Anglo Irish Bank Share Discussion Threads

[lbo] 21/1/2009 12:20

CNBC Guy Johnson is in Dublin and talking about Ireland live on CNBC. Talking about Patrick Roccas suicide and the losses assocaited with the failure of Anglo Irish bank!

Very sad

[masurenguy] 21/1/2009 08:44

BoI and AIB down 20% and 10% resoectively this morning !

[caveat_emptor] 21/1/2009 07:33

Gulp

who needs tribunals.....

sure that will keep the Kings Inns going for another ten years!!

[masurenguy] 21/1/2009 07:10

Independent.ie

Victims of Anglo must now think of legal action
By Charlie Weston
Tuesday January 20 2009

"HAS someone robbed Anglo Irish Bank?" my eight-year-old daughter wanted to know on listening to comments about the nationalised bank on 'Morning Ireland' yesterday. Gillian Weston is right in one respect. The bank has been robbed as far as shareholders are concerned, and the list of suspects is a long one.

It does not really matter who, or how many, eventually get to shoulder most of the blame for the collapse of Anglo. What really matters is the fact that out of 20,000 shareholders, some 15,000 of them had small holdings of 5,000 shares or fewer. These shareholders, often retired and for the most part not wealthy, have been dealt a devastating blow by the collapse of the bank and nationalisation. Many of the small shareholders bought into Anglo feeling it was a 'blue chip' stock. They were using handsome dividends to part-fund their retirement.

Now, the main hope for these people is the plan by the Government to appoint an assessor to put a value on the shareholdings. The assessor will have to recommend a "fair and reasonable sum" in compensation, according to the legislation to give effect to the nationalisation of the blighted bank. But this will be a secret process because the shareholders may not be entitled to a full explanation of the sum, if any, paid by the Government to compensate them for the takeover of Anglo. Decisions by the assessor will not have to be fully disclosed because of "commercial sensitivity". The assessor is set to take into account information which was not made public when people bought the shares but would have prevented them investing had it been known. We presume this is a reference to the 'loans to directors' scandal at Anglo. Mind you, how you put a valuation on that is anyone's guess.

People unhappy with the assessors' determination will be able to appeal to something called the Irish Financial Services Appeals Tribunal, which was set up as part of the Financial Regulator in 2003 for appeals against the regulator's decisions. However, rather than holding out hopes for some recompense from the assessor, Anglo shareholders might be better off coming together and taking legal action against the previous Anglo board, the Financial Regulator, and the Government for facilitating the wealth-destroying carry-on at the bank.

[hardie1961] 21/1/2009 01:10

Fitzpatrick & his cohorts should be brought before a judge

[masurenguy] 21/1/2009 00:07

Sweden's crash and recovery
By Carl Bildt
Published on September 28, 2008

NEW YORK: Being a visitor here at the United Nations during these momentous days for the global economy is definitely an experience. Though we, political leaders from all over the world, are supposed to deal with global politics, it should not be a surprise to anyone that the intense process between Washington and Wall Street affects the atmosphere in the giant UN building as well. As prime minister of Sweden in the early 1990s, when the country went through a similar crisis, I can easily imagine the strong pressure everyone feels who has been involved in developing the rescue plan. A financial meltdown of such a scale as we see today is dangerous not only for the United States, but an emergency for the global economy as a whole.

However, my experience in dealing with an even worse situation - though in regard to a far smaller economy - is that there are perfectly sound and adequate tools at hand if you want to stabilize the situation and regain confidence in the markets. Between 1990 and 1993, Sweden's GDP dropped by 6%, aggregate unemployment went up from 3% to 12% and the public deficit exploded to 12% of GDP. The downturn led to massive bankruptcies and falling asset prices. Loan losses in the banking sector skyrocketed and banks had to make provisions for losses equivalent to 12% of GDP. In the fall of 1992, the situation had almost spun out of control. Five out of seven of Sweden's largest banks, covering 90% of the market, were de facto insolvent, and we had to face the fact that all earlier measures had been insufficient. Non-performing loans exceeded by far the banking sector's total equity capital. It was obvious that even more decisive actions were necessary.

To establish a firm base for further measures, the government, backed by the opposition, issued a bank guarantee that provided protection from losses for all creditors except shareholders. There was no specified sum mentioned in the Parliament's legislation, and the government got a wide mandate to act in other respects as well. A special authority was set up to administer the bank guarantee and manage the banks facing insolvency. The Central Bank supplied liquidity but was not directly involved in managing the banks or the non-performing loans. The bad loans were assigned realistic values and put aside in a special company - Securum - whose mission was to regain as much as possible of the public money when the real estate market was stabilized. The direct outlays were equivalent to 4% of GDP and most of it could later be recovered. Adding the revenues from privatization of the banks, which were temporarily in public hands, meant that taxpayers made a slight profit.

