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| Share Name | Share Symbol | Market | Type | Share ISIN | Share Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Plus Mkts. | LSE:PMK | London | Ordinary Share | GB0032654641 | ORD 0.01P |
| Price Change | % Change | Share Price | Shares Traded | Last Trade
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.00 | 0.00% | 0.19 | 0.00 | 01:00:00 |
| Bid Price | Offer Price | High Price | Low Price | Open Price | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Industry Sector | Turnover | Profit | EPS - Basic | PE Ratio | Market Cap |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| - |
| Last Trade Time | Trade Type | Trade Size | Trade Price | Currency |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| - | O | 0 | 0.19 | GBX |
Plus Markets Group (PMK) Share Charts1 Year Plus Markets Group Chart |
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1 Month Plus Markets Group Chart |
Intraday Plus Markets Group Chart |
| Date | Time | Title | Posts |
|---|---|---|---|
| 27/8/2015 | 10:08 | Negative to Positive at PLUS? Recovery underway? | 4,874 |
| 26/10/2012 | 16:00 | pmk | - |
| 14/5/2012 | 10:29 | Plus Markets. The Sensible Board (moderated) | 486 |
| 09/2/2011 | 13:41 | Plus Markets...PMK....Making progress in 2007 | 2,446 |
| 30/1/2011 | 22:16 | tipped today in trendwatch | 3 |
| Trade Time | Trade Price | Trade Size | Trade Value | Trade Type |
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| Top Posts |
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Posted at 05/3/2014 14:38 by harry f Agree that one Lenigas share is enough.I didn't flag it as an investment opportunity but more regarding their current legal action against MOG which is currently being heard in the high court. I've only recently picked up on the story, and bobobob5 gives good updates on the LGO board, well worth a read for anybody imo. I don't know the story in detail so apologies in advance for any unintended inaccuracies but I briefly see it like this: LGO had a JV minority interest with MOG. MOG talked it down, referring to it specifically as a liability. LGO trusted them on this view. Behind the scenes MOG had Genel lurking who apparently are much larger and wanted to take the LGO and MOG stakes. MOG then pushed LGO for a sale and managed to acquire it for 1 USD plus liabilities, LGO agreed. It appears Genel had already made their interest known but it appears MOG withheld this information from LGO so shortly after LGO sold they flipped their stake plus the rest for a much larger value, apparently which implied the LGO stake was effectively worth around 10 million USD. MOG's point of view appears to be withholding what LGO see as price sensitive information wasn't material. Clearly it is. I cannot see any reason why LGO would sell at the price they did if they had view of complete information. Now why I've flagged it is for a couple of reasons. 1) There are some obvious analogies to PMK. 2) Imo it gives some indication of the tolerance/ materiality threshold for retrospective action. In comparison to PMK the situation appears more "binary" (or less complex), occurs over a shorter timescale, and involves a smaller amount. Imo certainly food for thought. |
Posted at 05/3/2014 13:38 by pjw1956 No harry, one Lenigas share is enough. Into tech stocks at the moment.Here, I am more interested in what Spencer Wilson is up to in the energy sector. Markab energy, site down at the moment Markab Energy Services PO Box 39553 Kuwait City, 73056 State of Kuwait - Press 20 Athabasca Resources (looking to list) Spencer Wilson Non-Executive Director Phoenician Corporation IV |
Posted at 09/5/2013 09:08 by harry f OTI kinda hope not really. On those terms anyway. I think for SOLO shareholders it looks a good deal, the market doesn't seem to see it that way because they'll see Lenigas' name with dilution but in context it looks good to me. 60mill extra shares issued at the current share price on the back of the existing 4billion shares in issue is minimal dilution. If that was us funding to the same levels with a placing price of 0.2 it would mean 150million extra shares to raise £300k, not something personally that i'd want and I don't think you would too. Imo for PLMO shareholders your "Buy 1 BP share" is the best option I can think of at the current time. |
Posted at 02/5/2013 17:25 by harry f It was the weather for a nice walk, got a bit stuck inside recently and had a big hangover to walk off. I think if I saw anything in my skim read of the accounts that stood out I'd have looked in more detail. like I said I'll have a better look at some stage.I don't believe it's a horror story by any means, far from it. Just a matter of spending more money than I personally had anticipated. However how the market interpreted this I believe was all wrong. Maybe recent posting focus (and I'm guilty of this too!) of stating what the residual cash position is makes investors think this is highly relevant and in some way the share price is wholly proportional to this. In actual fact I believe cash is more of a "comfort buffer" worst case scenario. Now we could say cash reported today is 20%-30% below market expectations so the share price falls correspondingly, at first it appears correct. But then look at other shells, for example 3DR, now AfriAg. Last week they reported £172k cash