Share Name Share Symbol Market Type Share ISIN Share Description
Frontera Resources Corporation LSE:FRR London Ordinary Share KYG368131069 ORD SHS USD0.00004 (DI)
  Price Change % Change Share Price Bid Price Offer Price High Price Low Price Open Price Shares Traded Last Trade
  -0.0025p -2.78% 0.0875p 0.085p 0.09p 0.09p 0.0875p 0.09p 7,384,292.00 12:14:34
Industry Sector Turnover (m) Profit (m) EPS - Basic PE Ratio Market Cap (m)
Oil & Gas Producers 2.5 -13.9 -0.7 - 7.31

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Date Time Title Posts
03/12/201612:59FRONTERA AND BEYOND4,760.00
17/3/201612:10The Simon Cawkwell FRR Ј20 a share thread15.00
14/7/201513:10Frontera - troll-free thread16,583.00
20/11/201315:00Frontera Resources Plc - Potential Caspian Giant1,611.00
18/1/201222:31Frontera Resources - Marching Through Georgia72.00

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DateSubject
04/12/2016
08:20
Frontera Daily Update: Frontera Resources Corporation is listed in the Oil & Gas Producers sector of the London Stock Exchange with ticker FRR. The last closing price for Frontera was 0.09p.
Frontera Resources Corporation has a 4 week average price of 0.10p and a 12 week average price of 0.09p.
The 1 year high share price is 0.78p while the 1 year low share price is currently 0.04p.
There are currently 8,350,082,209 shares in issue and the average daily traded volume is 40,769,810 shares. The market capitalisation of Frontera Resources Corporation is £7,306,321.93.
13/6/2016
14:29
dodge city: This will delist very soon. They will have to suspend trading if the share price keeps falling. I can't see it going any other way. Dross is clearly not intending to support the share price any time soon with a sensible update. Last weeks RNS makes no sense at all, it looks like he is deliberately trashing the share price. Whatever Dross is doing, he is up to no good, hence the exit of 2 of his managers, who clearly want nothing to do with it.
24/4/2015
14:09
nobull: A Dilutionary Tale... A loss making company with 18 bn barrels of oil in place, near Tibilisi, Had an unaccountable CEO who financed the company with debt to charge his shareholders to bet (the negative equity) He drilled as slowly as he could (increasing the debt), claiming he needed to do everything by the book (a Georgian ruling) and when oil prices fell, he profited from the rising finance charges and and converted his debt into shares, at a price of his choosing. When finally he started to produce, and oil prices rose, shareholders found no longer was it theirs but that of CEO Stevie. A Dilutionary Tale. Copyright Nobull April 2015 Whether the above portrays our company accurately or not is a moot point. It may not be right in every detail , but it is possible it is has grain of truth about what is really going on in our company. Now you might say who but a fool would invest in such a company? First, there was the £1.50 to 1p share price graph, with the downward trend strong in the months around the time the CEO converted his debt into shares, and falling share prices often attract the ‘reversion to mean’ bottom fishers. The mistake they make is not to realise each year they buy an FRR share, while the share has the same name and par value, the underlying entitlement to profit participation in Block 12 dwindles, making the lower cost shares no better value for money. The technical term is dilution. Second, there are the ‘ten-bag rerate on a change from cash guzzler to cash gusher’ believers who don’t realise the CEO is already rich and is happy to get rich slowly by compounding his more certain 15% returns on the debt (compared with the less certain but potentially larger irregular returns from oil exploration), a 15% rate of return for which he needs to supply a service, with his loaned capital: allowing shareholders to bet with it on exploration/challenging oil field development outcomes (Mirzaani 5 years of fraccing intentions but no change in Mirzaani production levels). Third, there are ‘the CPR is my saviour’ brigade. Their mistake is that he hardly ever does CPRs (2 in 8 years), and they don’t bring in the cash to get rid of the debt (the last one did not), and the CEO chooses the timing of when any money comes in from a farm-in or sale of a fixed asset so that enables him to manipulate the strength of the debt holders’ bargaining power to obtain a satisfactory conversion price into equity that suits himself. Fourth, some people confuse 18 billion barrels of prospective resources with a physical quantity of oil that can’t just be sucked out of the ground not realising the oil has not even been found yet, and that when it is found there is no guarantee it will be economic to extract, a risky activity which could involve throwing a lot of money away to get nothing back at all. (Prospective resources are hardly an asset in the short term, and not when the exploration license is short). Fifth, the CEO may get help from particular shareholders (Outrider Management) in manipulating the price. The latter may have a fuller kit of betting tools (RPNs, CLNs, Equity purchases through placings and equity purchases in the secondary market; we only have one betting tool, buying shares in the