost around £110m in management's opinion, and as you know very well MPL has raised only £150m, so sadly they have had to hugely cut the specification according to their cloth, despite probably shaving some £25m of cost off the original budget by heavily scaling back the terminal specification drawn out of management last week. Shareholder dissatisfaction/Formal Complaints should be forwarded to the FCA and London stock Exchange AIM Regulator. Our detailed list of serious complaints, diligently compiled over the last two years, of which many were made known at the time to the Nomad, is now on its way. In any reputable company, the executive management would not have lasted 12 months in the job, never mind 7 years! AIOHO/DYOR
mount teide: PJ1 - it would be possible to operate a ship repair facility with -3.5m in the access channel but, this would so restrict the size of the vessels that could be attracted to the facility as to question whether it could ever be a commercially viable proposition. At best it would probably be a highly noisy and dirty nickel and dime operation - hardly the business you would want at a £150m new port venture. Like you, I believe it was probably just another ruse from Gandhi to try and extract further funds from the market. He did something similar up at Pipavav - neither the container terminal or the shipyard facility he built there ever made any money until they were taken over, modified and run by professional operators with industry experience. When you consider the financial impact of the Directors 'preferred' specification, these revisions that we have heard of to date are all materially negative in terms of port land and berth size, and channel depth, compared to the IPO specification and build tender documentation. We are scratching our heads trying to work out why these changes should cost another £37million, when perhaps £25m of savings against budget would have been a more likely impact of the implementation of these highly material modifications. Shareholders should not forget too, that while these changes to the specification should deliver a huge potential reduction in total build cost they would, however come at a price - a much higher day to day operating cost to handle cargo to/from vessels, compared to having a quay wall with direct access to the storage compound. It is quite amazing and extremely concerning that two executive directors with no industry experience at senior management level have taken out of the company between them around £2m in salary plus huge 'expenses' since IPO , along with a further £0.5m paid in fees to the two NEDS, to deliver a 97% fall in the share-price, and a massive dilution at a 96% discount to the IPO share-price, to raise funds to implement changes to the final specification, that by any objective examination should have materially reduced the final build cost not increased it by up to £37m. AIOHO/DYOR
mount teide: Firstly, apologies for the long post. Interestingly, James Sutcliffe currently markets himself as a Business Transformation Non Executive Director in the Ports Sector. 'As a natural leader he is happy to represent major business and handle media and difficult situations diplomatically. As a Board Director he is particularly focused on improving Corporate Governance, effective financial reporting and achieving business strategies within the companies he works for.' How's that working out for SPL/MPL shareholders? With the share-price having lost 97% of its value since James Sutcliffe joined the board pre IPO, and the company massively diluting shareholders in November 2016 by raising another £37m of funds at an eye-watering 96% discount to the IPO price to 'finance'(and some would use that word in its loosest possible sense), the completion of the construction of a small, shallow water Port Terminal asset, to the Boards 'preferred' specification, James Sutcliffe's industry experience and expertise is clearly proving of huge value to shareholders in looking after their investment interests. Shareholders were told the reason for the additional £37 million of funds was to complete the build out of the Port Terminal to the 'preferred' specification of the Directors. Consequently, it would have been ENTIRELY REASONABLE for shareholders to assume that a request for further massive additional funds totalling around 55% of that raised at IPO together with the £49m of bank debt also raised for the project, would have resulted in the Directors 'preferred' specification delivering a higher specification to that contained in the IPO documentation and extremely detailed 2013 Arden Partners BUY Note and, what went out in the Tender Documentation to secure bids from the contractor/s they selected to approach to build the Port Terminal. In easy to understand non sector specialist terms, what shareholders originally were sold at IPO was a 'BMW 5 series' specification small