balance at 31/12, yet their valued at mid price at £2.25m. We report £772k cash balance at 31/12 a week later and our valuation at mid price today is approx. £1.04m. So we're still somewhere around 10 times undervalued on a cash basis vs AfriAg ..... we have more than 4 times the cash yet under half the market cap. It's still all wrong. Just think.... had AfriAg reported double the cash they did would the share price be double what it is? I think not. It's not dependent upon cash, but in our case the market acted as though it was. I just hold myself, I haven't sold any at all yet on the rises, no need to. I bought heavily at the right price and just hold. If it goes up and down in between real news I don't care. As you can tell though I don't have time for fools, the clown the other day should have just turned up at 9am saying he was in deramp mode rather than wasting a day. I agree with your #4774 rationale but not sure the final results is the place for such things. However I did think there was a material piece of information that should have been included, as it hasn't been (caveat - as I have said I've only skim read the accounts at this stage) then I trust the directors are working in our best interests by not disclosing this at the current time. Small chance I know but I'd love to see a nice juicy late/ early RNS here just to blow all todays sellers out of the water. It would be great timing. |
Posted at 21/3/2013 08:15 by harry f risk1I don't really know when I'm expecting news, all I know is a day we don't get any is a day closer to getting some. From my side and the rest of the long term shareholders on here nobody seems that bothered, the only poster who appears anxious to hear news is of course somebody who claims to have a negligible holding and claims to have written it off. There is no pressure though, it's not like the share price would be adversely affected in any great magnitude. Comparisons are made between this and 3DR, another shell whch has I think 40% of the assets we have yet is valued over twice our market cap, i.e. at least 5 times overvalued. Whatever happens these guys I think will do the right thing, done a good job so far at what appears eliminating costs. If they don't worst case is our money back, as you know, still well covered at the current share price That said I do have a timeline analogy which I could share with you if you want? |
Posted at 20/3/2013 06:07 by pjw1956 Morning harry & Old Thumper, I wonder who the Senior Independent Director and the Company's representatives were at this meetingJanuary 2012 Offer of Funding: "During the third week of December 2011, the Company's CEO and Senior Independent Director met with the Amara board in London. At this meeting, the Company's representatives stated that the Company was in serious need of financing and that an amount of £2 million was required. On that basis, an offer of underwritten funding was prepared for discussion and sent to the Company via our advisors Markab Capital on 3 January 2012. The term sheet was explicit in that such financing was "in conjunction with Amara Dhari Investments Limited." and who were the advisers here? "when it became apparent to the Company that the other major shareholders did not wish to participate in such fundraising and that we were the only shareholders offering financing (with a condition of management change), discussions were promptly terminated. Astonishingly, the Company paid their advisers a fee relating to these aborted discussions!" -------------------- -------------------- This is worth reading for any new investors Dear Sirs, Plus Markets Group Plc (the "Company") As one of the Company's largest shareholders, without whose funding the Company may have already ceased to exist, we are extremely disappointed at the contents of the announcement made on 8 June 2012, which we believe is inaccurate, and is a distraction from the very serious matters to be voted on by shareholders at the upcoming General Meeting and Annual General Meeting. We do however, consider it necessary to address and respond to the points specifically referencing Amara in the aforementioned announcement. Strategy and Formal Sale Process: The assertion made by the Company that we agreed with the sale and overall strategy of the Company, as stated in the announcement, is inaccurate. By way of background, the rationale for our investment in the Company in 2009, was on the basis that the Company's strategy would be to focus on the stock exchange ("SX") and to enhance its business by using the SX as a platform to promote tie-ups with other exchanges worldwide and to facilitate dual listings. To this end, given our substantial connections in the Middle East, we offered to provide the Company with regional offices, fund business development and marketing in the region, and provide bilingual personnel - all for the nominal sum of £1 per annum. Following a substantive change of management at Plus, this generous offer was rejected by the Company. Our investment agreement contains specific obligations of the Company to open an office in the Middle East, to facilitate such a strategy. We were also in discussions with several established stock exchanges located in high growth regions of the world, who were attracted to the idea of promoting dual-listings in London in conjunction with Plus. We brought this to the attention