secondary market). These institutional shareholders are specialists in extracting value from consensual restructurings such as profiting from changing the terms of conversion. (They maybe have the same goals as the CEO – to get richer slowly, but certainly). The CEO may get help from the Georgian Govt. with creating delays – we never had an explanation for the gas permit delays, and we don’t know if the Georgian Govt., or if people connected to it, are holders of some of the other debt instruments. Sixth, the CEO made his equity stake public (which makes some people think this is a safe bet) but kept his much larger debt stake more hidden. Related party transactions are in the accounts, which he published only at the last possible minute, when he was forced to by the listing rules. AIM listing rules and Cayman/UK/Delaware Company Law do not require the identities of the debt holders to be revealed other than as the quantity owned by related parties in the annual accounts. While there are rules to compel disclosure of director dealings in shares, there are none for director purchases of the company’s debt. Material changes in debt levels do not need to be RNSed. Seventh, the institutions were under no obligation to obey the notifiable interest rules – they were overseas distressed debt trading /restructuring specialists who profit from small shareholders’ ignorance of the technical matters like inducement charges and adjustment of the conversion terms, and they understand the importance of a business model where the value creation, if there is any, comes in lumps under the control of the CEO, so that the conversion price can be better manipulated to suit their interests. Eighth, slacking companies are more difficult to detect on AIM without the discipline of quarterly reporting like companies listed on the ASX have to suffer – lifestyle companies get outed quicker there. We won’t necessarily know until 30/9/15 whether a paid-for Varang rig is on site at Taribani (by then it will be too late to change the likely size of the finance charges we are faced with next year). There is no requirement on AIM to report underdelivery on a prior stated target or intention, and the latter can be stated ad nauseam to get the share price up ahead of placings. (The Taribani 8-well work-over program might be just an intention that never happens– there was no picture of the company owned fraccing fleet). Slackers loaded with debt should have a share price chart like we have. Ninth, people with high entry prices are easier to fool with ‘overpromise underdeliver’ because they want to believe. They tend to hang on, hoping for improvement. Tenth, there is a category of people who haven’t mastered what has taken me most of my life to master: money goes to those who don’t need it and secondly, if you can see a ten bagger, then someone richer than you will find a way to get your shares off you legally, giving you a two bagger, while they go on to get a five bagger with them (Low ball all cash offers by a cornerstone investor). The believers in “Steve will have a coherent plan”, “Steve is in it for the long term”, “Steve loves us”, etc. may be living a delusion. Steve is probably only listed here to get placings away to pay his salary and to create a business that will be worth having in the future, but the point at which the business is worth having is may be the point at which we will wake up and find we own very little, at least if the way it is being run now continues. Capitalism. Animal spirits. Money doesn’t grow on trees. You don’t get paid for research (no need to worry you’ve discovered 18 bn barrels oil, and that nobody else knows that FRR has it) – you get paid, if at all, for risk taking. The fact some people don’t understand the risks they are taking may give them the illusion that money really does grow on trees. Respect for long term FRR shareholders is paying back the debt from cash generated from operations, stopping the dilution, making sure Steve does not adjust the terms of conversion UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, and if that means making hard decisions about losing exploration licenses, then so be it – I do not understand why our gas revenue money should be used for high risk exploration if no farm-in partners are interested, especially when using the gas revenue enables our BOD to compound its returns at 15% p.a. risk free and then to dilute us out of existence (we will own 50% less of Block 12 next year if the share price flat lines at 1p, because that will create an inducement charge of $28.244m). I hope more substantial shareholders will call an EGM to get answers out of our CEO if he doesn’t start managing the dilution risk and the finance-cost blow-out risk appropriately, and that means talking about it in RNSs. And if respect for long term shareholders creates a short term 8 bagger, then that is not my fault. For the record, I have fallen into categories 1, 2 and 9. (Category 1 more for not appreciating the dilutive effect of the high finance charges rather than for believing in reversion to mean – the latter investment strategy is more suitable for producers over the economic cycle whereas this is a development play i.e. category 2).