port. The Directors then said in October 2016 Shareholders Placing and Open Offer documents, that we are not in any way cash strapped but by providing us with another £37m, we would be able to complete the construction to our 'preferred' specification - so shareholders were in effect being asked to now fund a BMW M5 standard Port terminal, the Directors preferred specification. The reality of the shameless revised port terminal specification drawn out under questioning by those in attendance at last weeks meeting(i understand some II's may have been made aware of this news some weeks ago, without necessarily understanding its full implications on their investment imho), is that shareholders were clearly misled in the October 2016 additional fund raise. Since they will not now be getting a shiny new BMW M5 Port Terminal, nor even a BMW 5 Series model, but if they are lucky a bog standard 1 Series Bread Van model with a price tag of TWO BMW M5's after taking in the impact of the bank debt. I have spoken at length to James Sutcliffe twice in the last three years by telephone, and on each occasion, i was telling him facts about the build out at Karanja(or lack of it!), he should have known about but was completely unaware of. Also, i suggested he speaks to the NOMAD because SPL/MPL has issued RNS statements( i provided examples), that evidence gathered by shareholders often at some considerable financial cost(hiring light aircraft to take photos over the site) have proved, and i'll be generous, to be wildly inaccurate at best, although the less charitable might consider 'wilful deception' to be a more accurate description. The situation with regard to the accuracy of the Official Market Statements has clearly not improved because if the NOMAD had travelled to India(which i understand they did late last year) to work with management to prepare the Documentation for the Shareholders Circular for the 31 October 2016 Placing and Open Offer, then at the very least, they should have checked that what management were claiming and went in that documentation(that the build out has continued without material interruption since October 2015) was in fact true. The NOMAD clearly failed to do this simple check, because if they had carried out some basic due diligence, they would have discovered that NO Land reclamation work had been carried out during the four months since the mid June 2016 update, when the Market was given news that 75 acres were now reclaimed. As a consequence, the expected build out progress targets that went into the Shareholders Circular were not only many multiples of the pace of progress previously achieved, but in fact were a work of complete fiction because NO reclamation work was actually going on, and by the Company's own written and photographic updates would not commence again until Jan 2017. June 2016 - company state 75 acres of land reclaimed Oct 2016 - company say work has continued without material interruption since Oct 2015. And as a consequence state the following expected progress targets in the documentation to raise £37m of additional funds: OUTLOOK - 'the Directors believe that the Company has sufficient resources to finance the continued construction of the Facility, WITHOUT DELAY, through to the end of the first quarter of 2017' By the end of January 2017 the Company expects to have: • completed the dredging requirement; • reclaimed 70 per cent. of the land(140 acres); and • constructed two berths, one of which will be capable of receiving vessels. 'By the end of the first quarter of 2017 the Company expects to have: • reclaimed 90 per cent. of the land; (180 acres) • constructed four berths, three of which will be capable of receiving vessels; and • entered into commercial agreements with end users.' Indeed, such was the Directors confidence that the build out was on track they stated in the Shareholders Fund Raising Circular (just two months from year end)that: '...the Directors expect that the Facility will be capable of receiving vessels by the end of this year(2016)....' Using information subsequently provided by the Company/Nomad, a comparison of the statements made above with reality, make sobering reading: Land Reclamation: June 2016 - 75 acres of land reclaimed Jan 2017 - expects to have reclaimed 140 acres - actual result 75 acres(ZERO progress for 6 months because NO land reclamation had been carried out since June 2016 - an easily verifiable fact that the Nomad could have checked in October 2016 when preparing the fund raising circular) Mar 2017 - expected to have reclaimed 180 acres - actual result 79 acres( 4 acres in 9 months!) Piling/Berths June 2016 - 58 piles(65m) via written update Sept 2016 - 100 piles (100m) via written update Jan 2017 - 68 piles (80m) via website photo update (clearly they overstated Sept position) Around 10 jetty piles were driven between June and Sept 2016, and then work stopped