of Plus management, yet nothing was pursued. As we expressed directly to the management of the Company, and later publicly in the press, we did not believe the strategy of pursing a Derivatives Exchange would bear fruit for Plus investors. We have been proved right. With respect to our opposition to the proposed sale, our written correspondence to the Company's board and its advisors on 31 January 2012 (only several days before the Formal Sales Process was announced), could not have been more clear. We have included the text for clarity: "....As we have expressed to both management and your advisors, as significant shareholders, we oppose any attempt to sell the business in whole or part (with the exception of a minority stake in either TS or DX), and will be very vigorous in opposing any such deal, if presented..." We did not believe, as stated, that a sale of the Company, or its main asset, in whole or part, would generate adequate returns for shareholders. Offers to Finance: Following our initial investment, we made it apparent to the board in both verbal and written communication that we were willing and able to provide further financing should it be required. In fact, we made specific provision for future fundraisings within the Amara corporate structure. We also wish to make the point that our initial financing was completed without the incurrence of exorbitant advisors fees in contrast to those fees which have been incurred by the Company more recently and in particular, in relation to the current proposed transaction. Please also note that at the time of our initial investment, our directors and shareholders went through the full FSA regulatory process without complication. Summer 2011 Offer of Funding: We were approached by the Company's advisors in the summer of 2011, with a view to providing additional financing to the Company via either an underwritten private placement or an underwritten rights issue, whereby the underwriter(s) would cover any shortfall if other shareholders did not take up their entitlement. We expressed our willingness to provide finance, however, explained that any such financing was conditional on a change of management of the Company as we did not believe that such management had the capability to take the Company forward and make it a success. When it became apparent to the Company that the other major shareholders did not wish to participate in such fundraising and that we were the only shareholders offering financing (with a condition of management change), discussions were promptly terminated. Astonishingly, the Company paid their advisers a fee relating to these aborted discussions! Amara's shareholders, who were willing to participate in such further funding of Plus, include some of the most prominent and wealthiest names in the Middle East. There is not, nor was there ever, an issue with proof of funds either during our most recent discussions with the Company or when we provided the Company with the initial £5 million. We would have welcomed discussions and negotiations with the Company to have reached the point where the amount required by the Company specified, terms agreed and confirmation of funds was required. January 2012 Offer of Funding: During the third week of December 2011, the Company's CEO and Senior Independent Director met with the Amara board in London. At this meeting, the Company's representatives stated that the Company was in serious need of financing and that an amount of £2 million was required. On that basis, an offer of underwritten funding was prepared for discussion and sent to the Company via our advisors Markab Capital on 3 January 2012. The term sheet was explicit in that such financing was "in conjunction with Amara Dhari Investments Limited". On 13 January 2012, we chased the Company as we had heard nothing from them since our term sheet was submitted. We have included the text for clarity: "....I remind the board that our offer is not open indefinitely and we have had no substantive discussions with the Company to advance the financing since our offer has been tabled, despite the Company's critical funding requirements....." On 20 January 2012, the Company finally responded in writing, suggesting a telephone call to discuss the matter further, stating inter alia, that their initial assessment of the capital requirements had been too low and that the pricing of our private placement offer was not high enough. The Company, however, did not specify any amounts that it believed it would require, nor did they suggest a price at which financing would be acceptable. Thus, on 24 January 2012, a call was arranged between Amara and members of the Plus executive board and its advisors to discuss our offer of funding. During this call the general principles of a financing were discussed, including changes we believed necessary to ensure the Company's success. During this call management neither suggested a pricing level that it deemed acceptable nor outlined the specific quantum it required. We mutually agreed to continue these discussions the following day, with a telephone call being arranged by management and its advisors. No-one got back to us, so on 31 January 2012, we again chased the Company. We have included the text for clarity: "...It has been almost one week since we last spoke, after having agreed on our call to continue the conversation