30/3/2015
10:15
nobull: To the LSE BB readers The debt trumps everything. If you don’t have finance at a reasonable price, you have no reason to be in business at all. You take out a mortgage because you expect your house to appreciate in value faster than the interest rate you pay on the mortgage – otherwise YOU DO NOT DO IT. All the oil and gas talk on the LSE board is a waste of time IF YOU DON’T HAVE FINANCE AT A REASONABLE PRICE. Balrogxxx, I don’t bang on about debt; I bang on about the PRICE of debt finance. Can we get finance at a reasonable price? Yes, we can. But only if Mr Nicandros delivers on the $21m annualised gas revenue (7 mmcfpd) and on collecting the $18m Varang contribution, IMMEDIATELY. On the latter, he has had a year to do this, and all we have had so far is talk and words (some of which have been put on paper in the form of a broker note, which, when printed on paper, is likely to contain some hydrocarbon constituents), but I’d rather he produced hydrocarbon molecules out of the ground in Georgia than just the component atoms in broker notes. There is no need for broker notes, if you manage the risk of a finance cost blow-out correctly (let the share price do the marketing). Being silent in RNSs about the risk of a finance cost blow-out is not the correct way to manage this risk. You have to be up-front with shareholders about it, if you care about it; you have to mentally think of your shareholders as co-owners of the business if you care about them. So it helps to address them properly... ‘Dear Co-owner...’ Why would you not care about them if you are a shareholder yourself? Mr Nicandros’ shareholding is protected from loss of value, unlike ours, by his holding of the CLNs. His CLN holding acts like a put option. What he loses from our shares falling in price he gets back from having a lower conversion price on the CLNs. He can adjust the CLN conversion price terms according to how fast he works: no progress in the next 14 months = conversion price of 1.2p. Rapid progress e.g. contribution received from Varang of $18m announced this week and 7mmcfpd production (giving annualised gas sales revenue of $21m) starting from 30/6/15 = conversion price of 16p (giving a 13.33 bagger between now and next year). The current share price is the market’s best guess at what the future cost of replacing the debt is. (I am not willing to argue with the posters who have demonstrated an inability to reason soundly – it is one thing to be a learner investor who wants to improve, but the type who can’t reason should not be invested in shares - and there are a few of those on the LSE BB). The market’s current guess at what the price of replacing the debt is can change of course between now and August 2016, so the situation can improve – we are not necessarily becalmed or doomed. THE CHOICE IS YOURS. If the conversion price turns out to be 1.2p, then the convertible debt finance will have cost 13.33 times more than was originally anticipated. That is what a finance cost blow-out is: it is an unanticipated cost that wipes out all your profits for years to come (a.k.a. Inducement charge). And the risk of having one needs to be managed properly. I am not convinced that it is being managed by our CEO at present (yes, he has alluded to the balance sheet recently, but it is not enough). Of course if he comes out with the right RNS, then that is different. For the text of the sort of RNS I would like, see my ADVFN post from a few days ago. (More knowledgeable oil and gas posters, like Edgein on ADVFN, think my progress expectation is too much, but given the size of finance cost blow-out that the shareholders capable of reasoning could be expecting, I don’t think the sort of progress I want to see is unreasonable. I am open to debate on that issue with experienced oil and gas investors). Glossary for learner investors (particularly those on the LSE BB who slag me off) Inducement charge: accounting terminology that has the economic effect of ensuring the share price does diddly squat for years. It usually relates to multiple accounting periods and it is finance charge. An example of one was the last one FRR had that amounted 17 years of gas production revenue from 2 mmcfpd being lost. Risk of delays: broker name for the risk of a finance cost blow-out, i.e. the risk of an unanticipated inducement charge in our case. Balrogxx, my moniker is nobull. Your post omits to mention how much the CLN debt holders would charge for all the scenarios you list, and, in the ‘comforting217; scenario where you imagine $25m comes from operations to take out the CLNs, you neglect to mention HOW the money will materialise (oil price of $500 a barrel?, gas sales of $21m starting when? Oil production increase from Niko-1 starting from? Farm-out of Mirzaani? Farm-out of Basin Edge C?). If you are unclear where exactly from operations it is to come from, then don’t you think we need to get Nicandros in London for a question and answer session IMMEDIATELY?