Parallel with direct measures to counter the effects of the credit crunch, strong actions were taken to stabilize the macroeconomic situation. There were certainly many lessons to be learned from Sweden's financial tsunami.

Lesson one was that bad macroeconomic management is costly. My government was prepared for a severe blow because of two decades of mismanagement of public spending and price stability. The Swedish economy was structurally in very bad shape when we were elected in the fall of 1991. We had to do the bailing out when things got untenable.

Lesson two was the importance of maintaining liquidity in the banking system. It is necessary in order to prevent a collapse of the financial system and limit the consequences for the real economy.

Lesson three was the necessity of swiftness and transparency in dealing with banking sector problems. A bailout always brings with it a risk of moral hazard. The best way to avoid this is, of course, to gear the terms of recapitalization in such a way that shareholders, who often include management, will have to pay for their mistakes.

Lesson four was that economic policy in a small economy must find a delicate balance between stimulating investments and consumption while maintaining a credible inflationary target. If the currency weakens and interest rates go up, you will not get the necessary growth and you risk stagflation.

I hesitate to make direct comparisons between the situation in Sweden almost two decades ago and that of America today. The U.S. has the world's largest economy and its economic fundamentals are still very strong; Sweden in those days was a slow-growth economy with severe structural problems. What is clear in both cases is that a rescue plan is not possible without achieving bipartisan consensus, which is indispensable for regaining confidence in the markets. We were able to achieve this in Sweden. Consensus lasted throughout the whole process of restructuring the banking system. We never faced demands for going back to the heavy regulated markets of the past or for permanent state involvement in managing the financial sector. On the contrary, due to an organized and well-managed restructuring, it was possible to preserve the advantages of the deregulation of the 1980s, and, when the market conditions made it possible, privatize the banks as well as the credit stocks. It is perfectly understandable that the strong measures the U.S. authorities are planning to deal with the crisis would arouse many questions. My experience is that the chances are very good for a positive outcome if the political system is capable of acting when action is needed.

Carl Bildt is foreign minister of Sweden. This Global Viewpoint article was distributed by Tribune Media Services.

[pharmacist08] 20/1/2009 18:45

dail approval confirmed.

[gluefactory] 20/1/2009 17:26

Patrick Rocca a man who invested heavily in Anglo took his life yesterday with a single shotgun blast to the head at his home in Castleknock Dublin 15.Shame on that toe rag Fitzpatrick who can sleep tonight no doubt oblivious to the wife and children left behind from this tragedy.

Wonder how many other high profile Irishmen will choose to take their own lives from that thieving gits activities,along with the pensioners he has robbed of their savings,whilst he played with other peoples money

[very powerful] 20/1/2009 10:39

There is alot more to come out! (bank of ireland)

[lbo] 19/1/2009 23:24

I really doubt Ireland will go bust! And I am and have been a pessimist on the Irish Economy for a while.

[wipo1] 19/1/2009 22:51

Very powerfull, The UK will go bust as well!

[hermana] 19/1/2009 20:23

h,not many goals scored in dat one! A few own goals for sure...

[very powerful] 19/1/2009 18:32

Ireland is going bust

[hermana] 19/1/2009 17:05

Where will they find all the new CEOs?

[masurenguy] 19/1/2009 16:49

AIB and BoI closed down 59% & 49% respectively. Shareholders are clearly bailing out in anticipation of future nationalization !

[hermana] 19/1/2009 13:27

Mas,at least they can bail elsewhere! Can muttonhead Lenihan find a way to charge holders here in any way? Talk about negative equity....

[masurenguy] 19/1/2009 13:23

BoI and AIB down 40% & 60% and in the UK Lloyds and RBS down 35% & 50%. Markets pricing in full scale nationalization of these banks as shareholders bail out.

[surfer2] 19/1/2009 13:18

THANKS A LOT SEAN, GREAT JOB

[bmw30csl] 19/1/2009 13:12

or ireland has more mouths to feed.

[pharmacist08] 19/1/2009 12:45

What's the difference between Ireland and Iceland?

One letter and six months

[pharmacist08] 19/1/2009 12:01

Appears did not matter what Irish bank was picked to invest in market saying they and Ireland are doomed, Giving government something to think about tomorrow as free fall has taken place and the only thing stopping them is the collision of nonexistance. BKIR now in the 30s ALBK 70s.

[lbo] 19/1/2009 11:46

minho are you trying to convince us or yourself! LOL

PS Does anyone honestly believe that the Irish public is going to pay current shareholders 1 cent when the liabilities and cost to the Irish public of bailing this dog out won't be known for years!


Five more resignations from Anglo board