the next day and begin to more fully discuss the terms of a transaction. We have yet to have a meaningful discussion on terms and have not once had any sort of negotiation, despite our term sheet now being with you for almost a month. For a company that is weeks away from potentially being put in the situation of an orderly wind-down by the regulator due to lack of capital, where all shareholder value will be destroyed, I find it astonishing that management have not engaged in substantive discussions with us. It is quite clear that you have no interest in proceeding with a financing provided by us...." Several days later, having failed to respond to our offer, the Company announced the Formal Sales Process. Continued Offers of Financial Support: On 5 March 2012, in written correspondence to the Company's advisors, upon electing not to participate in the formal sale process, we reiterated our offer of financial support. For clarity we have included the text: "...We remind you and the management that we remain open to financing the Company, as an existing shareholder, through a placing. We would welcome a serious dialogue with the management of the Company to further such a transaction. Further, as we have previously stated, we would be against any non-existing shareholder financing, particularly in light of several offers over the past two years to refinance the Company at much higher prices, which the Company had rejected. After rejecting these offers, we would take a negative view of any attempt to refinance the Company with outside shareholders, given the shares are at or near an all time low, as we believe the result would be a punitive dilution to existing shareholders, who have stuck with the business through this difficult period. We are available at any time to discuss this matter and look forward to working together with the Company. Please bring this position to the attention of the Company's board...." On 9 March 2012, having received no response to the above correspondence, we sent further correspondence to the Company's advisors. For clarity we have included the text: "...It has been one business week since we sent you our invitation to discuss a funding solution for PLUS and we have heard nothing. Given the precarious nature of the Company's financial position and our belief that it is not in the best interest of shareholders for management to sell or refinance the business with outside parties while the share price is near all time lows, we find it disturbing that yourself as advisor and management have not initiated any discussions with us. The fact that management have not held any substantive dialogue with us as long term shareholders to discuss a financing when a firm term sheet was put forward by us in January (was on the table for a month and not once were terms even discussed), and further declined to engage in discussions with us after yet another invitation was put forward to do so, raises serious questions. These concerns arise particularly in light of the Company's desperate need for funding. If management have a solution that they believe will satisfy shareholders and the business concerns of PLUS, it should put them to shareholders for discussion immediately. Absent that, it at the very least indicates uncertainty. Uncertainty creates risk. In case of PLUS, an RIE, risk should be minimised by the directors, acting prudently, by pursuing all avenues available to it to ensure the Company survives. We know management is not doing this, by failing to engage any dialogue with us regarding funding. We cannot believe that other shareholders do not share similar views to ourselves. It is time that the management of the Company listen to its shareholder base. As always, we are available to speak at any time and expect a timely response. Please bring this position to the attention of the Company's board....." The assertion therefore that the Company was "not aware" of an offer of funding from us is untrue, as it is very clear that offers of funding were presented both verbally and in writing to the Company and its advisors. It is also evident that the level of co-operation required from management to assist us in the production of a business plan (as required by the FSA and relating to a change in control should we have provided funding), was not forthcoming. Management As we have stated both privately and publicly, we believe that the actions of this board have directly led to the destruction of shareholder value, witnessed by the substantial decline in the value of our holdings since we have made our investment. Accordingly, we have initiated steps to reconstitute the board, starting with our nominated director Ahmad Al Asfour (given this is a replacement procedure which is less complex than that under the Companies Act 2006). As the Company is aware, we put into motion Al Asfour's replacement on the board in early May, using the procedures under our investment agreement with Plus. The board is now in possession of a legal opinion noting that we, the board of Amara, have the authority to manage the business and have acted pursuant to that authority to remove Al Asfour. Amara's directors, Ahmad Al-Omani and Spencer Wilson, constitute the board of Amara, and have been the sole directors since its investment in Plus. Conclusion We would like to reiterate our view that the management of the Company should be focusing all of its efforts on the substantial task of creating and preserving shareholder value, rather than releasing press statements which are derogatory to the very shareholders who have historically provided much needed financing, without which the Company may not exist today. We are appalled that executive management have agreed to take "enhanced" payouts of £423,000, for selling shareholders' business for £1 and call on management to waive those payouts. Moreover, we consider the expenditure of £960,000 of shareholder funds on professional and advisory fees to sell the business for £1 as incompetent, particularly in light of the fact that the main reason for the forced sale of the business is lack of capital. Very truly yours, Spencer Wilson |