28/3/2015
14:59
nobull: Ed, hi There is no long term future for the current shareholders unless the finance cost blow-out risk is properly managed. That means hitting a share price target of 4p in the coming weeks, 8p by November, and 16p by March next year, or a very large chunk of Block 12 is going to be sold at a massive loss to new shareholders who currently own the convertible loan notes (Mr Nicandros himself and his mates, such as DDJ Capital, the company whose principal is famous for writing a chapter of an investment book on distressed debt trading). The loss on the sale of Block 12 will be accounted for under the label "inducement charge". I don't honestly expect Mr Nicandros to issue such a clear RNS as the one above, as he does not intend to communicate on the level most posters can cope with - the wording is designed to be opaque to them). He prefers to pay for broker notes instead of actually hitting targets. Broker notes are no substitute for actually achieving targets - there is no need for paid-for broker notes to market the stock if you run the company right - you let the share price do the talking/marketing. Mr Nicandros has had more than a year since the Varang announcement, and all we have had is words, plans, and nothing else. You would think he could announce that he has received the $18m cash injection from Varang, wouldn't you? 3 mmcfpd was being achieved on 1/1/15, so it should be 5 mmfcpd now. It is all very well to be an oil and gas guru like Mr Nicandros, but there is no raison d'etre for the business if it does not have low costs per dollar of finance. Nobody borrows from a loan shark at 100% interest to try to make money on the stock market. And nobody should be using convertible debt finance as expensive as ours to try to make money drilling for oil and gas. Only accounting illiterate morons do that. The price of the convertible debt finance will be decided by the share price in 14 months' time. At the moment the convertible finance is going to be 13.33 times more expensive than was originally anticipated (conversion price divided by current share price). And to pay for this finance, we have to give up huge chunks of Block 12 at a fraction of what we have spent on it. HOW CLEVER IS THAT?. Mr Nicandros needs booting out of the company IMV if he can't manage the risk of a finance cost blow out, so we need the right RNS this week. In short, without the right RNS, Mr Nicandros is borrowing money at loan shark rates (too complicated for many LSE posters to understand this point) and then just talking oil and gas development and exploration (that excites the financially innumerate), which can never be profitable because of the excessively high finance costs - and even worse is the fact the actual costs don't become apparent until it too late, as the accounts don't make provisions for finance cost blow-outs, so of course understate the losses (that suits Mr Nicandros because all shareholders know is the stock just derates each day as the debt finance redemption date approaches, all other things being equal, which they never are. That, in short, is FRR, at least without the right RNS it is. The glowing broker notes of course add street cred (the finance cost blow-out risk is relabelled more innocuously as "risk of delays"). Just my view. (The 1.2p share price won't last long if we don't get the RNS he should be giving us.) Just my view.
21/1/2015
13:48
nobull: Ed, hi This is an "all you can eat in 30 minutes" type of license. Other than a brief time extension, anything you can't eat within the time limit reverts to the restaurant owner. Other countries have no time limit, but have a massive petroleum revenue rent tax instead. The Georgian Govt. gets its cut (which is far too big) by the time limit and by forcing us to sell gas below international prices, and it must be said by being tardy on producing the permits (that shortens the time left to get the gas out). Term The Block 12 PSA has a twenty-five year term which will expire on 13 November 2022. The term includes an exploration phase which will expire on 13 November 2017 (the “Exploration Phase”). If commercial production remains possible in relation to any part of Block 12 which is specified in a development area or areas under the Block 12 PSA (“Development Areas”), Frontera Georgia is entitled, after the expiration of the Block 12 PSA, to receive an extension of the term of the Block 12 PSA and the Mineral Licence regarding such Development Areas for a further period of five years (or the production life of the Development Area if this is shorter). So what can stop us pigging ourselves silly in the restaurant? 1. Not enough money to pay the entrance fee (high cost of capital i.e. having a low share price, like now) 2. Drunks pick pocketing us before we get there (the debt holders taking our money away) 3. Bad weather (the Georgian Govt. interfering and being slow to issue permits) 4. The food being too awful to eat (selling our gas for pittance because the Georgians haven't got any money) I agree the debt is renegotiable, but the price of the new debt is what matters. If it means giving up ownership of 99% of Block 12, then that would not be an acceptable solution. The interest rate is only part of the cost of the debt. The share price tells you what the likely price of the new, replacement debt will be. 17p share price might mean we can get a normal commercial loan at 9% interest perhaps. 0.8p share price might mean we are going to be paying 15% interest + have to issue shed loads of in-the-money warrants that deprive us of ownership of a large part of Block 12 once the warrants are exercised. The only sure fire way to have new debt at a reasonable price is to get a share price of 17p, and for that we need to have gas sales of $21.5m p.a. from 31/3/15 onwards. And as to being "on about the debt again", it is the biggest input cost of our business. It is not likely to be rig hire costs, or salaries that are our biggest input cost. So I think it is the most sensible thing to focus on, and of course it is the reduction in the cost of it that can help our share price power ahead. Just my view. P.S. By cost of debt, I also include the lost opportunity cost of any future value we could have had from being able to hold on to any bits of Block 12 that we were forced to sell prematurely e.g. through the exercise of any warrants given as a sweetner to any debt finance suppliers.