until Jan 2017, against the target of the completion of the construction of two berths! Land reclaimed March 2017 - 79 acres (against target of 180 acres) Apparently, despite claiming to have worked continuously without material interruption, during the last 9 months they achieved the grand total of just 5% of the progress expected in the circular to raise an additional £37m of funds! Can't wait to see the end of 2016 cash position and bank debt left to draw down - we should see that no later than the Prelims - it should make fascinating reading, since hardly any work on site occurred in H2/2016. A Google Earth image update for the end of Feb 2017, reveals just 104 jetty piles laid/ around 100m of progress, against a target of four berths complete by the end of Mar 2017. We calculate, if the progress achieved since Jan 2017 is maintained it would suggest the heavily scaled back 400m of jetty will still not see piling completed before H2/2018 at the earliest and, this assumes work through the next two monsoon seasons is maintained at the same rate of progress as during the current dry season, something that has not remotely been the case since construction eventually got started some three years ago, after four years of delays securing the necessary approvals. Some further thoughts: Contrary to what the Board was claiming, I posted on the SPL thread immediately after reading and discussing with industry colleagues, the 31 October 2016 Shareholders Circular to raise an additional £37m of funds: 'It would not suprise me, that for around £150m, all shareholders will see before the money again runs out, is around 300m-400m of berths with 4.5m of water availability, and around 75-100 acres of reclaimed land - something that could probably be built today to a very high spec for £40-50m.' The passage of time and news of the revised terminal specification suggests, this is likely to prove very close to what shareholders may see at best - along with its dire shareholder investment implications. MPL shareholders may be aware that Singapore has one of the three largest deep sea container ports in the world(currently three times the size of all the JNPT terminals combined). The port of Singapore has been enlarging its Port land area for decades and their current land reclamation costs are around US$25/sqm - US$100,000/acre. If Singapore can reclaim 200 acres of coastal land for around £25m today(including buying in the sand land fill material) - how come SPL need £150m to: Reclaim what will now be much less than 200 acres, and Construct a 400m shallow water piled jetty to handle barges and small coasters, and Provide basic port infrastructure facilities and cargo handling equipment. This strongly suggests(not for the first time) the MPL executive management are at best breathtakingly incompetent and totally out of their depth to a level that simply beggars belief. It also brings into question what due diligence the Nomad routinely carry's out to check the accuracy of the content of the statements issued to the market; in particular the Oct 2016 Fund Raising Documentation. As i understand it, the person responsible at the Nomad for the MPL account has no shipping/ports sector professional qualifications or operational experience and, only very limited industry knowledge, if my judgement of the numerous telephone discussions i've had with him are a reliable guide. Also, he seemed to find it highly amusing(before quickly correcting himself), that one PI i know, who lost £3m in the Globo AIM fraud, as a result of relying on Grant Thornton(MPL's auditors), allegedly checking and being satisfied that Globo had £100m of cash in the bank, only for the market to find out a short while afterwards, that the figure was in fact barely £100 not £100m, as a result of criminal activity on an industrial scale by the CEO, who turned out to be nothing more than a first class villain! Financially, as previously stated, the cash burn for this port development project was making very little sense. Following the £37m fund raise and shocking news of the considerably scaled down terminal specification for the project, it now makes absolutely NO SENSE whatsoever. AIOHO/DYOR