Posted at 30/10/2012 09:27 by harry f pjw. i dont know why you'd describe it as red flag or red mist, normally when somebody "surrenders" it's a white flag?somebody said to me recently that they had to reason to believe "it looks like their home and dry". i disagreed with them and think i was right too. i think people need to appreciate the problem here. some may have a preference for keeping their cards close to their chest and i can to some degree see that but everybody can't sit back expecting somebody else to work it out as if nobody does then it would go uncorrected. the new directors for instance can't give us the full extent of any future plans there may be because this is obviously price sensitive with whats at stake and for any potential involvement the fsa/ sfo may have. we know there will have been a fair few complaints to the latter. i think squirrel makes a great point in #4058 and one which shouldnt be overlooked by any means. at the time as we've seen with #4021 and #4047 in particular when something irregular does occur we more often than not don't appreciate the significance of this at the time. in the early days i sensed something was irregular here with regards trading. i presume some will have heard of trading clubs or whatever where companies hire desks to private investor traders and they sit together in a building while carrying on their own separate business. at first it felt like that, and it did so because of the pattern of trading. what loosely would occur is that the share would be bashed, often "indefatiguably" by a number of id's and this would lead to increased selling and after this there would be a lull. (the share price hit a temporary floor) then what occurred a few times is there would be heavy buying, notable for 2 things. one was it would often be 9.50 - 10am and often it would be in tranches, so there might be 5*250k trades and 5*100k trades for example or perhaps more, all within the space of a few minutes. at say 2p a share, quite a significant amount. with the low liquidity of this stock which we've seen on occasions in the past it doesnt take much to exhaust what the mm's hold. then what would occur is the bashers hold off for a while, and wait for others to buy in at a higher price as the share price has to "spike" to flush out volume. then when the speculation others had seen (and engaged in) due to the rising share price had run it's course (say after a 20-30% rise) the en masse selling would occur following a selling pattern similar to the buying pattern before the bashing starts again. at first this was done relatively "under the radar" but as time went on sometimes they were openly brazen about it. if you look in the right places you can definitely see it. one by product of this however is the following, and perhaps of greater significance. say "the group" bought heavily at 1.75p, the resulting spike meant the share price rose to 2p and new investors bought in at that price. when the inevitable fall came later these new investors would then be sitting on losses and would bail out. in the future for them it was a case of "once bitten, twice shy". what this did over time is reduce share ownership. whereas back in early 2010 there might be 100+ investors this would probably be reduced to somewhere below 50, even maybe 30 by 2012. if you think about it what this does is reduce any scrutiny which may arise in the future. for instance bruce who was sitting on 60million shares and has a lot to cover might only have the same amount of time to cover this as a personal investor holding 1million shares, so one could conclude from a scrutiny aspect there is a big difference between bruce holding 60million and 60 private investors holding one million each. but what i could never work out is how the market surveillance system apparently for fraud detection, which i believe plus had from in 2010 never picked this up. this was a low volume share and there might have been a weeks worth (or more) of normal buying volume within a 5 minute period on a tuesday morning, say followed by a weeks worth of sell volume within a 5 minute period a week/ fortnight later. how did the surveillance system fail to detect this? whilst #4061 is correct in the main, the first line i feel is not. |