21/1/2015
10:13
nobull: Dalesman, hi Thanks for your thorough analysis of management and the "oil and gas" aspect of the business. I do not have enough oil and gas investing experience to understand the effect of the forthcoming CPR i.e. whether it is a game changer or not, although of course I probably understand the difference between the various SPE classifications. I do not see how the CPR can add equity to the balance sheet without a sale. A few points to consider that are not covered by your analysis, in no order of importance but just off the top of my head: 1. If you go back a few years, there have been other missed targets. It is always difficult reading history backwards as one can impute all kinds of discreditable motives to the management especially if they made promises that weren't delivered on and if they happened to have capital raisings after the promises but before the outcome of the promises were known, but various respected posters here over the years have talked about a persistent "over promise and under deliver" problem (Atlantic, ngms27/killerdriller, Spp119, MichaelsADVFN). However, if we are about to have $21.5m gas sales 'switched on' in the next few months, you shouldn't be concerned about that. (7 mmcfpd pipe capacity was mentioned in the last operational update, but of course you know that is different from having sales of gas equal to that daily capacity. 2. The recent director purchases are peanuts (They could be "hello, I am loyal to the CEO, and I want a job in FRR NewCo" purchases, although Mr. McGregor signalled the time to sell right). Yes, the BOD has a lot of skin in the game; however, it also has a big interest in the debt (both the Related Party Notes that pay a 15% coupon and also in the Convertible Loan Notes that have a cost that is open ended - that is, there is a potential for an utterly massive finance-cost blow-out in July 2016 that can dilute us to oblivion - transfer all the reward to the debt owners despite us having taken all the risk), and the value of BOD's stakes (both in the debt and equity) is about the same, at the current share price, so the BOD has hedged its bets, although as the share price rises, the BOD will have greater incentive to work for the shareholders rather than the debt holders. If you think I am talking twaddle, just look at the last $100m inducement charge. That was a finance-cost blow-out due to the share price not being anywhere near the conversion price and the shareholders having to give up an utterly massive stake in Block 12 to the debt owners to persuade them not to ask to be repaid in cash, a payment that was made instead in the form of a "soon to be worth 20 times more" stake in Block 12. That is despicable. That is shareholder value destruction on a massive scale - why else is there no share price graph on the FRR web site? £1.50 to £0.008p is not pretty. 3. If the BOD can't call us "co owners" of the business in its communications, and if they can't feel able to hold a meeting in London and answer questions about the business and financing model, then you have to wonder if the game plan is to use us to dump all the risk on and use debt to remove all the reward, which they succesfully did in the last 'restructuring'/BOD debt holder enrichment exercise. 4. The prospective resource figures you refer to are totally meaningless without looking at how long our production license is for. We are in a restaurant where you can eat all you want in 30 minutes: that is the type of production license we have. Anything we can't eat in 30 minutes reverts to the ownership of the restaurant. Some shareholders (ones with low average entry prices and in some cases ones with excessive amounts of shares in relation to their ability to comprehend the risks they are taking) want our BOD wrapped up in cotton wool and protected from having shareholders kick the tyres to check out the business model. We get no comment from the BOD about whether we are selling gas at a discount to the world price (subsidising the Georgian population). Such things as the size of the reversion windfall, the amount of subsidy we provide, how the spoils of exploration success are to be divided between the Georgian Govt., the Georgian population, the equity holders, the debt owners, and the BOD, through its salaries) need to be discussed in a civilised, business-like manner at a meeting in London, face to face, without Liz Williamson (the vice president of investor relations) selecting less challenging questions, as happened through a previous webcast agm to pass through to the BOD. Some shareholders believe this is all miles too commercially sensitive, and we should be satisfied with being dummies because Steve is our Saviour who will dispense sweeties at the right moment. For the record, I have a 95% loss on my shareholding here, and its now a tiny holding. I am in favour of sacking the CEO if we don't have a statement of "We are on course for $21.5m gas sales in the next 12 months" by 31/3/15. The share price is a good indicator of the likely cost of any new, replacement longer maturity debt. We need the share price to be 17p before July 2016 to be sure we will not suffer another finance-cost blow-out that dilutes us out of existence. 4p by 31/12/15 seems a reasonable target. Yes, I know that is a 5 bagger. So what? AVM would be a 40 bagger if the gold price returned to $1829 per oz. Good luck whatever you choose to do.