mount teide: It is simply extraordinary, considering the company has now raised in excess of £150m in equity finance and debt, that the new Head of Finance's role is not even considered worthy of a Board position, and is being carried out by someone based outside the country. While a relatively callow youth, with no senior management Port Industry experience and, who has had operational responsibility for the appalling debacle that is the three and a half year to date, Karanja Port build out, has been promoted to the Board. Arden Partners in the 13 December 2013 Note rated MPL as a BUY with a target price of 175p, stating the building of Karanja 'was in' the then current price of 73p 'for free'! So it was interesting to note, that in October 2016 Shareholders Circular, Arden Partners had agreed to, amongst other things, introduce the Company to potential Placees at 10p per share, in return for a commission fee of £177,916.60 on completion of the Transaction. It was also interesting to note that in the October 2016 Capital Raise - the only MPL Director with hands on port development consultancy and construction experience, elected to take no part in the Placing, refusing to add a single share to his existing long term holding of ZERO shares! After trousering more than £250k in Fees since 2010, while the company he has overseen on behalf of shareholders, experienced an eye-watering 97% fall in the share-price since IPO, it would appear his investment judgement on port development projects is impeccable, particularly those where he is actively involved - equity investors and shareholders clearly could learn from the man! Consequently, it was a little surprising that the highly acclaimed fund managers at L&G and M&G did not take that particular Non exec's lead and refuse to throw anymore of their clients cash at this 'port development venture'(and i use that phrase in its loosest possible sense). L&G increased to 69.9m shares (18.2%) M&G increased to 60.6m shares (15.8%) With the 1000m of quay and 200 acres of land, Arden Partners in their Note dated 13 December 2013, stated that the terminal was capable, according to management, of handling an 8.0 million tonne cargo throughput per year. In practice, this would only be possible if a very high percentage of the cargo throughout were roll on roll off. Without ro-ro cargo there is no chance whatsoever of that throughput forecast being achieved. In fact, for a mix of mainly break bulk and containers( the target market), Karanja would do very well to achieve 4.0 million tonnes throughout per year. By way of comparison the Port of Tilbury with 1,120 acres of storage and 60 deep draft berths, last year handled around 12 million tonnes, and Tilbury has 4 daily short sea ro-ro/container services, and routinely sees 20 to 30 large ship movements per weekday. Should, the completed quay length at Karanja fall well short of the 1000m length in the GA plan(i bet my reputation it will, and by a very considerable amount ), the annual cargo throughput will be proportionately reduced. Considering the now £49m bank debt has a current 13.5% annual interest payment, this means an annual interest bill of £6.2m. It is worth noting that the Port of Dover(Britain's largest short sea port) made a profit of circa £3m last year. It is my view that Karanja will never see a 200 acre/1000m port development and is probably 18 months to two years away at best, from seeing something even HALF of that specification. As a consequence, it should prove a highly sobering experience for shareholders to note the following programme of bank debt principle and interest payments that have now stated to fall due: As at 31 December 2015, the Group's non-derivative financial liabilities have contractual maturities (and interest payments) as summarised below: Payment falling due: Within 1 year: Interest payment of £4.6m Within 1 to 5 years: Principle and Interest payments of £35.8m Following 5 years: Principle and Interest payments of £49.4m Since the borrowings are secured by the hypothecation of the port facility and pledge of its shares, in the view of this poster with 30 years senior level industry experience, it is a 100% probability, like Night following day, that the banks will take over the Port at some time in the next 18 months to three years. I strongly suspect a certain gentleman among the senior management is fully aware of this, and that all shareholders will see during the intervening period is the same slow rate of progress/ultra high cash burn of the past, until the Banks finally call time and step in. At which point, i would also bet serious money, that the market value of the 'port asset' at Karanja at that point in time would still be well below the outstanding debt principle. AIMHO/DYOR
pj 1: The are trapped in. If they sell it will just destroy the share price. If the Port does not get built they can do nothing. Its India, they have little chance of recovering any of the cash balances even if they decided to. Anyway, Relax, Lord Flight is impressed with works completed to date
deepvalueinvestor: Thanks for setting this up. I look forward to the day when £150m invested is reflected in the share price!
Mercantile Port share price data is direct from the London Stock Exchange
Your Recent History
Gulf Keyst..
FTSE 100
UK Sterlin..
Stocks you've viewed will appear in this box, letting you easily return to quotes you've seen previously.

Register now to create your own custom streaming stock watchlist.

By accessing the services available at ADVFN you are agreeing to be bound by ADVFN's Terms & Conditions

P:40 V: D:20170526 16:50:43