Posted at 26/10/2012 14:49 by harry f i'll cover the possible opportunities that the old directors had to raise additional funds....or in their view the lack of opportunity. this is not the main event/ argument imo but needs clarifying, because like many things i can't quite understand how with what occurred and the explanations given how it all fits together.bruce at the agm appeared amazed with the route the directors had pursued. he could not understand why when something was for sale there wasnt adequate cash in the coffers to make it anything other than a firesale with the commensurate reduction in value. as he stated even if we had an extra £1m to cover an additional 6 months losses, or even more in the bank at the commencement of the fsp would have have helped shareholder value a lot. i totally agree. now i think as an experienced investor it was intuitively a correct statement for him to make. to have a business valued operating as going concern vs one which is not (or may cease to be shortly) is profound. the main reason i can think of is a going concern with no immediate rush to sell results in a form of leverage insofar that potential acquirers have to be more realistic in what they offer, the lack of this as we saw often results in what appeared delays/ stalling until things were ultimately acquired at a firesale price. i don't think there's getting away from the fact that an extra £1m (6 months losses), maybe even £500k (3 months losses) in the coffers would have helped out cause a lot at the time. i doubt if anybody could disagree. now the explanation provided by the board at the egm for not pursuing a strategy to raise additional funds was loosely as follows: that notably amari as a major shareholders were already at 18%, and there was a limit imposed via the fsa for ownership thresholds of an individual shareholder to be 20% or below. going back further in time and recollecting events from a year earlier from the agm on 8th june 2011 as mentioned before 2 special resolutions were proposed, one which diluted pre emption rights with no apparent benefit to shareholders the other which would have enabled a 5p RI/ placing. ive pondered the question before were either of these feasible resultions to put to shareholders? anyway history tells us they were "thrown out". post the agm in 2011 the directors would i feel definitely appreciate something, that being with the resolutions being "thrown out" and in the the absence of any alternatives that the market and it's participants in the future would increasingly value the company not as a going concern. it was still a going concern at the time, but clearly without alternative proposals to raise funds the going concern status would become increasingly doubtful. at this stage i feel that urgency was the key because uncertainty over going concern status is akin to a "vicious circle", this is because as time goes on, more cash is burned, increasingly questioning going concern status, this feeds through to a reduction in the share price which then reduces the opportunity to raise more funds at or around the prevailing share price. my feeling of what would have been the best strategy post 2011 agm would have been for the directors asap to liaise with major shareholders, amari in particular to resolve the issue. the directors who's remit is to preserve and enhance shareholder value would obviously need to stress the need for extra funds and the fsa 20% limit. perhaps they could come to some RI agreement that in the event of low takeup that amari would be limited to a max 20% ownership. it does appear as though some dialogue indeed occurred in summer 2011 as it is mentioned in the open letter amara issued in june 2012, but for what appears to be a variety of reasons the talks broke down: in the absence of this occuring then i can't see why proposing a RI quickly was out of the question, and why was this overlooked. the share price on the day of the agm was 2.05p and in the preceding 6/12 months had been approx 1.8-2p average. all of the illustrative examples below are options which at the time, according to my calculations (subject to a minimum %'age of the total subsciption thresholds designated), where amari could apply for their full allocation and still not breach 20% ownership, and still raise £1m (plus or minus £15k) these are: (allocation as decimal of existing shares/ minimum overall takeup required for amari to stay below 20%/ RI price) a) 0.22/ 50%/ 2.35p b) 0.25/ 55%/ 1.88p c) 0.30/ 61%/ 1.4p d) 0.33/ 64%/ 1.23p e) 0.40/ 69%/ 0.94p f) 0.50/ 73%/ 0.70p this may appear confusing so i will expand on one, in fact what i believe is probably the most feasible which is option b), i'll explain why. under this scenario, all existing holders would be eligible for 1 new share for 4 existing shares at 1.88p. now if 55% of this is "taken up" in total across the board with amari subscribing for their full allocation it raises approx £1m and amari stay below 20%, if more than 55% is "taken up" then it raises additional funds in excess of £1m and amari are still below 20%. (if anyone needs workings i'll be happy to provide them) now one may ask, how do you know 55% would subscribe to the RI. that admittedly is indeterminable and perhaps a more suitable example, or should i say tempting option to shareholders is scenario c) where the RI price is at approx a 30% discount to the prevailing share price at the time and only requires 61% takeup. or perhaps d) or e)? i think it all depends on how much an individual believes at that time uncertainty over going concern status was "priced" into the share price. for example if instance if a subscription at 1.88p had in the minds of market participants ensured