03/12/2014
21:38
nobull: Joeyboy128, thanks, but of course I still own my stock, so it doesn't please me to see the FRR share price going down, although I see its descent, in the absence of answers from FRR, is totally justified.
03/12/2014
21:25
nobull: The Skipper, many thanks for that. It doesn't make much difference whether I vote in favour or not (holding too small). I do see from your answer that it is in my interests to vote "yes", and that it is unreasonable not to, but it is also unreasonable to let FRR work at a snail's pace and pretend that our cost of capital doesn’t matter (it never discusses this) (current liabilities exceeding current assets wasn't my main concern, the topic the Nomad assured you about? – I just assumed, unwisely perhaps, that our BOD would issue itself a load more 15% interest bearing RPNs to pay for ones maturing about now). My concern is the HIGH COST OF CAPITAL (particularly those convertibles), because if you don’t have cheap finance, you have less chance of ever being a viable business, and a greater concern is the fact that the BOD doesn’t appear to be in the least bit concerned about this at all. If the BOD have a sure fire plan, with detailed steps I can put ticks against, to get the cost of capital down, then why not tell me what it is? Having blind faith last time in Mirzaani riding to the rescue to save us from that sky high $100m inducement charge was a mistake. I don’t want to be in that position again just listening to a load of tosh that Mirzaaani will flow at 300 bopd, that gas sales will rise and that Varang will create new revenue streams, and then for all these things to happen too late and then get finished off with another inducement charge, and then just be told they did their best. The time to demand better performance is now, before it is too late. An example of a company that communicates well is AVM. Dire host country (Burkina Faso is less safe than Georgia?), balance sheet is terrible (going conecern worries, priced to go bust, high cost producer, loads of debt, and vulture funds owning some of its debt e.g. Elliot Partners, the hold-outs who are trying to screw Argentina), a market cap. that is half FRR’s, and AVM is a 40 bagger if gold were to return to $1829 per oz.) and AVM’s balance sheet now is where FRR’s will be in 6 month’s time if FRR does not work faster, and yet AVM manages to answer questions in regular analysts’ conference calls. So why can’t FRR? If you want to be taken seriously, you answer investors’ concerns (whether they are justified or not, as long as they are genuine concerns). Of course there are many ways to answer them: an elegant way is just to get the FRR share price up! Mr Nicandros’ equity stake is then more valuable than his debt stake, and then we know he is working for us. Just my view. Verdict: FRR can do better – still thinking of voting “no” even though that is a stupid course of action. I look forward to the next operations update answering my concerns, and it coming out before I have to vote. P.S. Many thanks again for all the hard work you have done.