going concern status when they believed this was uncertain before, it could well have had a profound effect on the share price, perhaps lifting it to 3p-4p? one could go as far as saying even on the day a RI was to be proposed the fact that this would indicate firm steps were being made to address the going concern issue that the share price increase to maybe 3-4p immediately, implying even 1.88p would be well discounted. one may disagree with how much was actaully priced in, but personally my observations are as follows. a number of what appear intelligent and experienced posters on bulletin boards with a negative outlook on the company reiterated the subject (of FSA minimum cash requirements) frequently and often with apparent "indefatigable" effort. obviously "going concern" was near to the forefront of their minds as a reason not to invest, as it must have been with many others. whichever one wishes to think would "fit best" i strongly believe one of a) to e) above was a viable funding option in mid 2011 yet none was never pursued. im not deliberately forgetting close brothers here who at 19.69% were perilously near the 20% threshold. i wouldnt expect them as what appears passive shareholders, who apparently wrote off the investment a long time ago to subscribe to the RI. and then another point is that if amari were strongly opposed to providing any additional funds in the absence of board changes as their open letter suggested then the 20% threshold problem might all but vanish, opening up a far greater array of RI options. in summary therefore, for the funding issue my thoughts are: 1) resolutions were put forward at the 2011 agm to raise cash but "thrown out" because they did not appear in my opinion to be in the interests of existing shareholders. these were a reduction of pre emption rights without apparent reason/ public explanation, and a request for power to allocate shares without a commensurate reduction in nominal value which was approx 250% of the share price at the time. 2) with the precarious nature of continued "going concern" status post the 2011 agm i would have expected a dialogue between major shareholders and the directors to ensure this was addressed asap, as it was critical to business valuation. whilst this took place between amara and the directors, subsequent talks failed. 3) i believe various RI funding proposals/ options (such as those described in a) - e) ) above were viable in mid 2011 and i believe had one been put to shareholders at the time (summer 2011) in an egm would have obtained the acceptance of shareholders while maintaining the 20% limit on the amari investment that the fsa stipulates. 4) in the months post the 2011 agm/ talks breaking down with amari up until the end of 2011 there appears going off publically available information to be no further efforts made to secure funding via any means. 5) an offer for for 80% of dx was made in december 2011. whilst the rns disclosure relating to this mentions a buyer valuation of £1.25m we cannot assume this to be equal to net proceeds because the rns also stipulates that the buyer was also requesting plus contribute significant resources over a transitional period. this offer was deemed unattractive at a strategic level, clive connors employment was terminated and he was replaced by a consultant, and there was stated intent to revisit it's strategy and a commitment to relaunch in the future. £400k of extra funding was provided to dx in january 2012. by september 2012 a relaunch had not occurred and dx was sold for £10k. 6) with going concern uncertainty having a large effect on shareholder value, and with the "perceived" lack of funding availability from any source it would have made sense for the directors to propose to sell the group 6 months earlier, when the cash balance would be approx £1m higher, and the company was still valued (to some extent) as a going concern. when the decision to sell was disclosed, more than anything it resulted in going concern status being removed resulting in a "fire sale", heavily impacting the amount of residual shareholder cash. |
Posted at 23/10/2012 17:07 by old thumper squirrel,On the day the shares are changed to 0.1p shares the traded share price won't change at all. It's just that all share issues must have a basis share price, nothing to do with the actual traded share price. It's just that the legal Bods won't allow companies to sell new shares below that basis price but they can sell them above the price. And because Plus is below 5p (the basis price)in order to sell more we must rebasis them. |
Posted at 17/10/2012 15:49 by squirrel888 OT - good link and good news article. I would never imagine in a million years that pmk share price would ever reach the dizzy heights of 30pence again. However it could easily challenge double figures with the right strategy in place. I'm sure ADI at least want their money back and some........wouldn't you? Afterall deferred shares will be issued at just short of 5p - which won't cause dilution (if that were possible) and would be incentivised - not sure everyone understands that bit of the RNS. Be good to have something out in the open around the first week of November - just as a sort of "Phoenix party" - "dance off" to ICAP's party. Come on - the downtrodden deserve that much - surely? |
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