23/11/2014
15:34
nobull: As the oil price falls, the price of our debt increases, ceteris paribus, via the inducement charge, which shows up without any warning, except to those who understand these things (I know that sounds patronising), when the convertible debt matures. So you have the POTENTIAL for a profits squeeze, or in our case, a loss increase. A feature of this type of debt, with an open ended cost, is you only know at the end if you are going bust or not. Of course that won't stop the market trying to guess the outcome, and that is reflected each day in our share price, the market's best guess of the outcome. It may not be just the price of our debt that increases either. If you have increased losses (due to falling oil price), then the QUANTITY of the debt is also increasing at the same time (unless you want to have sales of bits of Block 12 and our exploration success at fire sale prices via placings instead, in which case the size of the business you own is dwindling rapidly). There is only one solution to the problem: 1. Do not tolerate delays in gas sales ramp up. Keep on at Mr Nicandros to get 5 mmcfpd sales. HE SHOULD BE WORKING 24/7 TO RAMP the gas sales, not planting wheat, although that does matter too.) 2. Do not tolerate any excuses for delays in Varang starting work. Keep asking what the reasons are for the delays. An example calculation for an inducement charge when the share price is 0.8p and the conversion price is 15.95p is (and I am not sure I am doing the calculation right): 160m shares (for converting, say on a worst case basis, $40m of debt, at $0.25 cents or 15.95p a share) times the difference between the old conversion price and the new conversion price (15.95p - 0.8p or alternatively $0.25 - $0.0127) which is about $38m, from memory. This is an additional cost of the debt, on top of the interest rate already paid. The size of this charge determines whether we have a viable business or not. That is why Frontera should be called "2016 Finance Charge Punt". The presence of 9TCF prospective gas and 18bn prospective oil resources is a red herring, for the time being. AIMO. DYOR. Oil price volatility is up 8% YOY, so that improves the chances of the debt holders getting a windfall ($400m past expenditure for nothing) at our expense. An example of the unpredictability of oil prices is "Will Iran come in from the cold tonight as a result of the nuclear negotiations?". If it does, will it ramp up oil production or not? So to match an Ivy league educated owner of the FRR debt like Mr Breazzano of DDJ Capital, who has written a chapter of an investment book on distressed debt trading, you've got to be as smart as he is. One way to do that is to get Mr Nicandros to hold an AGM so we can question Mr Nicandros to get the knowledge to match Mr Beazzano's. Is Mr Breazzano selling DDJ's shares now to reload on FRR NewCo shares in the next restructuring, courtesy of a bankruptcy sized inducement charge? That is what we, well the thinking shareholders, wonder about. You can't tell from looking at Mr Nicandros' bets as they are about equal (the value of his debt holdings is similar, I wonder, to the value of his equity stake) at the current share price of 0.8p+. The change to the 5th Nomad does not help either; it only adds to one's suspicions. Of course a gas sales ramp up announcement would change everything, as would a "Varang has a drill rig in place on Taribani" announcement. BTW, each placing we have, ceteris paribus, reduces our share price as potential upside is lost to the new shareholders the shares are placed with, which has the effect of increasing the cost of our debt, thus making a bankruptcy event more likely, and furthermore the placings increase the size of the windfall the debt owners get in a bankruptcy. Mr Nicandros of course never talks about any of this, so you wouldn't think it was important. And of course I am always told to shut up on the LSE thread. I think I just want Mr Nicandros to deliver on the announcements we want or to start talking about his plans on how he is going to stop DDJ capital and the other vulture fund debt owners from ripping us off.
22/8/2014
12:57
nobull: Posting here because of the word limit on LSE. LovableLomax On the gas issue I am no wiser than what the RNSs have revealed. There is a small get-out for there to be no gas sales at all (yes, that is with production going into the grid) but when FRR don't mention "sales", then production going into the grid is just that. You have to go back to the last half year results to see our expectations being massaged to expect GAS SALES. One reason to play down any sales expectations by talking about gas going into the grid instead of talking about sales might be to pair up news of failure of the fracs with good gas sales news. I know this is not meant to happen, but I presume it does go on. It may also be a grey area of the AIM rules to suppress good news with a view to capturing it for the benefit of long term shareholders, to reduce finance costs, by exploiting it for a capital raising. Some companies do take their responsibilities to massage investors' expectations very carefully to reflect the most likely outcome, so that the shares are correctly priced at all times. Others don't (and others can't because of uncertainties outside their control). In the past Frontera has over-promised and under-delivered (ask all the old time shareholders, and they will tell you: ngms27, spp119, Atlantic, MichaelADVFN, Ghhghh, wshak and maybe even Symore Bottoms, etc.). However, sensible companies change, so it will be interesting to see if the pipe size specification (57,000 cubic metres per day) + the fact gas is going into the grid are correct indicators for what the company actually delivers (yes, we know the RNSs have a lawyer's get-out clause on the bottom so they can create any expectations they like without being held to account, but good companies go to extraordinary lengths to get it right, so we will see how right FRR gets it). Our finance charges are one of the biggest costs of the business. Oil and gas exploration requires a lot of capital and, if it is high risk capital, it should cost more than capital in other, lower risk, businesses, all other things being equal. In our case we have to BORROW the finance costs of that capital, and the price of the finance we use is not determined until after the event, so even the annual accounts may understate the finance costs, and therefore understate the annual loss, simply because they don't know how much to charge in each accounting period (yes, the interest rate is known on any debt capital, but the size of the any inducement charge, which obviously covers multiple accounting periods, is not known until it happens, if it happens at all) . That means when the outcome is known (i.e. whether we have a successful profitable oil and gas development and production business) the finance charges can come in lower than expected (no inducement charge) or higher than expected (bankruptcy sized finance charge like the last one of $100m). So the next gas sales announcement is the outcome of a sort of bet on the size of very big, or very small, finance charges to come in 2016: that is why the share price should have to move a lot on the next Half Year results, unless our Board is deliberately manipulating the news to keep us at the same share price (more about that later). In the best frauds, there is usually a massive multiplier. In the Bre X scandal, some ore samples were adulterated with powdered gold, so you spend, say, $1,000, and by choosing where to spread the gold over the samples you create the illusion of a massive volume of gold-rich ore – there must be a mathematical way to spread the powder over the samples to create the maximum effect by exploiting plausible geological assumptions about continuity, etc. – then there may be a further multiplier (the stock market) that multiplies the expected earnings from the imagined gold deposit by a PE ratio that effectively adds £10s of millions of pounds to the market cap. of the company, so the multiplier of the initial outlay to value created by the fraud is enormous. Any way debt is another type of trick to use to deprive shareholders of what they deserve through planned bankruptcy scams: I have read allegations of a person in British retailing making most of their money from loan-to-own deals and all sorts of shenanigans (exploitation of minority shareholders?) rather than from the actual retailing activity itself. I have a scientific background, so I make theories to fit the observations, and the more observations I can explain by the theory the better. All I know with this company is that the gas sales, if they are good, will put an end to all the worst theories about what might happen in the future. The worst theory I have (from the point of view of our future wealth) predicts so-so gas sales that keep our share price more or less at the same levels (enables future dilutive equity raisings that increase amount of free capital ripped off from us by the debt holders in a future bankruptcy, Canargo style) and enables shareholders to be clobbered in a final death blow right at the last minute in August 2016: the size of an inducement charge is often surprising because it represents multiple years' of unexpensed finance charges (unexpensed as far as the annual profit and loss statement is concerned) coming all at once. If Mr Nicandros were to report terrible or zero gas sales at the interims, then the share price would bomb anyway, and it would be difficult to have share placings, and the object surely of bankruptcy is to increase the size of the free capital grab that the priority creditors get to give Frontera NewCo a head start. In some loss making start-up businesses, there is a corresponding off balance sheet asset being created by the losses (Youtube's losses were creating an unassailable business model that were going to give it critical market share to enable it to make abnormally high monopoly style returns, and you would never have known from looking at the accounts). In our case, we (those of us with layman oil and gas business knowledge like myself) don't know if the annual losses are creating a correspondingly valuable business or not, and of course the CPR reports can be published at the timing of the directors' choosing. So I think we need to be less tolerant of delays, (and to be calling for the electric chair for our entire Board for any gas sales that come in at less than $6m p.a.), of reports and RNSs that fudge things, of reports that fail to explain reasons for delays, of delayed AGMs, of situations where we are denied the opportunity to question how FRR manages all its various conflicts of interest (the Georgian Govt. wants exploration done, but we need to spend less cash when our costs of capital are high, as they are now, what with the low share price) and to discuss the robustness (or otherwise) of the business model. I think if we can't be bothered to understand what moves our share price (unlikely to be anything to do with what I post) and we just sit back and tolerate any old rubbish RNSs, then we deserve to be ripped off. Fingers crossed for a very good gas sales announcement and for Varang to start drilling quickly (sorry it is difficult for me to get excited about increasing the size of a gas field when we have to spend cash on it and get no cash back in the short term from it, and when it is reliant on some other person to tell me it is now more valuable). BTW, a trade sale (at a good price) of our gas production operations would do in lieu of a statement that Mr Nicandros is working for all stakeholders in the business, as will success at anything on Block 12. Just my view. DYOR. All IMO.
Frontera share price data is direct from the London Stock Exchange
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